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This dissertation is a thematic analysis of the single-party years of the Turkish 
Republic. Turkey was a single-party state between 1925 and 1945 which was ruled by 
the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – RPP).  The “eternal chief” 
of the party, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk also served as a strong President accountable to 
none until his death in 1938. From that point on, İsmet İnönü, a close associate and 
long-time Prime Minister of Atatürk held these positions. RPP and its chiefs promoted 
the notion of a strong, secular, modern and independent nation-state, with a 
monolithic, cohesive, national society undivided by classes or diverse senses of 
belongingness. 
This research starts out from the presupposition that the single-party era 
Turkey was an authoritarian regime which shared many similarities with its 
contemporary authoritarian European states. These similarities such as the limitations 
on political and social pluralism, the utilization of personal charisma as a form of 
government, the building of a political religion by sacralisation of the ruling entity, 
and totalitarian traits of the regime will constitute the central themes which the thesis 
is focused on. For the examination of these themes, primary sources from the Prime 
Ministerial Archives were frequently used along a large selection of secondary 
sources. 
The dissertation starts with an introduction which summarizes the main 
arguments of the thesis. This chapter is followed by an historical analysis of the period 
of 1930-1945 and includes a literature review which shows how different historians 
and social scientists dealt with the Turkish authoritarianism. Following chapters do 
focus on the newly-emerged consensus on fascism and Turkish authoritarianism’s 
connection with it, the concept of political religion and Turkish authoritarianism’s 
connection with it, and the clash between the non-modern and modern as the central 
conflict which steered the actions of the Turkish single-party regime. 
This dissertation proposes that the Turkish single-party rule can be strongly 
considered as a candidate to be classified as a semi-fascist regime with totalitarian 
tendencies which aimed for the total transformation of the society by creating a new, 
modern, ‘ideal’ national community through cleansing it from unwanted elements by 
assimilation or exclusion, tried to build a political religion on sacralised entities such 
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as the party and its leaders and positioned the dichotomy between the non-modern, 
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Introduction and the Statement of the Argument 
 
This thesis is a thematic analysis of the single-party years of the Turkish Republic. 
From 1925 to 1945 Turkey was a single-party state which was ruled by the Republican 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – RPP). The founder and the “Eternal Chief”1 
of the party; Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, also served as a strong president accountable to 
none until his death in 1938. He was followed by İsmet İnönü, a close associate and 
long-time Prime Minister to Atatürk who took over these positions until the 
dismantling of the regime between 1946 and 1950. In the single-party era, Republican 
People’s Party and its chiefs promoted the notion of a modern, strong, secular, and 
independent nation-state, with a monolithic, cohesive society undivided by social 
classes, ideological differences and diverse ethnic, linguistic or gender-based 
identities. The main objective of the Republican elite was modernization which was 
defined by Atatürk as the goal of “reaching and surpassing the level of the 
contemporary civilization”.2 
Although the single-party system came into existence in 1923 as a de-facto 
situation, it only became official when the multiple, non-consecutive periods of multi-
party experiences came to a bitter end in 1930. From that point on, the political sphere 
in Turkey was limited to a single ruling party, until this system was dismantled by the 
same party itself after 1945. During the final phases of the Second World War, the 
Republican regime started to embrace a more democratic appearance to gain itself 
universal legitimacy and a place among the emerging Western bloc in the post-war 
world. With the first open, fair and competitive elections which were held in 1950, the 
transition to democracy was complete. From that point on Turkey became a democracy 
although it was and still is, a very brittle and imperfect one, constantly clouded by the 
presence of a powerful military which periodically intervened with the political sphere, 
and suffered from the insufficiency of the civil society participation to the political 
                                                          
1 Atatürk, who was declared the “Eternal Leader” of the party at the Second Party Congress in 1927, 
was acknowledged as the “Eternal Chief” of Turkey after his death. 





decision making procedures which was caused by the constant expansion of the state 
and bureaucracy in expense of personal freedoms. 
This research starts out from the presupposition that the single-party Turkey 
was an authoritarian regime which shared many similarities with its contemporary 
authoritarian European states. These similarities such as the limitations on political 
and social pluralism, the utilization of personal charisma as a form of government, the 
building of a political religion by the sacralisation of the ruling entity, and totalitarian 
traits of the regime will constitute the central themes which the thesis is focused on. 
Upon inspecting documents from the central institutions of the regime such as, the 
Prime Minister’s Office, scanning through newspapers which acted as mere mouth-
pieces for the government and examining non-documental evidences such as the 
language deployed by the ruling elite, Republican art and public monuments, I tried to 
discover the nature of the Turkish single-party experience.  
This research argues that the Republican regime was indisputably authoritarian 
and it disagrees with the prevalent theses on early Republican history which attribute 
a tutelary character to the regime. According to the findings of the research, the 
Republican era was neither a well-planned transitionary phase to democracy, nor an 
unfortunate necessity whose authoritarian attitude was determined by the coercive 
internal and external conditions. The Republican elite’s decision to implement an 
authoritarian regime was born out of ideological and functional concerns.  
Ideologically, the regime was impatient about modernization, due to the 
devastating effects of the losses, disasters and sufferings the Muslim Ottoman 
community went through in the long 19th century. Republicans, like many of their 
fascist and totalitarian contemporaries, believed that they were living through a 
‘special time’, 3  a watershed moment in Turkish history and they needed to act 
drastically, and radically to save the future of the country. Therefore they perceived 
the modernization issue as a life-or-death situation, positioned the dichotomy between 
the non-modern, eastern, Islamicate ‘past’ and modern, western ‘now’ in the core of 
                                                          
3 Many totalitarian regimes and movements felt that they were caught in the midst of a sea change in 
history, a ‘special time’ which followed the Age of Reason and was not restricted by the old-fashioned 
boundaries of humanitarian values, ordinary politics and common sense. This pervasive and almost 
religious idea of a being selected to achieve special deeds, led these movements to take drastic, extreme 
measures to pursue their ideals. For the concept, see Roger Griffin, “The Fascist Quest to Regenerate 
Time.” Matthew Feldman (Ed.), A Fascist Century (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 4. 
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their actions and aimed for a ‘civilizational leap’ from the ‘eastern’ to the ‘universal’ 
or ‘western’ civilization. To achieve this aim, the regime needed a society which can 
be easily controlled.  
Therefore they tried to establish a new, national ‘ideal community’ out of the 
multi-cultural, Islamicate remnants of the late Ottoman society through a total social 
transformation. The society they envisaged was a cohesive, monolithic bloc, without 
any ideological, class-based, gender-bases, internationalist, ethnic, linguistic, tribal, 
regional differences between its members. All policies of the regime were performed 
to reach these twin targets of modernization and creating an ideal, national community. 
To achieve these goals, the regime implemented aggressive, radical and drastic 
policies which brought Republican Turkey closer to the fascist regimes and political 
religions of the inter-war era. 
The temporal scope of this study coincides with the rise of authoritarian 
regimes in Europe which emerged out of a complex range of historical forces. The 
reasons for this phenomenon were the power vacuum in Europe due the collapse of 
order after the First World War, the destruction of the pre-war social order, the 
prevalent psychological need for a strong government, the perceived success of 
Mussolini’s and Hitler’s regimes, the global economic crisis of 1929 and liberalism’s 
inability to deal with the problems related to these issues. All of these problems 
effected the post-Ottoman Turkey as well, which became a fertile ground for the 
Republican ideals of establishing an ideal, national community and a strong, effective 
government. It should be noted that although there are similarities between Republican 
Turkey and its contemporary authoritarian states, Republican regime was not a copy 
of European authoritarianism. Policies associated with the zeitgeist of the inter-war 
era, such as anti-parliamentarism, strong leadership figures, and assimilationist or 
exclusionary policies focusing on building ‘ideal communities’ certainly played a role 
in the development of the Republican regime, but this role was mostly supplementary 
to the internal ideological concerns of the regime. These external conditions did not 
create or shape the Republican policies, but they arguably solidified the authoritarian 
attitudes of the regime during the creation of an ‘ideal’ national community.  
The subjects of the research are mainly the governmental policies towards; the 
creation of a powerful monolithic state authority, the assimilation of various ethnic, 
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religious and linguistic communities into the ‘ideal community’, the exclusion of the 
discontent parts of the population from the political, social and cultural spheres, the 
means of the control and the indoctrination the society according to the new ideology, 
and the creation of a new Turkish society. Throughout the study the ideology and 
policies of the regime will be examined through the lenses of fascism and political 
religions. Fascism, in this study, is defined as an authoritarian, revolutionary, and 
ultra-nationalist movement or regime, whose policies are based on the elimination of 
the internal and external enemies of the nation to revive it, and reclaim its past glories. 
Political religions are defined as totalitarian regimes which aimed to replace all 
religious, political, social and individual identities in the country with an official, 
omnipresent state-ideology which emerges out of a process of “sacralisation” – or 
attributing sacredness to – of secular entities such as the state, the ruling party, its 
ideology and leaders. Throughout this study, these two concepts are used to illuminate 
the Republican policies of modernization and creating a new national community 
which was isolated from the interference of internationalist ideologies and cleansed 
from various forms of political and social discontent. This study argues that to reach 
their first target of modernization, the regime encircled the community using a plethora 
of ideological weapons, such as the education system, cult of personalities of the 
presidents, sacralisation of the ruling party and created an ‘ideological singularity’ in 
the country through the instrumentality of a political religion. To reach their second 
goal of creating an easily controllable national community, the regime attacked all 
sources of plurality in Turkey, and used assimilationist policies to eliminate the 
differences which brought them very close the fascism.  
 
Sources: Their Limitations and How They Influenced the Research 
The entire catalogue of the Republican Archives of the Prime Ministry (Başbakanlık 
Cumhuriyet Arşivleri – BCA) is examined for this research. Specific sections of these 
documents which are heavily used in the dissertation are; documents from the Private 
Secretariat of the Prime Ministry, correspondence sent to Prime Ministry, documents 
of the General Directorate of Documentation Office of the Prime Ministry, 
correspondence between the Prime Ministry and other ministries, decrees of the 
Council of the Ministers, catalogue of Republican People’s Party documents and 
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papers, and records of the Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Public Works, 
and the Ministry of Natural Resources. Other sources which were frequently utilized 
in the research are; the Archives of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the texts 
of the significant legislations implemented by the regime, the minutes of the 
parliamentary discussions, several newspapers of the regime-friendly media, and 
memoirs, public speeches and writings of the Republican ruling-elite. 
Among these, the governmental documents, such as the orders from party 
chiefs and ministers, laws that were implemented by the ruling elite, and the 
publications of the state-sponsored media were examined to penetrate to the psyche of 
the regime. To better comprehend the sizeable impact of the party chiefs on the state 
ideology, the collected speeches and declarations of President Atatürk, the memoirs 
and speeches of his successor İnönü were used. Apart from these names who were 
located at the very top of the ruling elite, the memoirs written by their colleagues – 
especially people from Atatürk’s inner circle –, and other middle to high level officials 
were also examined. Written reports on the debates held in the parliament, Republican 
People’s Party’s party programmes and regulations, records of the party congresses, 
party publishing, statutes, declarations, and reports, constitute other primary sources. 
The research did also benefit from the newspapers and periodicals, especially which 
are published by Republican People’s Party members and acted as mouth‐pieces for 
the regime.4 Among these diverse sources, the archival materials which are collected 
from the Republican Archives of the Prime Ministry do hold a central position in the 
research. 
The catalogue of the Republican Archives of the Prime Ministry is rich in 
quantity and varied in context. These documents range from the security intelligences 
to the reports sent from the Republican People’s Party branches to the party centre. 
They reveal detailed information on how the regime regulated the media, monitored 
the activities of the party branches, and dealt with security questions. Yet, despite the 
                                                          
4 Following the Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925, and more specifically after the implementation of the new 
Press Law of 1931, the media in Turkey was brought under total control of the government. This law 
made political subservience to the regime a condition for all members of the publishing business. In 
1938, further amendments to the Press Law reserved the right of publishing only to the publishers who 
obtained permission from the government or the local authorities. With this article, solely the newspaper 
owners who were partners with the Republican regime managed to survive in the business. For the full 
text of the law, see Resmi Gazete, No. 1867 (June 25, 1931), Law No. 1881, pp. 365-378. For the 
amendments of 1938, see Resmi Gazete, No. 3960 (July 15, 1938), Law No. 3518, pp. 1105-1106. 
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relatively large size and significance of the Archives of the Prime Ministry, these 
archives include only a small part of the original documentation regarding the inner 
workings of the ruling party, because the archives of the Republican People’s Party 
were destroyed during the military coup of 1980 while the party was closed down. 
Today only a small section of the documents from the party archives are available at 
the Archives of the Prime Ministry. Another major archive in Turkey, the military 
archives, are not a part of this research because during the era which is inspected, the 
military was under governmental control and its impact in the political sphere was 
relatively weaker comparing to the other eras of the modern history of Turkey. Due to 
these physical restrictions the archives of the Prime Ministry which contain numerous 
documents on the governmental practices became the centre of this research. 
Therefore the single-party administration of the era and their actions constitute the 
focus of this study. In addition to the material limitations that led the research to focus 
on the governmental practices, there are historical realities supporting this outcome as 
well.  
In single-party era Turkey, the Republican elite who held all the significant 
positions in the political sphere, shared their authority and power only with a rather 
small minority which was consisted of large landowners, industrialists and the military. 
Although these elements established various pressure groups to shape the policies of 
the government which concerned their own respective fields, they never interfered 
with the ideological formation, and the reform programme of the single-party regime 
which single-handedly regulated the social and cultural spheres in Turkey. Therefore, 
although a form of ‘limited pluralism’ was evident in the single-party regime of 
Turkey, the interests of the components forming this pluralism did not clash with the 
total control the regime had over the people of Turkey. Furthermore, throughout the 
single-party era every source of political presence which existed outside of state 
authority was gradually eliminated. Following the demise of the opposition in the 
Parliament between 1920 and 1923, the opposition parties were abolished after 1925 
and independent social organizations were absorbed by the state. Eventually, in 1930s, 
even the relative autonomy of the single-party’s own local branches were perceived 
as a threat to the total state authority and with the party-state merger of 1936, the party 
was dissolved within the state. Starting from this date until 1945, no political presence 
outside the government was permissible for the regime. Unlike the German example, 
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where competing institutions tried to undercut each other constantly to gain more 
power and Hitler’s recognition, in Turkey the regime swallowed the contesting 
institutions as well.5 Therefore, especially in this particular era of Turkish history, the 
state emerged as an almighty force, step-by-step eliminating and swallowing every 
other political and social institution which left ‘nothing outside the state’ in the 
political, social and cultural spheres.6 This reality further justifies the necessity of 
focusing on the state ideology and actions, and therefore the methodological priorities 
of this research. 
 
Organisation of the Study 
The thesis is consisted of four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter is a 
historical analysis of the period of 1930-1945 which provides a summary of how 
different historians dealt with the Turkish authoritarianism. It presents the most 
significant academic perspectives regarding the single-party era. In this chapter the 
secondary literature on the Turkish single-party years is assessed. Therefore, the 
chapter is a combination of a literature review and an elementary narrative of the 
principal historical events of the Turkish single-party era. The chapter also establishes 
                                                          
5  In the German single-party regime there was a constant struggle between various elements of 
governance including Hitler himself, the Nazi Party, “the state, and traditional holders of social, 
economic, political, or cultural power.” Paxton defines this type of authoritarian regimes as 
“polyocracies” and suggests that this phenomenon does come into existence when the authoritarian 
leadership method “cascades down through the social and political pyramid, creating a host of petty 
Führers and Duces.” Similarly, Kershaw points out that in Nazi Germany, Hitler was detached from 
the daily work of government, which led the people working under him to try anticipating his will about 
the issue at hand and to improvise, as if they had to “channel” Hitler. Kershaw describes this process 
as “working towards Hitler.” In time this arbitrary way of decision-making spread throughout the nation 
and paved the way to the deterioration of the moral and humanitarian values and the cessation of 
altruism. Nazi Germany became a country where the only indicator that evaluated an action or decision 
was Hitler’s happiness. In the Turkish example, although a similar sycophancy and arbitrariness of the 
bureaucrats is evident, the party leaders were not detached from the daily workings of the government 
and policy making procedures. For more information on the inter-service rivalry of the German single-
party experience, see Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2004), pp. 
126-127, and Ian Kershaw, Hitler (London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 320-321. 
6 This ever-increasing authority and power of the Republican state is comparable to the Italian example 
and it reminds of Mussolini’s famous quote on the importance of the state in Fascist Italy. In the 
Doctrine of Fascism, published in 1931, Mussolini wrote the following: “To the Fascist, everything is 
found within the state and nothing can or may be found outside the state.” See Jens Petersen, “The 
History of the Concept of Totalitarianism in Italy.” Hans Meier (Ed.), Totalitarianism and Political 




the authoritarian nature of the regime which is further explained in the following 
chapters by using three different lenses: fascism, political religions and modernization. 
 The second chapter is dedicated to fascism which is the first heuristic lens that 
is used in this study to assess the Turkish authoritarianism. The first part of the chapter 
is deliberately theoretical and it constitutes of a brief summary of the historiography 
of fascism. The second part is dedicated to the evaluation of the Turkish 
authoritarianism by comparing its policies and deeds with the characteristics of 
fascism. In this chapter, from among its numerous definitions, Roger Griffin’s 
definition of fascism which has become widely accepted in the field since its inception 
in the early 1990s, is utilized. Griffin’s definition puts special emphasis on the 
revolutionary nature and ultra-nationalist ideology of fascism, therefore the existence 
of these two aspects of fascism in the Turkish single-party regime is particularly 
questioned in this chapter.7 To determine the policies and actions of the regime, a 
combination of secondary and primary sources is used, while the secondary sources 
constitute the majority. The primary sources are mostly texts of legislations. The main 
objectives of the chapter is to find if there is enough evidence to qualify the single-
party regime as a fascist regime while focusing primarily on its revolutionary and 
nationalist policies. The chapter argues that the single-party regime had fascist 
tendencies; especially in the field of ‘cleansing’ the society from unwanted identities 
to create an ‘ideal community’ without any diversity. 
 The third chapter deals with the concept of political religions and how the 
Turkish single-party regime created a political religion by sacralising secular entities 
such as the ruling party itself, its history and its leaders, mainly Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. Political religions are political systems which emerged during the inter-war 
era and strongly resembled the structure, power, intrusiveness, and pervasiveness of 
the organized religions. Similar to the traditional religions, political religions have 
sacred codes and liturgies. Gentile states that the political religions resemble “new 
churches devoted to propagandizing faith in absolute and unquestionable ideological 
truths, persecuting the unfaithful and worshipping sacralised human entities”. 
According to Gentile, these new secular religions are established through “the 
sacralisation of politics”, a process which he describes as the “merging of the religious 
                                                          
7 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Pinter, 1991), p. 26. 
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and political dimensions” where the regime takes over the features of a religion.8 The 
chapter starts with the historiography of the concept and continues with the 
examination of the single-party years through the lens of political religions. In this 
chapter as well, a combination of secondary and primary sources is used, while the 
primary sources constitute the majority. The primary sources used in this chapter are 
texts of legislations, minutes of parliamentary debates, speeches of the leaders of the 
single-party, and documents located at the Republican Archives of the Prime Ministry. 
The secondary sources are mostly reports and newspaper articles written by the 
members of the regime-friendly media of the Republican regime, and memoirs and 
essays written by important figures of the regime. Along with the written documents, 
public events such as parades, and public celebrations, and the imagery employed by 
the regime such as the public monuments are used as sources in this chapter, as well. 
The main objective of the chapter is to find if there is enough evidence to qualify the 
single-party regime as a political religion while focusing primarily how the regime 
utilized the cult of personalities of its leaders to survive and established sacralised 
entities out of the secular ones to encircle the society completely. Since every political 
religion is designed as simple dichotomies – as almost pseudo-religious, celestial 
fights between the ‘positive force’ which is represented by the regime and ‘decadent’ 
powers – the chapter also aims to find who Turkish authoritarianism’s enemy was. 
The chapter argues that it seems more than reasonable to state that in the single-party 
era Turkey, this pseudo-religious battle was fought between the single-party ideology 
and – not an external or even a material force – the past of the country. Single-party 
Turkey was an entity which was in war with its memories, and it aimed to eradicate 
all remnants of the imperial, multi-national, Islamic past through a series of 
modernizing reforms, which are examined in detail in the following chapter. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the modernization project of the single-party 
regime. This chapter shows how the strictly modernist approach of the Republican 
elite can be interpreted as the paramount motivation and the principal reasoning behind 
the ideological formation, and the key policies of the regime. As an authoritarian state, 
the central conflict which gave the regime a coherent identity was the perceived clash 
between the modernizing power of the Republican regime and the non-modern 
institutions and mind-sets which were, according to the ruling elite, mostly associated 
                                                          
8 Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 45. 
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with Islam, ‘the Orient’, and the culture and traditions emanated from them. Starting 
from 1925, the regime implemented a series of reforms to eradicate these ‘non-modern’ 
values from the society. This chapter examines the characteristics of this series of 
reforms and connects them with the motivations of the Republican political religion. 
The first part of this chapter deals with the concept of modernization, its historical 
background in Turkey, and the modernization attempts on the important social issues 
such as the women rights and education. The latter part of the chapter focuses on the 
destruction the modernization project caused within the society, concentrating mainly 
on one incident; the military campaigns of 1937-1938 in which the Dersim region in 
the Eastern Turkey came to the brink of almost total annihilation. In this chapter as 
well, a combination of secondary and primary sources is used. The majority of these 
sources are primary sources including documents about Dersim which were not 
published before. These documents are composed of security intelligences and the 
reports of civil bureaucrats which were prepared about the Dersim region, and the 
internal correspondences of several government offices dating back to the preparation 
and the implementation periods of the military campaigns targeting Dersim. The main 
objective of the chapter is to show how the modernity project in authoritarian Turkey 
worked, including both its constructive and mostly destructive aspects, and how this 
project was related to the general theme of the thesis, the existence of a Republican 
political religion which aimed for the total transformation of the society. 
The research is not based on case studies. Only the chapter focusing on 
modernization is mostly devoted to the Dersim Massacres. The remaining chapters 
utilize a mixture of smaller events. For instance, in the chapter on political religions, 
a bureaucratic debate on creating an official regulation concerning how the portraits 
of the party chiefs should be hung on the walls of the state offices, is used. In these 
interesting documents which were found in Archives of the Prime Ministry,9 one can 
see that the regime took such a trivial issue so seriously, they even established a 
commission from the highly ranked state officials, including even ministers, to solve 
the conundrum of which portrait goes where. This little incident, maybe overlooked 
by other historians as an insignificant issue, speak volumes of how the state tried to 
build a political religion with precise rituals and symbols. One of the objectives of this 
                                                          
9 BCA: File 242, 30..10.0.0/ 1.8…8. 
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research is to bring these overlooked anecdotes to the light and show how they share 
the same leitmotif regarding the nature of Turkish single-party regime of Turkey.  
In summary this research suggests, that the regime of the early Republican era 
stands out as an overtly nationalist, authoritarian regime which aimed for the total 
transformation of the society through a swift, comprehensive and radical process of 
reforms, established a political religion based on sacralised secular entities such as the 
party and its leaders, and placed the dichotomy between the non-modern, eastern, 
imperial ‘past’ of Turkey and the modern, western, nationalist ‘now’, which was 
represented by the single-party itself, in its core. The Republican regime was not 
transitionary, neither had a guilty conscience about the lack of pluralism within the 
system. Although it was influenced by the zeitgeist of the era, it was born out of 
internal conditions in Turkey. The mind-set of the leaders of the regime were formed 
during the sorrowful days of late-Ottoman era, which made them radical and 
uncompromising while implementing their reform projects. Like shown in the last 
chapter of this study, this unyielding and inflexible loyalty shown by the Republican 
elite to their ideological agenda led to some positive developments in Turkey, 
especially in fields of education and women’s rights but it equally led to destruction, 















The Historical Background 
 
The Establishment of the Single-Party Regime in Turkey 
The single-party regime of Turkey, which lasted in various forms, from 1923 to 1950 
was a product of the events of the late-Ottoman era. Most of the important political 
actors of the Republican era, were already politicized during the Hamidian era which 
lasted from 1878 to 1908. Sultan Abdülhamid II was an authoritarian figure and he 
was severely criticized for betraying the pro-constitutionalist ideals of the bureaucratic 
and the military elites who brought him to power in 1876 with a coup d’état, 
suspending the constitution, and dismissing the Parliament altogether after its 
members criticized the handling of the disastrous Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. 
Although Hamidian regime was authoritarian and religiously conservative, in this era 
the modernization attempts which started in the empire in the late 18th century were 
intensified, especially in the spheres of education, military and transportation.10 In fact, 
Abdülhamid’s enthusiastic reforms concerning the military led to the emergence of a 
new class of young idealist officers who felt a strong attachment to the ideal of “saving 
the fatherland”.11 The need for saving the country from the authoritarian rule of the 
sultan also became widespread among the members of the intelligentsia. Though their 
actions were closely monitored by the regime, these intellectuals still managed to build 
close contacts with Europe and the Turks living in Russia, mainly through their 
members who went to live in self-imposed exile in Europe. In time the paths of these 
idealist military officers and intellectuals converged in the form of the Young Turk 
movement. Most of the prominent names of the Republican ruling elite, including 
Mustafa Kemal, were members of this movement. 
                                                          
10  For more information on Sultan Abdülhamid’s reign, see Benjamin C. Fortna, “The Reign of 
Abdulhamid II.” Reşat Kasaba (Ed.), The Cambridge History of Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), pp. 38-61., and Selim Deringil, “Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: 
the Reign of Abdulhamid II.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 23/3 (1991), pp. 345-
359. 
11 Şerif Mardin, “Yenileşme Dinamiğinin Temelleri ve Atatürk.” Tarık Zafer Tunaya (Ed.) Çağdaş 
Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk (Istanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı, 1983), p. 218. 
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Young Turk (Jön Türkler) was an umbrella term for a movement which had 
members from many different ideological currents ranging from liberals to Turkish 
proto-nationalists who agreed on the lowest common denominator; a regime change 
to oust the sultan, reinstate the constitution, and stop the dissolution of the Empire. In 
time, the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti – CUP), a 
secret society which was established in 1889, became the paramount organization of 
the movement. In 1908, the group organized the Young Turk Revolution which 
ushered the Second Constitutional Era, 12 reinstated the constitution, and replaced 
Abdülhamid’s authoritarian rule with a constitutional monarchy. Organized political 
parties, competitive elections and vibrant parliamentary discussions were also 
products of this era, but similarly to the short-lived experiment of the First 
Constitutional Era, this parliamentary experience had also its problems. Its procedures 
were continuously plagued by coups, upheavals and ongoing wars but the democratic 
experiment still managed to continue, until 1913 when a clique within the Committee 
of Union and Progress consolidated its power after a counter-coup. The elections of 
1914 were contested only by the CUP members and democratic competition came to 
end. From that point on, until the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire 
was ruled by a small clique of Unionists which sided with the German Empire during 
the First World War against the Allied Powers. 
 Following the utter defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war, the 
members of this Unionist clique fell from grace and after the occupation of the capital 
Istanbul by the Allied Powers, most influential members of the Committee, such as 
the members of the ruling triumvirate, Talat, Enver13 and Cemal Pashas departed the 
                                                          
12 For information on the Committee of Union and Progress, The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and 
the Second Constitutional Era, see Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and 
Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve 
İttihat Terakki (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1998 [1980]); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak 
Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük, 1889-1902 (Istanbul: İletişim, 1986); The Young 
Turks in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 
in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 
13 İsmail Enver (1881-1922) who was commonly known as Enver Pasha after becoming a general in 
1914, was one of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress who played an important role in 
the 1908 Revolution. In 1913, along with Mehmed Talat (Pasha) and Ahmed Cemal (Pasha), he became 
one of the members of the triumvirate which ruled the Ottoman Empire until 1918 and served as the 
Minister of War (1914-1918). In this era, his influence on Ottoman politics and social life was so 
significant, some German sources described the Ottoman Empire of this period as “Enverland”. 
Following the Ottoman defeat in the First World War, Enver moved initially to Moscow to seek Soviet 
support to go back to Turkey and become the leader of the nationalist cause. After being refused by the 




Empire with the help of their German allies. Along with Istanbul, other parts of the 
Empire were also invaded by the Allies according to the Treaty of Sevres, which was 
signed on August 10, 1920 and concluded the disastrous First World War for the 
Ottoman Empire. This was an extremely harsh peace treaty. The preparation process 
in which even the most reasonable Turkish pleas were constantly overlooked, the 
aggressiveness of the tone of the agreement, and the scorched-earth mentality of the 
Allies, which aimed to reduce Ottoman Empire to impotency, were identical to the 
attitude shown towards Germany during the preparation of the Treaty of Versailles but 
unlike the latter, the Treaty of Sevres was never ratified due to the success of the 
resistance movement emerged out of Anatolia. Following the defeat, local resistance 
groups, which were known as ‘Defence of Rights Committees’ (Müdafaa-i Hukuk 
Cemiyetleri) were formed all around the Muslim populated areas of the Anatolian 
peninsula. Instead of forming armed resistance units, these organizations tried to 
pursue legal action based on a particular article of the ‘Fourteen Points’ of President 
Wilson, which guaranteed the right of self-rule of the Muslims in the remaining parts 
of the Empire.14 The Treaty of Sevres, especially its harshness and extremely negative 
attitude to the Ottoman Muslim pleas legitimized and intensified the resistance led by 
these committees. In this context, the Greek occupation of Izmir and the French 
occupation of Southern Anatolia can be perceived as significant moments in the 
development of the resistance movement, because they propelled the peaceful 
resistance into an armed action against the opposition forces. In time, these small 
pockets of resistance around Anatolia were merged into a full-fledged nationalist 
rebellion. 
 Another catalyst for the nationalist resistance was the arrival of the high-
ranked Ottoman bureaucrats, politicians and military officers to Anatolia. One of these 
military officers, Mustafa Kemal Pasha,15 arrived to Northern Anatolia in May 1919, 
and due to his stature as a successful military commander with promising leadership 
                                                          
14 Article XII of the ‘Fourteen Points’ stated that “the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire 
should be assured a secure sovereignty…” For the full text of the ‘Fourteen Points’, see Wilson's 
Message to Congress, January 8, 1918; Records of the United States Senate; Record Group 46; Records 
of the United States Senate; National Archives. 
15 Since surnames did not exist in Turkey until 1934, Atatürk used his given name (Mustafa) and middle 
name (Kemal) together with his military rank, Pasha (General). Due to his achievements in the War of 
Independence he was presented with the title of Gazi (War veteran) by the Grand Assembly and used 
this title until the adoption of the Surname Law in 1934, which gave him the surname, “Atatürk” (The 
Father of Turkish people). 
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qualities, his political acumen and his unblemished past owing to his previous 
exclusion from the most upper echelons of the Committee of Union and Progress 
which was associated by the public with the catastrophe of the World War, he managed 
to become the leader of the nationalist movement. In September 1919, various local 
resistance groups were merged into ‘Defence of Rights Group of Anatolia and 
Rumelia’ (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti – A-RMHC), which became 
the central organization responsible of building up the national resistance against the 
occupation in Anatolia. Defence of Rights Group was an umbrella body, where various 
ideologies, beliefs and identities were represented and did unite to reach a common, 
definite goal of ending the foreign occupation and restoring national sovereignty.16 
Most members of the A-RMHC became parliament members after the establishment 
of the Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi) in Ankara on April 23, 1920 
and contributed to the nationalist struggle known as the Turkish War of Independence. 
Mustafa Kemal acted both as the political and the military leader of the nationalist 
forces in this period, as the Speaker of the Parliament and the Head of the Government 
in Ankara, as well as being the Supreme Commander of the nationalist armies.  
  The Republican People’s Party, the single-party that ruled Turkey between 
1923 and 1950 has emerged out of this nationalist movement. From the early days of 
the resistance there was a clash among the nationalists between the supporters of 
Mustafa Kemal and his critics. The criticism derived mainly from personal rifts, 
Kemal’s increasing power at the expense of the parliament and from the continuation 
of several political rivalries from the Second Constitutional Era. In May 1921, Kemal 
established a political group in the Grand National Assembly, from the deputies who 
were loyal to him, which was known as the First Group (Birinci Grup).17 In time, 
members who did not belong this group, started to be known as the Second Group 
(İkinci Grup). The Second Group was made up of parliament members, who, although 
they gave full support to the common cause of the National Assembly, were critical of 
Mustafa Kemal’s actions, mainly his ever increasing power at the expense of the 
                                                          
16 Rustow states the local constituents of the A-RMHC which called themselves "Defence of Rights" 
or "Rejection of Annexation" committees consisted mostly of school teachers, ex-government officials, 
local religious officials, and other small town notables. In many provinces they amounted to a direct 
continuation of the recently dissolved Committee of Union and Progress. See Dankwart A. Rustow, 
“Atatürk as a Founder of State.” Daedalus, Vol. 97, No. 3 (1968), pp. 797. 
17  For more information on the First and Second Groups, see Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te 
Muhalefet: İkinci Grup (Istanbul: İletişim, 1994); and Hakkı Uyar, “Tarihe Nasıl Bakmak? Türk 
Devrimi, İkinci Grup ve Hüseyin Avni Ulaş Örneği.” Toplumsal Tarih, No. 18 (June 1995). 
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National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal’s seizure of the legislative power of the Assembly 
through the instrumentality of the Law on Supreme Military Command 
(Başkomutanlık Yasası), which was accepted in the National Assembly on August 5, 
1921, caused uproar among the members of the Second Group. Mustafa Kemal had 
total control of state affairs after the adoption of this law; he did not just take the 
legislative powers of the assembly but gathered executive power and jurisdiction as 
well, through the Independence Courts.18  
 With this law, which was later extended to the end of the war,19 the authority 
of the Grand National Assembly which started its life as a legislative, and executive 
body was curbed severely. This change led to the intensification of the opposition 
within the parliament. The Second Group started to demand National Assembly’s 
supervision on the decisions of the Independence Courts, the non-extension of Mustafa 
Kemal’s supreme command, and revoking of the death sentences imposed for 
‘opposition to the regime.’ Although later described as reactionaries and conservatives 
from the standpoint of Republican historiography, the members of the group voted 
similarly to the First Group in many significant events, in fact they even approved the 
capitulation of the sultanate on November 1, 1922. Furthermore, the percentage of 
Muslim clerics and Sufi religious leaders in the Second Group was much lower than 
that of the First Group, as well.20 According to some observers the differences between 
the two groups were minimal, almost non-existent except for personal problems. For 
instance, politician and author Suphi Nuri İleri, a contemporary of both groups stated, 
that they did not represent two distinct political poles and the differences between 
them were merely on personal level. İleri suggested that since the majority of the 
members of both groups belonged to the same generation, were educated in the same 
schools, and came from the same small bourgeoisie background, it was impossible for 
                                                          
18  Independence Courts (İstiklâl Mahkemeleri) were special courts founded during the War of 
Independence with extraordinary authority to punish crimes such as high treason, espionage, rebellions 
and desertions. The Courts were accountable to the Parliament, and their decisions were not appealable. 
After the end of the war, the courts were closed but during the early Republican era for three further 
occasions their authority were reinstated. These courts and the reasons for their establishment, or their 
most significant cases are: Istanbul Independence Court which dealt with the “Case of the Journalists” 
(December 1923-February 1924), Eastern Independent Courts which were established to deal with the 
“Sheikh Said Revolt” (March 1925-March 1927), and Ankara Independence Courts which were mostly 
associated with the “Izmir Assassination Attempt” (March 1925-March 1927). For more information 
of the Independence Courts, see Ergün Aybars, İstiklâl Mahkemeleri, 1920-1927 (Izmir: İleri, 1995). 
19 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1981), 
pp. 38-39. 
20 Demirel, Birinci Meclis’de Muhalefet, pp. 144-150. 
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them to produce two entirely distinct political entities. Therefore he concluded that the 
main political struggle of the era was between the supporters and adversaries of 
Mustafa Kemal and the main reason of the animosity derived from personal issues.21  
 Despite the fractions that it created in the political sphere, the Law on Supreme 
Military Command proved to be a success in the military sphere. While Mustafa 
Kemal took the control of the armies of the Grand National Assembly, the war on the 
Eastern front was already over. The armies of Ankara have defeated the newly 
established republic of Armenia and quickly recovered the Eastern territories lost in 
the post-war settlement in December, 1920. On the Western front, the fight was still 
continuing to stop the advance of the invading Greek armies. In early September 1921, 
a month later than the promulgation of the law, the nationalist forces under Mustafa 
Kemal’s direct control managed to stop the Greek Army at the Sakarya River. From 
that point on, the fate of the war was changed and the Greek Army retreated to protect 
their newly acquired possessions, while nationalist forces gained further ground. With 
a decisive final attack in August 1922, the nationalist forces drove out the Greek Army 
out of Anatolia. Following the military victory, the Treaty of Sevres was revised with 
the superseding the Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed on July 24, 1923. From a 
disastrous war experience, the nationalist movement emerged as partially victorious, 
by restoring the lands that had been proposed to be given to Greece, Armenia, and 
parts of southern Anatolia, which was given to France. The new Turkey was 
religiously and culturally more homogenous,22 and had total sovereignty over Turkish 
territory except for the Straits region, which remained under the supervision of an 
international commission. The nationalist movement accomplished most of their goals. 
 These military and diplomatic successes gave Mustafa Kemal a tremendous 
amount of prestige and earned him the respect of the masses. Kemal used this 
opportunity to transform the First Group into a full-fledged political party called 
People’s Party 23  on September 9, 1923. The Second Group members were first 
                                                          
21 Suphi Nuri İleri, “İkinci Grup Meselesi.” Mehmet Kaplan, İnci Enginün, Zeynep Kerman, Necat 
Birinci & Abdullah Uçman (Eds.) Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 
1981), p. 59. 
22 While, in 1906, 20 per cent of the Ottoman population were non-Muslims, in 1927 the ratio dropped 
to a mere 2.5 per cent which means that only 1/8 of the non-Muslims of the pre-war population 
continued to live in Turkey after the war. The rest of it either died in the war, were deported, massacred 
or voluntarily migrated to adjacent countries. See Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey (New York: 
Verso, 1987), pp. 102-104. 
23 On November 10, 1924, the party was renamed as the Republican People’s Party. 
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marginalized and then eliminated from the political sphere after the September 1923 
elections. According to Tunçay, the Second Group members and some former 
associates of the CUP were discouraged from standing or forced not to stand in 
elections and even if they managed to stand, people were pressured to not vote for 
them.24 On October 29, 1923, the establishment of the Turkish Republic was officially 
proclaimed and Mustafa Kemal became the President of the Republic, an office which 
he held until his death in 1938. In this early era of the Republican rule which would 
last until 1925, political pluralism was not entirely forbidden. There was no law 
prohibiting the establishment of opposition parties. This period witnessed to several 
drastic changes in Turkey. Important Islamic institutions such as the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and medreses, traditional schools which gave courses on Islamic 
theology, were closed by the government. After outlawing the medreses, a secular 
union in the field of education was established with issuing the Law on Unification of 
Education. Most importantly, on March 3, 1924, the seat of the caliphate, which had 
continued to exist even after the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate, was abolished. 
The same year also witnessed to the emergence of first formidable opposition group 
challenging Mustafa Kemal’s ruling party. 
 This entity was the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası), which was established in November 17, 1924 and had very reputable 
founding members. Most of them were Mustafa Kemal’s old friends and prominent 
figures of the War of Independence, such as Kâzım Karabekir,25 Refet Bele,26 Ali Fuat 
                                                          
24 Tunçay, Türkiye’de Tek Parti, pp. 48-49.  
25 Kâzım Karabekir (1882-1948) was a general who led the forces of the nationalists in the Eastern 
Front of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1921). Karabekir later served as a Parliament member 
until 1924 when he left Republican People’s Party and became the leader of the Progressive Republican 
Party. After the closure of his party due to allegations of its involvement with an Islamic revivalist 
revolt in 1925 and accusations of his involvement in the assassination attempt on Atatürk’s life in 1926, 
he was excluded from the political sphere. Only after Atatürk’s death he was rehabilitated and became 
a parliament member again in 1938. From 1946 until his death he also served as the Speaker of the 
Parliament. 
26 Refet Bele (1877-1963) was the general who was in charge of the South-Western Front of the Turkish 
War of Independence (1920-1921) and later served as the Minister of Interior (1921) and Minister of 
War (1921-1922) in the nationalist government. Like Karabekir, he was excluded from politics after 
1926 and rehabilitated in 1935 and served as a parliament member until 1950. From 1950 to 1961, he 




Cebesoy,27 Rauf Orbay28 and Adnan Adıvar29 who had reservations regarding the 
ever increasing authority of Kemal and his radical reform agenda. Except Adnan 
Adıvar, all of the remaining names have either signed the document or were consulted 
during the drafting of the Amasya Circular (Amasya Tamimi) in June 1919 which is 
considered as the first written document putting the Turkish War of Independence in 
motion. Therefore their contribution to the war effort was traceable back to the origins 
of the nationalist movement. Furthermore, these figures held important political and 
military offices during the Turkish War of Independence. Therefore the party cadres 
had experience in administration as well as high amount of prestige that could rival 
Mustafa Kemal’s authority. With such important names in its ranks and a party 
programme which included references to political and economic liberalism, 
democracy, a revised and direct election process, decentralization, the establishment 
of local elections, and implementing restrictions on President’s authority30 it was only 
natural that the Progressive Republican Party would become a serious contender for 
power and a fierce rival of Atatürk’s own Republican People’s Party.31  
 The new opposition party also found support in the Grand National Assembly 
and among some sections of the Istanbul press. In total, 28 parliament members left 
the Republican People’s Party and joined to the ranks of the Progressive Republican 
                                                          
27 Ali Fuat Cebesoy (1882-1968) was a military officer, politician and diplomat. Cebesoy was a college 
classmate and close friend of Atatürk. During the Turkish War of Independence he served as the 
Commander of the Western Front (1919-1920) before being sent to Moscow as the head of the crucial 
diplomatic mission which aimed to obtain Soviet support to the nationalist forces in Ankara. As a 
politician he served as Parliament member from 1921 to 1925. Due to his allegiance to the Progressive 
Republican Party he was relegated to political obscurity from 1925 to 1931. He returned to politics in 
1931 and served at the Parliament again until 1948 in the RPP. In 1948 he joined the Democratic Party 
and remained as a Parliament member until the military coup of 1960. 
28 Rauf Orbay (1881-1964) was a decorated naval officer who achieved fame due to his successes in 
the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). He later served as the Minister of Navy in the Ottoman Empire (1918) 
and the Prime Minister of the nationalist movement during the Turkish War of Independence (1922-
1923). After the assassination attempt on Atatürk’s life, refusing that he had any involvement with it, 
Orbay lived in self-exile until his return to Turkey in 1935. After his return Orbay lived under state 
surveillance but he was rehabilitated after Atatürk’s death and became a parliament member again in 
1938.  
29  Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar (1881-1955) was a Turkish politician, author, historian and medical doctor. 
Along with his wife Halide Edip, Dr. Adnan was one of the members of Atatürk’s most inner circle of 
friends during the Turkish War of Independence. He was as a member of the parliament both in the 
Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey (1919-1926). In the early days of the Ankara government he 
served as the Minister of Health (1920-1921) and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament (1921-1923). 
Following the closure of his PRP he went to a self-imposed exile in London and Paris until 1939. In 
1946 he became a parliament member again and served until 1950. 
30 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 75. 
31 For more information on the Progressive Republican Party see Erik-Jan Zürcher, Political Opposition 
in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925 (Leiden: Brill, 1991) and 
Tunçay, Türkiye’de Tek Parti, pp. 104-155. 
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Party. Along with the wind of political liberalism in the air, Mustafa Kemal appointed 
Ali Fethi Okyar, 32 a close friend and a more liberal party member as the Prime 
Minister to replace İsmet İnönü, to slow down the liberal opposition and stop the 
further dissolution of the Republican People’s Party. During this period, the political 
system in Turkey operated similarly to a modern participatory democracy but this 
pluralism lived only for a short while. In March, a revolt that arose in the South-
Eastern Turkey and led by a local leader of the Nakshbandiyya Sufi order33 called 
Sheikh Said shook up the political sphere. The revolt was participated by the masses, 
including the standing militia of the Sheikh himself, managed to wreak havoc in the 
South-eastern country side, and even to threat the large towns and cities. Feeling the 
need for a stronger government to deal with the disorder created by the rebels, Mustafa 
Kemal re-appointed İnönü, a politician with a more conservative approach than Okyar, 
to the Prime Ministry. The new government prepared a new law to quell the revolt 
which is called the Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu). The 
implementation of this law can be read as a watershed moment in Turkish history. 
                                                          
32 Ali Fethi Okyar (1880-1943) was a military officer, politician and diplomat. As one of the closest 
friends of Atatürk he was active in politics of the late Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey. He 
served as a Parliament Member and Minister of Interior during the last days of the Ottoman Empire 
(1917-1918). Okyar joined to the nationalists in Ankara in 1921. In addition of serving as a member of 
the parliament on three separate occasions (from 1921 to 1925, briefly in 1930 and lastly from 1939 to 
1943), Okyar presided over almost every important office of the regime. Throughout his career, he 
served as the Prime Minister (1923 and 1924-1925), Speaker of the Parliament (1923-1924), Minister 
of Defence (1924-1925) and Minister of Justice (1941-1943). As a diplomat Okyar also served as an 
ambassador in Paris and London. 
33 Nakshbandiyya (Nakşibendilik in Turkish) is one of the largest and most influential Sufi orders. 
Founded in the 14th century, the order quickly became the largest one in Central Asia. It started to be 
practised in Anatolia during the late 15th century. Its Khalidiyya (Halidiye in Turkish) branch started to 
be influential in Ottoman Empire during the early 19th century and replaced Kadiriyya as the largest 
Sufi order. According to Algar, by the end of the same century, they had more tekkes in Istanbul than 
any other Sufi order. In 1925, with the ban on Sufi orders Nakshbandiyya was forced to go underground. 
After the transition to the multi-party regime in 1950 multiple branches of the order resurfaced and 
especially after 1970s they regained their prestige due to their links with influential political actors from 
centre-right parties, and far-right movements in Turkey. During the zenith of its influence, it was widely 
reported that among the notable sympathizers of the order, were parliament members, ministers, and 
even prime ministers. Along with Nurculuk and Süleymancılık; two Sufi orders that are indigenous to 
Turkey, Nahshbandiyya is still one of largest religious orders in Turkey. Today at least four important 
Nakshibandi branches exist in Turkey. These are; the community of İskender Paşa (Fatih district, 
Istanbul), the community of Erenköy (Erenköy district, Istanbul), the community of İsmailağa (Fatih 
district, Istanbul) and the community of Menzil (Kahta, Adıyaman). For more information, see Hamid 
Algar, Nakşibendilik (Istanbul: İnsan, 2013); Ruşen Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar 
(Istanbul: Metis, 1990) and Elizabeth Özdalga, “Transformation of Sufi-Based Communities in Modern 
Turkey: The Naksibendis, the Nurcus, and the Gülen Community.” Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem & 




 The single article of the new law stipulated that the government was authorized 
through the instrumentality of executive decrees to prohibit any form of organization, 
agitation, encouragement, attempt, and publication which aimed to create ‘reactionary 
activities’, revolt or disturbance of the social order, peace, tranquillity, security and 
public order of the country.34 When the legislation was brought to the Grand Assembly 
for ratification, the members of the opposition party staged a determined resistance 
against it, on the grounds of that the new law was too broad, and in conflict with the 
basic human rights that were guaranteed by the constitution and gave extreme level of 
authority to the courts and law enforcement. The opposition believed that this law 
could target any source of dissidence, including the opposition party and free press of 
the country and could easily lead to authoritarianism.35 Before long, they proved to be 
right on this matter. 
 Although Sheikh Said Revolt contained both Islamic revivalist and Kurdish 
separatist roots, 36  the government downplayed the nationalist motives, and 
highlighted the Islamic ones. The Islamic roots of the revolt were evident; the leaders 
of the rebellion regularly preached against the modernization attempts of the 
government, especially the recent abolition of the Caliphate, and the closing of the 
Sufi religious orders. Sheikh Said, himself was a leading member of the 
Nakshbandiyya Sufi order. According to Okyar, the Prime Minister of the era, the 
documents found in the possession of the rebels showed that the main objective of the 
rebellion was “reinstating Sharia law”.37 Similarly, in a speech at the Grand Assembly, 
Mustafa Kemal himself defined the events as a reactionary revolt and depicted the 
                                                          
34 For the text of the law, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre II, Cilt 15, p. 145. 
35 For the reactions of the opposition to the Law on the Maintenance of Order, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt 
Ceridesi. Devre II, Cilt 15, pp. 126-158. 
36 Nearly all historians agree that the revolt had Islamic and nationalist agendas. The difference of 
opinions derive from the “amount” of these ideological elements. Olson states that although “both 
elements were involved” in the revolt the nationalist motivations were more important than the religious 
factors. Similarly to Olson, Oran recognizes the importance of religious and traditional actors in the 
revolt but states that the Sheikh Said Revolt was mostly a nationalist one, and defines it as the last 
“traditional” Kurdish nationalist revolt. On the other hand, Van Bruinessen remarks that the revolt was 
“neither a purely religious nor a purely nationalist one” but states that the religious factor may have 
predominated the nationalist element. Similary, according to Mumcu, the revolt was mostly Islamic. 
For these accounts, see Robert W. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said 
Rebellion: 1880-1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), pp. 152-63, Martin Van Bruinessen, 
Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed, 1992), pp. 265-
299, Oran, Türk Dış Politikası, p. 266, and Uğur Mumcu, Kürt - İslam Ayaklanması, 1919-1925 
(Ankara: Tekin Yayinevi, 1992). 
37 Prime Minister Ali Fethi Okyar’s speech as the Grand Assembly, February 25, 19925. See T.B.M.M. 
Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre II, Cilt 14, p. 307. 
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participants as “enemies of the Republic”.38 Furthermore, the regime tried to establish 
a connection between the new opposition party and the Islamic revivalist agendas of 
the rebels. The government, which was targeting the opposition party already since a 
group who had been irritated by the reforms, and former CUP members had joined the 
Progressive Republican Party before the revolts, exploited the fact that new party had 
declared before the events that they would be “respectful of religious beliefs.”39 This 
declaration was considered as evidence of the connection between the reactionary 
revolt and the PRP. In June 1925, the Progressive Republican Party was banned from 
political life without any concrete proof of their relations with reactionary movements. 
 The Law on the Maintenance of Order signified the transition from the multi-
party democracy to dictatorship since it provided the government with the frame to 
impose an authoritarian regime and crush the opposition altogether. The Independence 
Courts, which had been closed after the military victory, were re-activated in Ankara 
and Diyarbakır. Martial law in the eastern region of Turkey lasted until November 
1927. Dissidents from every part of the political spectrum felt the pressure while more 
than 500 people were sentenced to death.40 This was followed by the suppression of 
the free press. Although the 1924 constitution guaranteed the rights of the free press 
and prohibited governmental censorship, 41 by citing the superseding Law for the 
Maintenance of Order, numerous publications from every part of the political 
spectrum were banned by the government. Especially the Istanbul press, which was 
seen by the ruling party as a continuation of the anti-nationalist tendencies of the post-
war Istanbul government was targeted in this purge. Along with the newspapers 
supporting the Progressive Republican Party, socialist and Islamist newspapers which 
previously criticized the government were banned and shut down. The ban on the 
socialist publications ‘Sickle and Hammer’ (Orak–Çekiç) and ‘Enlightenment’ 
(Aydınlık), which supported neither the revolt nor the Progressive Republican Party, 
and even supported the government regarding the Sheikh Said case, constitutes a good 
example of the level of suppression on the media in this era. According to Keyder, in 
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this purge the government censored and banned so many publications that the total 
sale of daily papers, which was 120,000 before the revolt, dropped under 50,000 in 
1926.42 With this purge in the media, only the newspapers that enjoyed organic ties 
with the government and the ruling party manage to continue their existence. The 
multi-party system was able to live only for six months between November 1924 and 
June 1925.  
 Furthermore, the single-party regime continued to target the opposition even 
after the closure of the Progressive Republican Party. The former leaders of the 
disbanded opposition party were put on trial, in June 1926 on the grounds of that they 
had been connected to an assassination attempt in Izmir which had targeted Mustafa 
Kemal. Along with former Progressive Republican Party members, some former CUP 
members were also tried since the government alleged that there was a linear 
continuation between former CUP members who disliked Atatürk, the Second Group 
who opposed him in the parliament and the recently closed Progressive Republican 
Party. War heroes were later released but they remained excluded from the political 
life and some of them, such as Karabekir were put under strict surveillance while other 
such as Orbay and Adıvar who were abroad during the trials decided to not come back 
to Turkey until the normalization of the political sphere.43 Comparing their fate to that 
of some of their fellow party members, one can say they were, in fact, lucky since out 
of the twenty-eight deputies of the Progressive Republican Party, six of them, while 
still serving as members in the parliament were sentenced to death 44  by the 
Independence Courts for their role in the assassination attempt, along with nine other 
people. Additionally, in a separate trial, four former members of the CUP were also 
hanged. In short time, the entire opposition against the single-party regime was 
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decimated. One may reasonably claim that this act of the government was nothing but 
a politically motivated operation of vengeance. Since the trend of modern “show trials” 
in authoritarian states started in the 1930s, the Izmir Assassination trials could be 
described as a forerunner of this trend. 
 By 1927, the entire political sphere was cleansed from elements of pluralism. 
The opposition party was closed, and its members were purged out of the parliament. 
The social sphere as well was devoid of social organizations whether traditional ones, 
such as the Sufi religious orders or class-based organizations such as trade unions 
which could represent different identities of the citizens. The single-party remained as 
the foremost social and political organization in the country. In October 1927, the 
single-party regime was further solidified at the Second Grand Congress of the 
Republican People’s Party. The ideological boundaries of the regime was started to be 
determined in the Congress, and four tenets which were Republicanism, Populism, 
Nationalism and Secularism were included in the party regulations as the main 
principles of the party.45 Also, at the Congress, Mustafa Kemal delivered ‘The Great 
Speech’ (Nutuk), his thirty-nine hour long speech which presented the events from 
1919 to that day from his perspective. Throughout the speech Kemal discussed the 
weaknesses and deficiencies of his contemporary political enemies whom he recently 
silenced after the closing of the Progressive Republican Party and Izmir Assassination 
Trials. Although they participated in the national resistance right from the start of the 
Turkish War of Independence, due to the political rivalry between them and Mustafa 
Kemal, he either downplayed their importance or dismissed their contributions all 
together. Therefore Nutuk settled all of the conflicts of this period in Mustafa Kemal’s 
favour, thus establishing the official historiography for the events between the War of 
Independence and 1927. In the same congress, Mustafa Kemal was declared the 
‘Eternal Leader’ of the Republican People’s Party and with a change of regulations, 
he gained the right to handpick all parliament members by himself, a task that 
previously was a joint responsibility of the party council. 46  From this point on, 
elections which were continued to be held until the end of the single-party regime at 
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regular intervals, became nothing but elaborate confirmation mechanisms of the 
decisions made by the President without taking the interests of the local population 
into consideration. A single-party regime was firmly established by this date, but the 
global economic crisis of 1929 and the problems it created in Turkey would force the 
Republican elite to reconsider this political structure in 1930. 
 
The State-Sponsored Multi-Party Experience of 1930 
During the first phase of the single-party regime, between 1925 and 1930, the regime 
implemented important reforms which aimed for modernizing as fast as possible, and 
at any cost, in every sphere of life, such as the legal system, education, economy and 
industry to generate everlasting change in the traditional social order. These changes 
would have served the ultimate objective of altering both the look and the mind-set of 
the country for good, cutting off the ties with Eastern traditions and culture and firmly 
integrating Turkey into the Western civilization. Therefore the majority of these 
reforms targeted the traditions which were constructed over many centuries. These 
reforms ranged from cosmetic changes such as the abolition of fez, the universal male 
headgear in the Ottoman Empire, to the more substantial ones, such as the abolition of 
the dervish lodges (Tekke) and Sufi religious orders47 (Tarikat) that had represented 
heterodox Islam for centuries. These reforms that targeted to reduce the visibility and 
significance of religion in the social sphere were continued with the reforms of de-
Islamification of the legal sphere. In 1926, the Medjelle, the civil code of the Ottoman 
Empire which was in use since 1869 was replaced with a new civil code which was 
adapted from the Swiss civil code. This reform will be followed by the ratification of 
other legal codes, most importantly, the penal code which was adapted from the 
Italians and a code of commerce modelled after the German and Italian examples. In 
1928, according to the principle of secularism, the expression announcing that the 
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official religion of the country was Islam was removed from the constitution; thus 
Islam ceased to be the state religion. In the same year, “to break Turkey's ties with the 
Islamic East”48 an alphabet reform was implemented and the Arabo-Persian alphabet 
used in Turkey was replaced by a Turkified version of the Latin alphabet. All of these 
reforms led to the alienation of some sections of the society from the ruling elite. These 
sections including the members of the closed Sufi religious orders, and conservatives 
showed a substantial level of resistance to the reforms. Between December of 1925 
and February 1926, at least 57 citizens were sentenced to death by the Independence 
Courts due to the resistance shown to these reforms49 but it seems that the draconian 
measures taken by the government led to the establishment of a social equilibrium 
after 1926. From this date on the opposition against the Republican regime went 
underground and did not come to surface again until the devastating effects of the 
Global Economic Crisis of 1929 came to the shores of Turkey. To better comprehend 
the effects of the crisis we should briefly discuss the economic situation in the post-
World War Turkey.50 
In 1923, at the Economy Congress of Izmir (Izmir Iktisat Kongresi), the regime 
decided to implement a capitalist economy model based on two crucial principals; the 
encouragement of national capitalists to make them richer as quickly as possible and 
the encouragement of foreign investors and capital, especially to make investments 
that would improve the conditions of the national capitalists. The first principal was a 
continuation of the economic policies of the CUP which was aimed to create a 
Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie to replace the influence of the non-Muslim Ottoman 
citizens had in the economic sphere.51 To achieve this objective, the ruling party made 
things easier for the bourgeoning Muslim-Turkish capitalists to accumulate private 
wealth quickly.52 Through facilitation during tender procedures, granting privileges 
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on exporting and importing, customs duty exemption and tax exemptions, and the right 
to collaborate with state monopolies, a group of notables who enjoyed close relations 
with the party became extremely rich during the early Republican era.  
The second objective of the economic model; the encouragement of foreign 
capital, was immensely successful. According to Oran, the early Republican period 
was the most open period for the Turkish economy until the Turkish economy’s 
incorporation to globalism, which occurred at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. 53  One-third of the 210 new joint-stock companies that were established 
between 1920 and 1930 were joint ventures with foreign capital. While achieving these 
twin objectives, the Republican People’s Party became a bureaucratic-economic 
empire. Bureaucrats, party members, deputies who cooperated with the newly 
emerging economic magnates or participated in corporations associated with the 
foreign investment as founders, shareholders and board members made fortunes 
almost overnight. According to Bila, in this period the ruling party had turned into a 
“chamber of commerce.”54 
Most of these party members gathered around İş Bankası, Turkey’s first public 
bank, which was established in 1924. Although the original objective of the bank was 
to compete with foreign banks and the non-Muslim capitalists of Istanbul, it quickly 
became the first modern political pressure group of the Republic which served the 
needs of the national capitalists. Throughout this period this group supported the 
policies of regime regarding the restrictions of the rights of workers, and the 
prohibition of the establishment of trade unions, and other class-based associations.55 
Therefore it is fair to state that despite the economic progress achieved in this era, the 
lion’s share of the profit was shared among the members of a small elite which enjoyed 
close connections with the ruling elite, while the economic situation of the masses did 
not differ from the late-Ottoman era and continued to be in dire straits. Additionally 
to the problems of the distribution of income among the citizens, another economic 
problem was the unsatisfactory level of industrialization. During the first phase of the 
single-party regime Turkey remained to be an agricultural country. Most of its 
population lived in the countryside and small towns. Heavy industry was virtually non-
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existent. The relations between the ruling elite and the peasants were regulated through 
local notables and landowners who remained loyal to the Republican regime in 
exchange of the presentation of their interests in the ruling party, as well as the 
prohibition of the possibility of a land reform.56 Another fact that contributed to the 
impoverishment of the masses was the enormous foreign debts inherited from the 
Ottoman Empire. A sizeable proportion of the budget was reserved for the payment of 
this debt. 
This was the economic situation of the country when it was hit with the tidal 
waves of the Global Economic Crisis of 1929. The Great Depression triggered an 
economic crisis in Turkey, lowering the value of the sole Turkish export; agricultural 
goods. The crisis led to repercussions in other spheres of life. It intensified the 
widespread feelings of alienation of the people to the single-party rule, feelings that 
were derived from the monolithic political system, authoritarian attitudes of the 
regional and local party representatives, clientelism and corruption, and the 
government’s disregard even for basic political rights. The modernizing reforms 
which were constantly clashing with the customs and traditions of the society also 
played a significant part in this alienation. In 1929, Mustafa Kemal took a tour of the 
country and witnessed both the anguish caused by the economic situation and the 
alienation of the masses. He found an elaborate solution to minimise the effects of 
these problems and decided to establish an opposition party whose objectives were to 
act as a buffer zone between the alienated masses and the government, and to be 
instrumental in relaxing the tense political environment by providing a safety valve 
for the growing discontent of the people.  
Mustafa Kemal inspected the party programme himself, transferred the 
parliament members with Liberal tendencies to this new organization and appointed 
one of his closest friends, Ali Fethi Okyar as the head of the party. In July 1930, the 
end product of this process became the Liberal Republican Party, or LRP (Serbest 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası),57 an economically liberal mirror image of the ruling single party. 
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While being completely in peace with the secular ideals of the Republic, the new party 
favoured lower and progressive taxes, the abolition of the state monopolies and the 
increase of foreign capital (i.e., foreign loans and investment). Politically, it demanded 
greater freedom of expression, single-degree elections and greater political 
participation for women.  
In accordance with Mustafa Kemal’s predictions, after the establishment of a 
new party, the tense political atmosphere in the country relaxed, still he made a 
massive mistake in his calculations. Mustafa Kemal and other members of the ruling 
elite predicted that the new party would gain only limited support from the public. 
According to Koçak, the Republican People’s Party leaders were so out of touch with 
the reality, they genuinely believed that the government should get ready to take 
necessary precautions to protect the Liberal Republican Party members from public 
outrage when they would start to criticize the government.58 In reality, the response of 
the people to the new party was exceptional. In two weeks following the establishment 
of the opposition party, 13,000 people applied to join to the Liberals. According to the 
intelligence reports of the ruling party some of these new recruits were regarded as 
reactionaries who favoured “bringing back the old alphabet and wearing of fez, 
restoration of Ottoman dynasty, and reversal of all Kemalist reforms” although the 
leaders of the party continuously tried to prove their commitment to secularism at 
every chance; they even called the party, Liberal Secular Republican Party (Serbest 
Layık Cumhuriyet Fırkası), in their official writings and documents. Furthermore, the 
first article of the party programme guaranteed the party’s devotion to secularism. In 
the whole programme, words such as “religion” and “belief” were not mentioned at 
all. The only statement made by the party concerning religion was the “freedom of 
conscience” which was mentioned as one of the basic principles of the party.59  
Although the artificial opposition party remained loyal to Mustafa Kemal, and 
directed their criticism mainly to the government, the unpredictable success of the 
party in the 1930 local elections must have made Kemal wary of the whole experiment. 
In the local elections of 1930, which would be the last competitive elections in Turkey 
until 1946, Liberal Republican Party came first in 40 of the 502 municipalities 
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including the city of Samsun, only two months after its establishment. Despite the 
oppression and intimidation, the Liberals won 26 percent of the votes in Istanbul, and 
40 percent of the votes in Izmir. After the elections, Okyar claimed that his party had 
won in all constituencies, spoke out about the corruption of the electoral process in the 
assembly, listed the illegal activities occurred in the elections in detail and called for 
repeat elections.60 Fearing that his experiment had gone well beyond its purpose, on 
November 16, 1930, Mustafa Kemal decided to withdraw his support and protection 
from the LRP; a decision which actually was an unofficial death warrant for the party. 
To avoid a clash with Mustafa Kemal, Okyar stepped down and was forced to close 
the Liberal Republican Party, only three months after its foundation. 
During this temporary period of freedom in 1930, several other parties, both 
from the political right and left were founded or attempts were made to establish them, 
but they were either closed down or could not obtain permission to be established from 
the government.61 This trend continued until 1931 but a new opposition party similar 
to the LRP could not be established. Therefore, the Liberal Republican Party 
experiment became the last significant attempt at establishing a multi-party system 
during the single-party regime. After the violent incidents which occurred in Aegean 
town of Menemen on December 24, 1930, when a mob which was led allegedly by 
members of the Nakshbandiyya Sufi order attempted to incite a revolt and killed a 
young lieutenant and two municipal watchmen, the multi-party experience was 
finished for good. The government attempted to reveal the links between the 
perpetuators of these crimes and the Liberal Republican Party, although these attempts 
failed. Eventually, the government rounded up more than 2000 suspects; many of them 
were bystanders or citizens who had not been able to find the courage or means to 
intervene. Among the suspects were some former Progressive Republican Party 
supporters, as well. In total, 29 suspects were sentenced to death. The incidents were 
used by the ruling party to prove Liberals’ link with Islamic reactionism thus 
legitimizing the demise of the opposition party. The Menemen incident was the last 
                                                          
60 For Ali Fethi Okyar’s allegations on the electoral fraud, see See T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre III, 
Cilt 22, pp. 16-76. 
61 For detailed inspection of these political parties, see Tunçay, Türkiye’de Tek Parti, pp. 285-293. 
38 
 
nail in the coffin of the multi-party system; with it, hopes for a competitive democracy 
ended for good.62 
In the Third Grand Party Congress of 1931, the political regime of the Turkish 
Republic was officially announced as a single-party system. It was a crucial landmark 
for the republic because the plans for working in a multi-party system even with a 
meek, manageable opposition were renounced and an official authoritarian model took 
its place. Until the end of the Second World War not a single legal opposition group 
was allowed to participate in the political field. Similarly, the social sphere was cleared 
out of voluntary social organizations. At the same congress, the ideological framework 
of the regime was introduced with the principles called Six Arrows (Altı Ok) which 
were Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Reformism, Nationalism and Statism.63 
This was a crucial moment, because until 1931, Republican elite had never a cohesive 
ideology. What gave impetus to their actions had been an amalgamation of attitudes 
and opinions. Therefore, instead of an ideology, the Republican doxa had always 
remained as an elastic, flexible notion. In May 1931, for the first time, this fusion of 
opinions was collected together in the form of six fundamental and inalterable 
principles, which forged the framework of the Republican ideology and after being 
incorporated into the constitution with the amendment of 1937; the same six principles 
determined the ideological boundaries of the Turkish Republic and denoted the basic 
and unchangeable characteristics of the Turkish state.64 
 
The Single-Party Ideology 
Among the six principles which established the Republican ideology, Reformism 
denotes showing commitment and loyalty to the modernist reform agenda of the 
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Republican regime and protecting the acquisitions of these reforms at all costs. 
Although some contemporary commenters assigned a meaning of “constant change” 
and “the transformation of the society according to the needs of time” to this notion,65 
Republican Reformism strictly limited itself with the modernization agenda of the 
early-Republican era and did not possess a permanently transformative, renovating 
nature. On the contrary, since it commanded the preservation of the Republican 
reforms completed in 1920s and 1930s, Republican Reformism indicated a degree of 
staticity. Another principle, Republicanism, was defined in the party programme as 
the “preservation of the Republic, the only form of state which effectively implements 
the notion of national sovereignty at its fullest extent”66 and was quickly embraced by 
the whole society except for a small minority who were still hoping for an Ottoman 
restoration.  
Nationalism, perhaps the most significant core principle of the regime was 
described in the party programme as “not irredentist nor expansionist, but respectful 
to the other nations” and was used as the main instrument for establishing a national 
identity out of the multi-cultural Ottoman legacy. Republican Nationalism emphasized 
national unity and solidarity, had a mission to civilize and modernize the nation, 
refused class struggle, had only a cultural relation with Turks who remained out of 
boundaries of Turkey after the World War I, and, therefore had no irredentist claims.67 
Republican Nationalism was transformed through the process of nation-building 
before settling into an ethnicist form which utilized Turkification, 68  a form of 
assimilation, as its main instrument. 
Populism principle was an inheritance of the Turkish War of Independence 
whose motto was “sovereignty belongs to the people”. During the early-Republican 
period its meaning started to further include governmental policies geared for the 
improvement of the life standards of the people. Karpat suggested that although a 
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populist attitude was evident in the regime, it never led to the establishment of a social 
state, due to the symbiotic relations between the ruling party and the local notables, 
and the general opposition towards socialist ideas and values. Rather, the populism of 
the Republican elite indicated a classless society, which fits in with the aims of the 
party to establish a unified society and nation. The notion of social equality, which 
was a distinguishing feature of populism, was modified and reduced to the principle 
of equality before law.69 Similarly for Tunçay, Republican Populism was more similar 
to the French revolution’s anti-monarchism and dislike of status differences in the 
society. It disowned social classes and class struggle while approving of cohesion 
between professions. Therefore Republican populism was never expanded as an 
equalising or liberating principle but rather as a part of the nationalist tendencies of 
the Republican regime.70 Zürcher concurringly stated that Populism was in essence 
nothing but anti-socialism since it promoted national solidarity and a classless society, 
and valued the interests of the nation above the interests of a specific class. 
Additionally to Republican Populism’s dislike of class struggle and socialism, 
liberalism was interpreted as being equally harmful to the unity of the nation since it 
would imply the existence of social classes in society, which eventually would lead to 
conflict between classes. Therefore, in summary Republican Populism was the 
rejection of both the atomic individualism of liberalism and the existence of social 
classes.71 This assumption is further verified by the writings of Recep Peker,72 the 
longest-serving Secretary-General of the party which defined the Republican rule as a 
unique political system; a “third way” contrary both to liberalism which exploited the 
“masses of the nation” and socialism.  
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mainly through his “History of the Revolution” lectures, which in book form became compulsory 
reading in university and were transmitted to masses through radio. For more information on Peker, see 
Recep Peker, İnkılâp Dersleri (Ankara: Ulus, 1935). 
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Secularism, was a significant part of the modernization process of the 
Republican regime and can be read as one of the central concepts of the Republican 
identity. For the Republican elite, modernization which they equated with 
Westernization was the only solution to overcome the problems that led to the demise 
of the Ottoman Empire. The only way for Turkey to continue existing was 
modernizing as fast as possible and the most significant obstacles hindering this 
process were the values and traditions emanated from the past, specifically the 
Islamicate, “eastern” past. Therefore, the Republican reform agenda could easily be 
summarized as modernizing as fast as possible, and at any cost, in every sphere of life, 
such as the legal system, education, economy and industry to generate everlasting 
change in the traditional social order. These changes would have served the ultimate 
objective of altering both the look and the mind-set of the country for good, cutting 
off the ties with Eastern traditions and culture and firmly integrating Turkey into the 
Western civilization. Secularism was a key component of this policy. 
Additionally, Secularism was quite useful because it was repeatedly utilised in 
the defence of the regime whenever a real or imaginary threat arose. It became one of 
the justifications of the single-party rule and for the restrictions imposed on the 
opposition, which were mostly defined to be religious or from Islamic origin and 
Islamic revivalist intent. After all, the existence of the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) through which the state sponsored the official version of 
Islam, financed it, and regulated its services through the building and management of 
mosques, and the training of religious personnel shows that the party never approached 
this issue just as a matter of conscience or as the separation of the religious and 
political affairs.73 The shaping of a new, modern, progressive version of Islam that 
would be cleansed of ‘superstitions’ and protected from the misuse of the people who 
had been abusing it for personal gain and could co-exist with a westernized state, was 
always a part of Republican agenda. Eventually, this plan became a double-edged 
sword both modernizing the face of the country beyond any previous attempts and 
leading to the alienation and discontent of the masses through the widening of the 
emotional gap between the Turkish society and the secular ruling class. 
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The last main principle of the party; Statism was the most discussed one among 
the party members. It was defined in the party programme of 1931 as “while taking 
individual enterprise as the basis [of the economy], the party wants to actively involve 
the state in those affairs where the higher and general interests of the nation are at play, 
notably in the economic domain, in order to ensure at the soonest the prosperity of the 
nation and the development of the country.”74 This announcement was a reflection of 
the interventionist economic policies which became the norm in the world, subsequent 
to the recent global economic crisis. In this period two rival groups were formed within 
the party, the Statists, who were led by Prime Minister İnönü and Secretary-General 
Peker and favoured statism with all of its economic, politic and social implications 
and the Liberals, who were led by Celâl Bayar.75 Peker, who became the secretary-
general in 1931, was a statist who represented the totalitarian tendencies in the party. 
After the failure of the Liberal Republican Party experiment, he became the driving 
force of the Republican ideology. According to Tunçay he was “determining the 
official party line.”76 Following his appointment the line of separation between the 
state and the party became even blurrier. Peker remained in that position for five years, 
becoming the longest serving bureaucrat in the general-secretary position and without 
a doubt left his mark on the party. From Peker’s standpoint, notions of liberalism and 
freedom were open to misuse, which had brought mankind to the brink of a destructive 
era of anarchy. Freedom of thought and expression had weakened the state. Liberal 
economic politics also “created” the proletariat, as a potential harmful social class. For 
Peker, the liberal state was doomed. It would be replaced by the “nation-state.” His 
world view was disseminated to the public, especially to youth, through the Peoples’ 
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75 Mahmut Celâl Bayar (1883-1986) was one of the most prominent Republican politicians whose 
active political career covered almost 80 years of Turkish politics, stretching from the late-Ottoman era 
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Centre-Right parties of Turkish politics. For more information on Bayar, see his autobiography, Celâl 
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Houses (Halkevleri)77 and his “History of the Revolution” lectures, which in book 
form became compulsory reading in university and were transmitted to the masses 
through radio.  
On the other side of the debate there were Liberals who were critical of the 
over-monitoring of the economic sphere by the state were gathered around İş Bankası. 
Although being a sizeable pressure group, the political influence was restricted on 
protecting the members of the propertied classes from the restrictions on the economic 
liberties which were caused by the over-monitoring of the economy by the state. The 
speaker of this group Bayar was appointed to the Ministry of Economy in 1932, an 
office he continued to hold in 1937. In that time, İş Bankası controlled 38 per cent of 
the general deposit of all of the national banks. Its thirteen board members all were 
members of parliament.78 
Due to influence of the Liberals in the economic sphere, the nature of the 
Statism in Turkey is debated among the scholars. Most scholars and the party 
publishing itself, do not associate Republican statism with socialism and claim that 
the switch to a statist economic model is a product of a combination of international 
and local causes. It is evident, that the international developments, especially the Great 
Depression of 1929, had substantial influence on the transition from liberalism to 
statism as the liberal trend in the world economy was reversed. Right after the Great 
Depression, the Republican elite decided to take a series of measures to ensure the 
regulation of the economy and foreign trade by the state, to prevent the economy from 
the harm inflicted by the self-centred attitudes of the national bourgeoisie and the 
effects of the international economic crisis. Due to the depression, consumption rates 
and the level of income dropped sharply in Turkey. As a natural defence reflex, 
protectionist measures against imports were taken to limit the effects of the depression 
through implementing isolationist policies. People were encouraged to consume 
domestic products, which successfully caused a sharp decline in the amount of imports. 
The supervision of foreign trade and foreign exchange regime was completed in the 
                                                          
77 People’s Houses (Halkevleri) were educational institutions that were directly controlled by the single-
party. They were founded in 1932. According to the party publications, the objective of these 
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period between 1929 and 1931. On August 30, 1930, Prime Minister İnönü declared 
that the party was only “moderately statist” on economic affairs.79 
For most scholars, who took cue from İnönü, statism in Turkey was rather a 
form of liberalism in which the state gave itself the responsibility of the regulation of 
the economy. For instance, Keyder defines Republican Statism as nothing but 
“combining of the forces of the political elite and the developing bourgeoisie for 
accumulating wealth quickly.”80 Similarly, according to Ismail Cem, the Republican 
economic policy was nothing more than “liberal economic policies in the shape of 
Statism.” Cem further states that the main objectives of the statist policies were to 
develop the country through the personal enrichment of individuals and to replace the 
non-Muslim entrepreneurs with Muslim ones. This approach is evident in economic 
rhetoric of the Republican elite, which attributed significant importance to the 
influence of “millionaires” on the development of the country.81 From this point of 
view, all of the acts of statism; the planning, nationalisation of the foreign firms and 
the increase of state investments were performed to make things easier for the Turkish 
private sector.82 
In summary, in Republican statism, the state continued being the hegemonic 
power in economic life as the chief investor, operator and supervisor but private 
enterprises were continued to be encouraged. The end product proved to be successful. 
Turkish industry would never again reach the rates of growth accomplished between 
1930 and 1939. Between these years the average of growth rate was 10.3 percent83 but 
the growth did not contribute to the life standards of the masses because associated 
with the development of industry, capitalistic exploitation increased proportionately. 
In the period of 1934-1938, the real wages of proletariat dropped 25 percent.84 In 1932 
all of the workers of Istanbul were fingerprinted for surveillance. In 1936, the 
conservative Strike Law of 1909 (Tatil-i İşgal Kanunu), which had been accepted after 
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the 1908 strikes by the Ottoman Assembly, was replaced by a new Labour Law, which 
was based on the Industrial Law of Fascist Italy.  
The exploitation of the proletariat was legitimized on a principle of the party 
programme, which came right after the six principles. This principle was Corporatism. 
Corporatism, a third way between capitalism and socialism which free market and 
central planning go together, was a part of the Italian Fascist experiment. In 
corporatism, “business and labour are bound together in an organic unified whole, 
social classes do not conflict with one other but work in harmony for the common 
good and the national interest.” 85  According to the Republican People’s Party 
programme of 1931 the nation was “not composed of different classes but composed 
of people from various professions” which were integrated with each other and were 
complementary parts of a harmonious social organism. Article 14 of the programme 
stated that the cohesion between professions was “one of the essential principles” of 
the party. 86  In the following paragraph these professions were listed as small 
landowners, owners of small enterprises and trades-people, labourers and workers, 
freelancers, and industrialists, businessmen, and large landowners. The party 
promoted social harmony and order between these occupational groups instead of 
class struggle. In accordance with this principle, with the Association Law (Cemiyetler 
Kanunu) of 1938 establishing organizations based on class principals became 
forbidden in Turkey, and class-based freedom of association would be allowed only 
after the end of the single-party rule.87 
The corporatism principle of the Republican elite, speaks volumes on the 
Turkish society envisaged by them. For the Republican People’s Party, ‘the people’ 
was a notion equal to an amalgamation of different layers of society who would work 
together for the priorities set by the regime; the establishment of a national unity and 
the modernisation of the country by following the Western example. Like every other 
sense of belongingness and identities, belonging to a class was forbidden. Therefore 
proletariat movements which were perceived as disruptive to the national harmony 
were perceived as illegitimate for Republicans as every other voluntary political and 
social organizations such as Sufi religious orders, or political parties. According to 
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Kışlalı, one of the prominent supporters of Republican ideology, since “classes in 
modern sense were not present in Turkey” during the Republican era, the government 
tried to prevent their emergence which could cause problems in the future due to the 
possibility of the emergence of social cleavages between these classes.88 This claim 
which completely ignores the existence of the social classes in Turkey in 1930s is a 
telling example of the general attitude of the regime towards the diversity of identity 
within Turkish society. The whole ‘Six Arrows’, additionally to the seventh main 
principle, Corporatism, geared towards establishing a coherent, monolith of a society 
undivided by class-struggle, religious and denominational differences, different 
lifestyle choices, diverse linguistic and ethnic identities, and ideological currents; a 
society which was summarized by the secretary-general Peker as “a national bloc”.89 
After the acceptance of the ‘Six Arrows’ at the Third Grand Party Congress, the rest 
of the 1930s witnessed the implementation of the Republican programme of 
establishing a homogenous, modern, national, ‘ideal community’. 
 
Single-Party Rule of 1930s 
Following the consolidation of power and the establishment of the ideological 
framework of the regime, the single-party started to more aggressively shape the 
political, social and cultural spheres and actively tried to mould a uniform national 
identity for the citizens. After the Grand Party Congress of 1931, the party expanded 
its organisation geographically and recruited large numbers of additional members to 
numerous new branches. It sought to use the party organization “to mobilize and 
educate the population for the internalization of the reforms”. 90 The modernizing 
reforms targeting the visibility of Islam also intensified in this era. Among these 
reforms the most controversial step was taken in 1932. The ezan, or call to prayer 
which traditionally had been in its original language, Arabic, throughout the Islamic 
world was supplanted by a Turkish call to prayer. Similarly to the translation of the 
Quran into Turkish, this change was carried out to modernize Turkish Islam, but it had 
a further agenda, as well. The Turkification of the call to prayer was to contribute to 
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the nationalisation of Islam, and for cutting Turkish Muslims’ ties with rest of the 
Islamicate world. 
The ideological containment of society continued with the merging of every 
independent and semi-independent social and political organisation with the party. 
After 1931 all independent social and cultural organizations were absorbed by the 
Republican People’s Party and the party started to control cultural and intellectual life 
directly. Among these organizations the most important ones were the Turkish 
Women’s Union (Türk Kadınlar Birliği) and Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) which 
further restrained the people’s ability of expressing their identities. Turkish Women’s 
Union had emerged out of the organic feminist movement that existed in Turkey even 
before the establishment of the Turkish Republic following the almost synchronous 
proliferation of the women’s rights movements across the whole Middle East in the 
beginning of the 20th century. 91  Feminists in Turkey, although being modest in 
numbers, became politically active and ideologically conscious enough to try 
establishing a feminist political party in 1923, by the name of the People’s Party of 
Women (Kadınlar Halk Fırkası). The government did not accept this appeal on the 
grounds of that women were not legally allowed to participate in politics but it allowed 
the formation of a civil society organization called Turkish Women’s Union. The 
Union remained active in pursuing political rights for the women and wanted to 
nominate well-known female figures of the era, such as the leader of the union Nezihe 
Muhiddin and famous author Halide Edip, as candidates in the 1925 elections, but this 
proposal was also refused by the ruling party on the same grounds. In 1930s, after the 
call for reforms from the feminist movement and the modernist agenda of the ruling 
party came to a fruitful cooperation, women of Turkey finally gained the right to vote 
and to hold office. 92  Simultaneously with this victory, the Union was forced to 
becoming a state-sponsored association and the feminist movement had lost its radical 
reformist edge. The disintegration of the organic Turkish feminist movement was 
concluded in 1935 when the Turkish Women’s Union was closed by the government 
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on the grounds that it had “completed its task”. Later, at the Fourth Grand Party 
Congress which was held in May 1935, forming feminist social organizations become 
prohibited. 93 
The fate of the Turkish Hearths followed a similar pattern. Turkish Hearths 
had been established in 1912, in the relatively free environment of the Second 
Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire with a modernist, pan-Turkist worldview. 
For years, the Hearths had remained as the main organisation for the conceptualisation 
of Turkish nationalism. During the War of Independence, they had joined the 
nationalist camp. Initially, the Hearths had reflected the concept of a historical-
religious sense of nationhood which was contrary to Atatürk’s own secular version of 
nationhood. After the establishment of the Republic, the official, Republican version 
of nationalism slowly replaced that of the Hearths. In 1927, they were categorised as 
“establishments under government supervision” before being closed down 
permanently in 1931. At that time, they were the largest voluntary organization in 
Turkey with 267 centres and 32.000 registered members. 94  Atatürk justified the 
closing of these institutions as “gathering similar forces together and moving to same 
direction to reach the definite goals”. 95  Along with these state-sponsored 
organizations, other non-governmental organizations such as the Masonic Lodges 
were closed as well on the premise of “being connected to foreign powers or 
interests”.96 Since the formation of class-based associations was already forbidden, 
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one can argue that showing collective loyalty to religion, ethnicity, gender, ideology 
or class was not permitted during this era. 
The authoritarian Republican regime also strictly regulated the press which 
made it impossible for a non-party member publisher to survive in the business. 
According to the Press Law of 1931(Matbuat Kanunu), people who had been 
sentenced for being against the War of Independence, Republic and the reforms 
(Article 12-I), and journalists who had supported the Allied forces during the national 
struggle (Article 12-K) were banned from owning and publishing newspapers and 
periodicals. Publishing pro-sultanate, pro-caliphate, pro-communist and pro-anarchist 
publications was forbidden by Article 40. Another article imposed fines on 
publications which “dealt wrongly with national history,” thus allowing only the 
official version of the recent events to be printed. The government also had the right 
to close any publication permanently according to the Article 50 of the above-
mentioned law if they “published articles against the general policies of the country”.97 
With this vaguely defined term, the publishing of virtually any anti-regime material 
became punishable. In 1938 further amendments to the Press Law restricted the 
publishing of the newspapers and periodicals only to the publishers who had obtained 
permission from the government or the local authorities. 98 With this article, only 
newspaper owners who were part of the Republican ruling elite 99 survived while 
political opposition, especially dissidents who gained notoriety for writing against the 
party politics, were banned indefinitely from publishing. Peker justified the state-
censorship in Turkey with these words: “There is freedom of press in our country, but 
the government had every right to intervene when it sees treason in the press.”100 Of 
course, the definition of treason was extremely broad in early Republican Turkey, and 
the press freedom that Peker mentioned was reduced to propaganda that glorified the 
ideals of the regime and its leaders. 
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The encirclement of the society continued in the fields of education and science. 
The scientific community was ideologically surrounded by the ‘Twin Theses’; Thesis 
of Turkish History (Türk Tarih Tezi) which was proposed by the Turkish Historical 
Society in July 1932, and The Sun-Language Theory (Güneş Dil Teorisi) which was 
prepared by the Linguistic Society in August, 1936. According to Thesis of Turkish 
History, human civilization came to existence in Central Asia, and several millennia 
ago due to a drought in their homeland the Turks of Central Asia had been scattered 
to every corner of the world to create high civilizations. The Sumerians, Hittites, and 
Trojans of Anatolia and Mesopotamia were Turkish in essence. In fact, there was not 
a single civilization or empire that had not been established by proto-Turks. Even the 
Greek, Egyptian, Roman, Hindu, Mayan and Chinese civilizations were Turkish. 
Similarly, the Sun-Language Theory suggested that all languages of the world 
were derived from a basic language of Central Asia.101 According to the Turkish 
Linguistic Society, this language was proto-Turkish, thus all languages in the world 
which originated from this source were variations of Turkish. The methodology used 
by the Society to prove the theory was nothing but goropism and was far away from 
scientific. Even the tiniest phonetic resemblance between a Turkish and foreign word 
was exploited to declare that that foreign language originated from Turkish. For 
instance, it was claimed that the word “diablo” was Turkish because it sounds like an 
obscure Turkish word, devoğlu, which means “son of a giant”. Both of these theories 
were the brainchildren of Mustafa Kemal102 and they immensely contributed to the 
Republican ideology by contributing to the nationalist mythology and by cutting 
Turkey’s ties from the Islamic history and Islamicate culture. 
It was difficult to remain at the academy without supporting these theories. For 
instance prominent historian Zeki Velidi Togan specifically criticized the idea that the 
explanation of the supposed Turkish migration from Central Asia due to drought as 
too simplistic. Despite his measured critique against the thesis and his prominent 
stature in academia, he felt that he would be harassed by others and decided to move 
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to Vienna in 1932.103 Along with the scientific encirclement of the academia, there 
were also political boundaries which shaped the educational sphere. With the 
university reform of August 1933, the Darülfünun, the first modern university of the 
Ottoman Empire was closed, and re-opened as Istanbul University. During this 
transition two-thirds of the teaching staff of the university which were seen by the 
party as ‘unsuitable’ were made redundant. Among these names were academics that 
had acted reservedly during the establishment of the republic, and did not support, 
contribute to or openly criticised the official policies of the ruling party and the newly 
accepted theories on science. For instance, Ismail Hakkı Balatacıoğlu, an academic of 
the Istanbul University and head of the Istanbul branch of Liberal Republican Party 
was made redundant during the reform which suggests that the university reforms had 
political motivations.104  
During this era, new educational institutions were introduced, as well. These 
were People’s Houses (Halkevleri) which were established in 1932 and, in People’s 
Chambers (Halkodalari) which were established in 1939; the educational institutions 
that were directly controlled by the single-party. Houses were opened across the 
country and replaced the Turkish Hearths which were closed in 1931, as the most 
significant “voluntary” social organizations.105 According to the party publications, 
the objective of these institutions was “to keep alive and develop further the movement 
of reform and social progress in the country”. People’s Houses were located at large 
towns. In every People’s House there was a library, a reading room, a conference hall, 
a radio room, and a performance hall, while the People’s Chambers, the smaller 
versions of the People’s Houses, were located at the villages and small towns, and 
were more compact in size and limited in resources. Both of these institutions were 
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providing an elaborate form of supplementary education and adult education for the 
masses by building large libraries, staging plays and concerts, and opening exhibitions. 
With Houses in large towns and Chambers in villages, the masses that fell outside the 
formal education system of the state were asked to internalize the modernizing reforms. 
With the invention of the theses of history and language, the reforms on education, 
and the establishment of new educational institutions, the Republican regime ensured 
ideological uniformity at the field of education. 
After the destruction of the opposition, the closing of the voluntary social 
organizations and the ideological encirclement of the society through the educational 
institutions, the zenith of the single-party rule arrived in the shape of the party-state 
merger of 1936. The foreshocks of this momentous event were evident in the fourth 
party programme of 1935. Article 61 of the programme referred to the need for the 
“establishment of an immovable government authority to protect the legacy of the 
revolution, the security of the citizens, the national order, laws and regulations”.106 
Since at that time there was no apparent threat to the security of the aforementioned 
notions, this article was a messenger of the future policies on further limitations in the 
political and social spheres. After almost a year of preparation, with a circular letter 
issued on June 18, 1936, the party-state merger was announced with these words: “For 
enabling the materialization of the objectives set by the party and for maintaining and 
hastening the expansion of the party, a closer cooperation between the party and the 
government will be secured.”107 With this announcement, the Republican People’s 
Party was merged with the state.  
The merger dictated that the positions held by the party officials would be 
taken over by representatives in the government. For example, the Minister of Interior 
would become the secretary-general of the party. At that time, Atatürk’s right hand 
man, Şükrü Kaya, was filling that position; therefore he became the secretary-general 
as well, replacing Peker, who was removed from his post by Atatürk three days before 
the decision of the merger, after five years of uninterrupted service. Inspector-
Generals108 of the state started to supervise party activities and the party organization 
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as well. Governors who had worked under the control of the Interior Ministry became 
the heads of the local branches of the party. Before the announcement of the merger, 
some of the local branches were electing their chairmen from their constituencies after 
a democratic election process. After the merger their positions were taken over by the 
appointed governors. Furthermore, since most of the local chairmen also acted as head 
of the People House’s in their regions, these positions also were taken by the governors. 
As a result of these changes, the state penetrated every organ of the party.  
Koçak claims that in this merger, the state was the stronger component. It was 
the party which was “swallowed by the state”. Similarly Demirel, used the same 
metaphor to describe the merger.109 This move was the last step in a process that 
gradually eliminated every element of the opposition in the political sphere. The first 
step was to liquefy all opposition inside the party. This was followed by the 
elimination of every single opposition outside the party whether organic, such as 
Progressive Republican Party, or fabricated such Liberal Republican Party, and 
whether right-wing or left-wing. The third step was the absorption of every 
independent organization, such as the Turkish Hearths and the Turkish Women’s 
Union. Eventually even the instruments of the Republican People’s Party were 
perceived as a threat to the total state authority and the party was forced to dissolve 
within the state. For Oran, the merger especially targeted the local notables who ran 
the local branches of the party.110 With the merger the relative autonomy of the party, 
the local branches, chairmen of the local branches and general-secretary were reduced 
to minimum which supports the thesis of that no political presence outside the 
government was permissible for the Republican regime. Since even the local branches 
of the party where at least some sort of political participation was allowed were taken 
over by the state, this setup created all sorts of problems for the state. Even the official 
complaints of the people could not be registered because all offices were controlled 
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by the same officials. This was the nadir of political pluralism in early Republican 
Turkey. To complete the party-state merger, the main principles of the party were 
incorporated into the constitution with the constitutional amendment of 1937. With 
the amendment the second article of the constitution became “The state of Turkey is 
republican, nationalists, populist, statist, secular and revolutionary” and the ideology 
of the Republican ruling elite became the unchangeable ideology of the Turkish 
Republic. From 1937 to 1945, there was nothing except the state in the political, social, 
and cultural spheres in Turkey. Yet, the nature of this state organization is not 
sufficiently studied by the social scientists. 
 
The Historiography of the Early-Republican Era and the Statement of the 
Problematic 
Despite the authoritarianism of the era is apparent, and many aspects of the regime 
make it a unique form of authoritarianism, there are not many studies covering the 
entire single-party experience.111 There are several reasons for it, first of all being the 
popularity of other subjects relating to the history of Turkey. Since 1950s, the 
perceived success of the democratization process in Turkey and the dynamics between 
the military and civil politicians remained as the main issue of debate for the social 
scientists and historians that specialize on Turkish modern history. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, nationalism arrived as the freshly significant topic and working 
on issues such as Turkish nationalism, the creation of a Turkish identity out of the 
ashes of a multinational Ottoman empire and the Kurdish question as its natural 
consequence became new trends in social sciences, but these were replaced quickly 
after 9/11. Will Turkey, a modern country with Islamicate culture, and after 2001, with 
a government with Islamist tendencies, ever be able to find a balance between 
modernity, democracy and Islam, became the new popular subject. Based upon this 
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perception, one can clearly point out, that the single-party years of Turkish Republic, 
were never given enough attention and importance that they rightfully deserve.  
There are only a handful of works that focus on the ideology of single-party 
regime and although being highly valuable they are not without their problems. Mete 
Tunçay’s monumental work on the single-party era only focuses on the formative 
years of the regime and covers the period until 1931; the year of the intensification of 
the authoritarian attitudes of the regime. Similarly, Cemil Koçak’s writings do focus 
on the period between 1938 and 1945 thus they do not examine the reign of Atatürk. 
Çetin Yetkin’s work covers the entire era, but leaves out many significant events, such 
as the massacres of Dersim where more than ten thousand citizens were murdered by 
the state forces in 1938, either due to ideological concerns or to state oppression on 
the academia during the period in which Yetkin’s work was published. Hakkı Uyar’s 
work is another prominent study of the era but it does relate the history of the Turkish 
single-party to other single-party experiences or to the voluminous recent literature on 
authoritarianism, fascism and political religions. Finally, Stefan Plaggenborg’s 
comparative study of the Republican regime, Fascist Italy and Soviet Union is a much 
welcomed and valuable addition to the literature on the Turkish single-party 
experience, since it extensively deals with the totalitarian attitudes of the regime, but 
unfortunately this study suffers from a very limited engagement with the primary 
sources and over-reliance to secondary sources and memoirs. Additionally, although 
the scope of the work is very impressive, similarly to the aforementioned studies, the 
information on Dersim massacres is quite limited. Other historians focused on several 
specific aspects and moments of the single-party years, such as the rights of the 
minorities in the early-Republican era, or the foreign policy of the era, and managed 
to inspect their topics brilliantly but these works do not sufficiently describe the 
underlying leitmotivs of Turkish single-party regime. Therefore it is fair to say that 
this important era of Turkish history is not studied sufficiently by the social scientists. 
 Another problem with the historiography of the era derives from the common 
misapprehensions about the single-party era. The most popular of these is the 
‘democratic intent theory’. For many historians and political scientists writing after 
the transition to democracy, Turkish authoritarianism was a ‘successful’ single-party 
system which was established with ‘democratic intentions’ from the start and fulfilled 
its responsibility and destiny by completing the transition to the multi-party system. 
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In short, the single-party period was a “necessary and temporary period of 
authoritarianism to eventually reach to democracy”. 112  Unlike other authoritarian 
regimes, the Republican ideology managed to survive the Second World War, 
participated in the transformation process of the Turkish political system into 
pluralism and still exists in Turkey in various forms. Due to that difference, its 
subscribers found the chance to revise the contents and even the historical background 
of their ideology. This trend was followed by social scientists who described the 
single-party era as a transitional period to pluralistic democracy. 
The thesis on the democratic intent of the regime started around the closure of 
the Second World War and was promoted by the regime itself. Right after an Allied 
victory was sighted on the horizon, İnönü, who became the leader of Turkey after the 
death of Atatürk in 1938 with the title of National Chief (Milli Şef), and started to use 
a democratic rhetoric after moving away from the German sphere of influence, made 
comments about, maturing the rule of the people, as if the party had been trying to 
prepare the people for a democratic regime all along. The Republican leaders started 
to claim that the authoritarian rule of the single-party was a necessity. For them, 
authoritarianism was not a matter of choice, but it was unavoidable because of the 
“mind-set of the middle-ages” that was still prominent in the country, the republic 
should be protected against reactionary movements, and it was impossible to realize 
crucial reforms in a democratic regime because the cultural level of the country was 
underdeveloped compared to that of the European democracies.113 According to the 
party, once overcoming these problems, the authoritarian rule would be dismantled 
piece-by-piece. If the single-party era is examined, it can be seen that there was always 
a good reason for ‘postponing’ the transition period. For example, according to 
Republican People’s Party sources, in 1925 the multi-party system had been brought 
to an end and the rights of expression and association of the people were prohibited 
due to the Sheikh Said Revolt.  Of course, this method of justification does not clarify 
why a worker in Istanbul was stripped from his basic political rights such as joining 
to a trade union or to a class-based political movement due to a reactionary-nationalist 
revolt which had erupted hundreds of kilometres away. 
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Tarık Zafer Tunaya introduced the term “Tutelage Party” to explain this – 
hypothetical – transitional period. He suggested that in underdeveloped countries, 
“some parties announced that they are temporary, and they are building a bridge to a 
more democratic and modern society.” He added that “in these systems although there 
is no formal restriction in the constitution for the establishment of other parties and 
practising some freedoms, these freedoms could not be enjoyed and parties could not 
be formed.” Tunaya also stated that although “a de-facto single party regime without 
any substantial legal background would be established” this regime is temporary since 
the “tutelage party forms its own end through establishing a democratic system.” For 
Tunaya, the Republican People’s Party was a tutelage party which was established 
with the idea of a multi-party system in mind.114 Similarly, Suna Kili stated that the 
single-party regime did not allow other parties “initially” on the basis of that the 
“Republican People’s Party would represent the whole of the nation”. Furthermore, 
she claimed although being authoritarian in appearance, the single-party system 
favoured a pluralist society and continued to praise the regime for preparing the 
necessary settings for the transformation from an authoritarian society to a pluralist 
one, and eventually, from a single-party system to a multi-party system.115 
Similarly to the aforementioned scholars, Maurice Duverger signified the 
importance of the tutelary character of the Turkish single-party experiment by 
presenting it as a model for other Asian countries. He stated that trying to implement 
a pluralist democracy without a transition period in “traditional countries with 
uneducated masses” only plays into the hands of the educated and wealthy aristocracy, 
thus strengthening their rule and failing to establish a true democracy. On the other 
hand, a prudently executed single-party rule could led the way for the emergence of a 
new ruling class and an independent political elite, thus fulfilling the promise of 
establishing a democracy.116 İsmet Giritli agrees with Duverger and claims that the 
single-party regime of Turkey was neither a dictatorship nor a totalitarian regime 
although it showed “some authoritarian tendencies”. Giritli stated that Mustafa Kemal 
inspected Marxist-Leninist, Fascist and National Socialist doctrines and practices and 
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rejected them all. He concluded that Duverger’s claim on the transitionary nature of 
the regime is the best explanation and refer to the period of 1923-1938 as “preparation 
period for democracy”.117 Similarly, according to Schwartzenberg, the Turkish single-
party is different than other single-party regimes since it had always sided with the 
“western democratic ideals” and used the single-party rule as an instrument to achieve 
it. He stated that the Republican People’s Party was a rare example which acted as a 
political school during the “transition to democracy.”118  
In reality, after the demise of Liberal Republican Party, the ruling-party did 
not even contemplate a transition to democracy and increasingly justified its hold on 
power by pointing to – some real, mostly imaginary – threats to the regime. All reforms 
which weakened authoritarianism and were presented to the public opinion as genuine 
attempts to adopt democracy came to life after 1945, after the utter defeat of 
authoritarianism in Europe during the Second World War, chiefly to establish friendly 
relations with the Allied powers. These reforms included the right to establish trade 
unions and other class based organizations, the abolition of the Settlement Law of 
1934, and the shift towards direct elections. Furthermore, the regime claimed that it 
was the Republican People’s Party which facilitated and led the nation through the 
process of transition to democracy and cited the previous multi-party experiences as 
honest attempts to build a multi-party democracy. For instance, Republican 
publications proudly claimed that the LRP experiment was an undeniable proof of the 
genuine democratic motives of ruling party since the Republican People’s Party “[was] 
the only single-party which adopted a multi-party system in time without being forced 
to do it.”119 This is a bold and rather unfounded statement that whitewashes twenty 
two years of authoritarian government. Forming a regime-friendly opposition to 
relieve the tension in the country and forcing to close it down once the experiment had 
got out of hand does not qualify a regime to be regarded as a democracy; it only makes 
it a rather interesting and peculiar form of authoritarianism. The Republican People’s 
Party misleadingly claimed that both short-lived multi-party experiments had been 
terminated by the government unwillingly due to the ‘reactionary’ threats and gives 
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no explanation about the ban against socialist, liberal and conservative parties. For the 
Republican People’s Party everything except the party line was reactionary somehow; 
they were all potentially harmful, dangerous for the independence and the unity of the 
country. According to İnsel, this approach continues today in Turkey as an inheritance 
from the single-party days. Opponents to the official ideology and state are still 
deemed dangerous and harmful and their political legitimacy is continuously rejected 
by the state.120 
As mentioned above, there was always a ‘good’ reason to postpone the 
transition to participatory democracy. Kışlalı summarizes some of these reasons as 
following: The lack of industrialization and urbanization, widespread poverty, 
inadequate general education, the non-existence of an organized society with different 
bases of power balancing each other to protect the minority from a possible tyranny 
of majority, the lack of a widespread and effective web of  mass communication and 
democratic culture which is based upon tolerance, compromise and the ability and 
maturity to accept seeing rival ideological movements at the helm.  According to 
Kışlalı, without these conditions it was impossible to establish and preserve a 
democratic system. Kışlalı legitimizes the single-party years, by stating that since 
these conditions were not present in 1920s Turkey, the ruling elite needed a period of 
preparation to lay the groundwork for democracy. 121  The reasoning behind this 
assumption is quite feeble. This logic tends to overlook the fact that above-mentioned 
notions such as urbanization, tackling of poverty, establishing different bases of power 
which counterbalance each other or democratic culture based on tolerance are not the 
preconditions but rather the results of a democratic system. It is illogical to assume 
that a democratic culture and the much needed and crucial mind-sets of democracies 
such as the respect shown towards different political opinions, and tolerance and 
maturity to accept to see political opponents at office could foster under an 
authoritarian rule, and to think that dictatorship could lead the way to the establishment 
of political compromise is at best, an oxymoron. Furthermore, Kışlalı and other 
Republicans tend to overlook the parliamentary past of the country, and the brief 
multi-party experience of the Second Constitutional Era, as well. 
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Kışlalı gives an example from a speech of Atatürk which was given on the 
tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Republic and stated that “all requirements 
of a democracy will be installed to the system when occasion arises ... such as the 
establishment of political parties.” 122  Atatürk’s requirements were similar to the 
above-mentioned ones suggested by Kışlalı, but the intention behind this reasoning is 
clear: Atatürk and the other party leaders were well aware that in a fair and square 
electoral process any opposition party had a bigger chance to overthrow them. They 
experienced this at first hand in the local elections of 1930, in which the newly 
established Liberal Republican Party managed to win 40 out of 502 municipalities, 
even in most presumably rigged elections. For the party notables, authoritarian rule 
was necessary to prevent the exploitation of the ‘uneducated’ and ‘unconscious’ 
masses – especially the peasantry – by the opposition. They were not willing or ready 
to handover the power to people they considered malevolent to the future of the 
country and to their hard-fought reforms. 
For the Republican elites, the existence of the Republican People’s Party was 
much more legal, important, rightful and peculiar than other political organizations. 
This self-proclaimed uniqueness of the Republican People’s Party’s nature was 
frequently exploited by the party as a non-sequitur to prove the constant rightfulness 
and legitimacy of their political decisions and actions. Hence the Republican People’s 
Party was the entity that had saved the country and established the republic; 
disagreeing with its policies was not just politically wrong, it was also ethically unjust 
and in conflict with the national interests. From this ideological standpoint, all political 
organizations except the ruling party were harmful for the future of the country being 
either “an obstacle to development, modernization and westernization or a threat 
against the national unity, national interest or raison d’être”, 123  therefore their 
downfall was a patriotic act of the government. 
RPP was always defined by Mustafa Kemal not as a regular political party but 
as an organization unbounded by the limitations of everyday politics. The party was 
the guide that the country expected, 124  unblemished from the banality of daily 
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politics.125 With this approach he made the single-party untouchable as an idealist 
entity which was well above the common politics while at the same time he ridiculed 
the opposition party of the era; the Progressive Republican Party as a crude party 
which dealt with the unnecessary and trivial matters.126 Kemal’s comments on the 
virtues of competitive politics, which are regularly used by the Republicans as a proof, 
of the democratic tendencies of the single-party regime were only uttered during the 
state-sponsored Liberal Republican Party experiment and never repeated after 1931. 
In summary, there is not a single, sound proof of the alleged “democratic intent” 
because after 1931, the regime was based on the monopoly of one supreme leader, a 
single-political party, and an inactive parliament whose members were appointed by 
the leader. In party publications it was made clear that competitive politics was 
harmful for the country and the party was to be remained forever at the helm, educate 
the people politically along the party line whilst excluding them from the political 
sphere until they evolved into a ‘new man’ that totally absorbed the party ideology. 
First references on multi-party democracy were only made after the realization that 
the Allies were on the verge of victory in the Second World War, the totalitarian 
regimes of the west were collapsing and it became clear that without being a member 
of liberal western world Turkey will be isolated completely. 
The second common misapprehension on the single-party years is connected 
to the abovementioned “democratic intent theory”. This point which is used in defence 
of the single-party regime is the presumed “guilty-conscience” of the Republican 
People’s Party officials of the era. This defence is first mentioned by Duverger who 
stated that the Republican regime was not an ideological but rather a pragmatic single-
party regime which opposed the greatest obstacle in front of the modernization; 
religion, and wholeheartedly endeavoured for the Westernization of the society.  
According to Duverger; “The Turkish single-party system never leant on a single-
party doctrine, never gave a legal quality to the political monopoly, and never tried to 
abolish the parliamentary discussions. The Republican People’s Party always felt at 
unease, or even shame due to the political monopoly it held. The party had a guilty 
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conscience and this reality separated it from its contemporary fascist and communist 
models.” 127  Similarly, Kili stated that the zenith of Mustafa Kemal's reform 
programme was the transition to multi-party democracy and because he could not 
achieve this goal in his life time, he felt remorse until the end of his life.128 Although 
the claims on the modernizing power of the Republican People’s Party are correct, 
there is nothing to prove the highly unscientific notion of the ‘guilty conscience’ of 
the Republican elite. The claims about the reluctance of the Republican elite when 
establishing an authoritarian system and the guilt they felt afterwards could only be 
attributed to the wishful thinking on the side of these scholars.  
On the contrary to Duverger and Kili’s claims, throughout the 1930s pluralism 
was belittled as a disruptive force while the state as a notion was constantly glorified 
by the Republican elite. For instance, Secretary-General Peker claimed that 
parliamentary discussions were obstructive to governmental work since they tend to 
“complicate political procedures.” He further remarked that the governments should 
not be held accountable to the parliaments.129 For the ruling elite, state was more 
important than every other political and social institution. According to Arsal it was 
the “most effective and most important institution on the development of the 
civilization.”130 For Başgil, the “political, legal, economic and social spheres of life” 
should be shaped according to “the will of the state.”131 This approach has modern 
repercussions in Turkish political sphere. According to Kıvanç, this constant 
glorification of the state and the reluctance to adopt democratic norms eventually led 
to the prioritisation of the state at the expense of the people. For Kıvanç, for this reason, 
Turkish society is still trying to live in a space that the state considers its own, to an 
extent that is permitted by the state; a fact best summarized by Mahçupyan who stated 
that “politics in Turkey is organized as a domain within the state.” 132  Therefore 
claiming that the regime had a ‘guilty conscience’ due to single-party rule that they 
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have established, distorts the realities. Turkish single-party state was a definite 
authoritarian regime. The political sphere and social life in Turkey were regulated and 
shaped by the state that was dominated by a centralist and hierarchical bureaucratic 
structure with unlimited and unchecked power. For the Turkish authoritarianism, the 
existence of autonomous political, economic, cultural and ideological organizations 
outside of state supervision was intolerable. The single-party rule was not a necessity 
or a burden that the ruling elite had to carry over their shoulders, it was rather the 
choice of the ruling elite to easily implement their modernizing reform agenda and 
continue their rule. 
The third misinterpretation of the single-party regime is the assumption of that 
the existence of the democratic institutions in early-Republican Turkey, such as the 
parliament and the elections, disqualify early-Republican Turkey from being regarded 
as an authoritarian state.133 For the supporters of this theory, single-party Turkey 
should be classified as a democratic or hybrid regime which used some necessary 
authoritarian measures to achieve its crucial goals in modernization. To evaluate this 
idea, one should inspect the genuineness of the democratic institutions utilized by the 
regime. First of all, the parliament and the elections were not established in this era by 
the Republicans. Until the ban on opposition in 1925, Turkey had already enjoyed 11 
years of parliamentarian system in total, during 1908-1913 and 1919-1925. The single-
party government came into existence in the golden days of Turkish parliamentary life, 
but with every passing year the regime moved closer to anti-Parliamentarism. The 
Grand National Assembly during the War of Independence was a much more 
competitive assembly comparing to the later years of the regime. Starting from War 
of Independence, every colour of opposition; the Second Group, the Progressive 
Republican Party, various dissidents and Liberal Republican Party members were all 
driven away from the parliament. 
Even though the existence of the elections was counted by many as a 
democratic tendency of the Turkish single-party regime, elections in authoritarian 
states are not a rarity; even Hitler’s Germany continued to hold elections. According 
to Hague and Harrop, nearly in all authoritarian systems elections have still existed 
though being non-competitive. Only the most extreme dictatorship dispenses with 
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elections altogether.134 Among the types of elections which were held in authoritarian 
states the notion of ‘acclamatory elections’ suits for Turkey. In acclamatory elections 
official candidates are presented to the electorate mainly for ritual endorsement. 
Although single-party regimes following this approach create an illusion about the 
appearance of choice, these are corrupt affairs since the winner is known in advance. 
Even the ballot procedure is biased in this type of elections where votes were cast 
openly but counted secretly. 
The republican electoral system was a continuation of the two-stage election 
system of the late-Ottoman era. In the first stage, electors chose the second stage voters 
from a list which had been prepared by the party. All of the second stage candidates 
were party representatives. The voters who were chosen from among these candidates 
were the ones who would vote in the end for the parliamentary elections. 
Parliamentary candidates were also predetermined by the party. For an ordinary citizen, 
a member of the opposition or an independent local party member it was impossible 
to stand for election on his or her own initiative. There was just one list on the ballots 
for the second stage voter to approve. Although this voting system was merely a 
mechanism to legitimize the regime with a pretend demonstration of pluralism, the 
ruling party left nothing to chance and forced the electors to vote openly and counted 
the votes secretly. Until 1927, the task of finalizing the list of the parliament members 
was left to the joint action of the party council but after that date with a change of 
regulations, Mustafa Kemal started to handpick all of the MPs by himself. 135 
Therefore, in summary the election process was nothing but an elaborate confirmation 
mechanism of the decisions made by the President without taking the interests of the 
local population into consideration. 
Although Duverger claims that the RPP leaders believed that this type of 
election was “not ideal, but a temporary and regrettable, unfortunate necessity,” this 
claim does not represent the truth.136 In reality the party leaders defended the electoral 
system whole-heartedly and attributed their choice of electoral system to the 
incapability of the citizens to make an unaided choices. Peker took a step further and 
claimed that the two-rounded election system was more democratic because with this 
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system people voted in the first stage for people they personally knew contrary to the 
direct, one-stage elections.137 Peker’s claims on the positive aspects of the electoral 
system were repeated in the party programme of 1931. Fourth article of the programme 
proposed that the single-party was planning to switch to single-stage elections in the 
foreseeable future but this announcement was followed with the claim that the two-
stage elections were more democratic considering the unique conditions of the Turkish 
people. The article stated that the Turkish constituents were deprived of the “abilities, 
conditions and instruments” to familiarize themselves with the electoral candidates 
therefore the two-stage system was presented as the more preferable choice and as 
more suitable to the realities of Turkey. It should be noted that this system remained 
in use until the end of the single-party rule which further supports the assumption that 
the Republican rhetoric on this issue was based on justifying the non-democratic 
methods used in the electoral process on the contrary to Duverger’s claims. 
Another misreading of the Single-Party era is considering it as a mere 
continuation of the Young Turk era. According to many historians including Zürcher 
and Hanioğlu, the entire Republican ruling elite were products of the Young Turk 
movement and therefore, their regime can be read as a continuation of the ideology of 
the Committee of the Union and Progress. 138  Zürcher states that the Republican 
People’s Party is a direct descendant of the Young Turk movement and defines the 
period of 1913-50 as an unbroken “Young Turk Era”.139 Considering that the first 
three presidents who ruled Turkey until the military coup of 1960 were previously 
associated with Unionists, Zürcher’s periodization of Turkish history is noteworthy 
and can be used as a useful tool to show the continuities between the late-Ottoman and 
early Republican eras, but the policies and ideologies of Unionists and Republicans 
were not wholly identical. It is clear that both groups incorporated drastic and extreme 
measures in their political methodology to deal with the opposition and unwanted 
elements in the society, but the Republican regime managed to look as a legitimate 
and accountable parliamentary regime – at least on paper – right until the end, while 
the Unionist clique which ruled the county after the elections of 1912 had no 
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reservations of acting as a secret society to carry out their agenda. Unionist regime 
was radical, dangerous in their intentions and reckless in their actions, while the 
Republican regime was a much more sophisticated political entity. There were 
differences on the ideological level, as well. Although both regimes followed similar 
forms of nationalism and scientism, the sheer scope and depth of the Republican 
reforms, and their intense determination when targeting the Islamicate traditions of the 
post-Ottoman society of Anatolia puts the Republican regime in a different category 
than the Unionist one.  
Similarly to Zürcher, Keyder examines the early-Republican era as a 
continuation of the Young Turk period, as well, especially concerning the financial 
policies of both groups. He stated, that the Unionists wanted to create a national 
bourgeoisie to replace the non-Muslim bourgeoisie of the Ottoman Empire and the 
single-party regime took over this project in time. To achieve this goal they needed a 
centralised, planned, statist economy and therefore a strong state structure. Keyder 
concluded that, political authoritarianism was born out of the necessity dictated by 
these Unionist economic policies. It was not ideological but only functional and was 
a mere apparatus of the economic statism. According to Keyder, in Turkey some 
fascistic elements were attached to an authoritarian regime the main objective of which 
was to speed up the process of the accumulation of capital of the Muslims.140 This 
theory, although connections between the Unionists and the Republicans is undeniable, 
can be misleading to comprehend the nature of Turkish authoritarianism since it does 
not sufficiently explain the motives of the reforms made in the political, cultural and 
social spheres. For instance, if the sole concern was continuing the economic policies 
of the Unionists, why the regime closed every social organization in Turkey? It is 
improbable that the Turkish Women’s Union which was abolished in 1935 was a threat 
for the policies of the Republicans. Therefore the theory of that the economical statism 
inherited from the Young Turk era determined the structure of the regime due to a 
spill-over effect is not useful to comprehend the authoritarian tendencies of the single-
party regime. 
Another misconception regarding the single-party regime of Turkey is reading 
it as an anti-imperialist revolution which could be acknowledged as a possible path for 
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the development for all underdeveloped countries. For instance, one Republican 
observer stated in 1927, that “the Turkish revolution will wake up the whole oppressed 
Orient”.141 Especially in 1950s and 1960s, many Turkish and foreign experts who 
acknowledged the Turkish authoritarianism as a champion of modernism which 
opposed to the Islamicate past of Turkey, promoted the importance of the single-party 
regime, and even in some cases endorsed it as a possible path for the development for 
all underdeveloped countries.142 Similarly, according to Kili, the Turkish revolution 
constituted an example for the Third World to gain independence and the scale of its 
influence was similar to the French revolution’s significance on the bourgeoning 
nationalist movements in Europe in the early 19th century.143 This claim is difficult to 
substantiate since the anti-imperialism of the Republican elite only became prominent 
during the Turkish War of Independence. Right after the end of the war, the 
Republican regime smoothly integrated with the World-system and did not pursue an 
anti-imperialist agenda. In fact, paradoxically, their modernist approach gave the 
regime an orientalist attitude which is visible in how they depicted the bloody 
campaign in Dersim as a ‘march for civilization’. 
For the Republican elite, modernization was synonymous with Westernization. 
Atatürk stated that “although there are many countries in the world, there is just one 
civilization and for the progress of our nation, it should be a part of this civilization”.144 
In a different speech, he remarked that it was impossible for Turkey to survive without 
Westernization because “resistance to the storming impulse of the civilization is futile” 
and “societies which follow the static medieval laws, ideas and behaviours are bound 
to demise and captivity”.145 Atatürk’s perspective regarding the Western civilization 
being the only civilization suggests that a form of orientalism is traceable within the 
actions of the single-party regime. This attitude could be described as ‘auto-
orientalism’, an attitude which emanates from native people of the East who decided, 
or forced to look to their native lands through the lenses of the West. Therefore 
claiming that the Republican single-party regime was a champion of the East and a 
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guiding light for the emerging Third-World does not coincide with the ideological 
framework and the deeds of the regime.  
The single-party years were also treated by some scholars, including Milza, as 
an authoritarianism with a “progressive nature” which can only be described as a 
forward motion in history, as a bourgeoisie revolution which played its historical role 
and paved the path for better things and therefore differentiates from other 
authoritarian regimes such as the fascist ones that emerged to “fight against the 
modernity”.146 When dealing with this theory, one should also observe the recent 
historiography of fascism. As Gentile stated, for a long period of time, fascism was 
defined “as something inhuman, an expression of diabolical madness, or, in the 
opposite sense … as a caricature or in a clownish guise”.147 Starting from the 1970s, 
fascism has started to be seen as a distinct ideology and not just a phase of barbarism 
which aimed to destroy modernity. Especially the recent studies148 informed us that 
fascism was indeed a strictly modern ideology which tried to build an alternative form 
of modernity, therefore the defence on how the Turkish authoritarianism’s modernist 
agenda clashes with this basic characteristic of fascism has become rather redundant. 
Being strictly modernist does not rule out the authoritarian attitudes of the Republican 
regime. 
Another significant aspect of the Turkish single-party regime was its attitude 
concerning the traditional sources of authority in Turkey, which drastically 
differentiates it from its contemporary single-party rules in Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
Keyder, in his attempt to locate the Republican People’s Party’s position among its 
contemporaries, have put it in the same league with the abovementioned 
“Mediterranean dictatorships” on the grounds of that the Turkish single-party regime 
did not organically evolve out of a mass movement and followed a more traditionalist 
path in building a militarist dictatorship. 149  Yet, although the reasoning of this 
assumption is correct, the findings do not match with the facts. Grouping Turkish 
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authoritarianism with the dictatorships such as Spain and Portugal is unsuitable 
because these regimes worked hand-in-hand with the church,150 and the monarchy 
while Turkish authoritarianism terminated the significance of all sources of traditional 
legitimacy. According to Linz the enthusiastic and constant support of the church and 
clergy became “one of the basic sources of legitimation” for the regime of Franco. 
While in Spain, the regime promoted the idea of nacional-catolicismo; “the politicized 
religious culture and its multiple manifestations in political and cultural life to 
legitimize the authoritarian regime”, the Republicans attacked the traditional Ottoman 
sources of authority by ending the rule of the Ottoman dynasty and abolishing the 
Caliphate. These two sources of secular and religious authority could have been useful 
allies for the Republicans who desperately needed to establish links with the ordinary 
people, but they decided to overthrow them and build relations with the people through 
their own channels whether by using the local notables or creating entirely new links 
through the utilization of education, media, public celebrations, and public monuments. 
Therefore Keyder’s thesis remains to be problematic on fittingly describing the nature 
of the Turkish authoritarianism. 
Turkish authoritarian regime is also compared with similar newly emerged, 
modernizing, and nation-building regimes stretching from the Eastern Europe to the 
Greater Middle East; including the post-Ottoman Balkan states, Iran and 
Afghanistan.151 Upon inspecting these regimes, one can clearly see a pattern. All of 
these regimes carried significant imperial legacies, suffered from similar economic 
problems, performed similar reforms and resorted to oppression during their 
respective nation-building processes. For instance, in the Balkans several authoritarian 
regimes which emerged after the World War revoked the constitutions, close the 
parliaments and discouraged the foundation of political parties. For Fischer, these 
regimes were influenced by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in some matters – such as 
ethnic policies, leaders with military uniforms, special salutes – without entirely 
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embracing Fascism. Although the authoritarian attitudes and some policies of these 
regimes were similar to the Turkish example; there were drastic differences between 
them, as well.  Among these countries, Albania under Zog remained as a typical, 19th 
century monarchical dictatorship, while Alexandr in Yugoslavia established a strong, 
centralized royal dictatorship to control the Croatian separatism. Boris in Bulgaria 
formed a more inclusive semi-dictatorship. None of these regimes had neither 
ambitious reform agendas similar to Turkey, nor a cohesive ideology.152  
 Among the Balkan and Middle Eastern countries only Metaxas’ Greece which 
enjoyed great relations with Republican Turkey created a similar, moderately-fascist 
rule based on ‘anti-communism and anti-parliamentarism’ but it was still a drastically 
different regime. The aesthetics of Metaxas regime were extremely influenced by 
Italian and German examples including the use of Roman salute, references to a Third 
Hellenic Civilization – a mythical reference point similar to the Third Reich or Third 
Rome –, and a uniformed youth organization. None of these elements existed in 
Republican regime. Furthermore, Metaxas regime lacked a political party and it 
preserved and promoted the Greek monarchy as a source of legitimacy. Therefore the 
differences between these two regimes outweigh the similarities.  
Finally, in Iran and Afghanistan as well, modernizing authoritarian regimes 
were established. These regimes used Republican model as an example for their 
modernization project but remained as traditional monarchies.153 Therefore it is fair to 
say that there is a pattern of authoritarianism in this wide geography stretching from 
South East Europe to the Middle East the differences between these regimes are far 
greater than the common traits. These regimes were ruled by very different individuals 
who accepted different amounts of pluralism in their systems, and although being born 
from similar circumstances, reached to different conclusions. Therefore these regimes 
should not be put in the same category. As Fischer rightfully states, it is almost 
impossible to compare these regimes. 
Another problem with the historiography of this period is the common 
unscholarly treatment that it repeatedly receives. This situation is the result of several 
reasons. Firstly, due to the interest shown in this era, last decades witnessed to an 
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increase of popular history books written without scholarly concerns. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the ideological polarization in modern Turkey have led to the 
establishment of distinct groups who utilized several events, and personalities of the 
past according to their political agendas. This led to the resurgence in the publication 
of several distorted, unscientific and biased narratives of the era. Even today, the single 
party-years are an integral part of various political discussions and continue to serve 
ammunition to the daily political debates of the contemporary political factions in 
Turkey. Two political approaches seem to be especially popular among these factions. 
The first one, constantly attacks to a crudely conceptualized version of this period 
while the other faction glorifies these years as sort of a ‘Golden Age’. These almost 
cartoonish depictions of the era are not just of peripheral importance in the ideologies 
of these factions, but they constitute the very backbone of their political discourse. 
Therefore social scientists should act extremely careful for not falling into the traps of 
this rather Manichean perception of the past and rise above the unproductive political 
bickering. 
 
Conclusion and Contribution of the Study 
This long list of the misconceptions regarding the single-party years show us that the 
Turkish authoritarianism of the era is not studied sufficiently and thoroughly in social 
sciences, yet it provides us with excellent areas for research. Turkish single-party rule 
was a unique type of authoritarianism with its modernizing reforms, peaceful foreign 
policy, show-trials, massacres, and strange theses on history and language. There is 
much to discuss here but without giving enough importance to the recent studies on 
authoritarianism, fascism, totalitarianism and political religions, comprehending the 
nature of the regime, with its ideology and actions, as a whole, seems to be an 
impossible endeavour. Therefore in the following chapters the single-party years will 
be examined by using three different yet interrelated lenses: Fascism, political 
religions, and modernization.  
 Fascism is related to the Turkish authoritarianism because, as Griffin stated, 
the central goal of fascism was neither territorial expansion nor a reaction to modernity; 
it was neither “the preservation of capitalism from the onslaught of socialism” nor “the 
destruction of the working class movement” but it was a total transformation, a “social, 
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political, cultural and anthropological revolution” for the national rebirth. 154 
According to Kallis, this fascist notion of rebirth was “predicated on the twin concepts 
of a ‘new man’ and a new, fully inclusive but homogenous national community.”155 
Similarly, Roger Eatwell pointed out in his ‘fascist matrix’ that the quest for a creating 
a ‘new man’ and the forging ‘a new sense of nation and state’ constitute key themes 
of fascism.156 The common theme of all these definitions is the emphasis placed on 
the transformation of the society which was also one of the key concepts of the Turkish 
single-party rule. Since other aspects of fascism, such as nationalism and authoritarian 
rule also correspond to the characteristics of the Turkish single-party rule, a 
comparison between fascism and Republican regime will be both appropriate and 
productive to better comprehend the nature of Turkish authoritarianism. 
 As far as political religions, they are crucial to understand the Turkish single-
party rule because Republican regime needed to control the political, social and 
cultural spheres in Turkey for the success of their transformation project. Republican 
political religion was an instrument of this policy. Turkish single-party rule was a 
definite, text-book example of political religions. Emilio Gentile states that the 
political religions “resembled new churches devoted to propagandizing faith in 
absolute and unquestionable ideological truths, persecuting the unfaithful and 
worshipping sacralised human entities”. According to Gentile, these new secular 
religions are established through “the sacralisation of politics”, a process which he 
describes as the “merging of the religious and political dimensions” where the regime 
takes over the features of a religion.157 In Republican Turkey, the regime sacralised 
the secular entities such as the party and its leaders, most importantly the ‘eternal chief’ 
Atatürk and established a political religion based on these entities. 
Modernization, the concept which is used in the fourth chapter will be helpful 
to link the previous chapters together, since in every action of the regime, from 
establishing a single-party rule to building a new social order, the motivation for 
modernization is quite visible. In fact, modernization can be read as one of the central 
concepts of the Republican identity on which the Turkish political religion was built 
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upon. As the previous parts of this chapter showed, the early Republican regime was 
aggressive towards any type of plurality in the political, social and cultural spheres 
and tried actively to mould a uniform national identity for the citizens. The key 
element of this new identity was the modernity. For the Republican elite, 
modernization which they equated with Westernization was the only solution to 
overcome the problems that led to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The only way 
for Turkey to continue existing was modernizing as fast as possible and the most 
significant obstacles hindering this process were the values and traditions emanated 
from the past, specifically the Islamicate, “eastern” past, which the regime associated 
with the perceived darkness of the Middle Ages. Therefore, the Republican reform 
agenda can be summarized as modernizing as fast as possible, and at any cost, in every 
sphere of life, such as the legal system, education, economy and industry to generate 
everlasting change in the traditional social order. These changes would have served 
the ultimate objective of altering both the look and the mind-set of the country for 
good, cutting off the ties with Eastern traditions and culture and firmly integrating 
Turkey into the Western civilization. Therefore these three lenses used in this research 
do interact with each other. The authoritarianism of the regime was based on a political 
religion, and fuelled by the need of modernizing at any cost. The utilization of these 














Turkish Authoritarianism as a Form of Fascism 
 
 
The party takes the responsibility of governing 
upon itself in the name of the nation. 
 
- Declaration of the 
establishment of the single-party 
regime, Third Grand Party 
Congress of the Republican 
People’s Party, 1931 
 
 
In May 1931, at the Third Grand Party Congress158 of the Republican People’s 
Party it was declared that the Turkish Republic was, and would remain a single-party 
state. This declaration was significant, yet it was nothing more than stating the obvious. 
In fact, after the closure of the Progressive Republican Party due to allegations of its 
involvement with an Islamic revivalist revolt in 1925, RPP was ruling the country for 
the last six years without being challenged. In the following years, opportunities for 
building a full-fledged democracy existed in Turkey but the Republican elite was not 
willing to give up their power. In July 1930, due to several interrelated motives, most 
significantly to soften the devastating effects of the Great Depression of 1929, the 
Republican regime experimented with the idea of establishing a state-sponsored, tame 
opposition party, which would remain loyal to the main Republican tenets and would 
help to relax the tense political climate but it turned out that the Republicans 
underestimated the level of the discontent of the people. Due its increasing popularity 
the new opposition was pressured by the regime to close itself. This was the last 
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attempt to create a competitive political sphere which ended with bitterness and 
resentments.  
Nonetheless, the Third Grand Party Congress was still a crucial landmark 
moment of the Republican history because the plan for working in a multi-party 
system even with a meek, manageable opposition was renounced and an authoritarian 
model officially took its place. Until the end of the Second World War not a single 
legal opposition group was allowed to participate in the political field. Furthermore, 
at the Congress, the cohesive ideological framework of the regime was introduced 
with the principles known as Six Arrows, which were Republicanism, Populism, 
Secularism, Reformism, Nationalism and Statism. During the zenith of the single-
party rule in Turkey, the principles of the party, became the principles of the state, as 
well.  
A month after the Congress, the media which was already under heavy pressure 
from 1925 onward, came under strict state control with the enactment of the new Press 
Law of 1931 but the reach of the single-party rule was not restricted just to the political 
sphere and media. The Republican ideology was encircling the whole society from 
every angle imaginable. The education system utilized new institutions such as 
People’s Houses and, from  1939 onwards, People’s Chambers; which were directly 
controlled by the single-party and provided an elaborate form of supplementary 
education and adult education for the masses to disseminate the Republican ideology 
among the masses. 
The social sphere as well was controlled by the single-party. All voluntary 
social organizations, such as the Sufi religious orders159 which were outlawed in 1925, 
were forced to put an end to their activities. Turkish Hearths which were the main 
organisations for the conceptualisation of Turkish nationalism during the late-Ottoman 
and early-Republican era, were forced to terminate their operations in 1931. Similarly, 
Turkish Women’s Union, the flagship organization of the feminist movement in 
Turkey was pressured by the government to conclude their activities in 1935 on the 
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grounds that it had “completed its task” after the political enfranchisement of the 
Turkish women.160 Along with these organizations, other social organizations such as 
the Masonic Lodges were closed. The formation of the class-based organizations was 
also forbidden. Therefore in the single-party Turkey, not just the political sphere, but 
the media and cultural and social spheres were as well under the control of the political 
regime. In this era, any kind of pluralism was purged out of the society. 
The abandonment of pluralism and the adoption of an omnipotent single-party 
state fitted in well with the zeitgeist of the inter-war era Europe. In this period which 
constitutes the temporal landscape of this research the majority of European countries 
were controlled by authoritarian regimes. According to Pinto and Larsen, in the latter 
stages of the Second World War, participatory democracy was practiced only in four 
countries in Europe; Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and 
even in these countries in a restricted form161 while the rest of the continent was under 
control of authoritarian regimes of various forms, ranging from the military 
dictatorships of Spain and Portugal, through Fascism of Nazi Germany and Italy, to 
the communist single-party regime of the Soviet Union.  
Authoritarianism can be described as a political system which concentrated all 
political functions in the hands of a dictator or a small group of privileged notables; 
where fundamental freedoms were restricted by an oppressive police force, and 
opposition was silenced or crushed by state-sponsored intimidation. In authoritarian 
regimes, rulers stand above the law and are free from effective popular accountability. 
The media are either directly controlled or cowed. Political participation is usually 
limited and discouraged.162 All of the prerequisites listed here were integral parts of 
the Republican regime in Turkey. The political power was in the hands of the 
Presidents; initially Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) and later his successor, İsmet 
İnönü (1884-1973). In Turkish single-party regime, the presidents were unaccountable 
to any legal body or to the masses. On paper, there was a parliament and a cabinet of 
ministers led by a prime minister who were accountable to public opinion but 
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following the demise of the Progressive Republican Party in 1925, the parliament had 
lost all of its impartiality and become a mechanism to ratify the political agenda of the 
Presidents. Other members of the ruling elite were a group of ideologues and 
bureaucrats who remained in the inner circle of the presidents, and parliament 
members who were handpicked by the presidents.  
In Turkish single-party regime “autonomy of the individual from the 
collective”163 was not recognized. In early Republican Turkey the individual was seen 
merely as a member, an integral part of a coherent, cohesive monolith of a society 
which was perceived to be undivided by any ideological, gender-related or class-based 
differences and was described by Peker, the Secretary-General of the single-party as 
“a national bloc”.164 In Republican discourse the interests of this bloc should always 
trump over the rights of the individual, as Peker stated people should not be allowed 
to “have their own way” and should work together to reach the common goals set by 
the regime.165 Therefore establishing political parties, or voicing one’s ideology or 
identity through the instrumentality of social organisations was discouraged. There 
was only a single party in the political sphere, and its ideological, cultural, social 
institutions controlled their respective fields. This was the entire setup that ruled the 
country between 1925 and 1945. The Turkish Republic was therefore can be defined 
as an authoritarian regime. 
This chapter, like the rest of the study, is an analysis of this authoritarian 
regime. These regimes do tend to vary according to the amount of plurality they 
allowed to exist in the society. Usually, authoritarian regimes had to find partners 
among the remaining actors of the society such as large landowners, industrialists, 
religious establishment, monarchy, or the military and form alliances with them to 
widen their base of support and legitimize their rule.166 According to Juan J. Linz this 
coalition of actors forms a type of “limited pluralism” within the authoritarian regimes 
and constitutes one of the differences between authoritarianism and its most absolute 
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and oppressive form; totalitarianism.167 In Turkish authoritarianism, the relations of 
the regime with the aforementioned actors were rather intricate. The monarchy in 
Turkey; the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished in November 1922 by the Republicans 
and the last Sultan Vahdeddin defected to British occupation forces in Istanbul and 
was taken to Malta. Therefore forming an alliance with the monarchy was not 
practically possible, or ideologically conceivable for the Republican ruling elite. 
Similarly, the religious establishment, or what was left of it, was not a suitable 
candidate for practical and ideological reasons. In this era, starting with the 
Caliphate,168 an office held by the Ottoman sultans for centuries which harboured 
claims of representing all Muslims of the world, and Sufi religious orders; centuries-
old institutions associated with Islam were abolished to make room to a new, state-
friendly, national version of Islam. The abolition of Caliphate on March 3, 1924, was 
followed by the closure of the Ministry of Religious Affairs which was itself a 
continuation of the office of Sheik ul-Islam, the highest ranking individual in the 
religious bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire and to replace them, a state agency 
called Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) was established. 
With the outlawing of the Sufi religious orders in 1925, this organization became the 
sole authority over religious matters and promoted a modernised, Turkified, and 
westernized version of Islam. With this chain of reforms the sources of traditional 
religious authority were eliminated from the political, legal, cultural and social spheres 
according to the Republican ideology which aimed to reduce the visibility of Islam, 
the values associated with and the traditions emanated from it. Therefore similarly to 
the monarchy, the religious establishment in Turkey was never considered as a partner 
for the Republican ruling elite. 
Among the aforementioned social elements, only large landowners, 
industrialists and the military became partners of the Republican regime with varying 
degrees of influence over the policy making process of the government. Large land-
owners constituted the largest pressure group in the Republic. A significant number of 
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the large land-owners were members of the parliament during the single-party era and 
the government utilized their traditional connections with the peasantry which proved 
to be crucial for the regime, in exchange of representing the interests of the land-
owners against the peasants.169 A telling example of this symbiotic relationship is the 
constitution of 1924 which prohibited the possibility of a land reform. As for the 
industrialists, similarly to the landowners, they were supported by the government. 
With the Encouragement of the Industry Law of 1927 (Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu), tax 
immunity was introduced for the new and developing firms. Additionally, land 
donations, and guaranteed tenders in public procurement against foreign competition 
were bestowed on businessmen and industrialists who enjoyed good relations with the 
government. Later these close relations between the state-sponsored industrialists and 
party members who represented their interests in the government would led to the 
establishment of ‘İş Bankası Group’, a pressure group gathered around Turkey’s first 
public bank. With the contribution of this group, while regulating the labour relations, 
the regime recurrently took the side of the industrialists over the proletariat. In the 
period of 1934-1938, the real wages of proletariat dropped 25 per cent while the profit 
of the state-sponsored industrialists steadily increased.170 The pinnacle of the close 
corporation between big business and the single party was the new Labour Law of 
1936 (İş Kanunu), which denied the workers the right to strike.171 
The last component that played a role in the Republican regime was the 
military, which was traditionally involved in politics in Turkey but the level of 
autonomy they have enjoyed in this era was limited in comparison to the late-Ottoman 
and multi-party democracy eras. During the single-party years the military was put 
under strict governmental control although it still had a level of autonomy. For instance, 
Fevzi Çakmak,172 who served as the Chief of the General Staff during the entirety of 
this era, was still influential in political decisions concerning the national security. An 
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example of Çakmak’s influence on the civil policy making processes is evident in 
Samet Ağaoğlu’s memoirs. According to Ağaoğlu who was working as a high-level 
bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance, in 1937 the Ministry decided to build the first 
iron-steel industry complex in the region of Karadeniz Ereğli, a coastal town in North-
western Turkey. The decision was based on economic considerations, and the seaside 
location of Ereğli. Ağaoğlu states, that Çakmak had his reservations regarding the 
location of the factory which he found “hard to defend”. His decision was effected by 
the ever rising tension in Europe and the increasing possibility of a war. Considering 
his opinion the government decided to relocate the complex to Karabük, a town which 
is located 150 kilometres inland from Ereğli although running the factory there was 
far more expensive and harder to manage. Considering the factory would be built in 
1937, when bells of war were ringing in Europe, the decision seems to be reasonable 
from the military perspective.173  
Yet, despite Çakmak’s autonomy, his relatively large sphere of influence never 
interfered with the authority of the presidents and never harmed the harmonious 
regime-military relations. More importantly, not just the military but every other 
partner of the single-party regime never interfered with its ideological formation, and 
its reform programme which regulated the social and cultural spheres in the 
Republican Turkey. Therefore, even if a “limited pluralism” was inherent in the single-
party regime of Turkey, the interests of the components of this pluralism did not clash 
with the total control which the regime had over the people of Turkey.  
The complete single-party control of the political, social and cultural spheres 
show the totalitarian tendencies embedded within the Republican regime. One of the 
most significant events of the era; the party-state merger of 1935 which announced 
that the Republican Turkey will be a party-state, and party members will hold dual-
positions in the state bureaucracy and the party administration, is another example of 
these tendencies. According to regulations of the merger, for instance, the Minister of 
the Interior became the Party Secretary-General as well. With this merger even the 
different groups which provided a limited level of pluralism were forced to be 
incorporated within a single structure. It is noticeable that these totalitarian tendencies 
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embodied by the party-state merger increased in the mid-1930s, in synchronicity with 
the proliferation of a special form of totalitarianism in Europe. 
For the interwar years, one can clearly say that authoritarianism, and especially 
its totalitarian variant fascism, which emerged out of a complex range of historical 
forces became the norm in European politics. The first catalyst of the fascist upsurge 
was the First World War, which changed the face of the continent and created a power 
vacuum in Europe. According to Mazower, millions of dead people, broken families, 
insurrections, mutinies, revolutions, and the sense of a complete destruction of the 
social order after the collapse of the old regimes led to the emergence of “fatherless 
communities,” which were psychologically ready and eager for authoritarian 
regimes.174 
Benito Mussolini’s apparent success in Italy was another factor which gave 
impetus to the continental fascism. Afterward the Great Depression, which was 
perceived as the utter defeat of liberalism, this trend accelerated to such a level that 
democracy could only survive in just a few countries. This almost simultaneous 
appearance of fascist movements throughout Europe in the early 1930s was the most 
ominous political consequence of the Great Depression. Yet, it was Hitler’s victory 
that made fascism a universal ideology. Hobsbawm summarized the importance of 
Hitler’s success as follows: “Without the triumph of Hitler in Germany in early 1933, 
fascism would not have become a general movement”.175 After Hitler’s ascent to 
power, totalitarian version of authoritarianism gained further ground at the expense of 
competitive democracies. The combination of these factors paved the way to the 
proliferation of authoritarianism across the continent.176  
The effects of this phenomenon was felt in Republican Turkey, as well. The 
sufferings of the refugees who arrived to Turkey wave after wave after the loss of the 
Ottoman Europe, the devastating effects of the World War I and the collapse of the 
old Ottoman regime, created a ‘fatherless community’ in Turkey, as well, which 
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proved to be a fertile ground for the Republican ideals of establishing an ideal, national 
community. This reality gives further meaning to the surname adopted by Mustafa 
Kemal; Atatürk (literally the father of Turks). Similarly, the universal collapse of 
liberalism after the Great Depression which presented authoritarianism as a reasonable 
alternative to liberal democracies played an important role in the initial success of 
Turkish authoritarianism, as well. Interestingly, despite the similarity between the 
backgrounds of European fascism and Republican regime, it is impossible to depict 
the Turkish single-party experience as a mere copy of the German, or Italian regimes. 
Although the increase of totalitarian tendencies in Republican Turkey and the rise of 
fascism in Europe coincided with each other, it should be noted the Turkish single-
party regime was not a version of the European examples but it developed in time, 
organically. This experience was influenced in some aspects by the continental 
practices but mostly came to life from the internal dynamics of Turkey. In fact the 
authoritarian tendencies of the regime started much earlier than the proliferation of 
authoritarianism in Europe, and therefore it can be perceived as a precursor of them 
more than being their successor. 
Therefore comparing this local authoritarianism which managed to outlive its 
European counterparts with them will provide us the opportunity to better comprehend 
the nature of Turkish authoritarianism. In this chapter of the thesis fascism will be 
used as a lens to make this comparative analysis. The first part of the chapter will 
define what fascism is. This part will be followed by an assessment of Turkish 
authoritarianism in comparison with the main tenets of fascism.  
 
Theoretical Framework: The Fascist Minimum 
Fascism is a broad term which is defined and re-defined countlessly by social scientists 
since it became a phenomenon during the inter-war era. In its simplest form fascism 
is a totalitarian variant of authoritarianism. Its arrival to the political scene following 
the chaos of the First World War was not a coincidence. The First World War was not 
just a physical catastrophe that took the lives of the millions; it was a psychological 
disaster as well. It broke the minds and souls of the people who fought on the frontlines 
and their loved ones who waited for them at home. The war created a political and 
social vacuum in Europe that soon would be filled with hatred, paranoia and chaos. 
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Along with the collapse of the existing, old regimes and with them the old ruling 
classes, their machinery of power, influence, and hegemony also fell.177 Democratic 
governments and coalitions which were established after the collapse of the European 
monarchies, often appeared weak and unstable; the middle classes, squeezed between 
the big industrialists and the proletariat, became disfranchised and open for ultra-right 
propaganda thus composed the driving force of fascism; and lastly the propertied 
classes gave their support to authoritarianism due to the abnormal, almost paranoid 
fear of a socialist revolution. The economic situation was equally devastating. 
Although the European economy managed to recover from the record-breaking 
hyperinflation of post-World War years and enjoyed a course of economic boom in 
the 1920s, it eventually crash-landed with the arrival of the Great Depression in 1929. 
The Great Depression created an atmosphere of crisis and pessimism and caused a 
previously unseen amount of unemployment which was exploited by the fascist 
movements. 
In this turbulent climate, fascism presented itself as a political and social 
system which aimed to “protect and rebuild the unity, energy and purity of a nation”.178 
It glorified the nation and advocated for a warrior state seeking to recover former 
national glories, led by an all-powerful leader, to whom masses would show total 
commitment and submission.179 Unlike typical authoritarian regimes, fascism had a 
revolutionary discourse which placed the vision of the “nation’s imminent rebirth from 
decadence” in its core. 180  This revolutionary approach, the total rejection of the 
bourgeois civilization which was associated with the deterioration of order in Europe, 
and its grandiose promises made fascism a viable option for the discontent masses of 
the continent. 
Social scientists identified many different characteristics of fascism. For some, 
including Benito Mussolini himself, its fervent anti-socialism was regarded as a basic 
component of fascism.181 Similarly, the mainline communist definition of fascism as 
“the terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, chauvinistic and imperialist 
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elements of finance capital” which was formulated by Bulgarian communist leader 
Dimitrov in 1930s remained as canon in socialist ideology for decades. Therefore it is 
fair to say that both sides perceived each other as the antitheses of their own ideologies. 
The main conflict between socialism and fascism was the fact while socialism 
regarded class conflict as the central force of politics, fascism, on the other hand, 
denied the difference of interest between social classes; and it focused on the unity of 
people from different classes around the common cause of nationhood. Fascists 
considered the nation as a monolithic body, a unity, without any distinction 
whatsoever between classes. From the fascist standpoint, struggle between classes 
could not be tolerated. Instead, the struggle between nations was glorified and 
promoted as the only meaningful one. 
Another important aspect of the fascist ideology was the enormous emphasis 
put on the role of the leader. Fascist leaders presented themselves as strong, 
charismatic and aggressive figures. They emancipated themselves from any 
constitutionally defined notion of political leadership. Heywood states that in fascism 
“the leader is the symbolic embodiment of the people”.182 The leader-principle was 
perceived by fascists as the guiding principle of the fascist state. The fascist leader 
possessed both unlimited legal power and unquestionable ideological authority. The 
role and the importance of the leader were to be constantly repeated to the people and 
the leader was to enjoy direct, personal contact with them, through mass meetings, 
popular demonstrations and plebiscites. This form of leadership is an example of the 
charismatic leadership which was described by Max Weber as one of the three 
legitimisations of the political domination and as “the authority of the extraordinary 
and personal spiritual gift, the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence 
in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership.” 183  These 
characteristics attributed to Fascism can be multiplied. Fascism’s stance against 
parliamentary systems, its expansionism, the dislike against minorities (in German 
example a fervent anti-Semitism), and encouragement of the masses to actively 
support the regime instead of promoting mere political apathy can be added to this list. 
There are several problems with this approach though. First of all, some of these 
characteristics can be found in non-fascist ideologies and movements in well. 
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Secondly, defining an ideology in negative terms, just by listing what an ideology is 
not, rather than describing what is it, seems inappropriate. Additionally, focusing on 
the peripheral features of fascism instead of focusing to its core identity may lead to 
problems of our understanding of fascist regimes. Therefore historians and other social 
scientists allocated a substantial amount of time to define what fascism really is and 
study it. 
According to Emilio Gentile the literature on Fascism can be divided in two 
major eras. Until the 1970s, according to the traditional history writing fascism was a 
non-ideology. Instead, it was regarded as a sort of anti-historical and anti-modern 
phenomenon which came to existence in a special era of history and in a special 
geography – Inter-War Era Europe – and would never be repeated anytime, anywhere 
in the world. Fascism was regarded not as a coherent political thought but as a 
movement of violence. As Gentile stated fascism was defined “as something inhuman, 
an expression of diabolical madness, or, in the opposite sense … as a caricature or in 
a clownish guise. As a result, whether demonised or trivialised, fascism was reduced 
to a historical negativity”.184 
After 1970s, fascism has started to be seen as a distinct ideology. First historian 
who dealt with fascism as an ideology was George L. Mosse, who studied the culture 
and political style of National Socialism. According to Gentile, Mosse considered 
fascism “a phenomenon not at all foreign to the course of contemporary history but, 
on the contrary, argued that its roots lay deep in the history and society of modern 
Europe”. Following Mosse, Juan J. Linz specified that any definition of fascism could 
not be based only on its negations, but “should also consider its new appeal and its 
conception of man and society”. Linz added that, “no definition can ignore the 
importance of its distinctive style, its rhetoric and its symbolism, its chants, 
ceremonies and shirts that attracted so many young people in the years between the 
two wars”.185 
Stanley Payne continued this trend and defined fascism as an ideology on its 
own, in fact as the only major new ideology of the twentieth century and stated fascist 
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movements had these common features: Permanent nationalistic one-party 
authoritarianism which is neither temporary nor a prelude to internationalism, the 
charismatic leadership principle (incorporated by many communist and populist 
regimes as well), the search for a synthetic, ethnicist ideology which should be distinct 
from liberalism and Marxism, an authoritarian state system and lastly, a political 
economy of corporatism, syndicalism or partial socialism.186  
According to Gentile, fascism studies entered a stage of stagnation during 
1980s. In this era the existence of fascism as a different type of government than 
authoritarianism was questioned. An example of this scholarship is Renzo de Felice, 
an expert of Italian Fascism and Mussolini, who remarked that there was no 
connection or valid comparisons to be drawn between Italian Fascism and German 
National Socialism. According to De Felice these two were completely different 
ideologies from each other which made determining an overarching definition for 
fascism an almost impossible task.187  
The stagnation of Fascism studies came to end in 1990s which marked the 
beginning of a new period characterised “by a renewed, major interest in the 
theoretical aspects of fascism, turning scholarly attention toward its cultural and 
aesthetic aspects, while also attributing a primary role to ideology and culture in an 
attempt to give the fascist phenomenon a more precise definition”.188 In this period, 
Roger Griffin’s new definition of fascism primarily in terms of its “positive” 
ideological axioms, which he condensed into a single phrase: “Fascism is a genus of 
political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic  form 
of the populist ultra-nationalism” became the paramount definition of fascism.189 
Griffin’s definition is widely accepted because it does not define fascism as a form of 
reactionary movement, or barbarism exclusive to a certain era in the past. Furthermore, 
it defined what fascism is instead of describing what fascism is not. This popular 
definition includes all the core values of universal fascist movements and leaves out 
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all characteristics exclusive to certain versions of fascism. For instance, the connection 
between Nazi ideology and anti-Semitism is peculiar to this version of fascism alone; 
there were and would be in the future fascist movements which are not anti-Semite, 
and similarly there were and would be anti-Semite movements which are not fascist. 
Thus, the definition establishes a “fascist minimum” which includes two main 
components: “palingenesis” and “populist ultra-nationalism”. 
Etymologically, the term ‘palingenesis’, derives from Greek word palin (again, 
new) and genesis (creation, birth), and refers to the sense of a new start or regeneration 
after a phase of crisis or decline. Using this term, Griffin draws attention to the sense 
of messianic or fanatical mission embodied within fascism which Heywood describes 
as policies promoting the ideas of “the prospect of national regeneration, the rebirth 
of the national pride, and the promise of national greatness.”190 Griffin states, this 
concept is visible in every fascist movement, since they tend to highlight the moral 
bankruptcy and cultural decadence of modern society and proclaim the necessity of 
national rejuvenation, which is symbolized by the image of the nation rising once 
again, phoenix-like from its ashes. 191 The second component of the definition is, 
‘populist ultra-nationalism’. Here, populism means that the ruling elite, in practice or 
in principle depend on ‘power of the people’ as the basis of their legitimacy. Ultra-
nationalism is another rudimentary element of fascism. It should be noted, that fascism 
as an ideology seeks to promote much more than mere patriotism. It wishes to establish 
an intense and militant sense of national identity. This militant, and extreme type of 
nationalism which according to Griffin rejects basic values of humanism is defined as 
‘ultra-nationalism’. While this ulta-nationalism internally targets the minorities, 
externally it usually includes a fervent, aggressive expansionism to expand the 
territories of the nation, and subjugate the enemies.192 Therefore, in summary, the 
modern consensus on fascism, tends to describe it as an authoritarian, revolutionary, 
and ultra-nationalist movement or regime, whose policies are based on the elimination 
of the internal and external enemies of the nation to revive it, and reclaim its ‘past 
glories’.  
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The connection between fascism and Turkish single-party rule is rarely 
examined and in these rare occasions, the methodologies of these studies remained to 
be problematic. In these works, instead of focusing on the aforementioned core values 
of fascism, social scientists tended to look on some – and mostly trivial – elements of 
some of the fascist regimes, and compare these elements with the policies of Turkish 
authoritarianism. For instance Plaggenborg states that the criminal law of Republican 
Turkey was imported from Fascist Italy and describes this decision as a significant 
link between Republican regime and fascism.193 On the other hand, Feroz Ahmad 
states that fascist regimes used paramilitary organizations and uniformed youth 
organizations and uses the lack of such organizations in Republican Turkey as a proof 
of Republican elite’s refusal of totally embracing fascism. Similarly, Keyder and 
Plaggenborg pointed out that in fascist regimes, the regimes usually mobilized the 
masses, and created mass parties to manufacture support and consent from the masses, 
while in Republican Turkey, the elites never went to the masses and decided to form 
a vanguard party. 194  Parla focused on the corporatist element in Fascist Italy, 
compared it with the corporatism defined by the Republicans and came to the 
conclusion that the corporatism in Turkey was drastically different than the Fascist 
model.195 These examples, and many more show, that randomly picking an element 
from various fascist models and questioning its existence in Turkish authoritarian 
regime is an extremely problematic methodology. It is arbitrary and misses the core 
of fascism altogether. Taking the criminal law of Fascist Italy did not make Turkey 
fascist; similarly, copying the civil code of Switzerland did not make it a democracy. 
As for the youth organizations; they were not an integral part of the fascist experience. 
For instance, Metaxas regime in Greece had fascist tendencies and a uniformed youth 
organization, but Metaxas did not form a mass political party in Greece which is 
according to Keyder and Plaggenbrog a necessity to have a fascist system. Therefore 
from the standpoint of Ahmad, Metaxas regime can be defined as fascist while for 
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Keyder and Plaggenborg, it was not fascist which shows the arbitrary nature of the 
methodology used in these studies. 
It should be noted that none of the aforementioned scholars entirely dismissed 
the connections between fascism and the Republican regime. They all came to the 
nuanced conclusions in their respective studies. Ahmad mentioned the existence of 
some elements which gave a “fascist colouring”196 to the regime while Plaggenborg 
stated there were many occasions in which the Republican rule closely resembled 
Fascism, without totally embracing it. Similarly, Keyder acknowledges that some 
“fascistic elements”197 were attached to the economic statism of the Republic while 
Parla claims that there were partly fascistic tendencies in the Republican ideology but 
they did never dominate the entire ideology. Still, the aforementioned examples show 
us how misleading is the method of arbitrarily selecting random characteristics which 
do not represent the core values, the very soul of fascism to understand the nature of 
the Turkish single-party regime. Therefore, in this study, instead of arbitrarily 
selecting some elements from various fascist examples, the aforementioned 
overarching consensus on fascism which is recently established among the scholars of 
fascism studies, will be employed as a measuring stick to examine the fascist 
tendencies of the Turkish single-party regime. The rest of this chapter will look at the 
main components of the “fascist minimum” – a revolutionary approach, ultra-
nationalism, elimination of the internal and external threats and the notion of 
palingenesis which means the revival of the nation – and try to find the similarities 
and dissimilarities between fascism and Turkish authoritarianism. 
  
Forms of Nationalism Inherited from the Late-Ottoman Era  
This part of the chapter is composed of an assessment of the type of nationalism 
pursued by the Republican elite. As the aforementioned definition of fascism stated, 
nationalism, precisely its most aggressive and extreme form constitutes one of the 
major components of fascism. Nationalism was also an integral part of the Republican 
ideology right from its start. Republican People’s Party was born out of the nationalist 
resistance movement in Anatolia following the end of the First World War and the 
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invasion of the Empire by the Allied powers. In the initial phase of the resistance, 
which is known as the Turkish War of Independence (Kurtuluş Savaşı), the resistance 
fighters were called the Nationalist Forces (Kuvay-i Milliye). Later in April 1920, 
when the members of the Defence of Rights Group of Anatolia and Rumelia the 
leading organization of the War of Independence arrived to Ankara to form a 
parliament, their movement started to be known as the “nationalists”. 198  This 
movement was the precursor of the Republican People’s Party. 
When the Republican People’s Party was officially established on September 
9, 1923, nationalism was not among the principles of the party yet the concept of 
national sovereignty was mentioned in the first election bulletin of the party. In 1927, 
at the Second Grand Party Congress, it was declared that “the Republican People’s 
Party is a republican, populist, and nationalist political organization.”199 With this 
announcement the party became the main representative of Turkish nationalism in the 
political sphere. For many observers, the Republican nationalism promoted “common 
linguistic, emotional, and cultural traits of the people” and did not have any ethnicity 
or race based connotations.200 This issue is debatable, and to better comprehend the 
Republican nationalism, different currents of nationalism which inherited from the 
late-Ottoman era must be discussed here first. 
Nationalism in Turkey did not emerge with the Republican People’s Party. In 
fact, it did not emerge within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, either. Most 
prominent contributors to the idea of Turkish nationalism such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu,201 
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Ismail Gasprinski, 202 and Yusuf Akçura, 203 were all born in the Russian Empire. 
Simultaneously with them, in the post-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire, a nascent 
nationalism started to grow in search of replacing the crumbling Ottoman patriotism 
promoted by the Ottoman state. The most influential name of this form of nationalism 
in the Ottoman Empire was Ziya Gökalp. Due to the transparency of the intellectual 
boundaries between Ottoman and Russian Empires, the common language, and the 
circulation of the written material in a large Turkish-speaking area stretching from 
Kazan to Caucasus, from Crimea to Istanbul, these intellectuals influenced each other 
and the early form of Turkish nationalism, which was called Turkism (Türkçülük) 
came to existence in this intellectual intersection between these two empires. 204 
Although there were slight differences between the proposed programmes of each 
Turkist ideologue, the similarities outweighed these differences. Turkists commonly 
attached particular importance on the use of Turkish as the language of culture, 
education and administration. Another issue they placed special emphasis on was the 
need of extracting of a distinct Turkish identity from the Ottoman or Muslim supra-
identities. The last characteristic of the Turkist movement was the concept of the ‘unity 
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of the Turks’. This concept was far from being a monolithic ideology or strategy, 
instead it denoted to a combination of various meditations on the idea of unification 
of Turks, ranging from a possible political unity of the Turks of Ottoman and Russian 
Empires, to a softer union which was based on common culture and language.205 When 
the Turkish Republic was established, the first two issues were inherited by the 
Republican nationalism while the concept of the ‘unity of the Turks’ was completely 
abandoned. 
Nearly all of the Turkist ideologues were incorporated into Republican regime 
in early 1920s, typically in significant positions. Ahmet Ağaoğlu was an influential 
and active parliament member, while Yusuf Akçura became the president of the 
Turkish Historical Society but among them, the most influential Turkist was Ziya 
Gökalp. Gökalp (1876-1924) was a sociologist, writer and politician. Recognized as 
the first Turkish sociologist, and “the father of Turkish nationalism”, he was one of 
the most significant intellectuals of the late-Ottoman and early-Republican eras. 
Gökalp’s ideology brought together elements of Turkish nationalism, modernism and 
Islamic identity and suggested that these concepts were not mutually exclusive. For 
Gökalp, belongingness to a certain nation could only be acquired by sharing the same 
culture, therefore ethnicity did not play an important role in his version of Turkish 
nationalism.206 Since he considered religion as an integral part of the national culture, 
Gökalp did not exclude Islam from his nationalism formulation. Similarly, he 
maintained that modernization while still being connected to the national culture, 
similar to the Japanese example of the Meiji Restoration, does not conflict with 
nationalism. Therefore, Gökalp summarized his brand of nationalism by defining the 
Turkish nation as belonging “to the Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic 
religious community, and to Western internationality”. 207  Gokalp’s theses were 
important because it combined Westernization with nationalism which prepared a 
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blueprint for the Republican reforms. The emphasis that Gökalp has placed on 
“Islamic identity” as an important part of the culture will not be developed further by 
the Republican nationalism.  
Another influence on the Republican nationalism was the Turkish Hearths, the 
most influential organization of the late-Ottoman era Turkish nationalism which was 
established in 1912, in the relatively free environment of the Second Constitutional 
Era of the Ottoman Empire with a modernist, Turkist worldview. The approach of the 
Hearths towards the ‘unity of the Turks’ was perceived as ‘pan-Turkist’. For years, 
the Hearths had remained as the main organisation for the conceptualisation of Turkish 
nationalism. After 1908, Turkish Hearths were also supported by the CUP, the group 
that organized the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 which ushered the Second 
Constitutional Era and later became the ruling party of the Ottoman Empire in 1913. 
Many Turkist ideologues such as Gökalp and Ağaoğlu were active both in the Turkish 
Hearths and the Committee of Union and Progress. Since the emergence of the 
Committee of the Union and Progress coincided with the rise of ethnic-nationalism of 
the various different ethnicities of the Ottoman Empire, the nationalism of the Hearths 
and the Committee employed a more ethno-nationalist language as well. Starting from 
their usurpation of power in 1913, this language turned into a series of nationalist 
policies. One of the crucial policies of this era which would be continued by the 
Republican regime was the Turkification of the economic sphere. The Committee of 
the Union and Progress tried to create a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie that would 
replace the influence of the non-Muslim Ottoman citizens had in the economic 
sphere.208 These policies continued and culminated in the First World War in which 
nearly 2.5 million Armenian and Greeks were massacred, expelled, or left the 
country.209  
These were the nationalist elements inherited from the late-Ottoman era. 
Among the issues voiced by the early Turkists, the use of Turkish as the language of 
culture, education and administration and the need for the establishment of a new 
Turkish identity replacing the imperial identities became important aspects of the 
Republican nationalism as well. Similarly, Gökalp’s theses that combined 
Westernization with nationalism prepared a blueprint for the Republican reforms. The 
                                                          
208 Toprak, Turkiye’de Milli Iktisat, pp. 190-191. 
209 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, pp. 101-105. 
94 
 
policies of the CUP regarding creating a national economy by eliminating the non-
Muslim minorities from the competition were also copied by the Republicans to some 
degree. Yet, although the Republican policies regarding the minorities were aggressive 
and exclusionary, they were not as destructive as the policies of the CUP due to several 
reasons. Most importantly, the ethnic composition of the late-Ottoman and Republican 
eras were completely different from each other. While, in 1906, 20 per cent of the 
Ottoman population were non-Muslims, in 1927 this ratio dropped to a mere 2.5 per 
cent which means that only 1/8 of the non-Muslims of the pre-war population 
continued to live in Turkey after the war. The rest of it either died in the war, were 
deported, massacred or voluntarily migrated to adjacent countries.210 Therefore, the 
nationalist policies regarding the non-Muslim minorities did not need to be draconian 
during the Republican era. Instead of population exchange or mass killings Republican 
policies targeted to exclude these minorities from society. 
Apart from these similarities there were important aspects of the late-Ottoman 
Turkish nationalism that were completely discarded by the Republicans. The most 
significant of these concepts was the ‘unity of the Turks’. The Republican nationalism 
did not even entertain the idea of forming political or cultural alliances with the Turks 
living outside of Turkey. This change of attitude towards Turks that remained to live 
outside the borders of Turkey was based both on ideological and practical concerns. 
Ideologically, Atatürk regarded pan-Turkism as a needless adventure. Atatürk’s 
nationalism was firmly grounded on the modern boundaries of Turkey. Any irredentist 
claims to form political unity with Turks of Russia are frowned upon by the 
Republican elite. During the Turkish War of Independence, as early as December 1921, 
Atatürk ruled out any possibility of pan-Turkism by stating that the objectives of the 
Ankara government were “modest” and “realistic” and uncontaminated from “vain 
hopes”. Atatürk further stated that ideologies with grandiose, unrealistic objectives 
such as pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were the very reasons of the disaster that struck 
the Ottoman Empire.211 Atatürk’s objections to pan-Turkist ideas were part of his 
general aversion of the culture of conquest. One of the analyses of Atatürk regarding 
to ‘Ottoman Decline’ was the unrealistic and costly attempts to conquer more and 
more land. He criticized Ottoman bureaucrats and rulers, from the Grand Viziers who 
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tried to conquer Vienna, to the grandiose plans of expansion of the CUP for being out 
of touch with the realities. He stated that these attempts of expansion were 
economically costly, as well as being catastrophic due to severe losses of human lives. 
According to Atatürk, the Ottomans should have been settled with modest boundaries, 
and developed their own human resources to fulfil the potential of their available 
means of production instead of pursuing a “conquest economy”.212 Therefore the idea 
of merging all Turkish speaking people of the world through conquest was an 
unacceptable project for him. 
A political union between all Turkish speaking people was also inconceivable 
for the Republican elite due to several practical reasons. The pan-Turkist current of 
the late-Ottoman Turkish nationalism was mostly originated from the Turks of Crimea, 
Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Kazan, which were all within the boundaries of the Russian 
Empire. Politically Russian and Ottoman Empires were old enemies. Starting from the 
mid-17th century when the Russian Empire emerged as the main regional rival to the 
Ottomans in the Eastern Europe, these neighbouring countries have spent the last three 
centuries in an almost continuous war. Yet when the socialists overthrew the old 
regime in Russia in 1917, the pattern of relations changed. From 1918, Soviet Russia 
started to rebuild diplomatic relations with Turkey and after the establishment of the 
National Assembly in Ankara this process gained further momentum. The 
reconciliation with the Soviet regime was a necessity for the Ankara government to 
break the international isolation and to gain the much needed material help; mainly 
funds and armaments. The Ankara government, especially Mustafa Kemal was also 
planning to use the close relations with the Soviets as a bargaining chip against the 
Allied powers who were afraid of the proliferation of the socialism in the East. Kemal 
thought that a rapprochement with the Soviets would made the Allies more reluctant 
to use excessive amount of power when dealing with the nationalist insurgents of 
Ankara.  
Mustafa Kemal wrote a letter to Lenin three days after the opening of the Grand 
National Assembly and proposed a co-operation between the two governments 
“against the imperialist powers”. Kemal asked funds, armaments, and provisions “to 
defeat the imperialist powers” and to strengthen “the joint struggle against imperialism 
                                                          
212 Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri II, pp. 103-107. 
96 
 
in the future”.213 In the same letter, he went even a step further and offered the help of 
the armed forces of the Ankara government to secure the southern borders of Soviet 
Russia. The offer included helping the Red Army to install a socialist government in 
Azerbaijan. This was a complete diversion from the pan-Turkist objectives of the late-
Ottoman Turkish nationalist ideologues who extensively wrote and campaigned for a 
political union of all Turks. The letter proves that for Atatürk, securing Soviet help in 
this crucial stage of the War of Independence clearly outweighed the opportunity of 
establishing a union with the Turks of Azerbaijan. This letter was followed by 
establishing new socialist committees all over Ankara to gain the sympathy of the 
Soviets to the nationalist cause. After Ankara managed to gain significant military 
victories, Soviets came to the conclusion that the nationalist movement of Ankara 
would be a useful ally for them and, on March 16, 1921, Treaty of Moscow was signed 
between the two sides. Shortly after the agreement Soviet help started to pour in. In 
total, until the end of the war, ten per cent of the national defence budget of the 
nationalist movement would be provided by the Soviets. 214  This coalition would 
continue throughout the early years of the Republic in various different spheres. 
Economically, the five-year plan implemented in 1934 was prepared by the Soviets 
who were experienced in statist policies. The Soviet Union also donated money for 
the implementation of the plan. Diplomatically, the relations remained healthy as well. 
In 1935 a treaty of friendship which remained in effect for 10 years was signed 
between the two countries. A most telling example of the productive relations between 
these two countries is visible at the Monument of the Republic (Cumhuriyet Anıtı) 
which is located at the Taksim Square in Istanbul. The monument which was built in 
1928, depicted important names of the War of Independence including Atatürk, İnönü 
and Chief of General Staff Fevzi Çakmak, as well as the Soviet allies of the Ankara 
government namely Mikhail Frunze, the Red Army commander and Minister of 
Defence who visited Ankara in 1921 and his successor Klim Voroshilov. The 
existence of this monument was a prime example of the sound relationship between 
the Soviet Union and Republican Turkey.  Therefore, one can assume that pursuing a 
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pan-Turkist policy which could have jeopardized the relations between the two 
countries was out of question for the Republican elite for both ideological and practical 
reasons. 
Among the inheritance of the late-Ottoman era Turkish nationalism, another 
concept which was rejected by the Republican elite was the importance attributed to 
the contribution of the Islamicate culture to the Turkish national identity. Instead, the 
policies of the Republic tended to create a secular version of nationalism, and the new 
Turkish identity they established did not include any references to Islam.215 In fact, as 
an alternative to the Islamicate past, the glories of pre-Islamic Turkish society were 
promoted and at times, even had to be manufactured. Therefore among the different 
forms of nationalisms inherited from the late-Ottoman era, the Republican regime 
opted for a nationalism which was geared towards establishing a new, modern, secular 
Turkish identity. Expansionism, irredentism, pan-Turkism or neo-Ottomanism were 
all rejected. The supporters of the latter theories were all incorporated into the regime 
and they became committed Republican nationalists. For instance, the Turkish Hearths, 
the largest nationalist organization, renounced their pan-Turkist tenets. In 1927, they 
were categorised as “establishments under government supervision” before being 
closed down permanently in 1931, the same year of the official establishment of the 
single-party regime in Turkey. At the time of their closure, the Hearths were the largest 
voluntary organization in Turkey with 267 centres and 32.000 registered members.216 
The regime also confiscated their properties and opened up People’s Houses 
(Halkevleri); ideological instruments directly controlled by the party centre. Following 
the demise of the Hearths, the nationalist scene in Turkey started to be dominated by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s own vision of Turkish nationalism.  
 
The Ideology of the Republican Nationalism 
The first set of principles announced by Mustafa Kemal as a party programme in April 
1923, which was known as the Nine Principles (Dokuz Umde) did not include any 
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reference to nationalism but in October 1927, at the Second Congress of the 
Republican People’s Party, nationalism was recognised as one of the four main 
principles of the party. Party regulations also emphasized the importance of unity of 
language, and the necessity of the establishment of common feelings and thoughts 
among the members of the Turkish nation. The regulations which also acted as a party 
programme show that at this phase, the nationalism of the ruling party was not based 
on ethnicity or race. Furthermore, the regulations clearly defined the roadmap of the 
Republican nationalism by stating that one of the main aims of the party was to make 
the use of Turkish language widespread in the entire Turkey and develop Turkish 
language and culture.217 These regulations display that the Republican elite perceived 
nationhood very similar to Gökalp and highlighted the importance of the common 
culture and language, yet they discarded the significance of the common religion from 
Gökalp’s original formula. Additionally, the party programme pointed out that the 
regime would actively seek to promote Turkish language and culture, although the 
methods which would be used in this endeavour were not clearly defined back then. 
 Gökalp’s influence on Republican nationalism is visible in other important 
documents of the era, as well. In 1930, Atatürk defined the elements which constituted 
nationhood as; union in thought, morality, sentiment, and sensation; common 
memories, traditions, history and language; and a will to live together.218 Similarly, in 
another writing from the same era, culture once again came to the fore as the most 
important part of nationhood as he defined nation as “a society which consisted of 
people who share a common culture.”219 This approach was further solidified in the 
party programme of 1931. Second article of the programme described nation as “a 
political and social group consisting of citizens who are bonded to each other through 
common language, culture and ideals.” This definition as well denoted no racial or 
ethnic elements in the Republican conception of nationhood.220 These examples show 
that ethnic connotations were minimal in the nationalist rhetoric of the early 
Republican period.  
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 According to many observers, in this early phase, Republican nationalism was 
a form of civic nationalism, which put special emphasis on the importance of sharing 
common land and culture and avoided mentioning ethnicity, religion and race.221 
According to civic nationalism, a nation should be composed by all members of the 
society, regardless of their race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity. This type 
of nationalism envisages the nation as a community of equal right-bearing citizens; 
their union is formed voluntarily by the recognition that the self-interest of each citizen 
could only be achieved through by a commitment to the common good.222 The civic 
nation is an association of equal citizens. This citizenship is based on “jus soli” 
principle223 and therefore membership in the nation is in some sense open. On the 
other hand, “ethnic” nationalism emphasizes common descent and cultural sameness. 
In this type of nationalism membership to a nation is exclusive. Pre-existing 
characteristics of the citizens, such as their language, religion, customs and traditions 
give the unity to the nation.224 The nation is a given, it is almost a “fate from which 
none may escape.”225 In this model, citizenship is acquired “jus sanguinis”; or by 
blood. 
After the Third Grand Party Congress of 1931 the civic nationalist stance of 
the Republican regime started to slowly change and references to ethnicity increased 
in frequency. According to Aktar, the Republican nationalism of the 1930s represented 
a significant departure from Gökalp because its priority was no longer common culture, 
but the common “ethnic” background. 226  On the other hand, according to Bora, 
Republican nationalism did not undergo the mentioned transition. Bora imagines 
nationalism in Turkey as a nebula that was composed of different types of nationalism 
which were embraced by different classes and social actors. Bora states that Turkish 
nationalism used all kinds of nationalist forms, sometimes picking one of them as the 
                                                          
221 For an example of this approach, see Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, pp. 41-50. 
222 Ümit Özkırımlı, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement (London: Palgrave, 
2005), p. 26. 
223 Jus soli (right of the soil) is the legal principle of that nationality is determined by virtue of being 
born within or of living in the territories of a state. See Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, 
Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (London: Sage, 2002), p. 101 
224 Özkırımlı, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism, p. 26. 
225 Spencer & Wollman, Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, p. 101 
226 Ayhan Aktar, “Cumhuriyet Türkiye’si ve Irkçılık-Turancılık.” Presentation given in Istanbul, 2005. 
For similar examples, see Rıfat N. Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme 
Serüveni (1923–1945) (Istanbul: İletişim, 1999); Taha Parla, Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin 
Altı Ok'u (Istanbul: İletişim, 1995); and Mesut Yeğen, “Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question.” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 30:1 (2007), pp. 119-151. 
100 
 
valid form of nationalism and shaping it according to its needs, but other forms 
continued their existence, they would never be dismissed, they could be brought back 
and used again in the processes of building a national identity. The Turkish national 
identity was constructed through accepting, disapproving, changing, transforming 
these types of nationalities and through finding the middle ground between them. Bora 
lists these types of nationalism as; a nationalism based on ethnicity and modernization, 
which was originated from the Turks of Russia; an utopian pan-Turkism; an anti-
imperialist national independence movement; a nationalist, alarmist movement 
emerged in reaction to the loss of territory during the Balkan Wars and had concerns 
for the survival of the nation; a form of civic nationalism; the Islamist modernism 
which envisaged the ‘nation’ as a Muslim community; a reactionary peasantry who 
despised non-Muslims; and the concerns of the notables who had seized the lands and 
goods of the Armenians and Greeks during the First World War and therefore wanted 
an ethnically cleansed society. Bora states that during the War of Independence, all of 
these nationalist elements co-existed. After the war a definite identity was built from 
this complicated bundle due to the need of building a homogenous nation. Therefore 
a rather “ambivalent” national identity emerged after this process. On one side it was 
a political-legal definition which highlighted the importance of citizenship and the 
common homeland. On the other hand, it was an essentialist definition based on the 
ethnicity which was sanctified due to its “uniqueness.” Bora concluded his theory by 
stating that there was a constant tension between these definitions and the second 
definition was always the dominant one.227 
 Although Bora’s elaborate definition is a valuable explanation of the 
idiosyncrasies of the Turkish nationalism, the transition from a civic form of 
nationalism to a more ethnic one is visible in the deeds of the single-party and the 
speeches of the party notables. A speech given by Ali Fuad Başgil at the Second 
Congress of the Turkish Historical Society provides clues about the increasing ethnic 
elements of Republican nationalism. Başgil denied the civic nature of nationalism and 
stated that the elements which build a nation were not just “spiritual elements like the 
                                                          
227 Tanıl Bora, “İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği.” Toplum ve Bilim 71 (1996), pp. 172-173. For a 
similar approach on the multiple faces of Turkish nationalism, see Mesut Yeğen, “Turkish Nationalism 
and the Kurdish Question.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 30:1, pp. 119-151. Here Yeğen lists five 
different types of Turkish nationalism ranging from extreme far-right nationalism to mainstream secular 
nationalism that competed with each other.  
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desire to live together or material elements like the unity in language and blood, but a 
synthesis of all these elements.” According to him, the Turkish nation was composed 
of Turkish speakers, people with “Turkish blood in their veins,” or people “who 
believe that they are from Turkish stock” coming from a shared historical background, 
sharing the common feelings and culture.228 
Although references to blood and ethnicity started to dominate the Republican 
nationalism discourse of the 1930s, – examples included idioms such as the saying 
“the worst Turk is better than the best one of the non-Turks” of Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt,229 one of the main ideologues of the era along with Peker, and Peker himself, 
who attributed the survival of the Turks in the First World War to the “purity of their 
blood”230 –, this ethnic nationalism was not transformed into biological racism but it 
was not reverted back to civic nationalism, either. A telling example of the ethnicist 
policies of the regime the regulations concerning the military schools. According to 
these regulations, being a Turkish citizen would not suffice for being accepted to the 
military schools since “being from the pure Turkish blood” was inserted into the 
regulation as a prerequisite, as well, to ban especially non-Muslim Turks.231 Despite 
this increasing ethnicist attitude, Republican nationalism was not exclusionary to 
Muslim minorities, but it was assimilationist.  
Republican elite had a vision; an ideal Turkish identity, in mind when 
establishing this assimilation process. According to the Republican policies, an ideal 
Turk speaks Turkish, is a member of the westernized Turkish culture, wholeheartedly 
accepts the principles of the Republic and, preferably, has Turkish origins.232 If any 
citizen failed to observe one of these features, he or she had to find a way to be 
promoted to full-citizenship. Measures which could be used for this promotion were 
various. For example, the most significant prerequisite wanted from the Jewish people 
                                                          
228 Ali Fuat Başgil, “Türk Milliyetçiliği.” Presentation given in the Second Congress of Turkish History, 
1937. 
229 Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892-1943) was a politician, jurist and author. A member of the most inner 
circle of Atatürk, he continuously served as a parliament member from 1920 until the end of his life. 
As a famous lawyer who participated in the drafting of Civil Code, Penal Code and the Code of 
Commerce (1926), Bozkurt served as the Minister of Justice from 1924 to 1930. In political sphere, 
Bozkurt represented the most aggressive contingent of Turkish nationalism. His attitude towards the 
minorities often bordered racism. For Bozkurt’s interpretation of the Republican ideology, see Mahmut 
Esat Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1940). For an overview of his 
ideology, see Hakkı Uyar, Sol Milliyetçi Bir Türk Aydını – Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (Istanbul: Büke, 2000). 
230 Bora, “İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği.”, pp. 179-180. 
231 Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, pp. 157-159. 
232 Yıldız, “Kemalist Milliyetçilik”, p. 232. 
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for being “proper” Turks was the adoption of the Turkish language instead of their 
native language, Ladino.233 Republican nationalism was ready to accept people from 
different ethnicities into the Turkish nation after being assimilated. It was only hostile 
and exclusionary to the people who refused to be assimilated. Furthermore, although 
being a type of ethnic nationalism, Republican nationalism was different from racism 
because ethnicity corresponded to an anthropological and sociological category 
without any biological reference point. This type of nationalism did not describe a 
certain type of Turk with specific racial features. Race has never been a criterion for 
being a Turk. Even the most extremely nationalistic law of the era, the Settlement Law 
of 1934 defined “proper” Turkish nationals as “devoted to Turkish culture.”234 
An interesting characteristic of the Republican nationalism of this era is its 
relations with the religious minorities of Turkey. As mentioned above, the Republican 
elite discarded the importance of Islam from Gökalp’s formula. Unlike Gökalp who 
defined religion as the common conscience of society, for Republican nationalism, 
religious unity between people was not a prerequisite for nationhood. Atatürk himself 
stated that Turks had not formed a nation with the Arabs even though they had lived 
together for hundreds of years and therefore concluded that religious unity did not 
necessarily unite people to form a nation. Although in theory Republican nationalism 
was a secular form of nationalism, in practice the members of the non-Muslim 
minorities235 were always discriminated against. Paradoxically for a proudly secular 
polity, during the assimilation process the Republican elite closely associated 
Turkishness with Islam.236 For the non-Muslims, the path for gaining full membership 
to the Turkish nation was always trickier. The actions of the Republican regime show 
that although secularism was constantly promoted by the state, there was always a 
distinction between ‘citizenship’; a more formal, and almost an obligatory relationship 
between the state and the citizens which was mostly reserved for non-Muslim Turks, 
                                                          
233 Ladino, or Judeo-Spanish, is the language of the Sephardic Jews, who fled from Spain and Portugal 
during the Spanish Inquisition and especially after the issuance of the Decree of Expulsion of Jews in 
1492. The core of Ladino is medieval Spanish and to a lesser extent the other languages of the Iberian 
Peninsula. Over the centuries, Ladino was enriched with words from Turkish, and Hebrew, as well as 
from Greek, Italian, French, Bulgarian, and Arabic. 
234 For the entire text of the law, see Resmi Gazete, No. 2733 (July 21, 1936), Law No. 2510, p. 4003. 
235  In this chapter, Alevism which is a syncretic belief system is not grouped with non-Muslim 
minorities. Alevism as a distinct belief system is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this study.  
236 Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state 
Ethnic Conflict (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 101-103. 
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and ‘membership to Turkish nation’; an almost sacred bond between the state and the 
members of the nation which was strictly reserved for Muslims. 
According to Bora, a non-Muslim could only be a legal ‘citizen’. Full 
membership to nationhood was strictly reserved for Muslims. Without being a Turk 
in spirit and at heart, the state could at most ‘tolerate’ a non-Muslim.237 Even Atatürk, 
a deeply secular person, repeatedly used phrases such as “the Christian and Jewish 
citizens of our land” instead of recognizing identities such as Christian-Turk or 
Jewish-Turk.238 Similarly Peker similarly stated in one of his lectures that the single-
party recognized “these [Christian and Jewish] citizens as full Turks, on condition that 
they participate in what we have just expressed, the unity in language and in ideals.”239 
For the Republican elite, non-Muslims were not Turks, but Turkish citizens; 
they belonged to the state, not to the Turkish nation. Seeking a religious unity with 
other Muslim countries and people, or pursuing Islamist policies were unacceptable 
for the Republicans, but internally the religious unity was important. The Muslims 
living outside the boundaries of Turkey were never considered as members of the 
Turkish nation, yet similarly, the non-Muslims living inside the boundaries were not 
easily promoted to being Turks, mainly because the relations with the non-Muslims 
were shaped by the memories of the late Ottoman era, First World War and the War 
of Independence. One can assume that due to the separatist movements of Armenian 
and Greek nationalists, and the perceived hostile attitude of the minorities taken during 
the nationalist resistance in Anatolia after the First World War, the non-Muslim 
minorities were deemed untrustworthy by the ruling elite. Although Republican 
nationalism was secular in theory, in practice non-Muslim minorities were constantly 
discriminated against. Yet, these practices did not have a religious agenda but they 
were shaped by the memories of the past and the conception of non-Muslims as 
potential agents of foreign powers. 
The assimilationist policies of the Republican elite are described as 
Turkification. Aktar defines Turkification as the “uncompromising exertion of the 
                                                          
237 Bora, “İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği.”, pp. 181-182. 
238 İnan, Medeni Bilgiler, p. 23. This approach is still traceable in modern Turkish political terminology. 
The state authorities constantly describe the non-Muslims of Turkey with phrases such as “Our 
Armenian citizens” or “Our Jewish citizens.” Proper definitions like Armenian-Turkish or Jewish-
Turkish are never used by the state. 
239 Soner Çağaptay, “Reconfiguring the Turkish nation in the 1930s.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 
Vol. 8:2 (2002), pp. 67-82 
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Turkish ethnic identity’s authority over every aspect of social life including the 
language used in the streets, history taught in schools, education policies, economic 
life, trade, personnel recruitment regime, private law and settlement policies includes 
relocation of minorities to some regions.”240 Turkification was not a form of racism, 
which was at its peak in Europe during the 1930s. Racism seeks to restrict the 
membership to a nation solely of people belonging to the same racial background, thus 
it is exclusionist. Turkification, on the other hand, tried to expand the scope of 
Turkishness, thus it presented itself as inclusive. Racism tried to reduce the size of a 
nation by excluding people from different races, whereas on the contrary Turkification 
tries to increase it by melting the cultural identities of people into a single Turkishness. 
For Republican nationalism, the concept of ‘we’ referred to a constantly increasing 
group of people belonging to this single Turkish identity. As mentioned above, while 
every Muslim living inside the borders of Turkey was referred as Turkish, the non-
Muslims were the only ones who stood out as ‘others.’ Perceived as foreigners and 
potential threats to the Republic, the non-Muslims of Turkey lived in a constant state 
of fear, alienation and isolation as half and restricted citizens. Therefore, in summary, 
Turkification was a mixture of inclusive (for Muslims) and exclusionist (for non-
Muslims) policies. 
The Republican nationalism, as an ideology, can be defined as a fusion of civic 
nationalist elements; such as the significance attributed to common culture and ethnic 
nationalist elements, which were traceable especially in the policies targeting the 
minorities. Especially after 1931, and in synchronicity with increasing ethnic 
nationalist attitudes of the regime, assimilationist policies were intensified. During this 
era, citizens were expected to leave every single form of previously held identities, 
whether linguistic, ethnic or tribal and truly embrace the new national identity dictated 
by the regime. This policy is especially discriminatory towards the religious minorities.  
 
The Policies of Republican Nationalism 
As mentioned above, Turkification was a mixture of inclusive (mostly for Muslims) 
and exclusionist (mostly for non-Muslims) policies. Inclusive policies aimed for the 
                                                          
240 Aktar, Varlık Vergisi, p. 101. 
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assimilation of the minorities. The first stage of assimilation was denying the existence 
of diverse cultural and linguistic traits of the Muslim minorities and claiming that they 
were already Turks. A perfect example of this approach is visible in the governmental 
reports on the Kurdish and Zaza communities living in the eastern part of Turkey. For 
instance, available government and military reports from this era continuously called 
the Dersimi people who spoke Dimili; a Western Iranian language and adhered to the 
Alevi belief system as “original” Turks241 who were originated from the Khorasan 
region in North-Eastern Iran and Central Asia – the ancestral homeland of Anatolian 
people according to Republican nationalism –, and were linguistically and religiously 
Persianized due to close relations and proximity with Iran. For example, a 
parliamentary report from this period called Dersimis “hundred per cent Turks”, who 
were Persianized and “forgot their Turkishness” in this process.242 For Republican 
nationalism, Kurds and Zazas were not unwanted ethnicities. In fact they were 
promising candidates for the Turkification process. After all, as the report stated, all 
they had to do was “to be reminded of their own Turkishness”. This report was in 
accordance with the lectures of Recep Peker, who similarly stated that minorities such 
as Kurds, Circassians and Lazes “had the wrong idea” of belonging to these identities 
which were “imposed on them” and commented that the duty of the Republic was “to 
correct these false conceptions”.243 
The methods used by the Republican elite for this task were varied from 
indoctrination through education to forced relocation of certain groups. One telling 
example of the assimilation politics is the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign which 
started in 1927 and resumed throughout the 1930s at certain intervals. The campaign 
aimed to make Turkish the only acceptable public language in Turkey. Although the 
campaign targeted mainly Jewish Turks who traditionally spoke Ladino,244 Muslim 
minorities also suffered from its results. The campaign became more popular in mid-
1930s, especially in places like Izmir, which had a healthy Jewish population.245 The 
Jews of Izmir, acted before any enforcements, took the lead themselves and joined to 
                                                          
241 “Öz Türk” in Turkish. 
242 For the report, see BCA: 30...10.0.0/ 110.740...23. For a recently published booklet version of the 
report, see Hasan Reşit Tankut, Zazalar Üzerine Sosyolojik Tetkikler (Ankara: Kalan, 2000). 
243 Çağaptay, “Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s.”, pp. 67-82 
244 For more information on this campaign, see Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Turkiye Yahudileri; Senem 
Aslan, “Citizen, Speak Turkish!”: A Nation in the Making.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol 13:2 
(2007), pp. 245-272.; and Çağaptay, “Race, Assimilation and Kemalism.”, pp. 86-101. 
245 10 percent of the population of the city was Jewish at the time. 
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the campaign voluntarily. Similarly, Jewish communities of Thrace, Bursa, Ankara, 
Diyarbakir and lastly, Istanbul decided to support the campaign. 246  Although the 
campaigns were non-compulsory, in some other cities and town Turks pressured the 
Jews to make them speak Turkish in public. Other minorities which were affected by 
this harassment were Arabs, Circassians, migrants from Crete whose language was 
Greek although they were Muslims, and Kurds. 
Prime Minister Inönü made a fervid speech in the party congress of 1935 which 
emphasized the importance of speaking Turkish in the public sphere. He said that the 
government “will not keep quiet on this problem anymore,” and added that, “from 
now on all ‘citizens’ who are living ‘with us’ will be speaking Turkish.”247 Following 
this speech the National Turkish Students Union (Millî Türk Talebe Birliği); an 
organization which showed considerable interest in Fascism, started a new, more 
intolerant campaign.248 People speaking languages other than Turkish were harassed 
in the streets.249 The fiercest reactions targeted Jews. In the end ordinances were issued 
by most of the municipalities that possessed large Jewish populations to fine people 
who used languages other than Turkish in public, thus implementing a de facto ban on 
non-Turkish languages.250 In summary, in 1930s, speaking in a language other than 
Turkish had become almost impossible in public due to the risk of harassment and 
municipal restrictions.  
Another example of the exclusive side of the Republican nationalism is 
apparent in the Law on Arts and Employments allotted to Turkish Citizens (Türkiye'de 
Türk Vatandaşlarına Tahsis Edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler Hakkında Kanun), which was 
issued on June 4, 1932. With the enactment of this law, some lines of work became 
forbidden to non-citizen minorities. The act was aimed to force Greek people who as 
                                                          
246 Çağaptay, “Race, Assimilation and Kemalism.”, p. 95. 
247 Soner Çağaptay, “Otuzlarda Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Irk, Dil ve Etnisite”, Tanıl Bora (Ed.), Modern 
Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce – Cilt 4: Milliyetçilik (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), p. 260. 
248 This union was closed down by the government in 1936 due to its ties with international fascism and 
pan-Turkism which was rejected by the Republican nationalism. For more information on the Union, 
see M. Çağatay Okutan, Bozkurt'tan Kur'an'a Millî Türk Talebe Birliği, 1916-1980 (Istanbul: Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004). 
249 Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Turkiye Yahudileri, pp. 136-7. 
250 Klaus Kreiser and and Christoph H. Neumann, Kleine Geschicte der Türkei (Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam, 2003), p. 307. It should be noted that the fines were implemented strictly by the municipalities 
without any governmental control and at some occasions the government tried to stop the municipalities 
from fining the non-Turkish speakers. For instance, Bali points out that the Ministry of Interior sent a 
notice to the municipality of Istanbul ordering it not to impose any fines on non-Turkish speakers. See 
Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Turkiye Yahudileri, p. 280. 
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an exemption had not been forced to leave the country during the population exchange 
1923 and had obtained the right to stay and work in Istanbul.251 As a result of the law, 
nearly 15,000 Greeks were fired from their jobs and roughly 9000 of them migrated 
to Athens. The categories of occupations described by the government as ‘strategically 
important’ and thus not suitable for ‘foreigners’ were jobs like being a chauffeur or a 
janitor. For the government these born and raised Istanbulites could threaten ‘public 
safety’ if they continued to work in these ‘strategically important’ professions. This 
example and many more show us the rather paranoid tendencies of the regime.252 For 
the ruling elite, the non-Muslims had already betrayed the nation by cooperating with 
the enemies during the days following the First World War, and by having prospered. 
This image was so strongly engraved in their memory; they were unable to accept non-
Muslims as ‘true’ Turks although the majority of non-Muslims tried to go along with 
the Turkification process themselves.253 
In the single-party era, two significant events proved to be extremely 
devastating for the religious minorities.254 These were the Thrace Incidents of 1934 in 
which the Jewish population of Thrace region fled to Istanbul to escape from 
intimidation and the introduction of the Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) in 1942 which 
led to the demise of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie of Turkey. The Thrace incidents of 
1934 include the looting of Jewish properties in the cities of Çanakkale, Edirne, 
Kırklareli, Tekirdağ and their affiliated towns, the attempts to force Jews to leave the 
region through violence, intimidation and harassment, and sell their properties at 
bargain prices before they fled,255 boycotting Jewish shops,256 and in some cases, even 
                                                          
251 For the text of the law, see Resmi Gazete, No. 2126 (June 16, 1932), Law No. 2007, p. 512. 
252 Aktar, Türkleştirme Politikaları, pp. 114-116. Some similar examples to the exclusionary policies 
towards the religious minorities were: Act concerning Civil Servants (1926) which blocked non-
Muslims from entering to civil service, the Surname Law (1934) which prevented non-Muslims to take 
surnames in their respective languages, the regulations announced in July 1938 which prevented non-
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Muslim conscripts during the Second World War. For an overview of these policies, see Aktar, 
Türkleştirme Politikaları; M. Çağatay Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları (Istanbul: 
Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009); and Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar – Teori, Lozan, 
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253 Rıfat N. Bali, 1934 Trakya Olayları (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2008), pp. 5-6. 
254 It should be noted that almost the entire secondary literature concerning the religious minorities is 
about the officially recognized minorities of Jews, Armenians and Greeks. The problems of the people 
who adhere to the ancient Eastern churches such as Assyrians, Chaldeans and Nestorians are rarely 
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255 Bali, 1934 Trakya Olayları, p. 126. 
256 The main slogan of the boycotters was “Türkten Alışveriş Yap!” – “Buy only from Turks,” which 
was similar to the boycott slogans used by Nazis. See Bali, 1934 Trakya Olayları, p. 121. 
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public beatings and rape. The incidents were started on June 21, 1934 and were only 
stopped after Prime Minister İnönü’s condemnation of the events in July 5, 1934. To 
punish the perpetrators of the crimes, the Republican regime closed the anti-Semite 
periodicals, arrested the local notables who profited from the events and dismissed the 
mayor of Kırklareli. Looted goods were given back to their rightful owners, but no 
reparations were paid to the Jews to compensate for the damage and no precautions 
were made to facilitate the safe-return of the Thracian Jews to their lands after the 
events. The incidents affected roughly 20,000 of the Jews residing in Thrace. 
According to Levi, nearly 10,000 of them fled to Istanbul, some of them eventually 
returned to Thrace after the incidents finished, but most of them decided to stay in 
Istanbul or to migrate to foreign countries, including Palestine. The refugees who came 
to Istanbul after the attacks did not get any help from the government or any other 
official institution, but relied on the help of the Jewish community of Istanbul. Some 
perpetrators, including the mayor and chief constable of Kırklareli, were tried in courts, 
and others were fined. Only one person lost his life during the incidents; a gendarmerie 
corporal killed by the looters while trying to protect the Jews.257 
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason of the events but from the available 
sources one can assume instead of being resulted from the direct orders of the 
government, the events unfolded from a variety of interrelated factors. These can be 
summarized as; the agitations of racist publications258 and anti-Semite writers,259 the 
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258 Milli İnkılap (National Revolution) was the most influential of these publications. This anti-Semite 
periodical was a carbon copy of the infamous Nazi publication “Der Stürmer.” Its owner, Cevat Rıfat 
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10-17. 
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Thrace. Here he published far-right periodical Orhun and tried to disseminate his racist ideology among 
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Istanbul and started to publish the journal again in 1943. According to Bali, his significant presence in 
Edirne and the availability of his periodical throughout the region should not be ignored as a 
contributing factor to the events. For more information on his activities in Thrace, see Bali, 1934 Trakya 
Olayları, pp. 360-374. For a brief overview of his ideology, see Güven Bakırezer, “Nihâl Atsız.” Tanıl 




increasing Nazi influence, the insufficiency or the unwillingness of the local 
authorities and the government to protect the Jewish people and their properties, the 
military concerns of the ruling elite against the Italian threat and the banal anti-
Semitism and economic concerns of the local Muslims who wanted to take over the 
place of Jewish landowners and bourgeoisie of the region.260 All of these reasons 
played their parts in the violent attacks but some of them seem to be less significant 
than the others. For instance, the Nazi connection seems to be far-fetched idea261 and 
the influence of the racist publications should not be overestimated since the 
distributing network of these publications seem to be quite inadequate to cause a 
provocation of such calibre.262 
On the other hand the acts of the local authorities and the government do need 
a more thorough inspection. Although, as mentioned above, the government did its 
best to punish the perpetrators after the events, some scholars claim that they passively 
supported the attacks by not preventing them which means that the events were 
materialized within the administration’s knowledge and guidance. Aktar, one of the 
supporters of this theory claims that the fact that the incidents erupted simultaneously 
in Thrace, far from Istanbul and Ankara, gives the impression that they were not 
unrelated events which were perpetrated by individual pillagers. For him, the attacks 
were controlled from a central authority. Aktar further defends his theory by claiming 
that the government, and Atatürk himself who met with the leaders of the Jewish 
community of the region were well aware of their complaints. The question about why 
the government did not act sooner and waited until July 4, remains as a meaningful 
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question, although Aktar’s claims are not fully based on evidences, but only on well-
directed assumptions.263 
Another factor that implies government guidance in the attacks was the 
military concerns of the regime. In 1934, Republican leadership was wary of the two 
expansionist powers which threatened Turkey. These were Italy, which was led by 
Mussolini who envisaged establishing a new Roman Empire in the Mediterranean 
basin and Bulgaria, which harboured irredentist claims in the Balkans. 264  Thrace 
region, which shared borders with both zones of expansion of the irredentist powers 
was seen as an extremely important military zone for the regime. Considering that the 
Republican perception of the non-Muslim minorities were shaped from their wartime 
experiences, the possibility of that the Jewish people of the region were started to be 
seen as a potential threat to national security by the regime should not be 
underestimated. A typical example of this approach is traceable in a report prepared 
by İbrahim Talî Öngören,265 the Inspector-General of the region. Öngören was in the 
region for his periodical inspections between May 6 and June 7. In his report, which 
was presented to the Prime Ministry, Interior Ministry and Party Secretariat on June 
23, – right before the events – Öngören wrote that the wealth of the Jewish 
businessmen and tradesmen in comparison to the wealth of the Muslims constituted a 
serious problem that had to be solved. He further stated that Jews of the region 
supported Bulgaria, and they would most probably work as Bulgarian spies in a 
possible war between Turkey and Bulgaria. 266  The banality of Öngören’s anti-
Semitism is evident in his writing in which he defined the Thracian Jews as “immoral, 
sinister, importunate, duplicitous and avaricious.”267 
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265 İbrahim Talî Öngören (1875-1952) was a military physician, diplomat, politician and one of the most 
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267 For the full text of the report, see Bali, 1934 Trakya Olayları, pp. 387-410. 
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According to Aktar due to these military concerns and the perceived 
unreliability of the non-Muslims, the government wanted to remove a strategically 
important region from the “potential threat” of Jews by driving them to Istanbul, but 
their plan, which had to be undertaken with great care and finesse turned into a scandal 
due to the “inadequacy and the local notables eagerness” of the local party members 
who were impatient to take-over the riches of the fleeing Jews.268 Although it is 
debatable if the government directly orchestrated the events, their negative attitude 
towards non-Muslims and the perception of them as a potential ‘Fifth Column’ could 
have contributed to the events. 
The unreliability attributed to the non-Muslims speaks volumes about the 
discriminatory nature of the assimilation policies of the Republican regime. Despite 
all of their efforts and willingness to be a part of the Turkish nation, non-Muslims 
were not accepted as equal nationals. Furthermore, in parallel with the intensification 
of the authoritarianism, the ethnicist attitude of the regime intensified as well, which 
led to the further discriminations against non-Muslims. During 1940s, the most crucial 
example of this discriminatory attitude is illustrated with the Wealth Tax269 which was 
levied not just on the non-Muslim minorities but the implementation of the tax as a 
punitive measure against non-Muslims led to the large quantity of properties of the 
non-Muslims being transferred to Muslim Turks. 
During the Second World War, the government tried its best to deal with war 
profiteering and black marketers, but when the protectionist policies failed, they 
decided to relax the regulation of the markets which resulted in hyperinflation and led 
to certain actors in the society becoming extremely rich. These actors were mainly 
large landowners, and the importers, who were mostly non-Muslim.270 This newly 
gained wealth made the non-Muslims targets of the nationalist press and the 
Republican elite. On November 11, 1942, Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu271 made a 
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almost every important office of the regime. Throughout his career, he served as the Prime Minister 
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fiery speech at the Grand Assembly, explained the devastating economic conditions 
of Turkey in detail, blamed the war profiteers and announced a special wealth tax to 
solve the economic problems of the country. In this speech, Saracoğlu did not target 
the minorities, in fact, he explained that that would be levied solely on the big 
businessmen, rich landlords, and large landowners.272 However, in a closed session, 
he stated that the tax will specifically target “people who became rich by taking 
advantage of the hospitality shown” by Turkey.273 It was clear that he described the 
rich non-Muslims with these words which further proves that the non-Muslims of 
Turkey were perceived as guests who were tolerated by the real owners of the land; 
the Muslim Turks. 
The Wealth Tax did not seem to be destructive in essence but the 
implementation of the tax was nothing short of chaotic and catastrophic. Local 
councils which were responsible of determining the tax rates worked arbitrarily. The 
system was corrupt and rampant with favouritism and nepotism; in most cases the 
councils protected the tax payers they personally knew and to compensate the 
difference some taxpayers were forced to pay even more.274 Mostly, the victims of this 
arbitrariness were the non-Muslims. For instance, among the taxpayers in Istanbul, 87 
per cent of them were non-Muslims.275 
The collection of the tax was problematic as well; the tax payers were not 
allowed to object the rates determined by the councils and appeal to the decisions. 
Furthermore, the law gave only 15 days to the taxpayers to pay this amount. If a 
taxpayer would not pay the tax, they had to pay the same amount with interest, and 
when they were still not able to pay their properties would be confiscated. If the worth 
of the confiscated property was not enough to pay the tax, the taxpayers would be sent 
to labour camps. The arbitrary nature of the law was evident in the implementation of 
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these rules, as well. Among the 2057 taxpayers who were sent to the camps, 1400 of 
them were non-Muslims.276 
The nature of this law is widely debated. While some scholars such as Coşar 
claimed that the tax was a necessity and a simple product of the economic situation of 
the era, others such as Bali, Akar and Aktar emphasized the ethnicist attitude in the 
implementation of the law. While Coşar rightfully claims that the extra taxes which 
were sanctioned on the non-Muslims were not determined as a central state policy, but 
they were determined by the local councils. For instance, in Istanbul, it was Faik Ökte, 
the head of provincial treasury implemented a system specifically to tax the non-
Muslim much more heavily than the rest of the tax-payers.277 Coşar further comments 
that it was only natural for the non-Muslims to pay more, because the wealth was 
already gathered in their hands before the implementation of the law. On the other 
hand, Aktar defines the Wealth Tax as a continuation of the economic policies of the 
CUP. He claims that the government was aiming for the Turkification of the economic 
sphere, and to achieve this aim, they implemented this tax as a punitive measure. In 
the long term, this assumption seems to be correct; because the means of production 
and properties of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie were bought by the burgeoning 
Anatolian businessmen at bargain prices and the place of the non-Muslims 
entrepreneurs were taken over by the Muslims which led to a social transformation.278 
In the economic sphere, Coşar claims that the tax was a successful endeavour279 while 
Aktar claims in long term there were no significant improvements in Turkish economy 
due to the Wealth Tax. Furthermore, with the demise of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, 
entrepreneurship and the practices and trade traditions associated with them were gone 
until the development of the Turkish bourgeoisie and this vacuum created dormancy 
in Turkish private sector. Regardless of the intentions of the government, the Wealth 
Tax was perceived as a catastrophe by the non-Muslims of Turkey, and made their 
assimilation into Turkishness extremely difficult. The implementation of the tax 
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further showed that the actions of the Republican elite towards non-Muslims can be 
regarded as exclusionist. 
On the other hand, at least in principle, Republican policies towards non-
Muslim minorities are perceived as inclusionary by most scholars. For instance 
according to Yeğen, Kurds, the largest ethnic minority in Turkey were “allowed to 
experience citizenship rights without discrimination provided that they assimilated 
into Turkishness.”280 Yet, despite many common characteristics between Kurds and 
Turks, the path of the Kurds to assimilation was just as tricky as the non-Muslims. 
First barrier was language, while the second one was the different lifestyle. Right from 
the start, Republican nationalists perceived the Kurdish problem not as a national issue 
but as an issue of modernization. The Kurdish identity was perceived by the 
Republican ruling elite as a non-modern, archaic, backward identity because 
politically; they were organized as tribes, and socially; they were seen as ignorant. 
Furthermore, the Republican governments blamed them for refraining from 
performing military service and paying their taxes.281 The image of Kurd was also a 
naïve one; because according to the Republican view they were exploited by their 
tribal leaders and the leaders of the local Sufi religious orders. Therefore, the identity 
was a problematic one because it was developed at the intersection of various 
autonomous zones; such as linguistic, religious and social, without the intervention of 
the government. Republican nationalism tried to disturb each of these autonomous 
zones. The Sufi religious orders were abolished in 1925, through the education system 
Turkish started to penetrate into Kurdistan and the tribal system was tried to be 
dismantled by the regime, especially after the Settlement Law of 1934.282 These were 
the soft assimilation measures taken by the Republic. An example of these policies 
was the Plan on the Rehabilitation of the Eastern Provinces (Şark Islahat Planı), which 
was adopted in 1925 after the Sheikh Said revolts. With this plan the traditional social 
and cultural structures in eastern Turkey were targeted by the regime.  
The assimilationist features of the plan can be summarized as  follows: the 
participants of the past revolts would be forced into exile in Western Turkey (Articles 
5, 9 and 15), military outposts would be constructed with the money which would be 
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collected from the region (Article 17), the appointment of Kurds to any public office 
posts in the region would be prohibited (Article 10), the appointment of native judges 
to the eastern provinces would be prohibited (Article 3), the sale and lease of the 
former lands of Armenians to Kurds would be prohibited (Article 5), non-Kurds from 
the Black Sea region, and 500,000 immigrants from the Balkans and Caucasus would 
be settled on the lands “left behind by the Armenians” (Article 5), boarding schools 
and schools for girls would be constructed to change the Kurdish cultural identity 
(Article 14), education and publication in non-Turkish would be forbidden, personal 
names and place names in the region would be changed into Turkish, Kurdish 
language spoken in the private sphere would be prohibited on the west bank of 
Euphrates (Article 16) and speaking Kurdish in the public sphere would be restricted 
(Article 13).283 Even though it is unknown to what extent these suggestions were 
implemented, it is clear that this plan was designed to replace the local Kurdish identity 
with the modern Turkish identity. 
Similarly, according to the Circular on Turkification of 1930, people from 
small villages who communicated in “foreign languages” would be scattered in nearby 
Turkish towns (Article 3). Especially women would be encouraged to speak Turkish 
through placing them in Turkish towns and Turkish women would be encouraged by 
the government to marry non-Turkish speakers for the Turkification of their families. 
The aim of this programme was the “Turkification of their languages, customs and 
ideals, binding them to Turkish history and destiny.”284 These policies do show that 
the Republic had a diverse selection of assimilation policies used when dealing with 
Kurds, ranging from forced relocation to educational reforms. Assimilation policy 
aimed to end the perceived “backwardness” of the Kurdish communities. Along with 
the modernity-backwardness dichotomy, the concern for security constituted the 
remaining significant part of the state policy regarding the situation in the East. 
Therefore along with these soft measures, brutal force was occasionally used when 
any occurrence of an unrest in the region. The Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925 and the 
Ararat Rebellion of 1930 285  were dealt with the use of disproportionate force. 
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According to Yıldız, these vulgar displays of power resulted in the deepening of the 
gap between the state and the Kurds. 286  Regardless of the methods used, the 
Republican regime failed to assimilate the Kurds. Especially after 1980s, Kurdish 
national consciousness in Turkey is constantly getting stronger. 
 As the examples above show, although Republican nationalism started its life 
as a form of civic nationalism during the 1930s it was transformed into a nationalism 
which made more and more reference to Turkish ethnicity. More importantly 
Republican nationalism envisaged an undivided, monolithic, modern nationhood and 
to achieve this it used a combination of exclusionary and inclusionary policies. For 
some minorities, including the non-Muslim minorities, there were impassable 
boundaries between them and Turkishness therefore their assimilation process was a 
rather difficult one. On the other hand for Muslim minorities, for instance for Kurds, 
their ethnic and linguistic differences were not recognized at all. Instead their 
conditions were seen as a form of backwardness which was dealt with a mixture of 
soft and hard policies. Kurds were forced to accept the newly-formed Turkish identity 
through joining to the common culture and language, and when they resist to any 
policies of the centre; they were dealt with force.  
 
An Evaluation of Turkish Nationalism 
It should be noted that the Turkification process of the Republican regime was not a 
unique experience, in fact, it closely resembles the nation-building processes of many 
nation-states which emerged in the long 19th century and post-war era out of the 
crumbling multi-national, cosmopolitan empires. In these periods, new, modern 
nations were started to be formed as part of state policies. On the contrary to the 
primordialist theses about nationhood, the nation-building processes did not predate 
the nation-states. Instead, they followed the political ambitions of the states which is 
perfectly encapsulated by Piedmontese politician Massimo d’Azeglio’s famous 
remark on how the task of “making Italians” had still to be accomplished after the 
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unification of Italy. The Turkification process had a similar aim; Turkey was 
established after the nationalist struggle, but a Turkish nation in the modern sense did 
not exist. The legacy of the Ottoman millet system still lingered on in the early 
Republican era. Ottoman regime never organized its subjects according their ethnicity; 
religion has always been the main identity of an Ottoman. The Republican regime tried 
to transform the Muslim population in Anatolia and build a monolithic, modern 
national body out of these people who previously felt a connection to their state, 
religion, denomination or localities; but not to their “nation”. 
Turkification policies targeted ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic groups 
who did not fit to the modern, secular national entity envisaged by the Republican elite. 
From the linguistic perspective, the Republicans were luckier than their European 
counterparts. Hobsbawm states that only the half of the population of France properly 
spoke French in 1789. Similarly, in post-Risorgimento Italy, less than three percent of 
the “Italians” used Italian as the language for everyday conversation.287 Duggan adds 
that during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, the members of the Hungarian 
Parliament had to address the assembly in Latin to be understood by most of the 
members.288 On the other hand, in Turkey, Ottoman Turkish had been the language of 
the administration for a very long time but as the aforementioned examples on the 
Republican language policies such as the prohibition of the use of Kurdish on the west 
bank of Euphrates or the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaigns show us that 
assimilationist policies attacking the linguistic groups were still seen necessary for the 
Republican regime to swiftly establish a common national identity. Although these 
polices were in harmony with the zeitgeist of the post-war environment in Europe, the 
methods used by the Republican elite brought Turkey close to the Fascist camp. In this 
part of the chapter these policies will be evaluated in the light of the previously 
mentioned ‘fascist minimum’. 
To evaluate the legacy of Turkish nationalism with the lens of Fascism, we 
must once again remember the fascist minimum. A fascist regime must have three 
different components: a revolutionary approach, ultra-nationalism which is based on 
the elimination of the internal and external threats and the notion of palingenesis which 
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means the revival of the nation. Among these components revolutionary approach 
separates fascist regimes from traditional right-wing monarchies or conservative 
regimes such as Zog’s Albania, Metaxas’ Greece, Salazar’s Portugal and Franco’s 
Spain. All of these regimes aimed the preservation of traditional sources of authorities 
in their respective countries, while fascist regimes tried to radically challenge these 
sources. As mentioned in the previous chapters of this study, Republican regime was 
revolutionary. Instead of using traditional sources of authority in the country as a 
source of legitimacy, Republican attacked these sources, abolished the Sultanate, the 
Caliphate and Sufi religious orders. Therefore the Republican ideology was based on 
the total rejection of the traditions and it fits well with the fascist revolutionary model. 
Palingenesis, the second component of the definition refers to the sense of a 
new start or regeneration after a phase of crisis or decline. Using this term, Griffin 
draws attention to the sense of messianic or fanatical mission embodied within fascism 
which supported the prospect of “national regeneration, the rebirth of the national 
pride, and the promise of national greatness.”289 The last component of the definition, 
‘ultra-nationalism’ which means the establishment of an intense and militant sense of 
national identity. This is a militant, and extreme type of nationalism which rejected 
basic values of humanism, and employed eliminationism in the domestic sphere to 
cleanse the nation from unwanted ‘others’, 290  and utilized expansionism in the 
international sphere to fulfil the destiny of the nation.291 
 Upon inspecting the legacy of the Turkish single-party rule, it is evident that 
determining if the Republican regime was fascist or not, is an extremely difficult task; 
yet it provides us with a great opportunity to evaluate the Turkish single-party 
experience within the zeitgeist of its time. Republican single-party regime was 
definitely nationalist; in fact the nationalism employed by the regime was aggressive 
against the linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities in the country and it was aimed 
to eliminate them through melting their specific identities within the newly established, 
modern, secular, national identity. Although not being racist or genocidal, their 
assimilationist policies were still destructive. 
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 The assimilationist policies of the regime was a mixture of inclusionary and 
exclusionary measures. Even the regime presented itself as an overtly secular one, and 
claimed that all of the residents of the country were organic Turks, in practice the 
policies targeting the non-Muslim minorities were exclusionary. In regards of the 
religious minorities, every single action of the regime such as the intimidation and 
harassment they suffered during the “Citizen Speak, Turkish!” campaigns to the 
Wealth Tax, were discriminatory. Assimilationist policies are, of course, not unique 
to Turkey, they were used in nearly every nation-state that emerged after the First 
World War but the implementation of this process tend to differ from each other. On 
one hand there were practices of inclusion which can be described as tolerant 
integration and aimed for the long term assimilation.292 Education policies that target 
initially the establishment of manageable ethnic and linguistic identities within an 
overarching supra-identity cleanly defined by the state and eventually, the melting of 
these identities within that supra-identity to achieve a monolithic society with very 
minor differences between its members is the most basic example of these ‘long term’ 
policies. On the contrary to this method, the other method of assimilation was 
elimination of every source of diversity in the society through exclusion, intolerance 
and short term measures; such as mass killings or deportation. Fascism generally 
implemented this second form, because Fascists were convinced that they were living 
in a watershed moment in history with a special, almost spiritual task at hand,293 and 
to achieve to their goals as fast as possible, time was precious. The Republican 
practices oscillated between these two forms of eliminations. 
 Practices such as the education policies which used Turkish as the sole medium 
of instruction, the forced relocation of Kurdish tribe members in the Western parts of 
Turkey to dissolve their ethnic identities within the dominant Turkish identity of those 
regions were some of the plans that targeted long term assimilation. These practices 
did differ immensely from the extreme short term measures which can be seen in the 
Fascist extermination policies of the era. A plan such as the encouragement of Turkish 
women to marry non-Turkish speakers for the Turkification of their future families 
which was a part of the Circular on Turkification of 1930 would be inconceivable and 
unimaginable for the Fascist regimes of inter-war era. Still, we must consider that a 
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rather large portion of the Republican policies were exclusionary and aimed to 
eliminate diversity in short term. The fate of the non-Muslim minorities is a good 
example of this approach. Initial legal statutes concerning the non-Muslims targeted 
to isolate them. Regulations such as Act concerning Civil Servants (1926) which 
blocked non-Muslims from civil service, the Law on Arts and Employments allotted 
to Turkish Citizens (1932) which made some lines of work forbidden to the members 
of the Greek community of Istanbul and the regulations announced in July 1938 which 
prevented non-Muslims from becoming military officers restricted non-Muslims for 
specific roles in the society. Although later events such as Thrace Incidents of 1934, 
and the Wealth Tax of 1942 that physically and economically targeted non-Muslims 
were not entirely orchestrated by the regime, they were in accordance with the 
Republican perception of the non-Muslim minorities. For the Republican mind-set 
they were either agents of ‘foreign interests’ or mere ‘guests’ in Turkey. Due to the 
traumatic events in the Republican era the non-Muslim population reduced gradually 
and immigration became a viable option for the minorities. Eventually, these 
destructive and discriminatory politics were successful; while in 1927, 2.5 per cent of 
the population was non-Muslim, in modern Turkey this number dropped to 2 per 
thousand excluding the Alevis and non-religious.294 
 For the Muslim minorities the experience of Turkification depended to their 
background. For the millions of migrants arrived in Turkey from the Balkans, and 
Caucasus during the late 19th and 20th centuries, the experience was more positive. For 
them the assimilation process was quite straightforward, they had to give up their 
native language in exchange for being ‘proper’ Turkish nationals. This assimilation 
process was most problematic for Kurds due to several reasons. First, the Kurds were 
a much larger community. Secondly, in some provinces they were in majority. Lastly, 
the regime did not do enough to disturb the local, tribal, and linguistic ties among them 
by implementing serious social reforms. Due to these reasons, dissolving their identity 
among the new, national identity was an extremely difficult task. More problems 
followed when the regime decided to apply short term measures, and acted with brute 
force. In these cases the gap between the state and the Kurds became even wider.295 
In summary, in the domestic sphere the Republican nationalism targeted the 
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elimination of ‘others’ through Turkification, which can be described as an ultra-
nationalist approach. 
 On the other hand, the foreign policy of the Republican regime was 
fundamentally different than the domestic nationalist policies of the regime and the 
foreign policies of the Fascist regimes. According to most scholars such as Kallis and 
Paxton, Fascism goes hand in hand with expansionism. Kallis states that the ‘ideal 
community’ envisaged by Fascists usually covered areas which were left out of the 
boundaries of the Fascist states.296 On the contrary to the aggressive expansion plans 
of Fascist states, such as Mussolini’s dreams of controlling the Mediterranean or 
Hitler’s plans about the “Lebensraum” in the East which should be used as a colony 
for German settlers, 297  Republican foreign policy was based on the peaceful co-
existence of countries. Instead of expansion, the Republican policy relied on the 
contraction of the land and held that through the contraction of the land Turkey would 
be stronger. In the international sphere, essential notions for the Republican regime 
were the territorial integrity and the independence of the country. In this era, even the 
two instances of acquisition of land in Montreux and Sanjak did not conflict with this 
approach because in these cases the regime followed the international law to establish 
peaceful arrangements while for the Fascist regimes of the inter-war era, international 
law was perceived as a corrupt concept which was not a thing to be taken serious of. 
The reasons of this difference was ideological. According to Sternhell, the Fascist 
ideology was based the “total rejection of the bourgeois civilization with its political 
and social structures and moral values.”298 One of these values was rationalism which 
was discarded from the Fascist foreign policies but remained as an integral part of the 
Republican diplomacy. Instead of rejecting the world established on the values of 
Enlightenment, the Republican regime was fanatically devoted to the project of being 
a part of that world.299 
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As for the concept of ‘palingenesis’; the other central concept of Fascism 
which is described by Griffin as the “total transformation of the political, moral and 
aesthetic culture of the nation to produce a new type of national community”,300 
Republican nationalism was clearly palingenetic. The single-party regime was aimed 
for the total transformation of the society and the establishment of a new nation, and 
the methods it used were definitely revolutionary since it did not build any coalitions 
with the historical sources of power in Turkey. It closed down the centuries old Sufi 
religious orders, abolished the caliphate and the sultanate, and melted every single 
important social organization within the ruling party. Among the traditional sources 
of power only large landowners and the military remained parts of the Republican 
ruling mechanism but the ruling elite did not share much power with them; especially 
in the ideological sphere. The project of totally transforming the society that they 
envisaged was controlled by them without any interference from any other part of the 
society. Therefore it is safe to assume that Republican regime aimed for regeneration 
and rebirth and utilized every apparatus of the state to perform the necessary reforms. 
In the single-party ideology the decline and degeneration of the nation were not 
associated with a certain minority group (such as the case in Nazi Germany) or an 
external force (such as the case in Fascist Italy), instead they were associated with the 
multi-cultural Ottoman past, and the perceived backwardness emanated from the 
Islamicate culture. All actions of the Republican regime were performed to purge the 
remnants of this past from the monolithic, ‘healthy’ nation-state that they were aiming 
to build.301 Eliminating the ‘other’ from every single sphere whether social, political 
and cultural was seen necessary for the Republicans to achieve to modern, ideal 
society they envisaged. The methods they used to achieve this new society that they 
wanted to establish oscillated from generic Fascism to authoritarian modernism. 
Therefore the Republican regime can be described as a modernist, authoritarian regime 
with Fascist tendencies.  
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It should be noted that there were also numerous differences between Fascist 
regimes and single-party Turkey; such as Turkey’s acceptance of the values of a 
universal, Western civilization and the regime’s refusal to conduct an expansionist 
policy. This refusal was an important issue because it had internal repercussions. Since 
Republican single-party regime’s foreign policy did not have an expansionist agenda, 
Republican leadership did not seek to promote militarism in Turkey, unlike most 
Fascist systems. The regime in Turkey was neither militant, nor militaristic. It did not 
have any paramilitary organizations and it did not promote war.302 Similarly, it did not 
seek to mobilise the masses through a mass political party and RPP remained as a 
‘vanguard party’ which tried to generate change in the society by a series of reforms.303 
For some historians, these examples show that the Republican regime never truly 
embraced the entire Fascist methodology, but until the democratization process which 
started with the end of the war, the regime did not shy away from shaping the society 
according to its ideology in an authoritarian manner which did not give any room for 
political, social, religious and cultural plurality. Regardless of the lack of expansionist 
ideals, militarism and a search to recover former glories, the regime was authoritarian 
and it aimed to create a new, ideal national community through cleansing it from 
unwanted elements by assimilation or exclusion. The next chapter looks to this 









                                                          
302 Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, pp. 41-50. 




Turkish Authoritarianism as a Political Religion 
 
Like Prometheus, didn’t he (Atatürk), steal the 
fire from the hands of Zeus, didn’t he try to 
create “the new human” from the heat of a stalk? 
Didn’t he suffer the same end; the wrath of the 
one who never changes and loathes progress? 
And, even now, aren’t birds of prey 
continuously eating his liver, too?304 
- Yakup Kadri on Atatürk, 1953  
 
 
In the morning of the cold day of November 10, 1938, Atatürk, the president 
of the young Turkish Republic for the last fifteen years, passed away at the 
Dolmabahçe Palace, Istanbul. He had been battling cirrhosis for months, and people 
close to him were expecting the worst but the citizens, most of whom remained 
devoted to him from the early days of his ascension to the leadership of the nationalist 
movement in Anatolia in 1919, through the establishment of the Republican People’s 
Party and to the very last days of his four-term presidency, were still shocked when 
they saw the flags at the Palace flying at half-mast as a symbol of national mourning. 
The news reports at noon proved their worst fears right. Their leader, their ‘saviour’305 
was dead. 
 The level of shock was immense. The demise of Atatürk was a devastating 
psychological blow which shattered the dreams and the confidence of the people. Tarık 
Zafer Tunaya, who was then a student at Istanbul University remembered years later 
that when he saw the flag at the gate of the university flying at half-mast he thought 
that “while Atatürk was alive everything seemed possible for the future of our country, 
now at the time of his death, suddenly, everything seemed to be out of reach.” 
Similarly, Mina Urgan, another student of the same university described that moment 
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by stating that the entire nation felt “like a woman whose lover has just passed 
away”.306 
 Life in Istanbul seemed to stand still. All cinemas and theatres in the city closed 
for the day. Concerts, stage plays, and social gatherings were cancelled.307 Istanbul 
Football League games were cancelled and postponed for three weeks. While the 
government was preparing for a state funeral, thousands of people – especially young 
people and students – gathered all around the country and staged impromptu 
remembrance ceremonies to pay their respects to the late president. Kinross’s 
depictions of “women crying in the streets, praying in front of the pictures of Atatürk 
which were covered in black veils” show the sincerity of the trauma suffered by the 
people of Turkey.308 Yet, they were forbidden to express their sadness in traditional 
ways. The government prohibited the people from staging Islamic remembrance 
ceremonies.  
One of the most common of these ceremonies was Mevlid, an Islamically-
based but entirely Turkish tradition, in which a masnavi309 called Vesiletu’n-necat 
(Means of Salvation) which was written by Süleyman Çelebi at the beginning of the 
15th century to praise the birth and miracles of the Islamic prophet Mohammed is 
recited to the congregations at the mosques to remember and honour the recently died. 
According to Asım Us’s memoirs,310 this type of remembrance was banned right after 
Atatürk’s death started to be seen as imminent by the government. 311  Similarly, 
Cenâze Namazı, the Islamic funeral prayer of Atatürk was not held in public and was 
only attended by his family and close friends. One can assume that the government 
was afraid of the possible chaos and disorder that might occur in these rituals, yet they 
did not stop the secular ceremonies. In another impromptu gathering, thousands of 
students in Istanbul got together in front of the Dolmabahçe Palace two days after 
Atatürk’s death. Ulus, the official newspaper of the regime, reported this event with a 
highly peculiar choice of words, especially for an evidently secular country. The 
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headlines of the day read: “Thousands made the tawaf around the Palace”.312 Tawaf is 
an ancient rite which is known to have existed among many religious cults of the world. 
It played a very important role in Arabic polytheism and it was later incorporated in 
Islam as a part of the pilgrimage. In Islamic context, it means the collective 
circumambulation around the Kabaa, the holiest shrine of Islam which is located in 
Mecca. Ulus was not alone in associating the death-place of Atatürk with the Kabaa. 
Alaettin Gövsa,313 an educator, poet and Member of Parliament, composed a poem 
with similar themes which was named “Atamıza Tawaf” (Circumambulation of Our 
Father) right after Atatürk’s death. In this poem Gövsa imagined that following the 
passing of Atatürk he was circling the Dolmabahçe Palace which was depicted as a 
holy, ethereal realm and witnessing that every object related to Atatürk; the building 
itself, the soldiers guarding the premises and even the elements of nature were 
mournful due to the passing of the late President. Gövsa wrote: 
Old memories in my heart, I circumambulated,  
Since the sun314 does not rise anymore, everywhere was dark.315 
Symbolizing Atatürk and the regime established by him with the light, the sun, the 
stars and other sources of illumination and creating a dichotomy between him, his 
ideas and deeds and the people and ideologies which positioned themselves against 
Atatürk by representing them with the darkness was quite popular in early Republican 
literature. This tendency can also be observed in visual arts. Many monuments 
dedicated to Atatürk in this era were decorated with reliefs depicting several sources 
of light, such as the rising sun to reinforce this association.316 In accordance with this 
artistic trend, the rest of Gövsa’s poem was filled with similar imagery which glorified 
Atatürk as a source of light: 
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He was a torch, his cheerfulness brought light to every gathering, 
His magnificent personality filled up the state, 
His looks were beautiful, his soul was of a giant, 
He was a lightning bolt, in essence, a flame he was. 
 
With these similes, Ulus and Gövsa were not just making an exaggeration. The 
language employed by the regime regarding Atatürk’s death including the dramatic 
metaphors which associated his death-place with the Kaaba was quite deliberate. Like 
many other significant moments of his life – such as May 19th, his arrival in Anatolia 
during the nationalist struggle– a day which was began to be celebrated as “Atatürk 
Day” in 1935 and was later incorporated into a full-fledged national holiday – his death 
was used to add a brick to the establishment of the new political religion of Turkey. 
Like his battles, victories and achievements, his death was also sacralised. 
The official remembrance ceremony was carefully structured by the regime 
according to the new Republican imagery and icons. Atatürk’s catafalque was 
surrounded by six torches which were placed on tall white columns, resembling the 
Altı Ok (Six Arrows), the six main principles of the party.317 The emblem of the party 
was also six white arrows which are placed on a red background. The number six was 
a recurring theme in the ceremony, they were six guards watching over the 
catafalque.318 Black, the usual colour which is associated with death and mourning 
was replaced by red; the colour of the Republic and the party. Even his funeral 
challenged the traditions, and while it was secular in shape and form, it produced a 
deeply spiritual frenzy among the masses. In the official funeral ceremony, which was 
attended by hundreds of thousands, a stampede killed eleven mourners.319  
Yet the regime downplayed this incident, and constantly stated that life was 
going on, and the ruling party, the state and the regime would live on despite the death 
of the leader. They had to work even harder now, because Atatürk, as a source of 
natural charisma, was the cement that kept the Republic together. His successor, İsmet 
İnönü (1884-1973), who did not possess the charisma of Atatürk was proclaimed as 
the Milli Şef (National Chief), and took over the wide-ranging responsibilities of 
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Atatürk. In a speech given by Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu in 1943, İnönü was 
defined not as a usual leader but as “the mind and the soul of the nation”.320 In 
accordance with this description, the Republican regime carefully established an 
elaborate personality cult around İnönü mainly by associating him with the late 
founder of the Republic. 
The Republican political religion continued to use the cult of Atatürk even after 
his death to manufacture legitimacy for the regime. Throughout İnönü’s leadership, 
the regime would try its best to mirror Atatürk’s charisma on İnönü. Atatürk, who was 
already declared the “Eternal Leader” of the party at the Second Party Congress in 
1927, was acknowledged as the “Eternal Chief” of Turkey after his death. This made 
him the de facto ruler of the country even after his death, which created a strange 
hierarchy where the deceased seem to have more authority than the living. This system 
in which the actions of the living were constantly measured against the deeds and 
thoughts of Atatürk is quite similar to a “necrocracy”, a term coined by Christopher 
Hitchens to describe the political system in North Korea where Kim Il-Sung is still the 
official the head of state despite being dead since 1994.321 
The previous chapters of this study depicted the authoritarian and fascist 
tendencies of the Republican regime whose twin objectives were modernization and 
the creation of an ideal, national community. This study argues that to successfully 
reach to these goals, and to solidify and sustain the regime, the regime encircled the 
community using a plethora of ideological weapons, including the education system 
and the political party. During this process the most powerful ideological weapon in 
the Republican armoury was the Republican political religion which helped the regime 
to reach to the point of forming an ideological singularity in Turkey. This chapter of 
the study deals with the establishment of this political religion which was based on the 
personal cults of Presidents Atatürk and İnönü. The chapter will specifically focus on 
the reproduction and dissemination of the values of this political religion through the 
agency of public art, education, media and mass meetings, and the sacralisation of the 
secular entities, such as the leaders, the ruling party and the flag, to initially compete 
against and eventually replace the existing ideologies, beliefs and forms of belonging 
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in post-Ottoman Turkey. Since every political religion is designed as simple 
dichotomies322 – an almost pseudo-religious, celestial fight between the “positive 
force” represented by the regime and “decadent” powers – this chapter will also try to 
identify Turkish authoritarianism’s enemies which are crucial to understand the 
essential characteristics and tenets of the Republican ideology. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Political Religions and their Relation with Turkish 
Authoritarianism 
Political religions are political systems which strongly resemble the structure, power, 
intrusiveness, and pervasiveness of organized religions. Similar to the traditional 
religions, political religions have sacred codes and liturgies. The term was coined first 
by German philosopher Eric Voegelin in 1930s, during the rise of totalitarian regimes 
in Europe. Voegelin who witnessed the emergence of the Nazi regime in Germany, 
blamed the increasing influence of secularism, modernization, glorification of science 
and the decreasing belief in traditional religions for the rise of totalitarianism. 
According to Voegelin, in this spiritual crisis people started to look for spiritual 
meanings in inner-worldly political systems and in this process “the contents of the 
world became gods”.323 In summary, Voegelin’s approach was a deeply religious 
criticism of the powerful secular entities which were slowly taking the place of the 
religious ones in inter-war era Europe. 
 A similar concern on the “religious” nature of the authoritarian regimes of the 
inter-war era can be found in the works of Maritain. Maritain’s criticism have its roots 
in the Durkheimian dichotomy of ‘sacred and profane’.324 For Maritain, human beings 
have material and spiritual dimensions, and after the rise of secularism, World War I 
and the global economic crisis, liberal political systems lost the ability to reflect this 
spirituality. Maritain claims that only a political order which recognizes the 
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sovereignty of God is suitable for the spiritual needs of the people and states that in 
the spiritual vacuum of the inter-war era, new, Messianic regimes such as communism 
and fascism which promised both inner-worldly and spiritual salvation emerged. 
These regimes transformed secular entities such as the party and the state into religious 
entities, or in Maritain’s words; “turned idols into Gods”. Maritain defines these 
regimes as “secular religions” or “earthly religions” which had inner-worldly ends but 
still inspired “a sense of sacredness, of faith, of dedication, of fanaticism, intransigence 
and intolerance” as were the traditional religions. 325  Similarly, Luigi Storzo, a 
contemporary of Voegelin and Maritain described the system in Nazi Germany as a 
“pagan state religion” and stated that leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini were 
“elevated to the rank of prophet and saviour”. It should be noted that most of these 
critics came from religious and conservative backgrounds. They perceived religions 
as positive forces in humanity’s journey while political religions were seen as usurpers, 
occupying the rightful place of the divine. 
The theories of these conservative authors were later criticized or expanded by 
liberal social scientists. Hannah Arendt, one of the foremost experts on totalitarianism, 
refused Voegelin’s assumptions from a secular perspective. In 1950s, Arendt stated 
that blaming the rise of the authoritarian regimes on a religious crisis was questionable 
and secondly, assuming that the free, democratic societies were the achievements of 
religion was problematic. Furthermore, Arendt warned that the perception of religion 
as a remedy of totalitarianism may lead to the transformation of religions into 
ideologies, which could have equally devastating effects.326 In light of these criticisms, 
starting from 1960s, a more secular wave of scholarship started to develop on the 
concept of political religions. Among these scholars, Raymond Aron who used the 
concept of ‘secular religion’ as a synonym for totalitarianism327 did not perceive 
secularism in a negative light. In fact, he was critical of religions, and for him a 
political system taking the shape of religion was particularly dangerous because these 
regimes tend to overturn the acquisitions made possible due to Enlightenment values 
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by violating the private spheres of the people and abolishing the separation between 
the state and society.328  Juan J. Linz who lived in authoritarian Germany, and Spain, 
similarly pointed out how these regimes encroach the personal rights of the people by 
proposing their values as absolute truths. Linz described political religions as a 
“complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, a system of beliefs about authority, society 
and history, providing a comprehensive world vision, a weltanschauung that claims a 
truth-value incompatible with other views including the existing religious traditions”. 
Emilio Gentile, who wrote extensively about the concept defined it very similarly. 
Gentile stated that the political religions resemble “new churches devoted to 
propagandizing faith in absolute and unquestionable ideological truths, persecuting 
the unfaithful and worshipping sacralised human entities”. For Linz, the crucial 
sacralisation process includes attributing sacredness to secular “persons, places, 
symbols, dates, and the elaboration of rituals connected with them.” For instance, 
Lenin’s mausoleum, which was at least on paper a profane place in Durkheimian sense, 
was transformed into a sacred place through a series of parades, symbols, and 
ceremonies during the Soviet era.329 Similarly, in Nazi Germany, the profane concepts 
such as “blood and soil, people and Reich, Führer and flag” and the Nazi Party itself 
“elevated to the object of belief”. In political religions, agreeing with the official state 
ideology is not enough, members of the community must also “believe” in the 
sacredness of the ideology.330 
 In political religions, the transformation of the profane is usually initiated by a 
mostly elite group, which acts almost like a secular clergy. This group is controlled by 
the leader himself, through the instrumentality of several state apparatuses such as the 
education system or a mass political party. The group includes party members, 
bureaucrats, intellectuals, artists, academics, teachers, journalists and other public 
figures who can propagandize faith in the values represented by the regime. According 
to Gentile, the sacralisation process in political religions is not limited to the values, 
people and places related to the regime but it extends to the very sphere of politics, 
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and in time the religious and political dimensions merge with each other, and the 
regime takes over the features of a religion.331 For Gentile, unlike ‘civil religions’, 
which refer to the secular belief systems that coexist with traditional, religious ones, 
political religions seek to replace the existing religions.332 Stanley Payne suggests that 
political religions are arbitrary and totalising while civil religions are limited and 
tolerant and renounce any claim to control theistic religions. Payne also adds that while 
political religions expand the state’s power and try to atomise society, civil religions 
encourage voluntary associations.333 
 Promoting a Manichean world-view is one of the basic tenets of political 
religions. They claim that there is a cosmological battle between the forces of the light, 
represented by the political religion itself, and the forces of the dark, its political 
enemies. For most of the political religions, this eternal enemy is an external force and 
its internal agents. For instance, for Fascist Italy, the enemies were socialism, 
liberalism, their proxies in Italy and the supposed spiritual decadence emanated from 
these sources. In single-party Turkey, this celestial battle was fought between the 
single-party ideology and – not an external or even a material force – the country’s 
past. Single-party Turkey was an entity at war with its memories and was aiming to 
eradicate all remnants of the imperial, multi-cultural, Islamicate past through a series 
of modernizing reforms. Subordination of the religious authority was seen a necessity 
for the success of the regime. This characteristic of the Republican regime is in perfect 
accord with Linz’ theory on the hostile attitudes of political religions towards the 
traditional ones. Linz states that unlike civil religions, political religions do attempt to 
“compete with the existing religions, take their place and if possible destroy them”.334 
The relations between Turkish authoritarianism and Islam fits well into this category. 
Turkish authoritarianism never downplayed its revolutionary intentions 
concerning religion. It considered religion and the traditions that ensued from it as the 
main rivals to total state authority, as well as a reactionary force which must be 
controlled for the sake of the success of the modernization process. The competition 
between the new regime and the historical authority of the religious institutions 
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implies a comparable situation to Mosse’s interpretation of the rivalry between the 
National Socialism and Christianity. In Mosse’s opinion “National Socialism was a 
religion; the depth of the ideology, the liturgy, the element of hope, all helped to give 
the movement the character of a new faith ... Christianity was a rival, not a friend.”335 
Similarly in Turkey, Islam and the Islamic identity were the strongest rivals of the 
single-party regime. 
In Turkey, the single-party regime wanted to totally control Islam. To achieve 
this goal in November 1925 it closed all voluntary religious associations including the 
Sufi religious orders (Tarikat) which represented the almost infinite various 
permutations of heterodox Islam and dominated the spiritual and social life in the 
empire, specifically in the rural areas. This led to the diminution of the visibility of the 
Islamic religion in the social sphere. Furthermore in 1924, the regime terminated the 
authority of the caliphate, a papal-like institution which harboured claims of world-
wide jurisdiction over every Muslim, closed the Ministry of Religious Affairs which 
was itself a continuation of the office of Sheik ul-Islam336 that “governed an elaborate 
hierarchy of religious officials including judges, juris consults, and religious 
teachers”337 and to replace them, it established a state agency called Presidency of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) which became the sole authority over 
religious matters and promoted a modernised, Turkified,  and westernized version of 
Islam. In this era, religion was allowed to exist and thrive only in the boundaries which 
were determined by the state. 
The establishment of a political religion as a Republican state policy is studied 
rarely and when it is done, the results tend to be far from accurate. For instance Payne 
suggests that Republican Turkey created “a more limited civil religion”. 338 
Plaggenborg goes a step further and paradoxically suggests that although the single-
party regime used a religious terminology when establishing a cult of Atatürk and the 
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Republican imagery and language had a religious colouring, the regime did not even 
create a "civil religion".339 If we examine Gentile’s taxonomy of political and civil 
religions, we see that civil religions do live side by side with traditional religions and 
various secular ideologies.340 That is hardly true about the Turkish authoritarianism of 
1930s. Turkish authoritarianism did not coexist with other ideologies and political 
movements. No ideology, whether it was religious or secular, except what was 
promoted by the regime was allowed to organize and promote its values and ideas. 
Gentile adds that in civil religions “the full autonomy of the individual from the 
collective” is recognized and this is not the case for Turkish authoritarianism. In early 
Republican Turkey the individual was seen merely as a member, an integral part of a 
coherent, cohesive monolith of a society which was perceived to be undivided by any 
ideological, gender-related or class-based differences and was described by Peker, the 
Secretary-General of the single-party as “a national bloc”.341 In Republican discourse 
the interests of this bloc should always trump the rights of the individual, as Peker 
stated people should not be allowed to “have their own way” and should work together 
to reach the common goals set by the regime.342 According to Republican doxa, the 
individual was seen as void of any previous ideological or spiritual engagement, 
almost as a tabula rasa on which the regime could build a new Republican identity 
from scratch.  
This hostile attitude of the early Republican regime towards ideologies, beliefs 
and individuality led to the restriction of almost any form of self-expression such as 
belonging to an internationalist movement, displaying commitment in the public 
sphere to the religious, ethnic and denominational identities other than what was 
dictated by the regime since these acts were all perceived as separatism. In the 1930s 
the government even acted to close and absorb the social and cultural associations that 
were formerly sponsored and encouraged by the state, such as the Turkish Women’s 
Union and Turkish Hearths which further restrained the people’s ability of expressing 
their identities while concurrently undermining the interpretation of the Turkish 
authoritarianism as a civil religion that recognized the legality of the existence of other 
ideologies and beliefs besides the principles promoted by the regime. Atatürk justified 
                                                          
339 Plaggenborg, p. 204. 
340 Gentile & Mallett, p. 24. 
341 Tan, February 24, 1936. 
342 Peker, İnkılap Dersleri, pp. 59-64. 
135 
 
the closing of these institutions as “gathering similar forces together and moving in 
the same direction to reach the definite goals”.343 Along with these state-sponsored 
organizations, other non-governmental organizations such as the Masonic Lodges 
were closed on the premise of “being connected to foreign powers or interests”. The 
formation of class-based associations was already forbidden. The single-party regime 
did not even acknowledge the existence of various social classes in the first place.  
As these examples demonstrate, showing collective loyalty to religion, 
ethnicity, gender, ideology or class was not permitted during this era. Therefore 
defining Turkish authoritarianism as a civil religion is an implausible interpretation of 
the facts. The regime did not want to create an ideology that would peacefully co-exist 
with other ideologies, it sought rather to replace them. As the previous chapters show, 
Republican ideology was totalising, aggressive and intolerant against other values and 
ideas. It discouraged voluntary social organizations, restricted religious beliefs, 
political opinions, different forms of belongingness to ethnic and linguistic 
backgrounds, gender or social class and restrained the formation of collective 
identities to a domain limited within the state, and did not give them any room to thrive. 
To fill the void left behind by these forms of self-expression the regime built up a 
political religion based on the sacralisation of the secular personalities, entities and 
objects. 
 
The Process of the Sacralisation of the Secular in Turkey 
Gentile states that political religions are established after a process of “sacralisation” 
which occurs when the primacy of a collective secular entity is consecrated, such 
conceptions are incorporated into a code, members are considered an elect community 
with a messianic function to fulfil a mission, and a political liturgy and sacred history 
are formulated.344 We can observe that these steps were also taken by the Turkish 
single-party. First of all, the party was presented to the people not as a “regular” 
political party but as a special, almost sacred entity. The Republican People’s Party 
argued that it was a direct continuation of the Defence of Rights Group of Anatolia 
and Rumelia, the central organization which was responsible of building up the 
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national resistance against the occupation of Anatolia. Most members of the A-RMHC 
became parliament members after the establishment of the Grand National Assembly 
in Ankara on April 23, 1920 and contributed to the “national struggle” which was 
ended with the victory of the nationalist forces in 1922. 
A-RMHC was an umbrella body where various ideologies, beliefs and 
identities were represented and united to reach a common, definite goal of ending the 
occupation and restoring national sovereignty. Republican People’s Party publications 
claimed that the party was the sole heir of this rich and diverse tradition and stated that 
the RPP was “unlike any other political party, hence it was not founded from domestic 
political considerations. The party was founded during the War of Independence. It 
was founded due the necessities”.345 To further accentuate this assumption, the First 
Grand Congress of the party, which was held in October 1927, was officially 
recognized as the second congress, while the Sivas Congress (Sivas Kongresi), the 
temporary assembly of the Turkish national movement that was held for one week 
from 4 to 11 September 1919 in the eastern Anatolian city of Sivas and participated 
by all factions of the A-RMHC, was recognized retrospectively as the inaugural party 
congress. With this claim, the history of the party was consubstantiated with the 
emergence, planning, and execution processes of the Turkish War of Independence 
while, in contrast, the opposition which came to existence during and after the war 
were excluded from this shared political inheritance although they also originated 
from the same A-RMHC background and the War of Independence experience.  
This distortion of history proved to be crucially important because it managed 
to help the RPP to monopolize the success of the diverse nationalist movement, to 
present the party as “a political organisation which was put into existence at a turning-
point in Turkish history in order to carry out a special mission,”346 and eventually, to 
obtain legitimacy for the policies of the party. For the single-party its own existence 
was much more legal, important, rightful and significant than any other political 
organization, and was inseparable from the victory obtained in the Turkish War of 
Independence. This self-proclaimed peculiarity was frequently exploited by the party 
as a non-sequitur to prove the constant rightfulness and legitimacy of their political 
decisions and actions. Hence the single-party was the entity that had saved the country 
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and established the republic; disagreeing with its policies was not just politically 
wrong, it was also ethically unjust to the point of ‘heresy’ and conflicted with the 
national interests. From this ideological standpoint, every form of opposition 
regardless of its ideological stance, from socialists to liberals, from conservatives to 
Islamists were harmful for the future of the country being either “an obstacle to 
development, modernization and westernization or a threat against the national unity, 
national interest or raison d’être,” 347  therefore they needed to be excluded from 
political life, be isolated, incarcerated and even in some cases terminated.  
The fate of the Progressive Republican Party, the first significant opposition 
party of the Republic which was established in late 1924 is a clear example of this 
attitude of the regime. Among its members, the party had a wide array of prominent 
figures of the late Ottoman elite, war heroes and important actors of the Turkish War 
of Independence. With eminent names such as Karabekir, Bele, and Orbay within its 
ranks and a more liberal party programme, it was only natural that the PRP would 
become a serious contender for power and a fierce rival of the Republican People’s 
Party. 
At first, Atatürk seemed unimpressed by the new party. In a London Times 
interview, he stated that the party had nothing new or worthy to talk about that 
differentiated it from the Republican People’s Party and justified its existence.348 
Zürcher states that he even gone further in the interview and emphasized that “their 
republicanism is a sham, their party programme is fake, and they are themselves 
nothing but reactionaries” but later asked the Times reporter to leave these comments 
out of the final interview.349 From these accusations, only the last one seems to be a 
bit plausible due to the anger and discontent shown by some members of the new party 
towards the abrogation of the caliphate, but interpreting these complaints as 
reactionary activity stretches the meaning of reactionary considerably. Nevertheless, 
one year later, the party would be closed on the premises of supporting the Sheikh 
Said Revolt and its founders were put on trial for accusations on the grounds of their 
participation in an assassination attempt targeting Atatürk. This attitude which 
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constantly questioned the legitimacy of the opposition and glorified the ruling-party 
continued throughout the single-party era. 
Following Gentile’s model on the establishment of the political religions, the 
second step is the incorporation of the sacralisation of the secular entities into code 
which was completed in Republican Turkey in 1930s. Subsequent to the closing of 
every single opposition party in 1930, the single-party regime was firmly established 
officially in 1931. In the same year basic tenets of the party were put together in the 
form of six fundamental and inalterable principles, known as the ‘Six Arrows350  
which forged the framework of the single-party ideology and after being integrated 
into the constitution in the constitutional amendment of 1937; determined the 
ideological boundaries of the Turkish Republic. 
The third and final step in the sacralisation of the ruling party was the 
glorification of its history which was taken in October 1927, when President Mustafa 
Kemal delivered Nutuk (The Great Speech), his thirty-nine hour speech at the Second 
Grand Congress of the Republican People’s Party, and presented the events from 1919 
to that day from his own perspective. Throughout the speech Kemal discussed the 
weaknesses and deficiencies of his contemporary political enemies whom he recently 
silenced after the closing of the Progressive Republican Party. Although they 
contributed to the war effort and national resistance right from the start of the War of 
Independence, due to the political rivalry between them and Mustafa Kemal, he either 
downplayed their importance or dismissed their contributions altogether. In Nutuk, 
Kemal targeted the opposition members from the start and depicted them mostly as 
incompetent persons. In his vision the national struggle was won not with their help 
but despite their “narrowmindedness” and “constant obstructions”.  
A perfect example of this approach is visible in the section of the speech which 
dealt with the preparation of the Amasya Circular (Amasya Tamimi) in June 1919 
which is considered the document which set the Turkish War of Independence in 
motion. Kazım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay and Refet Bele either personally signed the 
document or were consulted during its drafting. Fearing that this fact would prove the 
claims of these opposition members that the war effort was a joint action and not 
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planned and executed by Kemal alone, while narrating the discussions in Amasya, 
Mustafa Kemal depicted them as incapable people who have signed this document 
reluctantly only after his persuasion.351 To emphasize the reluctance shown by these 
military officials, during his speech he even presented the original document to the 
Party Congress and asked his fellow party members to check how frail Refet Bele’s 
signature was.  
This example and many others show that Mustafa Kemal created a narrative of 
the events of the Turkish War of Independence that put himself at the centre and 
depicted the other important actors as reluctant, narrow minded, cowardly and 
virtually useless figures who almost caused the movement more harm than good. Not 
unexpectedly, this narrative is used to support, in fact even to whitewash, his decision 
to expel these old colleagues from the political sphere. Therefore we can conclude that 
the Great Speech settled all of the conflicts of this period in Mustafa Kemal’s favour, 
thus establishing the official historiography for the events between the Turkish War 
of Independence and 1927. After the Great Speech the history of the party and Turkey 
became sacred and inalterable. For instance, in 1934, “Our Independence War” 
(İstiklal Harbimiz), another historical account dealing with the same period was 
banned. This book was written as a response to Nutuk,352 by Kâzım Karabekir who 
was forced to live in political obscurity and under strict state surveillance after the 
closing of his party and the allegations on his participation to the assassination attempt 
against Atatürk.353 All copies of the book were confiscated and burned subsequently 
because it offered a different historical account for the events of the Turkish War of 
Independence.354 For the decades that followed, the Great Speech remained the central 
historical source for the Turkish historiography on the era, which further cemented the 
role of Atatürk as a saviour with a unique vision for the country.  
In time this unique vision would become the sole permissible ideology 
surrounding every component of society, invading every single aspect of the social 
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relations from education to administration, from culture to art. Therefore it is 
impossible to overlook the importance of the role of the leaders of the Early 
Republican era when dealing the establishment of the Turkish political religion. 
During the formative years of the single-party rule, the sacralisation of the party, its 
principles, and its history were closely linked with the process of establishing 
personality cults for its leaders, especially the two presidents of the single-party era; 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü.  
 
The Cult of Atatürk 
In the Turkish single-party regime, presidents Atatürk and İnönü were unaccountable 
to any legal body or the masses. On paper, there was a parliament and a cabinet of 
ministers led by a prime minister who were accountable to public opinion but 
following the demise of the Progressive Republican Party in 1925, the parliament had 
lost all of its impartiality and become a mechanism to ratify the political agenda of the 
Presidents. The parliamentary elections which were held every five years did not give 
the people any power to control the political sphere. First of all, there were no other 
parties than the ruling Republican People’s Party competing in the elections. 
Secondly, the electoral system was designed specifically to prevent any surprises, such 
as the possibility of the election of the independent candidates. The republican 
electoral system was a two-staged system. In the first stage, electors chose the second 
stage voters from a list of party representatives which had been determined by the 
party centre. These party representatives would vote in the second stage for a list of 
parliamentary candidates that was also predetermined by the party. There was just one 
list on the ballots for the second stage voters to approve. No ordinary citizen, member 
of the opposition or independent local party member could stand for election on his or 
her own initiative. Until 1927, the task of finalizing the list of the parliament members 
was left to the joint action of the party council but after that date with a change of 
regulations, Mustafa Kemal started to handpick all of the MPs by himself. 355  In 
summary the election process was just an elaborate confirmation mechanism of the 
decision made by the President without taking the interests of the local population into 
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consideration. Naturally this process made the parliament powerless to curb the 
authority of the Presidents.  
Without the presence of a strong parliament, political parties, or social 
organizations either secular in nature such as Turkish Hearths and Women’s Union or 
religious ones such as the Sufi orders, the entire political and social spheres were left 
to the single-party, and its chief, the President. As previously mentioned, in this era, 
other actors that usually competed for political power in Turkey, such as the military, 
were also tamed by the regime. With all societal and political actors were either 
coerced or having opted for collaboration with the regime, it is more than plausible to 
state that presidents Atatürk and İnönü enjoyed limitless, unrestricted power.  
There were two main sources for the legitimacy of the rule of the Presidents 
during the early Republican era. First, there was an apparent legality embedded within 
the system stemming from the existence of elections, a parliament and a cabinet, 
making it resemble a parliamentary democracy although the two-stage elections were 
nothing but an intricate acclamation of the President’s list, and the parliament and 
cabinet were merely apparatuses of the President’s will. Nevertheless, the regime used 
these elements to show that the Presidents had the backing of the entire nation.356 
Secondly, and more importantly, the regime derived legitimacy from the personality 
of the two leaders to acquire the much needed popular support, by promoting the 
personal cults of the presidents.  
It should be noted that in many countries, regimes attribute importance to 
several figures from the nation’s history, especially famous soldiers and politicians 
who contributed to the nation building process. Many nation states fondly remember 
the “Founding Fathers” of their nations such as Bolivar, Garibaldi, San Martin, and 
Washington. Therefore one might find the significance assigned to Atatürk, the war 
hero who led the national struggle successfully and İnönü, who was Atatürk’s right-
hand man, sounding board, and favourite Prime Minister while also being a more than 
adequate military officer on his own, quite usual. Yet, the boundaries between 
remembrance and glorification proved to be rather thick. In Republican Turkey, 
Atatürk and İnönü were not just revered as heroes, but their presences filled every 
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sphere of life. Furthermore, their ideas were made into an ideology. The introduction 
part of the RPP programme of 1935 stated that from date on, the Six Arrows, the 
principles pursued by the party will be “referred as the principles of Kemalism”, named 
after President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.357 Considering that in 1937, these principles 
were integrated to the constitution as unalterable characteristics of the state, one can 
state that the regime christened its ideology, its existence with the name of its 
president. Therefore the boundaries between remembrance and glorification were 
clearly crossed in the early Republican era. The regime was personified in its leader. 
The establishment of the personality cults of the Turkish leaders began by 
praising their statuses as war heroes. When they became leading figures of Turkish 
politics after the War of Independence, their vision, leadership qualities, and political 
acumen were also celebrated. All of these qualities can be summarized as their 
personal magnetism, in other words, their charisma. Since the main source of 
legitimacy of the regime was the personality cults of the leaders, the Republican style 
of rule of the era falls within the boundaries of charismatic leadership. 
Charismatic leadership was described by Weber as one of the three forms of 
legitimisation of political domination and as “the authority of the extraordinary and 
personal spiritual gift, the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in 
revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership”.358 Charisma as the 
main source of political legitimacy thus is a radical rejection of “traditional” and 
“legal-rational” forms of authority. In traditional form of legitimacy, the authority 
derives from custom and passed one sovereign to the following generation in a 
hereditary way. In the legal-rational pattern, the authority comes from rationally-
created rules. The traditional form of political domination is common in monarchies, 
while the legal-rational form is prevalent in democracies. The charismatic form is 
frequently visible in authoritarian states and political religions. Similarly in 
Republican Turkey, the regime employed the charismatic domination of the masses 
by the presidents Atatürk and İnönü to legitimize itself and to survive. 
Charisma as a political weapon can be categorized in two types; natural and 
manufactured. Natural charisma is defined as being spontaneously derived from the 
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qualities and successes of the leader, while manufactured or synthetic charisma is used 
to be fabricated by the utilization of media. 359  Although this categorization is 
problematic because it is evident that even the natural charisma employs the power of 
the media and contains a certain level of artificiality, here it serves a purpose to make 
a distinction between the two presidents of the era. Atatürk’s personality with is 
spontaneity, unpredictability, his ability to shape the masses according to his will and 
his heroic deeds as a war hero fit better to the natural variation of charisma, while 
İnönü who was a more careful, conservative politician who tried to continue the ruling 
style of Atatürk in a much measured way fits with the later model.  
The charismatic domination Atatürk had over the people of Turkey started 
even before his reign as a President. He became a semi-popular name before the War 
of Independence when he was first recognized as one of the heroes of the successful 
Dardanelles campaign.360 On October 1915, his photo and a brief inscription which 
described him as the “glorious defender of the Dardanelles” were published on the 
front page of the Tasvir-i Efkar newspaper.361 In March 1918, he was mentioned as a 
heroic figure in an interview362 conducted by Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın.363 In March 1919, 
the famous author and poet Yahya Kemal Beyatlı 364  wrote in Büyük Mecmua 
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magazine, that apart from the military success of the campaign, the battles “earned 
[Turkey] Mustafa Kemal”.365 The rest of the article defined Mustafa Kemal as “a 
young, diligent, and resolute commander” and “a great hero  ... whose name will be 
written in golden letters of history” due to the skills and leadership he showed during 
the battles at the Dardanelles. Another article describing him as an “exceptional 
commander whose reputation and famed soared after the last war” was published in 
November 1919, in daily newspaper Minber. 366 The story of this article is rather 
interesting and contributes greatly to the debate on natural and manufactured charisma. 
According to Falih Rıfkı Atay,367 a member of Atatürk’s most inner circle, Atatürk 
was a part-owner of this newspaper along his close friend Ali Fethi Okyar. 
Furthermore, he could have either contributed articles on his own to this publication 
or suggested what kinds of articles should be written as well. 368  Therefore the 
aforementioned article which further described him “one of the greatest commanders 
of the army” who “protected the capital from occupation by being the sole hero of the 
great battles [at the Dardanelles]” should be approached sceptically. In addition, this 
connection he had with Minber suggests that Atatürk actively sought to promote 
himself as a leadership candidate before his arrival to Anatolia, and influence the 
political sphere by increasing or creating his own charisma. 
In fact, despite his obvious military skills, Mustafa Kemal needed every kind 
of publicity, because although being known for his military expertise, politically 
Mustafa Kemal operated for most of his political career on the fringes of the main 
events. Born in 1881, in Salonica, in the European Turkey, to a middle-class family, 
Kemal had no family connections that could help his ambitions but nevertheless he 
managed to have a good education first at the Military High School in Manastır 
(Bitola) (1896-1899), later at the Ottoman Military Academy (1899-1902) and at the 
Ottoman Military College in Istanbul (1902-1905). Blacklisted due to his political 
activities in the military college, after his graduation Kemal did not get appointed to a 
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post in European Turkey and was sent to the Syrian part of the Empire. In Damascus 
he first showed the ability to effect his surroundings and took over the leadership of 
the Motherland and Freedom (Vatan ve Hürriyet) organization despite being 
challenged by other candidates of superior rank. He succeeded in returning to 
European Turkey in 1907 and opened a branch of the Motherland and Freedom in 
Salonica but his small political group was dissolved in the much more potent Ottoman 
Committee of Freedom (Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti) which was later merged with the 
Committee of Union and Progress, the group that organized the Young Turk 
Revolution in 1908 and later became the ruling party of the Ottoman Empire. 
Within this much larger committee Mustafa Kemal who was junior to the main 
political actors of the era, once again drifted to the fringes of the political centre.369 
There are different accounts as to why he was relegated to obscurity. According to 
Cebesoy, he and Kemal too openly criticized the policies of the CUP and their 
outspokenness led to their exclusion from the top ranks. Kemal’s personal clashes with 
his superior Enver Pasha, one of the leaders of the party and one of the most powerful 
men in the Empire, did not help his cause either.370 Even after his first success at the 
Dardanelles which made him a respected name his talent was not rightly recognized 
by the upper echelons of the party and he was denied a promotion to the rank of a 
general. Nevertheless, his military success continued in the Eastern campaign where 
the Ottoman army managed to stop the Russian army temporarily at Bitlis and Muş. 
By 1917, he was still not in the top echelons of the party but his successes landed him 
the potentially key role of being the advisor to Prince Vahdettin, the heir apparent to 
the Ottoman throne. A year later the Prince became the Sultan and Kemal wanted to 
magnify his own influence through his authority but Vahdettin proved to be too 
cautious to follow Kemal’s guidance and passed up the chance to take a firm grip on 
power at the expense of the ruling CUP. Nevertheless, not being in the top echelons 
of CUP helped Kemal eventually, after the utter defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the 
end of the war, he did not fall from grace like other notable CUP members.  
Following the occupation of the capital Istanbul by the Allied Powers, most 
influential members of the Committee, such as the members of the ruling triumvirate, 
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Talat, Enver and Cemal departed the Empire with the help of their German allies. This 
escape intensified the opposition which was already established both within and 
outside of the Committee and combining with the people’s dissatisfaction with the 
way CUP handled the war effort and ruled the Empire, it created a huge backlash 
against them.371 Therefore, not being a significant member of the Committee helped 
Mustafa Kemal on two interrelated levels. First, he was still respected by the people 
and his military colleagues despite the general defeat, and secondly, the new 
government that replaced the Unionist cabinet found in him a reputable officer 
untainted by Unionist politics which secured him a crucial post in Anatolia, the centre 
of the flourishing nationalist movement. The government decided to send a willing 
Mustafa Kemal to inspect the situation in Anatolia to satisfy the demands of the Allies 
who had concerns regarding the establishment of self-defence committees against the 
occupation, lack of public order, and the situation of the religious minorities. Allied 
Powers feared that the Allied occupation could cause reprisal attacks from the armed 
resistance members against the local Christians. To secure public order and prevent 
these attacks, this office equipped Mustafa Kemal with extensive and wide-ranging 
authority.372 Therefore when he arrived to Anatolia in 1919 as the Inspector to the 9th 
Army, he was reputable and powerful enough to present himself as a suitable candidate 
for the leadership of the fledgling nationalist resistance. 
When the Greeks occupied Izmir in May 1919 on behalf of the Allied powers, 
the Anatolian nationalists severed their ties with the government in Istanbul. Among 
the generals and high-ranking bureaucrats of the nationalist movement, Mustafa 
Kemal came to the fore for several reasons. First, he had a suitable military 
background. Furthermore, to other household names he was either ranked superior or 
his reputation was less tainted since he was not a part of the CUP ruling clique which 
suffered a devastating defeat in the First World War. He was one of the obvious 
choices for the leadership of the Defence of Rights Group of Anatolia and Rumelia. 
In August 1919, Mustafa Kemal was chosen as the Head of the Representative 
Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye), the temporary executive branch of the nationalist 
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movement. In the following months between his arrival in Anatolia and the 
establishment of the National Assembly in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal successfully 
defended his position as the leader of the nationalist movement against the supporters 
of a United States mandate for the remaining parts of the empire, activists who sought 
the independence of their respective regions of Anatolia instead of the liberation of 
the whole country373 and the Istanbul government that sought to punish him after his 
defection to the nationalist cause. Subsequently to the establishment of the National 
Assembly he used his influence to get selected for the office of the Speaker of the 
Parliament in Ankara in April 1920. Through this office he also acted as the head of 
government and gained further power. In summary, his military record during the First 
World War provided him a sound basis on which he started to construct a lasting 
legacy with the help of his wide-ranging realm of authority, intellect, political acumen, 
talent for organization and personal charisma. In the following months, he began to 
eliminate the burgeoning opposition against him step-by-step and paved the way to 
the personal rule which would eventually end with the establishment of his cult of 
personality. 
 
The Transition from Parliamentary System to the Personal Rule 
When the parliament was opened in Ankara on April 23, 1920, Turkey already had a 
brief yet intense experience with parliamentarism from the First and Second 
Constitutional Eras. The parliament in Ankara, the Grand National Assembly as a 
successor of this tradition, proved to be very dynamic. Actions of the government and 
even the military decisions of the general staff were dissected and debated vividly 
which made the assembly difficult to control. This pushed Mustafa Kemal to follow a 
more cautious approach since his position was still unstable in his early days at the 
office. There were other significant factors that contributed to his alertness. The most 
significant of these was the fragile military power of Ankara. Due to the lack of a 
central army, the government in Ankara was only able to deal with the military actions 
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funded by the Istanbul government and Anatolian people’s apathy for the nationalist 
struggle or in some cases their downright hostility towards the nationalists in Ankara 
through the instrumentality of the irregular forces. Furthermore, the fledgling 
nationalist resistance was having troubles of gaining the trust of the countryside which 
was caught between the civil war between the rival governments in Istanbul and 
Ankara, and infected by food shortages and lack of public order. In addition to this 
chaos, the CUP elite in exile were still casting long shadows over the new capital, and 
finally the political sphere in the city was in turmoil especially due to mushrooming 
of new socialist organizations which were founded to obtain Soviet help for the 
Turkish cause.374 In these chaotic circumstances Kemal slowly but surely altered the 
parliamentary regime into a personal rule yet managed to keep the legal appearance.  
His tendencies bordering on an authoritarian attitude started very early in 
September 1920 when he directly interfered to replace the legally elected Minister of 
the Interior Dr. Nâzım Resmor, a confessed socialist. When Resmor was elected by 
the Parliament to this post in expense of Kemal’s own candidate Refet Bele, he 
intervened with the process, and asked Resmor to step down.375 Resmor was the 
Secretary-General and the author of the party charter of the Green Army (Yeşil Ordu 
Cemiyeti), the most significant of the numerous socialist organizations which were 
established in Ankara after the rapprochement with the Soviets. Green Army was 
favouring the unification of the social aspects of Islam, especially the Islamic charity 
with the political ideals of Communism to create a localized, Islamicised version of 
socialism.376 After Resmor stepped down, Kemal claimed that he and his friends were 
“spies for foreign organizations”377 and sent him to the Independence Courts. In May 
1921 Resmor was sentenced to 15 years of hard labour but he was released in 
September without serving his full sentence by courtesy of a general amnesty which 
further proves that the accusations of treason and being a servant of foreign interests 
were far-fetched or more probably entirely unfounded. Regardless of Dr. Nâzım’s fate, 
the process of his forced resignation and the following accusations served the needs 
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of Mustafa Kemal. Following the incident, to prevent anything similar from happening 
again, Mustafa Kemal forced the Grand National Assembly to change the regulations 
concerning the selection of ministers in November 1920. Up to that point ministers 
were selected from a list of candidates nominated by their fellow deputies. The 
Assembly established the government among its own members following a democratic 
process which made the political sphere more pluralistic. The new regulations which 
stated that “the ministers will be elected from among the candidates nominated by the 
Speaker of the Parliament” – in this case Mustafa Kemal himself – changed this 
situation.378 This modification made Kemal even more powerful at the expense of the 
assembly and can be regarded as the first step to from the parliamentarian rule to a 
more personal one. 
After this event Kemal managed to find success both in the political and 
military spheres. Internally, he took the politics of the new capital under close control 
by disbanding the organic socialist movement in Ankara. The Green Army was closed 
and a puppet Communist Party was established to control the socialist scene. This was 
followed by victories in the Eastern Front. Starting from September 1920, the Eastern 
forces of the Ankara Government which were led by Kâzım Karabekir started to gain 
ground at the expense of the newly established republic of Armenia and quickly 
recovered the Eastern territories lost during the war. Following their success the 
military corps which were stationed in the East started to return to the Western Front 
where a joint army of regular and irregular forces were trying to stop the Greek 
advance. In January 1921, Mustafa Kemal decided to disband the irregular forces who 
had been crucial in supressing numerous uprisings that took place in the countryside 
against the Ankara government. A small scale civil war between the regular and 
irregular forces ensued until the defeat of the most important paramilitary leader of 
the irregular forces, Çerkes Ethem.379 After Ethem who was also influential in the 
socialist Green Army took refuge with the Greeks on February 2, 1921, Kemal 
strengthened his position as the sole leader of the nationalist movement. 
The next step for the personal rule came in August 1921 in the form of the Law 
on Supreme Military Command (Başkomutanlık Yasası). To understand the nature and 
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importance of this law, we should briefly discuss the preceding events and the state of 
the nationalist war effort. Mustafa Kemal was aware that despite his purge of Dr. 
Nâzım and his friends, and the elimination of Çerkes Ethem and other paramilitary 
leaders, the opposition within the parliament was still strong. According to him, the 
members of the opposition established several groups within the National Assembly 
to delay the decision making process of the parliament. Mustafa Kemal further claimed 
in Nutuk, that these groups were competing with each other and thus complicating 
political procedures.380 Therefore he had “no choice but interfering” to change the 
order of things. Kemal’s choice was the establishment of a political group of deputies 
who were loyal to him. In May 1921, he formed the group and became its leader. The 
emergence of this organization, which was known as the First Group led to the definite 
division of the National Assembly in two camps. A smaller number of deputies who, 
although giving full support to the common cause of the National Assembly, were 
critical of Mustafa Kemal’s actions, mainly his ever-increasing power at the expense 
of the assembly became to be known as the Second Group (İkinci Grup). Mustafa 
Kemal, who was the head of administration and the government as the Speaker of the 
Parliament, became a party leader, as well. 
The following months were crucial for the nationalists in Ankara. The invading 
Greek Army defeated the nationalist army at Kütahya, and Eskişehir, the most 
significant town which lay between the Greek Army and Ankara, fell into the hands 
of the Greeks. Anticipating the invasion of the capital, on July 23, 1921, the National 
Assembly even discussed the relocation of the parliament to the Central-Eastern 
Anatolian city of Kayseri but a majority of the parliament members refused to 
retreat.381 Instead the parliament decided to send a group of representatives to inspect 
the battle fronts and give the troops a morale boost. Upon their return to Ankara the 
members of the inspection group voiced their concerns and suggested the appointment 
of Mustafa Kemal to the supreme command of the army, to benefit from the leadership 
skills of Kemal and to boost the morale of the troops.382 Mustafa Kemal who later 
claimed that this proposal was a devious plan of the opposition members who sought 
ways to tarnish his reputation by appointing him as the head of an army which at that 
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that moment seemed to be condemned to lose the battle against the Greek forces,383 
accepted the role on one condition. He wanted to acquire the legislative powers of the 
parliament throughout the duration of his command. Lively debates followed this 
announcement. While some deputies initially found this proposal unacceptable, a 
majority gave their consent.384 With the adoption of this law Mustafa Kemal acquired 
total control of state affairs; he not only took over the legislative powers of the 
assembly but also gathered executive power and jurisdiction in his hands through the 
Independence Courts.  
From Mustafa Kemal’s standpoint, this was a necessary step to establish a 
working mechanism for an effective, swift war effort and military victory since he had 
found some of the parliament members to be totally ignorant, incompetent or over-
excited on military issues.385 This law was extended three times for periods of three 
months before July 10, 1922, when it was extended permanently until the end of the 
war.386 With this law the authority of the National Assembly which started its life as 
a legislative and executive body was curbed severely.  
While the struggle for the control of the Assembly ended in his favour, Mustafa 
Kemal’s more important struggle continued in the Western front of the Turkish War 
of Independence. Eventually, the nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal succeeded in 
repulsing the forces of Greek occupation and altering the Treaty of Sèvres with the 
superseding Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed on July 24, 1923. From a disastrous 
war experience, Turkey emerged partially victorious, and managed to restore the lands 
that had been proposed to be given to Greece, and Armenia, and parts of southern 
Anatolia, which had been given to France. This achievement gave Mustafa Kemal a 
tremendous amount of prestige and earned him the respect of the masses. He became 
the embodiment of the success of the nationalist movement.  Kemal used this 
opportunity which was derived from the devotion of the people and transformed the 
First Group into the Republican People’s Party (RPP). The Second Group members 
were first marginalized and then eliminated from political life in the September 1923 
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elections. On October 29, 1923, the establishment of the Turkish Republic was 
officially proclaimed and Mustafa Kemal became the President of the Republic, an 
office which he would hold until his death in 1938. 
According to Rustow, Mustafa Kemal’s story until 1923 fits well within the 
charismatic hypothesis: His personal initiative, narrow escapes, successes, and popular 
support all fit in the notion of charismatic leadership.387 In the following years, the 
regime promoted his heroism and his almost supernatural abilities and qualities to 
manufacture further legitimacy for single-party rule. The success he had in the past, 
especially his management of the war effort was represented as undeniable proof of 
the correctness of the vision he had for the future of the country. Between the time 
passed between the Dardanelles Campaign which earned him his early fame, and the 
establishment of the Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal silenced the opposition both 
within and outside of the parliament, dissolved the irregular forces, destroyed the 
bourgeoning socialism of Anatolia, and managed to prevent the old Unionist elite from 
taking over the leadership of the nationalist movement in Anatolia. Furthermore, 
during the establishment of his cult, this very complex era and the contributions of 
various elements to the Turkish War of Independence will be simplified as the product 
of a single mind and vision, namely, as the product of Atatürk. His own narrative of 
the war effort contributed to this perception. For instance, the very first sentence of 
the Great Speech, the official historiography of the events, is “On May 19 of 1919, I 
arrived at Samsun” which spatially and temporally puts himself at the centre and 
genesis of the nationalist resistance. Furthermore, he stated that the important 
decisions taken after the war, such as the establishment of the Republic and the 
abolishment of the Sultanate and Caliphate, were already decided in his mind but he 
had to implement these policies cautiously because of the “limitations of the minds 
and souls” of his former comrades-in-arms who were sentenced to remain at the 
peripheries of the political sphere after his ascendance to the Presidency.  A very 
interesting passage of the Great Speech further illustrates this self-claimed prophetic 
vision. In this section Kemal claims that he “sensed a great ability for progress in the 
conscience and in the future of the nation” well before the establishment of the 
Republic but he had to keep this hidden “like a national secret and enforce it to the 
                                                          
387 Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of a State.", p. 597. 
153 
 
whole society gradually”. 388  This version of events depicts Mustafa Kemal as a 
visionary with a grand master-plan who had to break loose from the shackles that were 
holding him and the potential of the nation back. The actions of the single party regime 
showed that these shackles whether in the form of supporters of other political ideals, 
old friends who became opposition members, concepts and institutions such as the 
Sultanate, traditions, contemporary elections, or parliamentary discussions had to 
disappear so that only Atatürk’s vision would fill the entire social and political spheres. 
 
The Demise of the Opposition and the Domination of the Media 
The personality cults of the Turkish presidents relied heavily on their control of the 
media. In early Republican era a new class of regime-friendly media was created as a 
control mechanism, and important representatives of these media outlets were 
integrated into the regime chiefly by being picked as parliament members by the 
presidents. Along with the official newspaper of the party, Hakimiyet-i Milliye 
(National Sovereignty) (renamed as Ulus (Nation) after 1934), several newspapers 
such as Cumhuriyet (The Republic) and Vakit (The Times) whose owners or editors 
of were parliament members acted as mere bulletins of the regime which 
propagandized Republican ideals and the cult of personalities of presidents Atatürk 
and İnönü. The rest of the media, which had once thrived both in variety and quantity 
after the revolution of 1908, were forced into cooperation with the regime, and when 
they did not accept to stay within the ideological boundaries set by the Republic, they 
were silenced. 
In this era, the most devastating intervention came in the form of the Law on 
the Maintenance of Order which was declared to suppress the Sheikh Said Revolt in 
March 1925. The revolt was coincided with the rise of Progressive Republican Party, 
the first opposition party which managed to challenge the domination of Kemal’s 
Republican People’s Party. Using the revolt as a pretext, firstly the Progressive 
Republican Party was banned from political which was followed by the suppression 
of the free press. Although the 1924 constitution guaranteed the rights of the free press 
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and prohibited governmental censorship,389 by citing the superseding Law for the 
Maintenance of Order, numerous publications from every part of the political 
spectrum were banned by the government. The Istanbul press, which was seen by the 
ruling party as a continuation of the anti-nationalist tendencies of the Istanbul 
government, was especially targeted in the purge. Along with the newspapers 
supporting the Progressive Republican Party, socialist newspapers and periodicals, 
and Islamist newspapers which previously criticized the government for the abolition 
of the caliphate, were also banned and shut down.  
The purges continued even after new opposition party was banned from 
politics. The former leaders and prominent members of the disbanded Progressive 
Republican Party including decorated war heroes such as Orbay and Karabekir were 
put on trial in June 1926 on the grounds that they had been connected to an 
assassination attempt in Izmir which had targeted Mustafa Kemal. The war heroes 
were released but they remained banned from political life and some of them such as 
Kâzım Karabekir were put under strict surveillance while other such as Orbay who 
was abroad during the trials decided to not come back to Turkey until the 
normalization of the political sphere. In the trials out of the twenty-eight deputies of 
the PRP, six of them, while still serving as members of parliament, were sentenced to 
death by the Independence Courts for their role in the assassination attempt, along with 
nine other people. Additionally, in a separate trial, four former members of the CUP 
were hanged. In a short time, Mustafa Kemal managed to decimate the entire 
opposition. The defeat and subsequent tarnishing of the reputations of the old war 
heroes by associating them with an assassination attempt targeting the President were 
especially important, since these men, with similar backgrounds and military 
successes to Atatürk, could have been real contenders in fair and square elections. 
Furthermore, narrowly escaping an assassination plot added another brick to Atatürk’s 
charisma by making him look undefeatable. Following the attempt on his life Atatürk 
announced to the press that this attempt was not targeting him but the ideals of the 
republic and said that his “insignificant body will surely one day turn into dust, but the 
Republic will live on forever”.390 The claim that, along with Atatürk’s life, the ideals 
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of the Republic were under threat would be used throughout the single-party era to 
justify the authoritarian measures taken by the regime. 
After the demise of the PRP, Turkey became an unofficial single-party state 
until 1930 except the short-lived multi-party experiment of Liberal Republican Party. 
A second and more devastating blow to the free press came after this unsuccessful 
attempt at competitive politics in the form of The Press Law of 1931 which restricted 
the publication business from the political dissidents. With this purge in the media, 
only the newspapers that enjoyed organic ties with the government and the ruling party 
managed to continue their existence, a factor which would further expand the reach of 
the personality cults of the presidents. With the subordination of the media, the closing 
of the Turkish Hearths in 1931, and the university reform of 1933, which purged the 
dissidents from the universities, an ideological uniformity was established in the 
country. From that point on the cult of Atatürk was further solidified by several 
methods: Public presence which was implemented by the proliferation of Republican 
imagery and especially monuments and statues modelled after Kemal, and the 
ideological encirclement of the people through the instrumentality of education, 
People’s Houses, and state-sponsored theories on history and language. 
 
The Cult of Atatürk in Republican Imagery 
The steadily increasing visibility of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was a significant feature 
of the political religion of the Republican Turkey. Starting from the first statue of him 
which was built in Sarayburnu (Seraglio Point), Istanbul in October 1926, dozens of 
memorials were dedicated to him.391 It should be noted that the emergence of such a 
strong tradition in a predominantly Muslim country where due to rigid interpretation 
of the Quranic prohibition on idolatry,392 sculpture as a form of art did not find any 
room to thrive, is particularly noteworthy. In the Ottoman Empire, although other 
forms of visual arts, such as painting which managed to survive either in its 
Islamicized form of miniature making, or in the form of western painting which started 
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to develop slowly after the reforms of modernization that started in the early 19th 
century, sculpture, due to religious stigma associated with it, never found the same 
chance. Even during the era of transformation, the public monuments built in the 
Ottoman Empire only came in the form of government buildings, clock towers, 
mosques and fountains. The first monarch who ordered the construction of a statue of 
his own was Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876) but this statue was never displayed in 
public but was rather used decoratively within the boundaries of the palace. The first 
public monument with a definite political agenda was the Liberty Monument (Abide-
i Hürriyet) in Şişli, Istanbul, which was constructed to commemorate the soldiers who 
were killed by the forces of a coup attempt to end the Second Constitutional Era and 
to reinstate absolute monarchism in 1909, but this monument does not include any 
forms representing the human body. Therefore one can state that public statues were 
introduced to Turkey during the early Republican era, specifically in the form of 
Atatürk statues.393 The first statue of him at Sarayburnu can also be read as a challenge 
to the conservative Islamic values which the regime tried to eradicate and replace with 
the values of Republican political religion. 
The debates surrounding the first statue were extremely colourful and show us 
the importance attributed by the media to the monuments of Atatürk. Well-known 
figures of the Istanbul press debated vividly where the first monument dedicated to 
Atatürk should be built and how Atatürk should be depicted. The early debates focused 
on the location of the monument while different writers tried to detect where the most 
central place in Istanbul was and where the monument would be most visible to as 
many people as possible. Avram Galanti,394 writing on June 23, 1925 stated that the 
location suggested by the officials, Sarayburnu, the promontory on the north-eastern 
edge of the historical peninsula, was too remote. He wrote that “since he [Atatürk] is 
an übermensch, as well as being a human” the monument should not be located at a 
remote part of Istanbul, but it should be built in a crowded place instead, such as 
Eminönü Square, where many more people could see it daily.395 Prominent painter Ali 
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Sami Boyar, writing on June 26, was not that displeased with Sarayburnu as a location, 
in fact he seemed to like the idea of a seaside monument which people arriving to 
Istanbul via sea transport from the Marmara Sea and Bosporus would be able to see. 
Boyar voiced a reservation though, he claimed that people from the densely inhabited 
districts of Beşiktaş and Üsküdar, would not be able to see the monument if it was 
located in Sarayburnu and suggested that the monument should be built next to the 
Maiden’s Tower (Kız Kulesi), the small islet located at the Southern entrance of the 
Bosporus.396 Despite all these discussions surrounding the location of the monument, 
at the end the city council decided to build it at Sarayburnu. The works started in 1925, 
and this important and historic mission was trusted to the Austrian sculptor Heinrich 
Krippel. 
Another point of discussion regarding the first monument was the depiction of 
Atatürk. Not just the shape and posture of the statue but the outfit in which he would 
be depicted as well was debated in the press. Galanti stated that since Atatürk was a 
polymath, the sculptor could have easily depict him as a soldier in a military uniform, 
or as a civilian reformer or even as a farmer before coming to the conclusion that the 
first Atatürk statue must be represented in an officer uniform. Galanti based this 
argument on the assumption that although the war for independence was over, Atatürk 
was still in a battle against the “enemies of civilization” and since “the adversaries of 
civilization only respect strength, and strength could only be depicted with a sword”, 
the president should be portrayed in military attire. On the other hand Boyar remarked 
that the stance of statue is more important than the outfit and stated that the monument 
should look so solemn and aesthetic that even merely its silhouette against the Istanbul 
night sky should depict Atatürk’s historical grandness. Yet when the monument which 
represented him in civil attire was finished, its posture was almost universally panned. 
Krippel had depicted Atatürk in motion, his right foot slightly in front of the left one, 
which looked like he was planning to take a step ahead. Famous poet and author, 
Ahmet Haşim wrote that this movement of the statue was so distracting it made it 
impossible for the viewer to focus on Atatürk’s face and more importantly the statue 
looked in mid-step which made him look almost hesitant whereas a monument of a 
hero “should look like that he can wait patiently throughout eternity”.397 Although the 
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statue did not fully please the important names of the media, a huge crowd gathered 
on the day of the opening, and following a grandiose ceremony participated by the 
Mayor of Istanbul, thousands of citizens poured in to see the six-meter tall statue. The 
masses continued to come and witness this historic moment, the first publically 
displayed statue of a ruler in a predominantly Islamic country, until the dawn. 
Following the success of the statue among the citizens of Istanbul, monuments 
dedicated to Atatürk started to mushroom all across Turkey.  
In the same year several local Republican People’s Party organizations started 
to write to the President’s Office to gain the privilege of having statues of Atatürk in 
their hometown. In short time, this new trend became almost a race between local 
administrations. The representatives of Bursa came to Ankara personally to have a 
meeting with Atatürk for the possibility of having a statue of him and to ask him to 
visit Bursa.398 The representatives of Sivas went one step ahead and made the journey 
to Ankara just to thank Atatürk since he gave them his permission for erecting a statue 
of him in their hometown.399 In the following years, the construction of the statues 
became widespread. In late 1926, in the Central Anatolian town of Konya, a six-and-
a-half meter tall pedestal which was a part of an unfinished monument from 1910s, 
was completed by integrating an Atatürk statue on top of it. Similar to the one in 
Istanbul, this statue was financed by the town municipality as well. This time Atatürk 
was depicted in his officer uniform.400 Between 1929 and 1931 new statues were built 
in the north-western towns of Edirne, Kırklareli and Tekirdağ.401 In 1932, Samsun, a 
city of historical importance for the Republic due to its connection with Atatürk’s 
journey to Anatolia during the Turkish War of Independence, was given a special 
statue which is called the Statue of Honour (Onur Anıtı) and depicted Atatürk in his 
military uniform and on a reared up war horse. Considering Samsun was the only city 
which the rival Liberal Republican Party won the local elections in 1930, the 
construction of this monument by the local Republican People’s Party representatives 
can also be perceived as an act of recapturing a fallen city and baptising it with the 
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holiest figure of the regime.402 This statue too was made by the Austrian Krippel, who 
although his work in Istanbul was disliked by the experts, manage to find work in 
Turkey until 1938. 
After the proliferation of the statues all over the country, the government felt 
the need to control the quality of the work. A commission of nine “experts of 
international fame” was formed in December 1937 to evaluate the quality of the statues 
which will be made in the future. This commission had many esteemed Turkish artists 
of the time such as the sculptor Mehmet Tomruk,403 and famous painter İbrahim 
Çallı404 as well as internationally famed experts, such as French urban planner and 
architect Henri Prost,405 and French designer and architect Louis Süe.406 The statues 
were chiefly built after a tendering process and a competition among the artists. Most 
of the monuments were constructed by foreign sculptors. Among these, the most 
prolific sculptor was Krippel. The Austrian artist who worked on the statues in Istanbul 
and Samsun, built six monuments in Turkey between 1926 and 1938, including the 
monuments in Konya and Ulus district of Ankara. The monument in Ulus which is 
called the Victory Monument (Zafer Anıtı) was constructed in 1927 and financed 
privately by parliament member Yunus Nadi’s newspaper407 and its readers, which 
shows us how well the media and the ruling party were integrated to build the cult of 
personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
Probably the most famous sculptor who worked in early Republican Turkey 
was Joseph Thorak who completed the Security Monument (Emniyet Abidesi) in 
Ankara in 1935, and was one of Hitler’s favourite artists and along with Arno Breker 
                                                          
402 Most studies on the elections of 1930 and the detailed inspection of the election process conducted 
by the LRP leader Okyar show that Samsun was the only city which was “officially won” by the party, 
while the rest of election results which favoured the new opposition party were heavily distorted by the 
regime to protect the ruling single party. Since a complete data of the results are not available, and the 
available results were contested by the LRP on the grounds of electoral fraud, it is impossible to 
determine if Okyar’s claim of a countrywide landslide victory was correct. Similarly to Okyar, LRP 
member Ahmet Ağaoğlu stated that the most significant reason of the LRP victory in Samsun was the 
presence of a decent governor who refused to rig the elections in favour of the ruling party and claimed 
if every governor did act like him, the LRP would easily won three out of every four election districts. 
See Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları, p. 88. 
403 BCA: No. 8357, 30..18.1.2/82.20..18./8357. 
404 BCA: File 259, No. 10081, 30..18.1.2/85.106..12. 
405 BCA: No. 15295, 30..18.1.2/94.16..10. 
406 BCA: File 159, No. 12523, 30..18.1.2/89.119..3. 
407 Osma, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Anıt Heykelleri, pp. 40-45. 
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the most prolific sculptor of the Nazi era. 408 In addition to the sculptures in the 
Security Monument, Thorak also produced several busts of Atatürk including a well-
known one located at the gates of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography of 
the University of Ankara. Despite Thorak’s fame, he did not produce as many 
monuments as Krippel whose productivity was only rivalled by the Italian artist Pietro 
Canonica. Canonica has built the Monument of the Republic (Cumhuriyet Anıtı) in 
Taksim Square in Istanbul, in 1928, and in addition to two significant monuments in 
the capital Ankara. The Monument of the Republic is unique because it depicts other 
important figures from the War of Independence along with Atatürk. Apart from İnönü 
and Chief of General Staff Fevzi Çakmak, the Soviet allies of the Ankara government 
namely Mikhail Frunze, the Red Army commander and Minister of Defence who 
visited Ankara in 1921 and his successor Klim Voroshilov were included in the 
monument as well, but rather from their inclusion, the exclusion of other notables of 
the war effort such as Karabekir, Orbay, Cebesoy and Bele who were associated with 
the opposition against Mustafa Kemal is more significant. Considering the monument 
was finished after the demise of the Progressive Republican Party in 1925, the purge 
of the opposition in 1925-1926 and the delivery of the Great Speech in 1927, the 
monument can be seen as a marble and bronze manifestation of the transformation 
from a parliamentary regime to the personal rule and as the consolidation of the 
historical narrative provided by Atatürk. Here, Atatürk’s closest ally, his favourite 
prime minister and future successor İnönü and Çakmak, the loyal chief of the tamed 
military forces were depicted as standing on both sides of Atatürk, while the decorated 
military officers of the Progressive Republican Party who were fallen from grace due 
to the political rift between them and Atatürk, were left out of the monument, echoing 
their exclusion from the history of the Turkish War of Independence and their 
expulsion from the political sphere.409  
Another important monument of Canonica is the equestrian statue of Atatürk 
which was completed in 1927 and located in front of the Ethnography Museum in 
                                                          
408 Joan L. Clinefelter, Artists for the Reich: Culture and Race from Weimar to Nazi Germany (New 
York: Berg, 2005), p. 101. 
409 Contrary to the deliberate erasure of the dissident generals from the Republican memory, Atatürk’s 
loyal allies; İnönü and Çakmak continued to be included in further monuments. For instance, the reliefs 
covering the pedestal of the Great Victory Monument in Afyon depicted Atatürk, İnönü and Çakmak 
as jointly leant over a map, planning the final stage of the Turkish War of Independence.  
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Ankara. This statue was financed by the Ministry of National Education. 410 
Significantly different from the earlier statues, this one had reliefs covering the sides 
of the pedestal, and representing several moments of Atatürk’s life. One of these reliefs 
depicts a Greek general surrendering to Atatürk by surrendering him his sword while 
another relief shows Atatürk speaking at the parliament. Another relief on the side 
depicts several children giving him flowers. A similar pattern can be found among the 
reliefs on the Atatürk statue in Samsun. In these reliefs Atatürk was shown standing 
up while surrounded by his people, some of them kneeling in front of him. It seems 
that by using these reliefs which depicted some of the many roles that Atatürk assumed 
in the political and social spheres of Turkey, the local Republican People’s Party 
representatives tried to overcome the problems they encountered during the 
construction of the Sarayburnu monument. This way, Atatürk the teacher of the people, 
the father figure of the youth, the decorated military officer and civil politician were 
all portrayed in a single monument which further solidified his unique position as a 
President with wide ranging authority over many different aspects of politics and 
social life in Turkey. 
Along with the reliefs, another method of propagandizing the importance of 
Atatürk was the use of inscriptions surrounding the monuments. The first four 
monuments of Atatürk did not have any inscriptions except Atatürk’s name and the 
year of construction of the monument. Starting from the monument in Ulus, Ankara, 
which was financed by Yunus Nadi’s newspaper, more elaborate inscriptions became 
visible on the monuments. The monument at Ulus was covered on all sides by several 
quotes from Mustafa Kemal while the inscription of the monument in the North-
Western town of Bursa described Atatürk as “the saviour of the nation, the founder of 
the Republic, the creator of a new history of the world” and asked the visitors to “bow 
down in reverence in front of this sacred monument”.411 Similarly, the inscription of 
Great Victory Monument (Büyük Utku Anıtı) in Afyon,412 stated that the monument 
was dedicated to the “great national hero Atatürk” as a “souvenir of gratitude”. 
                                                          
410 Semavi Eyice, Atatürk ve Pietro Canonica (Istanbul: Eren, 1986), p. 9. 
411 Osma, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Anıt Heykelleri, pp. 58-62. 
412 This statue is not strictly an Atatürk monument because the main element of its composition is a 
giant of a man representing the Turkish nation towering over his enemy but the pedestal has a large 
relief depicting Atatürk. See U. Ayla Tekiner, Atatürk Heykelleri (Istanbul: İletişim, 2010), p. 142. 
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Another method for promoting the Atatürk image through these monuments 
was their imposing public opening ceremonies. Although Atatürk himself never 
participated in them, each opening ceremony was attended by the high-ranking 
representatives of the state and the party. Opening ceremonies were either integrated 
as centrepieces to larger national holidays or became local celebration days of their 
own.413 Typical elements of a Republican opening ceremony are all visible in the 
ceremony of the Statue of Honour in Samsun. The festivities on January 15, 1932 
started with the military marching band playing the national anthem which was 
followed by the reading of a telegraph of gratitude by Atatürk414 and a speech of the 
governor. The proceedings continued with the orations of other local notables 
including the editor-in-chief of a regional newspaper and director of education of the 
city. Parades participated by students and guards of honour followed the speeches and 
the ceremony ended with an official reception at the county council building.415 This 
chain of activities that corresponded to a show of strength of the regime with all of its 
administrative, military, educational and artistic presence, would become a template 
for all other opening ceremonies. Similarly to the ceremony in Samsun, the 
Sarayburnu monument in Istanbul and the monuments in Konya and Bursa were all 
opened by the mayors of the cities while the ceremonies of the monuments in Ankara 
and in places of particular importance, such as Izmir where the Greek occupation 
started in May 1919, were always attended by the major actors of the regime. For 
instance, the equestrian statue in front of the Ethnography Museum was opened by 
Prime Minister İnönü, while the Speaker of the Parliament and mayor of the city also 
attended to the ceremony. Similarly, the Atatürk Monument in Izmir which was built 
by Canonica was opened by İnönü and due to the significance of the city, the opening 
ceremony almost turned into a nation-wide celebration of a public holiday. 
The western-Anatolian city of Izmir was of crucial importance for the 
Republican regime for several different reasons. Historically, the occupation of the 
city by the Greek Army constituted the major event that kindled the national resistance 
                                                          
413 This practice is inherited from the Second Constitutional Era. The ground-breaking and opening 
ceremonies of the Liberty Monument in Şişli, Istanbul, were both held on July 23 of 1909 and 1911, 
respectively. This date was designated as a public holiday which was called Iyd-i Milli (National 
Holiday) to commemorate the anniversary of the 1908 Revolution.  
414 Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri, p. 611. 
415 Akşam, January 16, 1932 and M. Fuat Zübeyiroğlu, "Gazi Heykeli'nin Açılma Merasimi: Resmi 
Küşat Nasıl Oldu ve Söylenen Nutuklar." Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 26 January 1932, p. 5. 
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in Anatolia. The emancipation of the city had become a vital goal for the Ankara 
government and they managed to achieve this goal eventually when the final Turkish 
offensive drove the Greek Army, along with most of the Christian population 
inhabiting the city, out of the Izmir on September 9, 1922. Furthermore, Izmir was the 
second largest city of Republican Turkey after Istanbul which made the construction 
of a statue there almost mandatory but even more important than these reasons, the 
recent political events occurred in the city has made a show of strength in Izmir 
necessary. Izmir was one of the bastions of opposition against the rule of the 
Republican People’s Party. 
 In 1930, two major events which reinforced the authoritarian attitudes of the 
regime took place in Izmir and its surrounding region. The first of these incidents was 
the opposition leader Ali Fethi Okyar’s visit to Izmir. After the establishment of 
Okyar’s state-sponsored Liberal Republican Party as an opposition which would 
remain loyal to the secular and anti-monarchist values416 of the regime in August 
1930, the new party was met with unforeseen enthusiasm from the masses. Opposition 
members from every colour of the political spectrum, Republican People’s Party 
members who were critical of Prime Minister İnönü, and above all, the impoverished 
masses who felt the crushing blows of the global economic crisis of 1929 started to 
pour in. Just a fortnight after the party’s establishment, 13,000 people applied to join 
the LRP. The Aegean region of Turkey and its economic and cultural centre Izmir has 
quickly become a Liberal stronghold. To consolidate the support of the region, and to 
answer to a recent speech of İnönü, Okyar decided to visit the region on September 1, 
1930. When he and his fellow members arrived to Izmir on September 4 via sea 
transport, they found the city in a state of unprecedented excitement. According to 
Akşam newspaper around 50,000 people welcomed the opposition leader. 417 
                                                          
416 On August 11, 1930 after inspecting the programme of the new opposition party Atatürk wrote a 
letter to his friend Okyar which states his happiness regarding the special emphasis put on these two 
issues by the new party. He wrote: “Once more I have noticed with great pleasure that we share a 
common ground regarding the principles of secularism and republicanism. After all these two constitute 
the fundamental principles that I have always pursued and will continue pursuing in politics.” To further 
prove their commitment to the secular ideals, the representatives called the party, Liberal Secular 
Republican Party (Serbest Layık Cumhuriyet Fırkası), in their official writings and documents. 
Furthermore, the first article of the programme guaranteed the party’s devotion to secularism. In the 
whole programme, words such as “religion” and “belief” were not mentioned at all. Only in the party 
regulations “freedom of conscience” is mentioned as one of the basic principles of the party. For 
Atatürk’s letter to Okyar, see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri IV 
(Ankara: AAM, 2006), p. 598.   
417 Aksam, September 6, 1930. 
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According to Cumhuriyet, “there were men jumping from their boats to the [Okyar’s] 
vessel to hug him. A lot of them were in tears. When Fethi Bey finally reached to the 
embankment, thousands rushed to meet him. In this stampede his suit get torn, some 
people fell to the sea, some get crushed.” 418 The atmosphere became even more 
intense when the governor of the city tried to prevent Okyar from delivering a speech 
on the grounds of public security. Upon hearing the news, angry protesters shredded 
portraits of Atatürk to pieces,419 and broke the windows of the Republican People’s 
Party buildings. In retaliation, the police opened fire on them, which resulted in the 
death of a 12-year old boy. Okyar managed to complete the meeting on September 7. 
In the local elections that followed the events, the opposition party managed to win 
forty percent of the votes, despite various threats, and intimidations. This was the 
largest share of votes of the party received in the three largest cities of Turkey. 
The repercussions of the events in Izmir continued to be felt throughout the 
region despite the demise of the Liberal Republican Party after the elections. The 
second incident which contributed to the importance of Izmir occurred in Menemen, 
a district of Izmir province. On December 24, 1930 a mob which were led allegedly 
by members of the Nakshbandiyya Sufi order attempted to incite an Islamic revivalist 
revolt and killed a young lieutenant and two municipal watchmen. Shocked by the 
sympathetic attitude of the local folk towards the reactionaries, Atatürk pushed the 
government to declare martial law in the region. The commission that investigated the 
incidents claimed that a secret organization including influential Nakshbandi leaders, 
such as Sheikh Mehmed Esad Erbili had been behind these actions, although Tunçay 
states that the link between the reactionaries and the Sufi order was not very likely to 
be true. Even further, the government attempted to reveal imaginary links between the 
reactionaries and Liberal Republican Party, although these attempts failed. 420 
Eventually, the government rounded up more than 2,000 suspects; many of them were 
bystanders or citizens who had not been able to find the courage or means to intervene 
in the incidents. Among the suspects were some former Progressive Republican Party 
supporters. In total, 29 suspects including Sheikh Erbili’s son, were executed. The 
                                                          
418 Cumhuriyet, September 5, 1930. “Izmir Rihtiminda Tezahurat.” 
419 Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıl (Istanbul: Iletişim, 1984), pp. 117-118. 
420 Tunçay, Türkiye’de Tek Parti, pp. 303-305. 
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incidents were used by the regime to prove LRP’s link with the reactionaries, thus 
legitimizing the demise of the opposition party.421  
Due to Izmir’s historical and economic importance and its strong association 
with the opposition, the opening ceremony of the Izmir Atatürk Monument became an 
opportunity for the regime to show its strength. The media started to promote the 
ceremony days before the opening date. According to Cumhuriyet newspaper, people 
lined up along the railway line to greet Prime Minister İnönü on his journey to Izmir. 
Nearly the entire first page of the following day’s issue was allocated to the coverage 
of the ceremony. Several headlines illustrated how warmly İnönü was received, and 
how eager the citizens were to hear his speech at the ceremony and to see the Atatürk 
monument. The ceremony was held on July 27, 1932 and involved Prime Minister 
İnönü, the Foreign Minister, the governor of the city, ministers of education and public 
works, parliament members, generals, civilian and military officials, representatives 
of judiciary, representative from foreign missions of the city, local party members, 
students422 and according to the reports of Cumhuriyet and Akşam 50,000 citizens.423 
In his speeches İnönü described the statue as a “sign that will constantly remind the 
Turkish nation their common great cause” and as the “the embodiment of the will of 
the Turkish nation in the form of an unyielding iron grasp.” This speech demonstrates 
one of the main motivations of the regime’s determination of erecting Atatürk 
monuments. They were there to remind the people of their leader, the party, and the 
“cause” determined by them without any active contribution from the people. The 
monuments were a type of medium, an agent of communication which only worked 
one-way. In an authoritarian regime without any agencies of their own and without 
any social organizations or political parties, the people were forced to accept the vision 
of the leader that was constantly reinforced through the Republican imagery. The 
lavish opening ceremonies accompanying the monuments were more than being an 
instrument of indoctrination, they were staged to create awe among the citizens for the 
                                                          
421 In some Republican People’s Party sources, the Menemen incident is cited as the reason for the 
closing of the Liberal Republican Party although the incident occurred after the dissolving of the party. 
For instance, the RPP propaganda material celebrating the 40th anniversary of the party states that “the 
perpetuators of these incidents were encouraged by the negative aura caused by the Liberal Republican 
Party”. See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Ed.), CHP – Millet Hizmetinde 40 Yıl (Ankara: Ankara, 1963), 
pp. 30-35. 
422 Akşam, July 26, 1932. 




strength of the regime, and to show that their subaltern status is something to be 
celebrated, not to be fought against. Fittingly to these aims, the following celebrations 
were so lively they were described by Akşam as being on a par with the celebrations 
that occurred during the city’s emancipation from the Greek occupation.424  
In the Republican monuments the figure of Six Arrows, the official symbol of 
the party was widely used. Examining the photos of the opening ceremonies of the 
monument, the flags carrying this emblem are visible nearly as much as the flag of 
Turkey. The Six Arrow emblem was created in 1933 by Ismail Hakki Tonguç, a 
graphic artist and educator who would later become the General Director of Primary 
Education. The emblem depicts six white arrows, representing the six basic principles 
of the party, on a red background. The shapes of the arrows were determined by 
Tonguç after carefully examining the traditional Turkish arrows gathered from the 
Topkapı Palace.425 White arrows, closely resembling ray of lights, were symbolized 
the continuous forward motion undertaken by the party. The Six Arrows motif in 
Atatürk monuments is visible in the monument of Adana, which was constructed in 
1935. Here, Atatürk was depicted in military attire and located in the centre of this 
rather large composition of monuments on a pedestal while three figures circled 
around him. One of them, a healthy young man is depicted as holding the Six Arrows 
in the air. This figure, which unifies President Atatürk and his party in one monument, 
marks a crucial moment in the single-party history, namely, the party-state merger of 
1935. The merger, the zenith of the authoritarian tendencies of the early Republican 
era, dictated that the positions held by party officials would be taken over by 
corresponding representatives of the state. With this move the boundaries between the 
ruling party and the state, which had been already blurry, were totally removed and 
even the limited political plurality that had existed in local branches was sacrificed for 
total uniformity. The Republican imagery marked this crucial moment of history 
through representing it in the medium of art. 
In summary, the monuments of Atatürk, and the party regalia were utilized by 
the regime for a plethora of reasons that were interconnected with each other in the 
larger framework of building and later consolidating an authoritarian political religion 
which would replace the values, beliefs, ideologies and various senses of 
                                                          
424 Akşam, July 28, 1932. 
425 Cumhuriyet, October 19, 1933. 
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belongingness that were present in the post-Ottoman Turkish society. The monuments 
challenged the centuries-old Islamic norm of non-depiction of the human form in 
sculpture and thus served the modernist approach of the regime. Constructing 
monuments in cities where the opposition was strong gave the regime a chance to 
show its strength and regain its authority. The composition of the monuments 
consolidated the historical narrative determined by Atatürk by excluding the important 
actors of the War of Independence who became opposition members while depicting 
the loyal friends of Atatürk next to him in the monuments and legitimized the 
expulsion of the opposition members from the political sphere. Furthermore, the 
statues of Atatürk along with their reliefs and inscriptions and the lavish opening 
ceremonies accompanying them were perfect tools of propaganda for the regime. 
More importantly, the monuments helped immensely the establishment and 
consolidation of the cult of Atatürk by depicting him as the only legitimate hero, leader, 
and saviour of the people with almost supernatural abilities. This sacralisation of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is not just restricted to his constant presence in public places. 
The media which was controlled by the regime contributed to this process as well. 
For a citizen of Turkey, Atatürk’s presence in the early Republican media must 
have been impossible to ignore. He was constantly visible, and the respect and 
gratitude shown to him was bordering on glorification. He was called the Greatest 
Turk,426 the Great Turkish Genius,427 the Great Ghazi,428 the Founder,429 the Great 
Guide of the nation, the Great Educator430 and the Great Emancipator431 among as 
many other honorary titles. He was regularly compared to other leaders, military 
figures, eminent scientists and famous artists from history, and most of the time, he 
prevailed over them. Türk Yurdu magazine for instance described him as the “greatest 
genius and revolutionary ever produced for all centuries”.432 Similarly Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt, one of the most prominent ideologues of the party compared him to famous 
historical figures and claimed he was a greater leader than Julius Caesar, Hannibal, 
                                                          
426 En Büyük Türk (Afet İnan, “Türk-Osmanlı Tarihinin Karakteristik Noktalarına Bir Bakış.” Belleten, 
Vol. II, No. 5-6 (April 1938), pp. 123-132. 
427 Büyük Türk Dahisi ("Yeni Harflerimiz ve Türk Ocakları." Türk Yurdu (August 1928), p.  45.) 
428 Büyük Gazi 
429 Bani. 
430 Büyük Mürşid, Büyük Mürebbi – (“Dünkü Bayram Merasimi Karşısında." Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 
September 30, 1925.) 
431 Büyük Munci. 
432 "Reis-i Cumhur Hazretlerinin Seyahatleri." Türk Yurdu (September 1928), p. 39. 
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Napoleon Bonaparte, George Washington, Peter the Great and Alexander the Great. 
After this claim Bozkurt moved to comparing Atatürk’s importance to his 
contemporary world leaders and passionately claimed how much Atatürk had 
influenced them. Bozkurt stated that, “Mussolini admired Atatürk very much. 
Similarly Hitler always made remarks about how he took Atatürk as an example. A 
contemporary German historian observed that both National Socialism and Fascism 
were nothing but modified versions of Mustafa Kemal’s regime. This assumption was 
profoundly true”.433 Of course, when he uttered these words in 1938, these two leaders 
were still relatively respected figures, and had sympathizers in almost every country, 
even in the most stable Western democracies.434   
Another example of glorifying Atatürk by comparing him with the greatest 
minds of humanity, can be found in the works of the author Raif Necdet Kestelli. He 
stated that Atatürk is a far superior leader than Napoleon and his greatness knows no 
boundaries. According to Kestelli, Atatürk was a polymath. He continued, “Atatürk is 
a great scientist, an eminent artist, a world-wide known Turkish genius on the same 
level as Pasteur, Edison, Shakespeare or Beethoven.” 435 These quotes, which can 
easily be multiplied, reflect the prevailing sentiments among Republican media. Some 
of the qualities of Atatürk constantly praised by media were attributed to his unique 
genius while the rest were seen as a part of his hard work and dedication. He was 
pictured as a dedicated leader who worked ceaselessly to reach his goals. Türk Yurdu 
supported this image by claiming that Atatürk used to work “forty, fifty hours without 
sleeping and resting” for his country.  
Atatürk was the personification of the regime. His successor İnönü once stated 
that “understanding and loving the Turkish revolution, and serving to the success of 
the Turkish revolution cannot be separated from understanding and loving the great 
                                                          
433 Bozkurt, Atatürk İhtilali, pp. 69-75. On the other hand, according to Plaggenborg and Ahmad, in 
1950s, some Italian social scientists would claim that the Republican regime was an “imitation” of 
Fascist Italy. See Plaggenborg, p. 45., and Ahmad, p. 65. 
434 According to most sources, Atatürk despised his contemporary authoritarian leaders; especially 
Mussolini and Hitler. Kinross informs us that Atatürk had read Mein Kampf and said that “Hitler’s 
untamed language and insane thoughts made him feel sick to his stomach.” For more information, see 
Kinross, Atatürk, p. 535. On the other hand, some recent publications support Bozkurt’s claim and 
suggest that Hitler and other major Nazi figures admired Atatürk. For more information, see Stefan 
Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2014). 
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chief Mustafa Kemal and sincerely trying to apply his ideals. These notions are 
inseparable from each other.” With this speech, İnönü declared that Atatürk was the 
embodiment of the Republic and republican ideals.436 He was seen as the quintessence 
and the soul of Turkey. İzzet Ulvi Aykurt, a parliament member, stated right after the 
alphabet reform of 1928 that Kemal was the embodiment of the “spirit of revolution,” 
a concept which according to him was responsible for the progress of a society. Aykurt 
continued to describe Kemal as “a genius who had found the ability of keeping the 
spirit of revolution alive in his very own soul” and “our saviour, the genius of our own 
age, is one of those wondrous beings rarely produced by centuries”.437 These examples 
speak volumes of the level of admiration shown for Atatürk. If we return to Gentile’s 
definition of political religions being “new churches devoted to propagandizing faith 
in absolute and unquestionable ideological truths, persecuting the unfaithful and 
worshipping sacralised human entities”, we can conclude that among other secular 
entities that sacralised, such as the party, the state and the history of the War of 
Independence, the most intense and successful process of sacralisation has been the 
one focusing on Atatürk. Therefore his death in 1938 could have destroyed the 
Republican regime, but the Republican elite managed to project Atatürk’s charisma to 
his successor İnönü, and managed to survive.  
 
The Transition to İnönü Era 
As seen in the previous parts of this chapter, Atatürk played several roles within the 
Republican regime. He was a politician, a reformer and an educator. The monuments 
depicted him as a war hero and a successful military officer. Following the Republican 
reforms, he was started to be known as the “Head Teacher”, as well. Prime Minister 
İnönü also emphasized the role of Atatürk as an educator and stated that “today every 
corner of our country is a classroom, and the head teacher is the Ghazi, the main 
treasure and the greatest son of this nation”.438 These roles of Atatürk further cement 
the cult of personalities of the Republican leaders who filled various unconventional 
“functions” throughout the single-party era that cannot be associated with 
conventional political regimes. Atatürk was the self-appointed educator, the leader 
                                                          
436 İsmet İnönü, Ülkü – Halkevleri Mecmuası, Vol. 3, No. 14. (April 1934), pp. 81-87. 
437 İzzet Ulvi Aykurt, “Yeni Türk Harfleri Münasebetiyle.” Türk Yurdu (June 1928), pp. 1-3. 
438 “İsmet Paşa Hazretlerinin Nutukları. ” Türk Yurdu (September 1928), pp. 40-41 
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who was blessed with a special vision and the saviour of the people but above all, he 
was a father figure of the nation.  
For Leon and Langenbacher, in political religions the charismatic leader 
“becomes the quasi-religious father of the country”.439 Indeed, in Turkey, the leader 
became a father figure for the country; he was even called as Atatürk which means 
“the father of the Turks” or just as “Ata” in short form, which means “father”. Arsal 
summarizes the importance of Atatürk as the central figure for Turkish society with 
these words: “According to the ideology of the Turkish revolution the shortest 
definition of the state is a nation which gathers around his father (Atatürk).”440 After 
his death in November 10, 1938, the unusual connection he had with the people that 
had been carefully constructed on the basis of his successes during the War of 
Independence and consolidated through various forms of one-way communication 
such as elections, Atatürk monuments, and media, created a crucial problem for his 
successor İnönü. Upon coming to office and taking over the wide-ranging 
responsibilities of Atatürk with the official title of Milli Şef (The National Chief), he 
had to build similarly close relations with the citizens to fill the void left by the demise 
of Atatürk. 
This was not an easy task. First, the personalities of the two leaders were very 
different from each other. While Atatürk was mercurial and unpredictable, İnönü was 
more restrained, and careful. Politically, İnönü took all the necessary steps; he decided 
to expand the base that supported him and therefore rehabilitated political dissidents. 
Kâzım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay and Adnan Adıvar returned to politics after thirteen 
years’ exclusion although Karabekir remained under surveillance.441 This was a crack 
in the face of the regime that made the second phase of the Turkish authoritarianism 
more pluralistic than its first phase. Similarly, İnönü followed a cautious approach in 
international politics, and pursued a policy of neutrality during the Second World War. 
Internally, for the legitimation of the regime, the political religion continued to exist, 
and Atatürk, although dead, remained its central figure.   
It is debatable whether İnönü tried to emulate Atatürk’s role as the central 
figure of Republican political religion. İnönü did not openly imitate or challenge 
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Atatürk, even when he changed some aspects of his regime. His method was mostly 
reflecting, transferring the charisma of Atatürk to himself by pointing out their shared 
past. In fact, they were extremely close to each other since the days of the War of 
Independence. Atatürk trusted him enough to make him the commander of the Western 
front of the war, later to send him to Lausanne Conference to discuss the peace 
conditions and eventually, to appoint him as Prime Minister on three separate 
occasions for a total tenure of almost fourteen years. This story fits well to the 
description of manufactured charisma by Glassman. According to Glassman, though 
technically charisma should not be transferable, “in practice, close association with 
the charismatic leader often confers charisma onto others. At the death of a charismatic 
leader the group will often turn for leadership to one of the individuals closely 
associated with the charismatic leader. In this sense charisma is transferable and it is 
often the case that those close to a charismatic leader can succeed that leader.” This is 
exactly what happened in Republican Turkey. İnönü did not dismantle Atatürk’s place 
as the central figure of the state. He has built himself a place alongside it. 
Regarding their public presence, although Atatürk was dead he was still more 
visible than his successor. During İnönü’s reign, there were only three attempts to 
make İnönü monuments. In 1939, it was suggested to build a İnönü monument at 
Metristepe, Bozüyük, where İnönü led the troops of the nationalist government at the 
Battle of İnönü but this project was quickly shelved.442 In 1940, it was decided to add 
an equestrian İnönü monument in Taksim Square, Istanbul, next to the Republic 
Monument. The statue was finished in 1944, but was never erected in Taksim Square 
as planned, presumably due to İnönü’s avoidance from being perceived by the people 
as trying to challenge Atatürk’s importance. The monument waited for years to find a 
suitable place, and after the transition to multi-party regime, it was locked away. Years 
later, in 1982, it was moved to a small park in Maçka, Istanbul.443 Of the three attempts 
to erect an İnönü monument, the only successful one was the monument which 
depicted İnönü in civilian clothing and was located not in a crowded public place but 
at the gates of the Faculty of Agriculture in Ankara, which further proves İnönü’s 
reluctance to overshadow Atatürk, especially considering that unlike İnönü 
monuments, the construction of Atatürk monuments continued during this period. 
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Another example which shows that İnönü did not want to challenge Atatürk’s 
central role in the political religion but rather to use it to consolidate and legitimise his 
own position is visible in the debates surrounding the regulations of 1941 on how 
public offices should display the portraits of the eternal and national chiefs. The 
documents of the debates that came to my attention among the documents at the Prime 
Ministerial Archives also constitute a rich example of how the two leaders were 
incorporated in Republican rituals and of how bureaucratic processes work in 
authoritarian states. The story begins in 1941, when Dr. Rıza Levent, the Chief 
Inspector of Aydın region in western Turkey was apparently worried about the lack of 
protocol and order on how public offices should display the portraits of the party chiefs. 
In some offices there were only portraits of Atatürk while some others had the portraits 
of both leaders. Furthermore, there was no uniformity regarding the size of the 
portraits, the way the leaders were depicted or their location in the public offices. In a 
note he sent to the office of the secretary-general of the party, Dr. Rıza asked if there 
was a rule on which portraits of which leaders will go where in public offices, schools 
and other governmental agencies.444  
Secretary-General Ahmet Fikri Tüzer’s answer was negative, there were no 
regulations regarding this issue. Tüzer, who started to obsess about the issue, sent 
messages to every Turkish foreign representative, ordering them to make enquiries to 
find whether any regulations on displaying portraits existed in foreign countries. 
Furthermore, he established a commission from the members of the Ministry of State 
and the Ministry of Education to solve this conundrum. Despite their hard work, the 
commission could not find a universally accepted set of rules for portrait hanging. The 
Minister of Education, Hasan Âli Yücel, summarized the findings of the commission 
and stated that every country has its own set of rules on this matter. Prime Minster 
Refik Saydam examined the report and came to the conclusion that although there 
were many different regulations on exhibiting portraits of leaders in foreign countries, 
in Turkey “displaying the portraits of our chiefs in a random manner may cause a 
deficiency of the respect that everyone is obligated to show” and therefore “there 
should be a uniform application in every office”. 445  This was followed by the 
ratification of a set of regulations. According to the new regulations, current chief 
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İnönü’s portrait should hang right behind the chair of the public office holder (above 
shoulder height) and eternal chief Atatürk’s portrait should hang on the opposite wall, 
directly facing the portrait of İnönü. In offices where this setup was not physically 
applicable both portraits should hang next to each other, behind the chair of the public 
office holder. On these occasions İnönü would be on the right side while Atatürk 
would be on the left.  
More interestingly, the remaining documents show that these regulations were 
changed in 1944 on İnönü’s order and the places of the two portraits were switched. 
İnönü stated that this change was “a manifestation of our eternal gratitude and 
gratefulness we have for Atatürk” which show us that the earlier setup must have been 
criticized by citizens or other party members because it was perceived as being 
disrespectful to the eternal leader Atatürk.446 İnönü, who presented himself as the 
rightful heir of Atatürk and carefully tried to reflect the charisma of Atatürk onto 
himself, to obtain legitimacy, must have thought that the position of the portrait that 
was hung on the wall behind the chair of the public office holder was associated more 
with the authority of the state, and that it was best to leave that position to the real 
source of authority: Atatürk.447  
Interestingly, the position of the portraits of the two presidents resembles a 
similar design. After the funeral ceremony of Atatürk was held at Dolmabahçe Palace, 
his body was brought back to Ankara and was located at the Ethnography Museum 
which was a temporal resting place. Three years later an architectural competition for 
the construction of the final resting place of Atatürk was held. In 1944, the building of 
this tomb began but due to budgetary restrictions the construction was only finished 
in 1953, fifteen year after Atatürk’s demise. This monumental tomb, “Anıtkabir” 
(Monument-Tomb) was located in central Ankara, on a hill dominating the city. Since 
its completion, this massive building has become a focal point of official and civilian 
remembrances of Atatürk. In the opposite direction, facing this 56 ft. tall, 188 ft. long 
gigantic building, there is the rather humble tomb of President İnönü. Even in his death, 
he remained in the shadow of his predecessor. 
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An Assessment of the Turkish Political Religion 
In this chapter, I have looked to the single-party years of the Turkish Republic through 
the lense of political religions. Here I have used political religions as a heuristic device, 
to learn more in-depth about the authoritarian tendencies of the regime. I specifically 
examined the amount of tolerance shown to other ideologies, identities and beliefs, the 
freedom of the individuals, the utilization of the methods of communication by the 
regime, and the importance attributed to the leader cult. 
According to the simplest definition of the concept, political religions are 
political systems which resemble the organized religions. Like religions, they 
propagandize faith in absolute and unquestionable ideological truths, persecute the 
unfaithful and almost worship sacralised human entities. Political religions are 
established through “merging of the religious and political dimensions”, a process 
defined by Gentile as the sacralisation of the secular, where the regime takes over the 
features of a religion.448 Although even in the most democratic regimes, a certain level 
of sacredness could be attributed to a secular entity, concept, or even to a person, a 
crucial difference of the political religions is that they are not willing to co-exist with 
other identities; instead they seek ways to replace them. In political religions, the state, 
as the only legal and rightful entity fills the political and social spheres. Finally, to 
legitimize themselves and to survive, they promote a Manichean world-view which 
means that they claim that there is an almost cosmological battle between the forces 
of the light, represented by the regime itself, and the forces of the dark; its political 
enemies. 
It is more than fair to say that the political system of the single-party years 
resemble organized religions. The single-party regime of Turkey prohibited 
competitive politics after 1925 until the transition to multi-party regime in 1945, 
except a three-month long multi-party experience in 1930. Similarly to the political 
sphere, the social life as well was regulated by the party while all voluntary social 
organizations, from traditional Sufi orders that dominated the social life in rural areas, 
to the fledgling class-based social movements in the cities, were prohibited. No 
tolerance was shown to other beliefs, ideologies and identities. This left the party and 
its ideology alone in the political and social spheres. Furthermore the ideology of the 
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party was turned into a code, “The Six Arrows”, and then integrated as the unalterable 
principles of the state to the constitution. This act made all other ideologies and beliefs 
that oppose the ideology of the ruling party, illegal. The regime had in its armoury a 
plethora of instruments to disseminate its modernist Republican ideology to masses, 
ranging from the education system to the large network of public monuments. Without 
a source of force of resistance in the country, especially after 1931, the regime 
surrounded the citizens with its ideological weapons, Republican imagery, the 
education system, grand theories of language and history, and media. The ideological 
truths of the party became unquestionable, and therefore crossed the line between the 
sacred and profane. The ideology of the regime became a religion. 
As for the sacralisation of the secular entities, the Turkish case is a textbook 
example. For Linz, the sacralisation process in political religions includes attributing 
sacredness to secular “persons, places, symbols, dates, and the elaboration of rituals 
connected with them.” In Republican Turkey, each of these elements attributed to 
Atatürk were sacralised. The day of his arrival to Anatolia during the national struggle 
became a public holiday, while the date of his death was declared as a day of national 
mourning. Religious imagery was constantly used in Republican depictions of Atatürk. 
He was not just presented as a hero, but also as a prophet, a holy being, or, in some 
cases, even as a god. İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa depicted his meetings with Atatürk as a 
form of contact with an otherworldly being. He stated: “Our Great Ghazi has a very 
powerful personality. One who comes to contact with him gains a power of belief 
which would suffice to bring light to the darkness, a light which is powerful as a piece 
of the sun itself”.449 Another significant description of Atatürk with strong religious 
connotations can be found in Avram Galanti’s writings. Galanti stated that Chapter 61, 
Verse 1 of the Book of Isaiah in the Bible “could be wholly applied for Atatürk’s great 
personality”. The verse is: “because the Lord has anointed me, to proclaim good news 
to the poor, He has sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim freedom for the 
captives, and release from darkness for the prisoners, to comfort all who mourn”.450 
Lastly, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu took a step further when he described in his memoirs 
the moment he met with Mustafa Kemal as follows: “Ghazi was standing motionless 
like a statue, like a work of art made out of bronze. It was a terrifying sight. I am telling 
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this with all of my sincerity, I was feeling the ecstasy and awe of a believer who 
appears before its maker in a most glorious temple”.451 This sacralisation of Atatürk 
was thorough and complete, it is difficult to find a more suitable example to Maritain’s 
concept of “idols turning into gods” than the deification of Mustafa Kemal. 
In Republican single-party rule, while the leaders were sacralised as heroes, 
their political enemies were persecuted or relegated to obscurity. The generals who 
started the Turkish War of Independence with Atatürk were excluded from politics. 
The newspapers that supported other political agendas were either closed or tamed. 
All of these qualities make the regime resemble organized religions. Historians who 
examine this period of Turkish history came to similar conclusions. For instance, 
according to Tunçay, prominent members of the Republican People’s Party, most 
importantly Atatürk, became a demigod while other party chiefs were considered like 
the gods of Olympus for the urbanized Turks. Similarly, Zürcher stated that for some 
“Kemalism was known as the Turkish religion.”452 
On the other hand, whether all aspects of Turkish authoritarianism qualify for 
being a political religion is debatable. Stanley Payne lists some of the religious 
characteristics adopted by political religions as: development of a salvation myth, 
creation of elaborate ceremonies and liturgies; canonisation of saints and martyrs; the 
development of a cultural and spiritual revolution to create a new man; the projection 
of messianic and Universalist goals.453 Among these, the lack of Universalist goals 
stands out as the most problematic one. Although having an inalterable set of 
principles with the Six Arrows, the ideological aim of Turkish authoritarianism was 
limited to the boundaries of Turkey. It was intending for a total revolution in Turkey 
but its staunch nationalism prevented the possibility of planning to export this 
revolution around the globe, though some intellectuals in “Kadro”454 periodical tried 
to create a Universalist project out of Turkish authoritarianism. Kadro claimed that 
the system in Turkey was unique, and it was a third-way between liberalism and 
socialism, a new phase of development beyond these ideologies and they defined it as 
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the “National Liberation State”. According to the members of the periodical, this 
supposedly anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and statist policies of the Republican 
Turkey could offer a solution to the underdeveloped world. 455  Although İnönü, 
supported and even contributed some articles to the magazine, the impact of the 
publication has been minimal. Apart from the lack of a Universalist goal, the single 
party-regime in Turkey fulfils all other prerequisites of Payne’s matrix to be qualified 
as a political religion.  
Lastly, the data collected for this chapter from the primary and secondary 
sources, especially the intellectual output generated by the members of regime-
friendly media demonstrate that in single-party Turkey, the political religion was 
established and survived mainly due to two interconnected reasons. Firstly, the system 
was designed to maximize the duration and the authority of the personal rule of 
Atatürk. The demise of the opposition, the domination of the media, and the 
establishment of the personal cult of Atatürk, in fact the entire political religion were 
instruments to keep the Republican leaders at power as long as possible.  In connection 
with this personal rule, the ideology of Atatürk also played a significant role in the 
establishment of the Turkish political religion. As the previous chapter displayed, 
Atatürk and the Republican elite sincerely believed that the Turkish society needed a 
total transformation and the only way for Turkey to continue its existence was 
modernizing as fast as possible which was only conceivable through total control of 
the political, social and cultural spheres. Therefore the regime removed all the 
obstacles that stood in the way of this modernizing reforms through the instrumentality 
of a political religion based on the cult of Atatürk. The most significant obstacles were 
perceived as the values and traditions emanated from the Islamicate past, which the 
regime associated with the ‘darkness of the middle ages’. Some of the most drastic 
acts of the era, such as the reforms in the fields of language and religion were aimed 
to cut off the cultural and historical ties of the nation with the Islamicate culture and 
the other remnants of the imperial, multi-national past. Some other acts, such as the 
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monument building project of 1930s contributed to both of these motivations 
simultaneously. 
Although most modernizing reforms that accompanied the establishment of the 
political religion; especially reforms on education and women rights helped to change 
the face of the country for good, two major problems were inherited from this era that 
would haunt the Turkish politics and social life for decades. Firstly, the political 
religion created a very elaborate and powerful cult of personality which still exists in 
Turkey. Furthermore the existence of this cult, made further cults possible, since the 
society became accustomed to having a fatherlike, all powerful figure as a leader of 
the country. Many politicians, including the incumbent president of Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan successfully exploited this psychological conditioning of the Turkish people 
to increase their controls over them. Secondly, the reforms emanated from the 
Republican political religion created a Turkey which is in war with its own past, 
culture and memories that created deep political and social cleavages within the 
society, especially by alienating the more religious and conservative elements of the 
national community. The effects of these reforms will be discussed in the following 















The Quest for Modernity and the Liquidation of Dersim 
 
We’ve had enough of living like Orientals in the 
West … Free us from this dark dungeon.456  
- Ziya Gökalp, “Petition to Ghazi”, 1922 
 
On June 1, 1936, Sabiha Gökçen, one of Atatürk’s adopted daughters,457 completed 
her first flight as an airplane pilot. She had been training for this moment for over a 
year as a member of the “Türkkuşu” (Turkish Bird) initiative set up by Atatürk to train 
young civilian aviators. Her flying lessons started with controlling a glider, which 
proved rather difficult for Gökçen, a slender, twenty-two year old girl whose small 
frame was not heavy enough to balance the glider, therefore several sandbags were 
installed to the aircraft to provide the needed extra weight. After these alterations 
Gökçen managed to control the light aircraft and later continued her education by 
piloting heavier gliders and using the parachute under the guidance of the Soviet 
aviation experts. Following the success of her first airplane flight, she gave a brief 
interview to the Cumhuriyet newspaper, in which she stated: “I do not know how 
successful I am going to be, but I am wholly committed to flying”.458 Her career 
proved to be successful indeed. Gökçen continued the flying lessons and later in Soviet 
Russia, she participated in several aviation competitions and war games, becoming 
one of the first female fighter pilots in the world. Her personal story is firmly 
connected to the modernization project envisaged by his father, because only a year 
after from her first flight, Gökçen was piloting one of the aircrafts which dropped 
bombs on the Eastern Anatolian town of Dersim as a part of the military campaign 
which devastated the region and cost thousands of lives.  
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 Dersim was a geographically isolated area. Being surrounded by high 
mountains the region was also cut off from the dominant Sunni Muslim culture of 
Eastern Anatolia. This isolation led to the establishment of a uniquely syncretistic 
religious belief system, as well as to the emergence of a tribal social order based on 
the religious-secular authority of the tribe leaders. Due to harsh living conditions 
within Dersim and the lack of central governmental control in the area, the Dersimi 
tribes were also armed, and were in a constant struggle, internally with each other, and 
externally with the surrounding regions which were dominated by Sunni Muslims. 
After the establishment of the Republic, several plans were prepared to prevent the 
public order problems created by the Dersimi tribes, and to implement state authority 
over the region. On paper, the plans included a military campaign which would 
specifically target the tribe leaders and notables, and several construction projects that 
would change the social structure in the region for good. The reality proved to be much 
bleaker than the promises; the military campaign caused the demise of 13,806 
residents of Dersim.459 Considering the population of the region was estimated around 
65,000 in 1935,460 one can observe that almost 1/5 of the Dersimi people were killed 
during the campaign. Furthermore, many others were forcibly removed from their 
lands and sent away to other parts of the country and to dishearten them from 
returning, many villages, houses, and farms were burned to the ground.  
 The Republican regime presented the campaign targeting Dersim as a 
modernizing crusade against the local elements who were perceived by the regime as 
actively resisting the modernization attempts of the government. This attitude of the 
government is evident in the documents available in the archives, the reports of the 
regime-friendly media and the statements of the party leaders. For instance, the Prime 
Minister of the era İsmet İnönü stated in the Grand Assembly that the military 
campaign that continued from April 1937 to November 1938 was waged to “open up 
the region to civilization”.461 The reality was much more complicated and multi-
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layered than this, but modernity, the leitmotif of most of the Republican tenets and 
practices, still remained visible in the actions taken in Dersim. The damage inflicted 
on the people and the land was almost celebrated as a victory against the resistance 
which was shown by the “archaic forces of the past” against the “modern forces” 
represented by the Turkish Republic. From the official point of view, the single-party 
insisted that to replace this archaic system with modernity, a fresh start was needed 
and this could only be achieved through drastic measures. The bombs dropped by 
Gökçen, and her fellow combat pilots were mere instruments of this radical 
programme.  
 A military campaign accompanied by a rebuilding programme which included 
the construction of roads, schools, military outposts and barracks was first proposed 
in late 1931 but due to the devastating effects of the Great Depression, the regime was 
not able to financially back the project and the plan was shelved462 but Dersim never 
went out of the gaze of the Republic. Planes on reconnaissance missions gathered 
information and topographical data, while government agents periodically sent 
detailed reports on the relations between the tribes of Dersim. Even the smallest 
incidents such as personal feuds between tribal chieftains were reported to the 
government.463 Comprehensive military reports that include detailed information on 
the roads, water supplies and the terrain of the region were prepared. The region was 
bound to Ankara with a railroad system. On December 25, 1935, the entire province 
was put under the authority of a military governor-general with extraordinary 
executive powers. The government established coalitions with some of the Dersimi 
tribes by utilizing the long-standing feuds between them. In the following months, 
military barracks, outposts, roads and telephone lines were built in the region to 
support the military campaign. While the government was preparing for a total assault, 
some of the Dersimi tribes held meetings to find out and evaluate the intentions of the 
government. A tribal chief called Sayyid 464 Rıza (1862/1863-1937), who claimed 
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descent from the Prophet Muhammad and therefore enjoyed religious authority over 
other tribes, came to the fore as the leader of the Dersimi resistance movement. This 
small-scale resistance triggered the implementation of the military plans of the 
government. In the spring of 1937, the Republican army entered Dersim, and quickly 
gained ground. Most of the tribal chieftains and their families were captured. On 
September 11, 1937, Sayyid Rıza surrendered to the government. 465  His capture 
brought the end of the first phase of the military campaign. 
 Sabiha Gökçen started her duty in the Dersim campaign in the spring of 1937. 
For a month, she flew almost every day and took part in both reconnaissance flights 
and bombing runs. She returned back to Ankara in May and did not participate in the 
second stage of the military operations of 1938, the phase when the real bloodshed 
occurred. On May 28, Gökçen was awarded a special medal for her contribution to 
Turkish aviation.466 From this date on, she became almost a fixture of the front pages 
of the newspapers. Ulus, the official newspaper of the regime, devoted its front page 
to her when she officially received her military pilot licence on June 21, 1937.467 On 
July 6, Gökçen was once again on the front page of the same newspaper and this time 
she was presented as “Our Heroic Aviator”.468 Similarly her graduation ceremony on 
August 30, 1937 was on the front pages of the newspapers with an inscription stating 
that “the Turkish nation should feel proud of our heroic aviator”. Indeed, Gökçen 
became a heroine of the regime. Furthermore, as a modern, independent woman who 
was capable of establishing herself in an environment that was previously reserved 
solely for men, she was the perfect embodiment of the modernizing achievements of 
the Republican regime. The image of young Gökçen in her pilot uniform would be the 
one of the most circulated images of the perceived modernity of the Turkish Republic. 
Gökçen’s stardom would continue with national and international flying tours. She 
participated in the “Great Motherland Tour”, a two thousand kilometre long tour 
encircling Turkey which was organized by Türkkuşu to popularize aviation across the 
country.469 Gökçen also represented the modern face of Turkey abroad; a year later, 
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she toured the Balkan countries with her plane.470 Altınay points out that Gökçen’s 
fame also crossed the ocean, and several newspaper articles were written about her in 
the New York Times. These articles stated that “the appearance of a woman military 
flier must have been a bombshell in itself” for the residents of Dersim and celebrated 
the progress of Turkey which was personified in Gökçen, who represented “the 
advance in little more than a decade from the veil and the harem to the air pilot’s 
helmet and the battlefield”.471 These statements showed that with the help of Gökçen’s 
image, the Republican regime was successful in presenting itself to the world as a 
modernizing force and as an agent of progress in a region whose cultural richness and 
indigenous modernity were dismissed entirely by the author of the New York Times 
article, by associating it with solely with the veil and harem; the most well-known 
concepts of the male, orientalist fascination. 
 A similar orientalist approach is visible in the Republican imagination of 
Dersim. In fact, the Republican elite saw the social order and lifestyle in Dersim as 
the antithesis of Republican modernization attempts. In a speech given at the 
Parliament, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk stated concerning the military campaign that 
“there should be no obstacles left between our nation and the high civilization and 
welfare that it truly deserves” and thus implied that Dersim was an obstacle for 
reaching the ultimate goal of “high civilization”.472 The Republican media followed 
the same pattern. Yunus Nadi,473 a member of the parliament and the owner of the 
influential and pro-government newspaper Cumhuriyet depicted the campaign as “not 
a military campaign but a march on civilization” and defined the people of Dersim as 
“mountain Bedouins”. 474  Similarly Kurun newspaper described the campaign in 
Dersim as a fundamental part of the Turkish revolution and stated that Turkey was 
establishing “culture and civilization” in the region.475 According to Son Posta this 
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was a fight between two spirits, “at the end of which the spirit of civilization and 
progress will predominate”. 476  These examples show that Republican modernism 
acted as if the local culture of Dersim did not exist at all. For them, Dersim was not 
just materialistically underdeveloped but it was also deprived of its own culture, 
history and civilization. Similarly to the colonialist approach, from the Republican 
perspective Dersim was seen as a place which is still in its natural form, devoid of any 
culture and civilization. For them, these features could only be inserted into the region 
externally by the forces of the Republic. 
 Sabiha Gökçen’s identity came to the help of the Republican elite to further 
emphasize the importance of their campaign which would bring civilization to the 
region. The image of historical backwardness of Dersim was deliberately placed in 
contrast with the modern persona of the first female fighter pilot. A newspaper article 
dating September 12, 1937, constitutes a quintessential example of this approach. 
According to Tan newspaper, after his capture, Gökçen allegedly met with Sayyid 
Rıza in person although not a single archival document, or Gökçen’s own memoir 
confirms this meeting. The newspaper reported the alleged meeting between Gökçen 
and Rıza not just as a meeting of two persons but rather as a showdown between two 
representatives of their respective, distinct civilizations. According to the report, 
Gökçen was standing victoriously while Rıza, the most powerful and respected 
chieftain of Dersim, which was defined as an “old bandit” by the newspaper, 
“appeared incapable next to the heroic Turkish girl who dropped bombs over him 
during the campaign”. This image alone, which personifies Sayyid Rıza and Dersim 
as old, weak and archaic and Gökçen and the young Turkish Republic as young, 
capable and modern shows how modernity was seen as the central concept in the 
Republican imagination regarding the military campaign in Dersim.  
This attitude of the regime was not only limited to Dersim but in fact also is 
applicable to the formation of the basic ideological tenets and practices of the 
Republican regime. Politically, claiming that the Republic represented the modern 
norms of civilization while its political adversaries were mere instruments for 
reactionary ideologies and conservatism was one of the key arguments of the 
legitimization of the single-party rule. Furthermore, ideologically, modernization can 
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be read as one of the central concepts of the Republican identity on which the Turkish 
political religion was built. As the previous chapters showed, promoting the existence 
of a struggle between the non-modern, eastern “past” and modern, western “present” 
which was represented by the Republican regime, was the central argument of the 
Turkish political religion. As the previous chapters show, the early Republican regime 
was aggressive towards any type of plurality in the political, social and cultural spheres 
and tried actively to mould a uniform national identity for the citizens. The key 
element of this new identity was modernity.  
As mentioned in the previous parts of this study, the regime was extremely 
impatient about modernization, mostly due to the devastating effects of the losses, 
disasters and sufferings the Muslim Ottoman community went through in the long 19th 
century. Republicans, like many of their fascist and totalitarian contemporaries, 
believed that they were living through a ‘special time’, a watershed moment in Turkish 
history and they needed to act drastically, and radically to save the future of the 
country. Therefore they perceived the modernization issue as a life-or-death situation. 
For the Republican elite, modernization which they equated with Westernization was 
the only solution to overcome the problems that led to the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire. The only way for Turkey to continue its existence was modernizing as fast as 
possible and the most significant obstacles hindering this process were the values and 
traditions that emanated from the past, specifically the Islamicate, “eastern” past. 
Therefore, the Republican reform agenda could easily be summarized as modernizing 
as fast as possible, and at any cost, in every sphere of life, such as the legal system, 
education, the economy and industry to generate everlasting change in the traditional 
social order. These changes would have served the ultimate objective of altering both 
the look and the mind-set of the country for good, cutting off the ties with Eastern 
traditions and culture and firmly integrating Turkey into the Western civilization. To 
achieve this aim, the regime implemented a radical modernization programme. 
This chapter of the thesis deals with this modernization process. The chapter 
will show how the strictly modernist approach of the Republican elite can be 
interpreted as the paramount motivation and the principal reasoning behind the 
ideological formation, and the key policies of the regime. The first part of this chapter 
deals with the concept of modernization, its historical background in Turkey, and 
modernization attempts on the important social issues such as women’s rights and 
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education. The latter part of the chapter focuses on the destruction the modernization 
project caused within the society, concentrating mainly on one single event; the 
military campaigns in the Dersim region of Eastern Turkey.  
 
The History of Modernization in Turkey and its Influence on the Republican 
Ideology 
The idea of modernization in Turkey did not start with the early Republican elite. The 
need for reforms had already started to be discussed within the Ottoman Empire in the 
late 16th century. These debates were focused mainly on economic corruption, 
worrying signals of the disappearance of harmony between certain elements of the 
ruling polity, and the signs of the breakdown of the system of meritocracy which gave 
the Ottoman Empire its unique character.477 This early and rather alarmist ‘decline’ 
discourse was later transformed into a series of modernizing reforms in the spheres of 
military and administration during the late 18th and 19th centuries,  to revitalize the 
Ottoman power and prestige. These reforms which came to their zenith during the 
Tanzimat era,478 aimed for the preservation of the Empire and revitalization of its 
power. 
During the Tanzimat era the reform programme was extended from military 
and administrative matters to legal, social and religious spheres. Prior to this era, the 
Ottoman society was divided along religious and denominational lines according to 
the millet system, in which the rights of several religious groups such as Muslims, 
Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews were recognised by the state. Although the 
division between these groups were not impenetrable and these communities did not 
live in isolation from one another,479 the reformers of the Tanzimat era still tried to 
promote an Ottoman identity to replace these identities and prevent the separatist 
movement in the Empire. 
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The Tanzimat was a period of technical advancements as well. A new postal 
system, the use of telegraph and steamships were introduced and railroad construction 
began in this era. Another wave of modernization came in the field of education. To 
improve the education system which was based on Islamic madrasah style teaching, 
new elementary and secondary schools were established with a reformed, secular 
curriculum including arithmetic, geography and history. Although the education 
reform also included the establishment of a university which would integrate 
professional, humanistic and religious studies, much of the educational reform 
programme remained on paper without creating drastic changes in Ottoman society.480 
Regardless, this era created a lasting heritage. An elaborate, modern bureaucracy was 
established and instantly become an important factor in Ottoman politics.481 
During the Tanzimat period a new front was opened in the debate on 
modernization. The power and the authority of the sultan started to be discussed 
among the intellectuals. The most influential intellectual group of the era was the 
Young Ottomans (Yeni Osmanlılar), a secret society which is regarded as “the first 
modern ideological movement among the Ottoman elite of the empire”. 482  The 
members of the society constituted a loose coalition of intellectuals who although were 
originated from different political backgrounds ranging “from constitutionalist 
liberalism to modernist Islamism, and even to nascent Turkish nationalism and 
socialism”, still managed to find a common ground in constitutionalism.483 Young 
Ottomans criticized the Tanzimat period for its various shortcomings including the 
nepotism within the bureaucracy, corruption of the bureaucrats, and imitation of the 
West without considering the importance of the Ottoman/Islamic past. Instead of a 
bureaucrat-led reform programme they promoted the idea of a constitutional regime, 
in which the real power would be in the hands of the society. Following the financial 
difficulties exacerbated by the global market crash of 1873, their ideas gained ground 
among the bureaucratic and the military elites, and led to a coup d’état in which the 
ruling Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876) was replaced first with Murad V, and later with 
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Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1876. Following his ascension to the throne a new 
constitution was promulgated and a constitutional monarchy was established.  
After the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1876, a bicameral 
parliamentary system was installed in the Ottoman Empire. However, this system was 
abolished by Sultan Abdülhamid II until 1878 when the Sultan suspended the 
constitution, and dismissed the Parliament altogether after its members criticized the 
handling of the disastrous Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Although Abdülhamid’s 
regime which lasted more than thirty years, was authoritarian and religiously 
conservative, during his reign the modernization in the spheres of education, military 
and transportation continued, or indeed intensified. In fact, Abdülhamid’s enthusiastic 
reforms concerning the military led to the emergence of a new class of young idealist 
officers who felt a strong attachment to the ideal of “rescuing the motherland”.484 The 
need for saving the country from the authoritarian rule of the Sultan also became 
widespread among the members of the intelligentsia. Though their actions were 
closely monitored by the regime, they still managed to build close contacts with 
Europe and the Turks living in Russia. In time the paths of these two groups converged 
in the form of the Young Turk movement. 
‘Young Turk’ (Jön Türkler) was an umbrella term for a movement that had 
members from many different ideological currents ranging from liberals to nationalists 
who agreed on the lowest common denominator, a regime change to oust the sultan 
and stop the dissolution of the Empire. Within this group, and by their interactions 
with other ideologies existing in the Empire, the need of modernisation as well as its 
scale, and the areas which needed to be modernised constituted the source of major 
intellectual debates during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Ziya Gökalp, in its 
influential article “The Three Currents” (Üç Cereyan), on the late Ottoman ideologies 
stated that the idea of modernization was an essential tenet within every political 
movement of the era.485 Indeed, modernisation has been a crucial part of the respective 
political agendas of all major ideological currents of the late Ottoman period, whether 
in the form of mere technicism, or in the shape of more socially and political 
penetrating reforms.  
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For instance, Islamic revivalism (İslamcılık), one of the major political 
movements of the late Ottoman period, although suggesting a return to the core Islamic 
values and institutions of the alleged “Golden Age of Islam”, repeatedly mentioned 
the existence of an urgent need for matching the technological advancements of the 
modern world. According to Mehmet Akif Ersoy,486 a prominent Islamist of the era, 
it was “impossible to deny the importance of European science, knowledge, 
civilization and the industrial progress” but their treatment towards the oppressed 
people in their colonies, “the way they cruelly make these poor people suffer” made 
him to believe that the morality of the Western powers did not match their material 
advancements. Therefore Akif suggested that Muslims of the Empire should only 
embrace the scientific progress of the West.487 Similarly, supporters of the Turkist 
(Türkçülük) worldview, while favouring a union of all Turks instead of an Islamic one, 
never shied away from getting inspired by the modern technological domination of the 
West. For instance Gökalp, the paramount Turkish nationalist thinker of his era, stated 
that Turks needed “to build ships, locomotives, airplanes, and automobiles and use 
them like Europeans do”.488 
For Islamic revivalism and Turkism, modernization on certain fields such as 
military organization and technology were seen as crucial for the survival of the sacred 
values which are associated with these ideologies. Modernity itself was not the 
ultimate aim, it was merely an instrument to fight the oppressive powers of the West 
in a war of life and death. Witnessing the dissolution of the Empire made the 
proponents of these ideologies adamant on the necessity of modernization. In Akif’s 
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words Muslims should never let their negative feelings towards Europeans prevent 
them from adopting technical and scientific advancements of the West, because 
without modernization, it was “impossible for the nation to survive”.489 For these two 
major ideologies of the late Ottoman era, modernization was needed to compete with 
European powers but Turks should “only adopt scientific and practical tools from 
Europe”, not their life-style.490 For the Islamist and Turkist intellectuals, aside from 
their apparent technical superiority, the remaining aspects of the Western modernity, 
especially the materialistic outlook on life which was prevalent among the Western 
societies, were associated with the detriment of the moral values and with the cultural 
erosion in the Ottoman Empire. According to these schools of thought, these factors 
contributed to the “Ottoman decline” that ended with the Empire’s subjugation to the 
West, and therefore importing Western ideals that were not related to the technical 
advancements should be avoided at all costs. 
On the other hand, for the members of the Westernization (Garbcılık) 
movement491 – the last political group in Gökalp’s categorization and the one from 
which a significant part of the early Republican ruling elite originated, modernity 
represented much more than the material advancements of the West. For instance for 
Abdullah Cevdet,492 “there was no other civilization than the Western one”493 and it 
should be adapted to Turkey in its entirety. Similarly, İsmail Hakkı Kılıçzade,494 who 
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wrote in 1912 a series of articles Cevdet’s periodical, İctihâd, proposed a wide array 
of modernizing reforms ranging from the introduction of a new headgear to the 
abolishment of religious schools495 the majority of which were implemented years 
later by the Republicans. Furthermore, Cevdet’s views on what type of a system should 
replace the Ottoman monarchy almost summarizes the future policies of the early 
Republican elite. According to Cevdet, the new regime “should build a barrier in front 
of the movements of the past which prevented harmony and progress, and smash the 
superstitious beliefs into pieces under the guidance of intelligence, science and 
industrial development”. Cevdet sets the final target of the future reforms as being “to 
increase the knowledge of the people to such a level, that they would never allow 
malicious rulers to rule over them again”.496 This discourse which glorifies science 
while ridiculing belief as superstition and suggests that poor governance is a disease 
which is curable through knowledge is in perfect accordance with the early Republican 
ideology. 
According to Hanioğlu, intellectuals such as Cevdet and Kılıçzade were very 
influential on the theoretical development of the Republican elite. Following their 
example, the Republicans opted for a total transformation of society instead of settling 
solely for reforms on technology. For this elite, modernization was synonymous with 
Westernization. Atatürk, himself, stated that “although there are many countries in the 
world, there is just one civilization and for the progress of our nation, it should be a 
part of this civilization”. He further commented that throughout their history Turks 
moved westward, and this custom would continue during the Republican era.497 In a 
different speech, Atatürk remarked that it was impossible for Turkey to survive 
without Westernization because “resistance to the storming impulse of the civilization 
is futile” and “societies which follow the static medieval laws, ideas and behaviours 
are bound to demise and captivity”. 498  Atatürk’s perspective regarding Western 
civilization being the only civilization suggests that a form of Orientalism is traceable 
within the actions of the single-party regime. This attitude could be described as “auto-
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orientalism”, an attitude which emanates from native people of the East who decided, 
or were forced, to look to their native lands through the lenses of the West.  
According to Edward Said, from the Western perspective, Europe represents 
the standards by which the rest of the world has to be judged. The orient, which was 
essentialized by the West, is perceived as static and underdeveloped in comparison 
with the developed, rational, and superior Europe, therefore its path to modernization 
should be to follow, in fact even to mimic the European example. 499  Similarly, 
Mitchell states that, “modernization continues to be commonly understood as a 
process begun and finished in Europe, from where it has been exported across ever-
expanding regions of the non-west. The destiny of those regions had been to mimic, 
never quite successfully, the history already performed by the West. To become 
modern, it is still said, or today become postmodern, is to act like West”.500 The 
Republican ruling elite of Turkey followed this pattern. For Atatürk and his fellow 
Republican modernisers, modernity was established in the developed world through a 
linear process, a continuous forward motion in history. It was a more elaborate 
phenomenon than mere technical development, it was rather a mind-set which was 
built slowly over time by the pivotal events and influential ideological and cultural 
trends of European history, such as the Renaissance, the Reform and Enlightenment, 
the emergence of nation-state, the French Revolution and positivism. Therefore the 
entire historical background of the West needed to be replicated as quickly as possible 
regardless of the social, cultural, or economic exceptions of post-Ottoman Turkish 
society. For the Republican elite, it was only through following the Western example 
that Turkish society could transform from a traditional society to a modern and 
industrialized one.  
The Republican world-view did not allow several contemporary modernities 
to co-exist with one another. Western modernity was almost a Platonic ideal form; 
while the rest of the world lived on the fringes of it, powerless, and bound to be 
exploited by the West. Republican interpretation of the “Ottoman decline” was also 
powered by this view. A complex notion such as the dissolution of the empire is often 
associated with the resistance showed by Ottoman dynasty to the changing ways of 
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the West and their reluctance to adopt Western modernity with its institutions, mind-
set and outlook in its entirety. This was perceived as a mistake which should not be 
repeated by the Republic. After the establishment of the Republic, especially after the 
end of competitive politics in 1925, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s own vision, which was 
influenced by the late Ottoman era intellectuals, overtook the role of being the sole 
path of modernization. Islamists, like Mehmet Akif Ersoy were forced to leave the 
political sphere to the Republicans. Similarly, Turkists were tamed by the regime, 
abandoned their dreams of uniting all Turkish speaking people under a single flag and 
joined the Republican camp. After that, modernization became a state project in 
Turkey while the single-party started to act as a vanguard party to control, direct and 
shape this state-sponsored modernization project. 
To understand the urgency of this call for total transformation, one must also 
take the life experiences of the Republican elite into consideration. Most of them spent 
their lives observing one humiliating defeat after another, witnessing the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. For instance Atatürk’s personal experience was nothing short of 
catastrophic. He witnessed that the Empire he was born into crumbling down. His 
birthplace, the cities where he was raised and educated were lost to the same Balkan 
powers which were subjugated for centuries by the Ottoman Empire. The only feeling 
of accomplishment for his generation was the establishment of an independent 
Republic which was wrested out of the hands of the Allied Forces at the end of the 
First World War. Therefore their fanatical dedication to the modernization programme 
can be perceived as a reasonable strategy to protect what they fought for. Their 
methods, however, are open to discussion and criticism. 
 
Republican Modernization 
As mentioned in the introduction, the early Republican ideology was based on two 
objectives; establishing an easily controllable monolithic ideal community and 
modernizing as soon as possible in every sphere of life, such as law, education, 
economy and industry to generate everlasting change in the social sphere and secure 
the future of the country. Republican modernization promoted more than mere 
technicism, it sought the replacement of the Islamic-Ottoman tradition, a tradition 
regarded by the Republican elite as foreign to the Turkish nation whose pre-Islamic 
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past was equally glorious as the heyday of the Ottoman Empire, and incompatible with 
Western culture which was defined by the Republicans as the “universal civilization”. 
From this model Mustafa Kemal and his allies formed a fanatical modernist approach 
deeply devoted to the non-religious sections of the national culture that they promoted 
and at times even had to manufacture. 
In the early Republican era the materialistic outlook on life was endorsed. 
People were encouraged to gain knowledge in sciences, both natural and social, and 
to use scientific methods in their field of work. The technological advancements of the 
West were followed closely and adopted when feasible. Women’s rights were 
supported as a state policy and ground-breaking reforms were made to promote gender 
equality. A program of modernization in the fields of industry and transportation was 
set in motion. The health system was modernized and projects to fight infectious 
diseases were implemented.501 Educational reform which included some of the most 
radical transformations such as the switch from the Perso-Arabic script to the Latin 
alphabet targeted the total Westernization of this field. Accompanied by a literacy 
campaign, the alphabet change proved to be successful. Nearly all of these reforms 
had no popular support and were not implemented due to public demand, they were 
rather state-projects, while most of them were the pet projects of the leader Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk himself. Aside from some exceptions, such as the reforms regarding 
women’s rights, in Republican modernization people were passive; the motor of 
change was the state. Many modernizing reforms implemented by the Republican 
ruling elite targeted social elements and concepts which the single-party associated 
with Islam and Oriental traditions. Most of these reforms were performed after 1925, 
following the end of the multi-party regime and the cleansing of dissidents from the 
political sphere during the closing of the Progressive Republican Party in June 1925, 
and the trials of 1926 following the assassination attempt on Atatürk’s life. The more 
the regime felt secure and uncontested, the more the reforms gained momentum and 
grew more radical. 
The first significant reform of this period was the abolition of the fez aimed at 
westernizing the appearance of the people which was introduced in November 1925. 
                                                          
501 For a review of the Republican fight against infectious diseases, see Halis Akder, “Forgotten 
Campaigns: A History of Disease in Turkey.” Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem & Philip Robins (Eds.), 
Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century (Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 220-226. 
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The Fez was a brimless hat of North African origin which was adopted in 1829 as the 
universal male headgear in the Ottoman Empire as part of the modernizing reforms of 
Sultan Mahmud II. Before this reform in the Ottoman world various headgear had 
represented the social status and religious identity of its owner. With the introduction 
of fez to replace other headgear, the Sultan tried to change the “centuries-old Ottoman 
tradition in which headgear had provided the crucial and central marker of identity, 
status, and rank” and create a uniformity between the Muslim and non-Muslim parts 
of the society.502 After its adoption, the fez quickly became part of Ottoman identity 
to such a point that in the West it started to be seen as the definite symbol of 
‘Ottomanness’. Ironically when this headgear, whose adoption constituted an 
important reform of its time, started to be associated with the Oriental appearance, it 
gained more significance among the conservatives and started to be associated with 
the Islamic identity while simultaneously losing appeal for the younger generations of 
the Westernization supporters, to which most of the Republican elite belonged. For 
them, the fez had become an icon of the backwardness of the Ottoman society. These 
clashing perception started intellectual debated between the supporters of both sides 
of the argument. 
Examples of these debates among the intellectuals can be found in the writings 
of İsmail Hakkı Kılıçzade, Abdullah Cevdet and Süleyman Nazif.503 As early as 1915, 
Kılıçzade wrote that wearing a fez had nothing to with Islam, and therefore wearing a 
western-style hat would not contradict with the beliefs of the Ottoman society. Starting 
from 1924, Cevdet and Nazif wrote several articles targeting the conservative parts of 
society who were supporting the fez almost as an integral part of the Islamic creed and 
objecting to the use of Western style hats, by giving rather unsubstantial evidence from 
the hadith literature. They claimed that fez was not an integral part of Islam, and stated 
                                                          
502  Donald Quataert. “Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829.” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (August 1997), pp. 403-425. 
503 Süleyman Nazif (1869-1927) was a poet, intellectual and bureaucrat. Known for his wit, he was one 
of the most prominent intellectuals of the late Ottoman era. Nazif initially criticized the Hamidian 
regime and contributed articles to Young Turk journals but later he made peace with the regime and 
returned to Turkey. After the revolution of 1908 he was appointed as the governor of Basra, Mosul and 
Baghdad provinces before taking his leave from politics in 1915 to concentrate on literature. Due to an 
article he wrote criticizing the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Forces (“Kara Bir Gün” - A Black 
Day) he was blacklisted by the Allies and in March 1920 he was sent to prison in Malta due to a 
nationalist speech he gave at the remembrance ceremony for Pierre Loti. He returned to Istanbul in 
October 1921 and continued to write for the Resimli Ay newspaper. For more information on Nazif, see 
Syed Tanvir Wasti, “Süleyman Nazif – A Multi-Faceted Personality.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 50, 
No. 3 (May 2014), pp. 493-508. 
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that the Muslim community of Turkey was losing time and energy by arguing about 
such a trivial matter. Nazif further argued that Islam should not be reduced to mere 
appearance and the aims and objectives of the Muslims should be much holier issues 
than defending a type of clothing which has no place in any previous Islamic source.504 
Against the backdrop of these intellectual debates, in the summer of 1925, Atatürk 
started to publicly wear a western-style hat during his tour of various Anatolian cities. 
In August 1925, he delivered a fervent speech in Inebolu in favour of the western-style 
hat. In this speech he likened Turkish people wearing the Oriental clothing to a “very 
precious jewel covered in mud” and stated that a change of style was necessary to 
show the world the real value of the Turkish people.505 These remarks show that 
Atatürk himself had complaints about the Orientalist approach of the West and feared 
that the Westerners would continue to see backwardness upon looking at the attire of 
the Turks regardless of their actual progress and accomplishments. Following his tour 
and the speech at Inebolu, a bill was proposed to the Grand Assembly to make the 
western-style hat the official headgear of the parliament members, civil servants, and 
to outlaw the public use of any other headgear.506 In the meeting on November 25, 
1925, the proposal was discussed and a huge majority of the Grand Assembly 
supported the bill. The statements of the parliament members resembled Atatürk’s 
approach. The general discourse of the deputies was that the fez was hindering the 
Turkish people “from entering among the civilized and modern nations”, therefore it 
should be replaced by the hat, “the most obvious characteristic of the common Western 
apparel”. The only objection to the new headgear bill was based on the premise that 
the proposal was conflicting with several articles of the constitution which protected 
the freedom of the individuals and it was quickly ruled out.507  
                                                          
504 For a summary of these articles which includes a colourful debate between Suleyman Nazif and 
religious scholar İskilipli Âtıf Hoca who fervently opposed the use of Western-style hats, see Selami 
Kılıç, “Şapka Meselesi ve Kılık Kıyafet İnkılâbı.” Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü 
Dergisi: Atatürk Yolu. Vol. 4, No. 16 (1995), pp. 529-547.  
505 Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri III, pp. 218-222. 
506 The clothing of the state officials responsible of religious duties were excluded from this bill. For 
the full text of the resolution, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre II, Cilt 19, p. 231. 
507 The objection was voiced by Nureddin Ibrahim Konyar (Sakallı Nurettin Paşa - Bearded Nurettin 
Pasha) (1873-1932), a retired general who was one of the few remaining independent MPs in the 
Parliament. He was a rather infamous, and a divisive figure of the late-Ottoman Empire. His admirers 
praised him for his military skills, especially his contribution to the victory at Kut (1916) while his 
critics blamed him for the massacres against the Greek citizens of the Empire (1919-1922), harassment 
of civilians in the Eastern province of Sivas (1921), as well as the lynching of the anti-nationalist 
journalist Ali Kemal and Smyrna’s last Greek Orthodox bishop Chrysostomos and the Great Fire of 
Smyrna (1922). His objection to the headgear law must have made Atatürk rather furious, because in 
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The ratification of the Law on Headgear (Şapka Kanunu) was the first step in 
the chain of reforms targeting to reduce the visibility and significance of religion, 
religious institutions and traditions. The abolition of the dervish lodges (Tekke) and 
Sufi religious orders (Tarikat) that had represented heterodox Islam for centuries and 
had a stronger influence on the people than the official, state version of Islam followed 
this reform. Once again the first indication of this reform was a speech of Atatürk. On 
August 30, 1925 Atatürk delivered a speech concerning the situation of Sufi religious 
orders at a gathering in the Republican People’s Party centre of Kastamonu province 
in Northern Anatolia and stated that “hoping for the help of long dead is a disgrace for 
a civilized society” and “the Republic of Turkey will never be the land of sheikhs,508 
dervishes,509 murids,510 and religious lunatics. The only true tarikat, is the tarikat of 
civilization”. 511  Following his guidance, a new bill which ratified in the Grand 
Assembly on November 30, 1925 stating that all buildings designed for the gatherings 
of Sufi brotherhoods, unless  part of a mosque which served the people, would be 
closed. All religious and spiritual titles derived from leading, serving in or being a 
member of a religious order or performing a heterodox religious or spiritual acts such 
as being a sheikh, dervish, murid, dede,512 seyyid,513 baba,514 khalifa,515 fortune-teller, 
sorcerer, spiritual healer, clairvoyant or muska maker516 were forbidden and became 
punishable criminal acts.517 The law was very comprehensive and the inclusion of the 
                                                          
Nutuk, Atatürk devoted an unusually large amount of time to criticizing him for his actions in the War 
of Independence, and for his character. In my copy of Nutuk, eighteen pages were allocated to condemn 
Nurettin Pasha, which is much higher than the amount of time devoted to criticize more significant 
names of the opposition. For Nurettin Pasha’s objection to the proposal and the following debates, see 
T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre II, Cilt 19, pp. 222-232. For Atatürk’s attacks on Nurettin Pasha see, 
Atatürk, Nutuk, pp. 707-727.   
508 The leader of an Islamic religious order. 
509 A follower of a Sufi teaching known for their extreme poverty and austerity. 
510 An aspirant member of a Sufi order who follows a murshid (guide). 
511 Here Atatürk makes a word-play. Tarikat, the Turkish word of Arabic origin for religious order 
literary means “path”. By using the word tarikat, he meant that the only path that must be followed for 
enlightenment is the path of modernization, not Sufism. For the whole speech, see Atatürk, Söylev ve 
Demeçleri III, pp. 223-228. 
512 Leaders of the Alevi-Bektashi religious orders. 
513 Religious title which is especially used in Alevi-Bektashi orders that claim descendancy from 
Prophet Mohammed’s family, specifically from his grandson Husayn ibn Ali. 
514 Leaders of the Bektashi religious orders. 
515 Religious order member who is nominated by the Sheikh as his successor during his lifetime to take 
over the lead of the order following his death.  
516  Muska is triangular-shaped amulet, containing verses from the Quran or other prayers and 
traditionally wrapped in leather. It is believed that they protect the wearer from harm and bring them 
good luck. 
517 For the parliamentary debates on the text of the proposal, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre II, Cilt 
19, pp. 281-289. For the full-text of the legislation, see Resmi Gazete, No. 243 (December 12, 1925), 
Law No. 677, p. 113.   
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not strictly Islamic practices of fortune-telling, and sorcery in the legislation along 
with the well-organized and structured Sufi brotherhoods showed that for the 
Republican elite there was not much difference between these diverse social actors. 
This perception is in line with Linz’s theory on political religions using “anti-religious 
formulations that identify religion with superstition”.518 Furthermore, in Atatürk’s 
speech at Kastamonu the leaders and the disciples of the Sufi religious orders were put 
together in the same group with ‘religious lunatics’ which proved further evidence for 
Republican elite’s strictly positivist approach of seeing every single element of 
heterodox Islam as a kind of lunacy, or deception, and initially as a hindrance to 
reaching the level of Western civilization. These twin laws of November 1925 did 
meet with a considerable resistance. Mobile Independence Courts started to work 
again. At least 57 people were sentenced to death due to their resistance to the Law of 
Headgear and the closing of Sufi religious orders between December 1925 and 
February 1926.519 
The reforms which targeted the reduction of the visibility and significance of 
religion in the social sphere continued with attempts to de-Islamify the legal sphere. 
Once again, the start of the legal reforms was signalled by Atatürk himself. In his 
opening speech of the legislative year in November 1, 1925, he remarked that the new 
penal code, the civil code and the code of commerce should be prepared within the 
present legislative year.520 Atatürk added that these new legal codes must follow the 
examples of the codes of modern civilization which further demonstrates the agenda 
of these reforms. The legal codes which were ordered by Atatürk were prepared within 
four months and were presented to the attention of the Grand Assembly in February 
1926. The debates started with the new civil code which was proposed to replace the 
Medjelle, the civil code of the Ottoman Empire which was in use since 1869. While 
the Medjelle was based on sharia; the Islamic law and took its source from the Quran, 
the hadith attributed to the Prophet Mohammed and the previous decisions and 
                                                          
518 Linz, “The Religious Use of Politics and/or the Political Use of Religion”, pp. 102-104. 
519 Tunçay, Türkiye’de Tek Parti, p. 116.  
520 President Atatürk’s speech at the Grand Assembly, November 1, 1925. See T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi. 
Devre II, Cilt 19, p. 10. 
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opinions of Muslim jurists,521 the new civil code was adapted from the Swiss civil 
code.  
During the debates in the parliament, the religious basis of the previous code 
was criticized while the improvements, especially the improvements regarding women 
rights in the new civil code were celebrated by several parliament members. Mahmut 
Esat Bozkurt, the Minister of Justice, summarized that the main improvements of the 
code were in the fields of family organisation, inheritance rules and equal rights 
between the sexes, issues which were all related to the rights of the women. Similarly, 
Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, praised the law for giving back the rights to 
Turkish women that they truly deserved for their self-sacrifice and virtues they had 
shown for centuries. Regarding the fact that the new civil code was almost a word for 
word translation of the Swiss civil code, Besim Atalay, the deputy for Aksaray, 
defended the code from possible objections by expressing that the Republic should 
follow the lead of the West in the field of law as well, just as it was already following 
the West in the spheres of social and natural sciences. Atalay warned the other 
parliament members that if Turkey would not follow the example of the Western 
world, its existence would be in danger similarly to other Islamic regions such as 
Sudan, Morocco, and Bukhara.522 Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, the deputy for Sinop, 
similarly supported the progressive nature of the new civil code and stated that the 
new code would definitely clash with the traditions of society but that society should 
embrace this change, should not let traditions shape the legal code but instead let the 
legal code shape the traditions of society. Bozkurt, when closing the debates, similarly 
stated that traditions and religious beliefs should not form the basis of a legal system 
because they are static, resistant to change while life and the needs of the societies 
constantly evolve. Bozkurt added that, therefore laws based on religion would freeze 
the societies in the backward ages of the emergence of their respective religions. The 
Minister of Justice continued that to reach a certain level of civilization, secularism 
was a necessity. In fact, the leitmotif of all of these speeches was a staunch belief in 
                                                          
521 For more information on Medjelle, see Carter Vaughn Findley, "Medjelle." Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
Second Edition. Brill Online, 2015.First appeared online: 2012, First Print Edition: 1960-2007.   
522 The Muslim entities mentioned here were all recently succumbed to the Western expansionism. 
Sudan, which was once a part of the Ottoman Empire was ruled since 1899 by the British Empire. The 
joint forces of France and Spain had recently suppressed a Berber uprising and retook the control of 
Morocco in 1925. The Central Asian Turkic state of Emirate of Bukhara was invaded by the Soviet 
troops in September 1920. 
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secularism, and in the need for progress which would only been possible by following 
Western examples.  
The new civil code was ratified by unanimous vote on February 17, 1926.523 
As the parliament members stated, the most significant improvements concerned the 
rights of the women. The code officially ended polygamy, guaranteed their right to 
work and of Islamic practices which did not accept equality between the sexes in 
regards of testimony and divorce524 ceased to be sources of law. This code would be 
followed by the ratification of other legal codes, most importantly, the penal code 
which was adapted from the Italians and a code of commerce modelled after German 
and Italian examples. In 1928, according to the principle of secularism, the expression 
announcing that the official religion of the country was Islam was removed from the 
constitution; thus Islam ceased to be the state religion. Several further reforms 
targeting Islamic traditions followed the legal reforms. In 1926, the regime decided to 
adopt the Gregorian calendar instead of the Islamic calendar. In 1931 Ottoman units 
of measurements were replaced with the metric system. These reforms, along with 
that, was accepted in 1935, designating Sunday as the official day of rest instead of 
Friday, the sacred day for Muslims, were made to harmonize commerce with the 
Western world while simultaneously moving away from the common culture of the 
Islamicate societies.  
 
The Alphabet Reform, the Literacy Campaign and Republican Education 
The most controversial reform of this era was the switch from the Arabo-Persian 
alphabet to the Latin alphabet. According to Feroz Ahmad, with this reform Turkey 
cut its historic ties with the East and the Islamic world, on a level and scope far beyond 
any other Republican reforms.525 Similarly Geoffrey Lewis states, that the “purpose 
of the change of alphabet was to break Turkey's ties with the Islamic East”.526 During 
the entirety of the lifespan of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish was written mainly in 
                                                          
523 For the debates at the Grand Assembly, and for the full text of the civil code of 1926, see T.B.M.M. 
Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre II, Cilt 22, pp. 229-237 and the attached file, pp. 1-102. 
524 In Islamic law the testimony of a woman is worth half of a man. According to various hadith 
collections this is due to the perceived “deficiency” in their intelligence in comparison with men. The 
divorce procedures in Islam also favour the men; for men divorce is easily obtained, while obtaining 
divorce for women is typically quite difficult. 
525 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, p. 100. 
526 Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform, p. 27. 
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Arabo-Persian script.527 In addition to the Arabo-Persian script, the Armenian and 
Greek members of the Empire employed their respective alphabets as well to write the 
dominant language of the Empire.528 After the elimination and the expelling of these 
minorities, in the post-Ottoman setting Turkish continued to be written with Arabo-
Persian letters but for many linguists the script and the characteristics of the language 
did not harmoniously match each other. Lewis summarizes the problems of the 
alphabet as follows: There were no vowels in the Arabo-Persian alphabet that 
correspond to many vowels of the Turkish language, every letter was shown with 
different signs at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of the words, some letters 
in the Arabo-Persian alphabet represent sounds that do not exist in Turkish and some 
letters represented more than one sound in Turkish which created confusion. For 
instance, the letter ‘kef’ in the Arabo-Persian alphabet represented the letters ‘g, k, n, 
and y’ in Turkish.529 Therefore, words that sound entirely different and had different 
meanings were sometimes shown with the exact same Arabic letters. For instance, 
three distinct Turkish words; eğlenmek (‘to have fun’), eklenmek (‘to be added’) and 
eylenmek (‘to linger’) were all written with the same Arabic letters.530 Similarly, with 
the Arabic letters alif-waw-nun, the Turkish words on (‘ten’), un (‘flour’) and ün 
(‘fame’) could be written.531  
Even before the Republican reforms there were debates among the Ottoman 
intellectuals over how to make the alphabet more suitable for the Turkish language.532 
Starting from the Tanzimat era, several plans were proposed to increase the suitability 
of the Arabo-Persian alphabet.  Some of these were: showing every vowel with 
diacritics inherited from Arabic; abandoning the practice of to joining letters together; 
adding new letters to represent the missing vowels; showing the letters with only one 
form regardless of their position within the word; showing every vowel in a word with 
a letter to make the words easier to read and prevent confusing them with other words 
written with similar consonants and lastly; and switching to the Latin alphabet. Some 
                                                          
527 The alphabet of Ottomans was the Arabic alphabet with additional Persian letters for the sounds pe, 
che, and je. 
528 Benjamin C. Fortna, Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 10-11. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Sadri Maksudi Arsal, “Latin Harflerini Niçin Kabul Ettik?” Türk Yurdu (March-April 1930), p. 122. 
531 Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform, p. 28. 
532  For a summary of these debates, see Hüseyin Yorulmaz, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe 
Tartışmaları (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1995), and Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform, pp. 27-32. 
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of these reforms were implemented to various degrees of success but the search for a 
more suitable alphabet continued. It should be noted that the impetus for these 
proposals and reforms were mostly practicability, and not ideological concerns, but 
the reformers were aware of the fact that the Arabic letters were embedded to the 
religious fabrics of the society. An early reform attempt proposed in 1863 for adding 
additional vowels to the Arabo-Persian alphabet that correspond to uniquely Turkish 
sounds was refused on the grounds of that “it would conduce to the oblivion of ancient 
Islamic works”.533 
The discussion on the possibility of switching to the Latin alphabet intensified 
after the establishment of the Republic. According to Lewis, Mustafa Kemal, who was 
keen on implementing the reform, felt in 1923 that it was still early to carry out such 
a drastic reform. The dissolution of the opposition in 1925-1926 and the success of the 
following reforms which ended with the reduction of the visibility and significance of 
religion, and religious institutions in the political, social, cultural and legal spheres 
that were implemented between 1925 and 1928 must have changed his mind because 
in the summer of 1928 Atatürk has decided to carry out the alphabet reform. The final 
decision for the alphabet reform was taken in late May 1928 and in the following July 
it was planned to form an alphabet commission to prepare a modified version of the 
Latin alphabet suitable for Turkish. 534  Atatürk announced the decision to switch 
alphabets on August 9 by and the necessary regulations were passed in the Grand 
Assembly on November 1, 1928. Therefore between the summer of 1928 and the 
ratification of the legislature, a part of the population, especially bureaucrats already 
became familiar with the new alphabet.  
On the day of the ratification of the regulations concerning the new alphabet 
at the single-party dominated parliament, there were no heated discussions on the 
proposed law. Instead, there were only a couple of celebratory speeches. Atatürk’s 
opening speech had set the tone. He remarked that with the ratification of the 
legislation which is officially called “On the Adoption and Application of the New 
Turkish Letters”, the Turkish nation would enter into a “universe of light”. Refik 
                                                          
533 Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform, p. 28. 
534 BCA: File A1, 30...1.0.0/ 1.4…12.  The Latin alphabet was not copied in its entirety. In the Turkish 
version of the alphabet, some letters of the Latin alphabet such as “Q” were left out and some letters, 
such as “Ç” which correspond to the Turkish sound “ch” were added. The commission determined these 
details after a series of debates. 
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Koraltan, the deputy of Konya, similarly emphasized that Turkey would “once again 
be a part of the enlightened world” and criticized the old Arabic letters for “hindering 
the nation from the path of progress for centuries”. The nationalist poet and parliament 
member Mehmet Emin Yurdakul 535 stated that the new letters would change the 
destiny of the Turkish people, just as the Hebrew letters used by the Prophet Moses 
when writing the Ten Commandments changed the destiny of his own people. These 
examples once again demonstrated several significant elements that determined the 
mind-set of the Republican elite. The blame for the perceived underdevelopment of 
the nation was put on the Arabness of the alphabet. The Western world was described 
as a realm of illumination while the East was seen as a source of darkness. Lastly, as 
the poetic utterance of Yurdakul exhibits, the Republican reforms and the leadership 
of Atatürk were perceived in religious terms by comparing the alphabet reform with 
the inscription of the commandments; an example which further solidifies the 
existence of a political religion in Republican Turkey.536 
According to the new law the use of books printed in the old characters for 
instruction in schools was forbidden. No books were to be published in the old letters 
after the end of the year. All correspondence between citizens and government 
departments would have to be in the new letters from June 1, 1929. Using the new 
letters became a prerequisite for being elected as a parliament member. From 
November 12 on, public servants began to take exams on the new alphabet. On 
December 1, newspapers started to be published with the Latin alphabet. From January 
1, 1929, the correspondence in public offices started to be conducted in Latin alphabet 
but some offices were given further time until June 1929.537  
Following the ratification of the alphabet reform, a massive campaign targeting 
illiteracy was set in motion. After announcing the reform to the public, during a 
                                                          
535 Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944) was a nationalist poet and politician. His poetry style was 
influenced by Turkish “folk” poetry and included a “cleaner” Turkish purged from Arabic and Persian 
loanwords. As a supporter of the Young Turk movement, he was appointed as the governor of Hejaz 
and later Sivas provinces. Later he became one of the founders of Turkish Hearths and supported the 
nationalist cause in Anatolia with his writings and fiery public speeches. Yurdakul served as a 
parliament after the war. For his artistry and propaganda efforts, see Erol Koroglu, Ottoman 
Propaganda and Turkish Identity (London: Tauris, 2007), pp. 128-196. 
536 For the parliamentary speeches and the full text of the regulations on the new alphabet, see 
T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre III, Cilt 5, pp. 2-18.   
537 Mücteba İlgürel, “Millet Mektepleri.” Münir Aktepe, Mehmet Kaplan & Nejat Göyünç (Eds.) 




meeting with the public, Atatürk made a fiery speech about the illiteracy problem in 
Turkey and stated that the “new Turkish alphabet should be learned with all haste. 
Teach it to every citizen, to every man and woman, to the porters and boatmen. Regard 
this as a national duty. While performing this duty, remember, eighty per cent of our 
population do not know how to read and write, this is a shame. Every individual should 
be ashamed of this fact. This nation is not created to feel ashamed”.538 An important 
instrument of these sentiments was the special schools, which were called as National 
Schools (Millet Mektepleri). These institutions were established to teach the new 
alphabet to people aged from 16 to 40. In addition to learning the new letters, students 
here were taught a variety of courses, ranging from basic calculation, to information 
on personal hygiene, and civics. The alphabet reform was comprehensive and 
compulsory for every citizen. For instance prisoners who served their time were only 
allowed to be released after they proved that they had learnt the new alphabet. Heads 
of families were responsible for the literacy of their fellow household members. If the 
head of family knew the new alphabet, it was his or her duty to teach it to the rest of 
the family, otherwise he or she was responsible of sending them to the national 
schools. Successful students received a booklet consisting of a photo of Atatürk, his 
address to the Turkish youth, and the Turkish constitution upon their graduation from 
national schools.539 
The reform and the following literacy campaign was a success for the 
modernization project of the single-party regime. According to Lewis, the Latin 
alphabet was “undeniably the best that has ever been used for Turkish, and has played 
a large part in the rise of literacy; according to the official figures, from 9 per cent in 
1924 to 65 per cent in 1975 and 82.3 per cent in 1995”.540 Ahmad gives similar 
numbers to Lewis, and states that in 1927, only 1 out of 10 people was literate in 
Turkey, in 1945 this ratio climbed to 1 out of 3.541 Considering the literacy campaign 
was implemented with a limited budget during the economic crisis of 1930s, these 
numbers represent a significant increase. Yet, for the single-party regime, the more 
important aspect of the reform was its connection with the Westernization process. As 
the speeches at the Grand Assembly summarized, this reform was perceived as a 
                                                          
538 Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri III, p. 272. 
539 İlgürel, “Millet Mektepleri.” 
540 Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform, p. 37. 
541 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, pp. 100-103. 
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necessity to change civilizations. The importance of the reform is also visible by 
observing the backlash it has created. Among the reforms of the era, this one stands 
out, even today, as the most contested. After the transition to the multi-party regime 
in 1950, criticisms on the necessity of the alphabet reform were voiced by many, 
especially conservative political parties and intellectuals, and the issue is still a part of 
the contemporary political debates. The main points of the criticisms against the 
reform did not change either. As early as September 1928, journalist İzzet Ulvi 
Baykurt listed these in an article he wrote for the Türk Yurdu magazine.542 According 
to him the main arguments of the opponents of the reforms were that the classics of 
Turkish literature would be unintelligible to the people, the relations of Turkey with 
other Muslims and Turks will be severed, the art of Arabic calligraphy would be 
forgotten and the learned classes, especially the ones who were only exposed to the 
traditional madrasah education, would be illiterates after the ratification of the new 
legislation. These arguments, especially the one which blames the alphabet change for 
Turkey’s separation from the Muslim civilization, are still used by the critics of the 
reform. Ironically, Baykurt’s answer to these criticisms, which summarize the 
Republican attitude regarding the modernizing reforms, are also still in use to defend 
the alphabet reform. According to Baykurt, all of these criticisms were unnecessary 
because pre-reform Turkish literature did not have many classics in the first place, in 
fact most of the literature available in Arabo-Persian alphabet were filled with 
“superstitious beliefs and scholastic thoughts”, and therefore people would not miss 
much by being unable to read them in the future. Regarding the relations with other 
Muslim countries, Baykurt stated that the Republican reform would set an example 
for them and predicted that they will, in the future, also change their alphabets, 
therefore the links between Turkey and other Muslim countries would never be 
broken. Baykurt proved to be right to some degree, the Turkic speaking countries and 
political entities such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Tataristan, too, adopted the 
Latin alphabet, but Arabic- and Persian-speaking Middle Eastern countries did not 
change their scripts. Therefore for the younger generations of Turkish citizens, 
following the intellectual and cultural movements and products of the Western world 
became in time, much easier than following the Middle East. The abandonment of 
teaching Arabic and Persian in schools as foreign languages, and the replacement of 
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these by instruction of English, French or German, further accelerated the process of 
moving away from the sphere of influence of the Middle Eastern culture. These 
examples solidify the theory that the main Republican agenda behind the alphabet 
change was using the reforms as an instrument of Westernization politics. This attitude 
is most evident at the articles of Republican authors who discussed the outcome of the 
alphabet reform in 1930s. Sadi Maksudi Arsal claimed in 1930 that with this reform 
Atatürk “opened up the gates of Western civilization to the Turks”. 543 Similarly, 
Mehmed Fuat Köprülü wrote on the tenth anniversary of the reform, that with the 
alphabet reform, Turkey has “escaped from the medieval Eastern culture and entered 
the sphere of influence of the Western culture”.544 Therefore, it is more than plausible 
to claim that the main concern of the regime while implementing the reform was not 
the practicality or the suitability of the new alphabet. The chief motivation was leaving 
behind the old, weak, and decaying Eastern civilization, which the regime associated 
with the Arabo-Persian script, and entering the promising, modern, and enlightened 
realm of Western civilization. 
The alphabet reform and the following literacy campaign can also be read as a 
part of the educational reforms of the Republic. The concept of education was 
attributed central importance by the Republican elite as an instrument of change. 
Education of the masses was perceived as a duty of the regime. Every apparatus of the 
ruling entity were seen as elements of the educational crusade and every aspect of the 
social relations, and political and cultural spheres were perceived as candidates to be 
included in the educational reforms. For instance Atatürk stated during the Second 
Party Congress of the Republican People’s Party that the main objective of the party 
was to give “political education” to the people, as if politics, even in its most 
rudimentary form did not exist in Turkey. Therefore the boundaries of the educational 
reforms of the single-party were not limited to formal education, but rather the reforms 
targeted the entire nation and every sphere of life.  
The early Republican era witnessed a leap in accessibility of formal education. 
The budget reserved for education grew drastically every year except the years of 
global economic crisis. In 1923, Ministry of Education has received 3 million Turkish 
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Liras from the budget which would increase to 43 million in 1943.545 Also, in this era 
dramatic improvements in the number of schools, enrolled students and teachers were 
observed. The combined number of primary, secondary, high schools and universities 
climbed from 5,005 in 1923 to 11,340 in 1945. In the same time period the number of 
teachers rose from 12,993 to 27,680 and most importantly the number of enrolled 
students almost tripled and became more than 1.1 million. The school system was not 
the only instrument of the educational policies of the Republic. Additionally, in 1932, 
People’s Houses (Halkevleri) and, in 1939, People’s Chambers (Halkodaları), 
educational institutions that were directly controlled by the single-party were opened 
across the country and replaced the Turkish Hearths which were closed in 1931, as the 
most significant “voluntary” social organizations. 546  According to the party 
publications, the objective of these institutions was “to keep alive and develop further 
the movement of reform and social progress in the country”.547 People’s Houses were 
located at large towns. In every People’s House there was a library, a reading room, a 
conference hall, a radio room, and a performance hall, while the People’s Chambers, 
the smaller versions of the People’s Houses, were located at the villages and small 
towns, and were more compact in size and limited in resources. Both of these 
institutions were providing an elaborate form of supplementary education and adult 
education for the masses by building large libraries, staging plays and concerts, and 
opening exhibitions. With Houses in large towns and Chambers in villages, the masses 
                                                          
545 BCA: 30...1.0.0/ 90.559…4. 
546 On paper, participation to the activities of the People’s Houses was voluntary, yet several documents 
in the Prime Ministerial Archives show that for civil servants, such as teachers, participation was 
“strongly advised by the government”, in fact orders were sent to several ministries to encourage their 
members to continue participating in the activities of the Houses. See, BCA: No. 13178, File: 14-62, 
30...18.1.2/ 30.55…15. 
547 The information regarding the People’s Houses is gathered mainly from a propaganda brochure the 
regime published in 1942, at the 10th anniversary of the establishment of these institutions and the 
documents available at the Republican Archives in Ankara. For more information on the Houses, 
including statistics and illustrated graphics concerning the People’s Houses, see the 10th anniversary 
issue; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, (Ed.) CHP – Halkevleri ve Halkodaları, 1932-1942 (Ankara: Alaeddin 
Kıral Basımevi, 1942). For additional information, see Kemal H. Karpat, “The People's Houses in 
Turkey: Establishment and Growth.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (Winter - Spring, 1963), 
pp. 55-67., and “The Impact of the People's Houses on the Development of Communication in Turkey: 
1931-1951.” Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 15, Issue 1/4 (1974), pp. 69-84. In recent years, the 
People’s Houses have become a popular subject of research and several monographs focusing on 
various local branches were published. For some of these, see Eminalp Malkoç, Devrimin Kültür 
Fidanlığı - Halkevleri ve Kadıköy Halkevi (Alef: Istanbul, 2009), Selçuk Duman, Modern Türkiye’nin 
İnşasında Halkevleri ve Sivas Halkevi Örneği (Berikan: Istanbul, 2013) and Feyza Kurnaz Şahin, 
Atatürk'ün Kültür Kurumlarından Halkevleri ve Afyon Halkevi (Berikan: Istanbul, 2015). 
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that fell outside the formal education system of the state were asked to internalize the 
modernizing reforms. 
The activities performed by the Houses were divided into nine categories and 
put into the responsibility of different branches. Each People's House had to be 
involved in activities in at least three of these nine categories. These were: Language 
and literature, the arts, performances, sports, social work, taught courses, library and 
publications, Peasantism (Köycülük) and, lastly, museums and exhibitions. 548 The 
language and literature branches were responsible for organizing conferences. These 
conferences were either attended by prominent names of Turkish politics and 
literature, or used to provide a medium of expression for the local talent. These 
branches also helped the Turkish Linguistic Society by scanning, finding and 
suggesting words from their respective local vernaculars to replace the foreign loan 
words in Turkish. The arts divisions of the Houses were responsible for organizing 
exhibitions of visual arts, staging concerts, and organizing art competitions. 
Performance branches were in charge of forming volunteer groups to perform stage 
plays. In the departments related to the arts, both universal and national cultural 
products were performed. For instance, classical and Turkish music were both 
performed by the arts branches, and plays from the classic European repertoire, 
nationalist and educational Turkish plays and traditional Turkish shadow theatre, 
Karagöz, were all produced by the performance branches.549  
The sports divisions were responsible for the physical education of the citizens 
who did not get physical education courses in their primary schools or high schools. 
They also promoted different types of sports which were feasible to do within that 
respective region and organized sporting competitions with People’s Houses of other 
regions. 550  The social works divisions of the Houses endorsed “constructive and 
preventive philanthropy” and according to the party publications reached out to tens 
of thousands of sick and elderly each year. The taught courses branches were 
supplementary education institutions helping the Republican formal education system. 
                                                          
548 The establishment of the branch of library and publications was compulsory for every People’s 
House. The other branches were established after considering practical concerns. 
549 For an evaluation of the Performances Branches of the People’s Houses, see Eyal Ari, “The People's 
Houses and the Theatre in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (July 2004), pp. 32-58. 
550 For instance, for the members of the People’s Houses in Sivas and Kayseri, due to their proximity 




These branches offered various courses depending on the public demand and the 
means available to the House. Some of these courses were: literacy course for 
illiterates, elementary natural sciences, vocational training, fine arts, and foreign 
languages. During the summer months, the Houses also opened summer schools to 
help the students who failed their courses in the previous school year. The branch of 
library and publications was the central unit of a People’s House. These branches were 
responsible for publishing books, and classifying and ordering the books sent by the 
party centre, and ministries, and granted by old libraries of their respective regions and 
personal collections. The party publications claim that from 1932 to 1942, the People’s 
Houses across the country had more than 420,000 books in their collections. The 
library units also provided reading material for the mobile libraries, the reading rooms 
they opened in remote places such as villages, or prisons where access to the House 
library was not possible. 551  The Peasantist (Köycü) divisions within the People’s 
Houses were apparatuses of the Peasantist inclination of the Republican ideology. 
Synchronous with the almost global proliferation of the importance attributed to the 
virtues of rural living in 1930s, Republican modernism placed high value on village 
life while also aiming for the modernization of the village. The Peasantist divisions, 
working together with the People’s Chambers in the villages were responsible for 
changing the countryside by modernizing it while preserving the rural, pastoral values. 
According to party publications, another objective of these branches was to create 
cohesion between the urbanites and the peasants by increasing the mutual sympathy 
and solidarism they felt for each other. To achieve this intimacy, village tours were 
organized by the Peasantist branches. These tours were attended by People’s Houses 
members who worked as physicians, veterinary physicians, dentists, teachers, and 
agriculturists whose professions made them valuable to contribute to the 
modernization of the villages. The urban groups visiting the villages dealt with the 
problems of villagers, and gave them instructions and recommendations on a wide 
range of issues, from village planning to precautions against epidemics, and 
construction of the village houses.552 The last division, museums and history, were 
                                                          
551 BCA: 490...1.0.0/ 3.11…14. 
552 Karaömeroğlu states that these visits did not provide much contribution to the problems of villagers 
and did not manage to close the gap between the urbanites and villagers. For his evaluation of the 
Peasantism of the People’s Houses, see M. Asım Karaömeroğlu, “The People's Houses and the Cult of 
the Peasant in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34:4 (October 1998), pp. 67-91. 
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responsible for studying local history and publishing these studies, as well as 
exhibiting historical artefacts of their respective regions. 
The Republic was proud of the achievements of the People’s Houses. On 
paper, the reach of the Houses and the scope of their activities are apparent from the 
rather impressive statistics. In a decade, the total number of Houses climbed to 383, 
in addition to 198 People’s Chambers that opened after 1939. Already by 1940 a total 
of ten million citizens across the country made use of the services at the People’s 
Houses. Together with the regular participants at the People’s Chambers the 
membership figures of the Houses reached 165,000 in 1940.553 In comparison to the 
267 centres and 32,000 registered members of the Turkish Hearths, the institutions the 
People’s Houses replaced as the most significant social organization in Turkey, these 
numbers look impressive indeed. However, the level of penetration of the institutions 
to people’s consciousness is debatable because the social fabric of society did not 
appear to be changed drastically despite the efforts of the Houses. There are several 
reasons for this, the most obvious being the fact that the Houses were too closely 
controlled by the centre which prevented them from becoming entirely localized and 
being able to gain the trust of the masses. Despite their idealism the Houses were not 
perceived as integral parts of the communities they represented. According to the 
documents at the Prime Ministerial Archives, this perception seems to be rightfully 
deserved. The books in the libraries of the People’s Houses were sent by Ankara. The 
stage plays which the performances divisions were allowed to stage were picked by 
the capital. The history departments of the Houses were not allowed to publish their 
own articles without being inspected by the Turkish Historical Society. The Houses 
were constantly pressured by the government to emphasize certain events and 
activities. Even regulations on how to clean the Houses were sent from Ankara to the 
branches. There was no breathing room left to individual Houses to establish close 
connections with their localities. As the documents demonstrate, the bulk of the 
membership remained civil servants, teachers, and party members who were devoted 
to the Republican ideology or were coerced to attend the activities half-heartedly. An 
example of the alienation these member groups felt when establishing contact with 
their surroundings is visible in the accounts of Fay Kirby who likened the participants 
of the Peasantist division of Ankara People’s House who prepared for a visit to a 
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nearby village to a group of adventurers equipping themselves for an “African 
Safari”.554  
It should be added that despite this alienation, the ruling elite perceived the 
people of Turkey, whether living in city centres and in rural areas in a very positive 
light, but did not trust them enough to let them contribute to the citizen-state relations 
through the instrumentality of the People’s Houses. Similar to the other apparatuses 
of the Turkish single-party regime such as the media, the public monuments and 
ceremonies, the Houses remained as a medium of one-way communication between 
the state and the citizens, without any significant contribution by the citizens 
themselves. Therefore, the dormancy of the Houses despite all the government support 
show that in Republican modernization, the state was the motor of change and the 
people were passive either by choice, by apathy but mostly due to being left without 
agency. A similar interpretation can be made to evaluate the Republican educational 
reforms in general; they were enthusiastic and idealist, and aimed for the total 
transformation of the society by using the medium of education as a modernising 
device. They were a continuation of the reform attempts and programs of the late-
Ottoman Westernizers. In urban centres, in comparison to the rural areas the reforms 
managed to take hold, but they could not penetrate the social fabric of the rural areas 
to complete the task of the total transformation of society. The most important reason 
for this failure was the inability of the ruling elite to adapt themselves to the 
exceptional conditions of the various Anatolian localities which limited the level of 
voluntary association of the masses with the modernization agenda. An example which 
contradicts this generalization is the reforms regarding women’s rights. 
 
Republican Reforms on Women’s Rights 
In Republican historiography, the increased social and political rights of the Turkish 
women constitute one of the major success stories of the Republican modernization of 
the 1930s although similarly to the situation of the educational reforms, the 
improvements in women’s rights did not start with the Republican reforms. Despite 
the fact that developments in this field during the late Ottoman era were not recognized 
                                                          




by the Republican elite, the continuity between the late Ottoman and the Republican 
reform agendas regarding the rights of women is apparent. As a crucial difference 
between the two eras, the Republican reforms, once again, specifically targeted 
Turkey’s previous identification with Islamicate culture.  
Starting from the Tanzimat era several improvements were implemented 
regarding the rights of women, such as the by-law of 1847 which changed the Islamic 
inheritance law that allotted women half the share of inheritance available to men who 
have the same degree of relation to the decedent and entitled Ottoman women with 
equal rights of inheritance. The first secondary school for girls was opened in Istanbul 
in 1859 and was followed by the establishment of secondary schools in Salonica, 
Bursa and Beirut. During the Hamidian era the number of these schools rose 
significantly and from 1880 on high schools for girls were introduced to the school 
system. 555  Although these institutions had numerous problems including the low 
student numbers, the questionable quality of education, and the scarcity of girls’ 
schools across the Empire, their existence signifies that the situation of women in the 
Empire, especially women who lived in the large cities who had access to these 
institutions, was not light years behind their counterparts in the Western world. In 
addition to the proliferation of the educational institutions, the media of the era also 
contributed to women’s rights issues. 
In late Ottoman period, concerns over issues such as women’s education and 
social practices that were oppressive to women such as polygamy, arranged marriages, 
and concubinage, were voiced both by male and female members of the intelligentsia. 
According to Fleischmann, this proliferation of feminist discourse within the Ottoman 
Empire was a part of a larger framework of Middle Eastern feminism. As early as 1895 
the first women’s magazine was published in Ottoman Empire which was called 
Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete (The Ladies Own Gazette). 556  Famous names of the 
                                                          
555  Şefika Kurnaz, Cumhuriyet Öncesinde Türk Kadını, 1839-1923 (Ankara: Başbakanlık Aile 
Araştırma Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), pp. 4-28. 
556 There were other publications predating the Ladies Own Gazette such as Kypseli (published in 
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Ottoman women’s rights movement, such as Fatma Aliye who is commonly 
recognized as the first female Turkish novelist, contributed articles to the magazine. 
According to Frierson, the magazine campaigned for the education of women without 
disregarding their “traditional” obligations as mothers, wives and loyal Ottoman 
subjects.557 The Ladies Own Gazette offered Ottoman women a mixture of serious 
texts on women’s rights, valuable information on diverse issues such as childrearing, 
nutrition and disease prevention, and light entertainment. The magazine was published 
twice weekly and circulated not just in the Ottoman lands but among the Turkish 
speaking populations of Russia, as well.558 With the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, 
the women’s rights movement in the Ottoman Empire gained further momentum but 
the reform programme implemented during the Second Constitutional Era did not 
satisfy the demands of women. Although they were a part of the work-force for a long 
time and managed to find employment in public service and various other fields after 
the Revolution, such as telegraph operators, nurses, and postal clerks, they still were 
paid much lower than men and their social and political rights were still not 
recognised. In 1913, The World of the Women (Kadınlar Dünyası), an influential 
feminist newspaper, started publication. This journal, which was entirely run by 
women, closely followed the international feminist movement while remaining very 
loyal to Ottoman identity, defended the rights of the Ottoman women – regardless of 
their religious and ethnic affiliation – and campaigned for women’s rights, along with 
its sister organization Ottoman Society for the Defence of Women’s Rights (Osmanli 
Müdafaa-i Hukuk-ı Nisvan Cemiyeti).559 This group was just one of the dozens of 
women’s organizations which operated in countless fields, ranging from contributing 
to the war effort to increasing the knowledge of the Ottoman women, from 
philanthropy to providing vocational training for women. As with the modernizers of 
the late Ottoman era, the members of the Ottoman women’s rights movement belonged 
to a variety of groups regarding their perception of Islamic identity. Some of them, 
like Fatma Aliye, attributed special importance to the Islamic identity and while 
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applauding the political activities of their sister feminist organizations in the West, 
criticized them for their scandalous behaviour and asked Ottoman women to continue 
behaving like proper ladies and retain their traditional roles in the family while 
simultaneously seeking education and knowledge. Other feminists, like Fatma Aliye’s 
sister Emine Semiye, who was active in the field of politics as a member of the 
Ottoman Democrats (Fırka-i İbad) , indicated that some women of the era steadily 
crossed over the traditional lines that separated women from the men in the social and 
political spheres. Regardless of their nature, the activities of the women’s rights 
organizations and the feminist publications of the era show that the Republican 
perception of the situation of women in the Ottoman Empire, as a form of slavery 
bereft of agency, was far from being true. 
An example given by Karakışla further illustrates this point. During the Balkan 
Wars of 1912-1913, due to many positions left open by the conscripted male 
population of the Empire, women started to participate more in economic life which 
drastically increased their visibility in the society. In 1913, an Istanbulite woman 
named Ayşe Bedra Osman applied to an open position at the Istanbul Telephone 
Company (Dersaadet Telefon Anonim Şirket-i Osmaniyesi). The recruitment policy of 
the Company favoured non-Muslim women over Muslims and therefore they did not 
employ Ayşe Bedra Osman. The World of the Women and Defence of Women’s 
Rights launched a campaign to pressure the Company to change its recruitment policy 
that ended with a victory, and not just for Osman, but also for seven Muslim women 
in total who were employed by the Istanbul Telephone Company in 1914.560 This 
example further supports the assumption that an independent, and functioning 
women’s rights movement indeed existed in the late Ottoman era which was powerful 
enough to sway public opinion to support their agenda. Therefore the Republican 
reformers did not find a tabula rasa regarding the women’s rights when they took over 
the administration, but rather inherited the legacy of a combination of state reforms 
from Tanzimat, Hamidian and Second Constitutional Eras, and a rich, organic yet 
internationally connected, and capable feminist movement. 
In between the collapse of the Ottoman order at the end of the First World War 
and the establishment of the Republic, women came to the fore once again. Their 
                                                          




contribution to the war effort during the Turkish War of Independence was praised by 
the Republican elite, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself, who in a meeting with 
the women of Konya province in March 1923, stated that “no other women of a nation 
could claim that they worked as much as the women of Anatolia to grant their nation’s 
emancipation and victory”.561 Atatürk further stated that to establish a civilized society 
the education of women was a necessity, but from his tone in this speech, as well as 
his other speeches about the women’s rights issue from this era, it is apparent that he 
closely followed the rhetoric of the late Ottoman era feminism and emphasized the 
importance of women’s education, their crucial duty as child-rearers, and the 
importance of the perfection and the exhibition of womanly virtues. According to the 
speeches of Atatürk and the lack of any substantial legal reform on this matter, 
women’s participation in the workforce and in politics seems not to be a part of the 
Republican reform agenda during the very first years of the Republic. In April 1923, 
the new law on the parliamentary elections only granted the right to vote to the male 
population of the country. During the discussions of this law, only one parliament 
member, Hilmi Bey562 proposed the expansion of the law to grant women the right to 
vote, or at least their inclusion in the population census which would be conducted to 
determine the amount of deputies that represent the constituencies. His speech created 
a ruckus at the Grand Assembly which ended with angry parliament members shouting 
at him and stomping their feet to prevent Hilmi Bey from continuing his speech.563 
The intolerance shown to the sole supporter of the women’s cause in parliament 
signifies that the women’s rights movement in Republican Turkey had not many 
supporters among the members of the ruling elite. An example of this reluctance is 
also visible in the case of the proposed feminist political party. 
In July 1923, feminists in Turkey, although modest in number, showed their 
level of political awareness and ideological consciousness by proposing to establish a 
feminist political party under the name of the People’s Party of Women (Kadınlar 
                                                          
561 Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri III, pp. 151-157. 
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Halk Fırkası). Considering that the First Group in the Grand Assembly led by Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk would be officially established only in September 1923, the People’s 
Party of Women was on the verge of being the first political party of the young 
Republic. The government did not accept this appeal on the grounds that women were 
not legally allowed to participate in politics although it did give the green light for the 
formation of a civil society organization. Instead of a party, the Turkish Women’s 
Union (Türk Kadınlar Birliği) was established in February 1924. The Union remained 
active in pursuing political rights for women and in 1925 even planned a campaign to 
nominate the well-known female figures of the era, such as the leader of the Union 
Nezihe Muhiddin and the famous author Halide Edip, as parliamentary candidates in 
the forthcoming 1927 elections, but this proposal was also refused by the ruling party 
on the same grounds. According to Zihinoğlu, to circumnavigate their obstacle the 
Union contemplated for a while sending a feminist man to the Parliament to defend 
the feminist women’s cause and raise awareness for the plight of the Turkish women’s 
rights movement to be represented in the political sphere.564 
While the efforts of the Union regarding the political representation of women 
failed, the social rights of women were recognized by the regime. Especially after 
1925, the watershed moment of the end of the opposition, the ruling party became 
bolder in performing more drastic reforms. Some of these reforms directly changed 
the social status of women. The first substantial reform package on women’s rights 
came in the form of the new civil code in 1926. During the discussions of the code in 
the Grand Assembly, Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, praised the law for 
giving back to Turkish women “the rights they truly deserved for their self-sacrifice 
and virtues they have shown for centuries”. The new civil code was ratified by 
unanimous vote on February 17, 1926.565 As Kaya and several fellow parliament 
members stated during the debates, the most significant improvements were in the 
rights of women. The code officially ended polygamy, guaranteed their right to work 
and abolished the Islamic practices which did not accept the equality between the sexes 
in regards of testimony and divorce. In Islamic law the testimony of a woman was 
worth half of a man. According to various hadith collections this was due to the 
deficiency in their intelligence in comparison with men. Divorce procedures in Islam 
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also favoured men; for men divorce is easily obtained, while obtaining divorce for 
women was typically quite difficult. The civil code made significant corrections 
relating to these matters. Its contribution surpassed any previous arrangements made 
on the woman issue. 
In March 1927, The Turkish Women’s Union held a congress in Istanbul. Here, 
Nezihe Muhiddin once again voiced the plea of Turkish women for political 
representation. The following incidents showed that the women’s rights movements 
were ahead of the Republican elite regarding the reforms and this conflict of interests 
concerning the pace of the reforms made the regime uncomfortable. In September 
1927, police raided the headquarters of the Women’s Union on the premise of 
administrative infraction. Muhiddin and the leading cadre of the movement were 
forced to resign from their duties. According to Zihinoğlu, a more regime-friendly and 
tame administration took over after this intervention which she perceives as politically 
motivated. Simultaneously, in this era the Union was first acknowledged as a “public 
benefit society” and later as a state-sponsored organization.566 The chief duty of the 
Women’s Union became representing Turkey and its modernising reforms in the 
international arena. In 1929, Union member Efzayiş Suat attended the annual 
Congress of the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship 
held in Berlin.567 Furthermore, it was decided to organize the next meeting in Istanbul. 
This arrangement provided the regime another opportunity to show the world Turkey’s 
changing, modern exterior under Republican rule. 
In 1930, Turkish women finally managed to gain the right to vote and to be 
elected, at last at the municipal level. On April 14, 1930, a large crowd of Women’s 
Union members gathered in Taksim Square in front of the Monument of the Republic 
to express their gratitude. 568 In December 1934, the persistent calls for women’s 
enfranchisement of the feminist movement and the increasingly modernist agenda of 
the ruling party finally converged, and the women of Turkey gained the right to vote 
and to be elected in parliamentary elections. Although the fact that the elections would 
not be competitive until 1946 surely reduces the importance of the reform, it was still 
a significant moment in Turkish history. Furthermore, in this era the Republic tried to 
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make women more visible in the social sphere. There was a substantial increase 
regarding the number of female students since all faculties of all universities were 
opened to women. It is impossible to deny the Republican efforts to make education 
more available and accessible to women.569 The quality of the Republican education 
is open to debate, but a crucial aspect of the single-party education system was the 
vital importance attributed to gender related issues in the curricula such as gender 
equality and women’s’ participation in the work force. Gümüşoğlu’s comparative 
analysis of the primary school textbooks of the single-party era and the multi-party 
democracy after 1945 clearly demonstrates that the educational mentality of the 
single-party period was more concerned with the equality of gender, and placed more 
emphasis on the visibility of women in business life and social life.570 It is staggering 
how the Turkish ruling elite moved from stomping their feet on the ground in anger to 
protest a single parliament member who defended the existence of Turkish women in 
1923 to embracing gender equality and the political enfranchisement of women in 
early 1930s. Therefore an analysis of the Republican rhetoric regarding this issue is 
needed. 
To prevent a conservative backlash, a significant part of the discourse utilized 
by the Republican elite in regards to women’s rights was finding, or inventing, 
examples from the pre-Islamic past of the Turkish nation to prove that equality 
between the sexes was ingrained in the very fabric of Turkishness. For instance, Sadri 
Maksudi Arsal, who spoke in favour of the enfranchisement of the women in the Grand 
Assembly, stated that “Turkish women always participated in the political sphere”. 
Arsal then moved on to give examples from pre-Islamic Turkish history to buttress his 
claim. He asserted that the Khanate of Bukhara which was overrun by Arabs in the 7th 
century was led by a woman. Arsal further claimed that the wives or mothers of 
Turkish rulers, such as Bilge Khagan’s mother in the 6th century and a wife of a Uyghur 
ruler in the 10th century, were helping the men in administrative matters.571 This rather 
flimsy “evidence” was produced and repeated in abundance by the ruling elite to fulfil 
two interrelated objectives. First, as mentioned before, the Republicans tried to prevent 
a conservative backlash by presenting the empowerment of women as consonant with 
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Turkish traditions. Secondly, the blame was once again put on the Islamic past. 
According to Republican perspective, Turks were already modern and civilized from 
time immemorial until Islam intervened. Thus, the Republican regime, by removing 
the remnants of the Islamic past through a series of modernizing reforms was freeing 
the Turkish women. Therefore, the Republican perception of the women’s rights issue 
was firmly linked with the overarching theme, the leitmotif of Republican ideology, 
modernizing by the elimination of the obstacles established by the values and 
traditions of the past, specifically the Islamic, “eastern” past.  
In 1935, in the first elections following the enfranchisement of women, 
eighteen women were elected to the parliament of 400 seats. This ratio of female 
parliamentary representation would only be surpassed after the 2007 elections.572  
Ironically, the conclusion of the women question in line with the Republican ideology 
led to the disintegration of the organic Turkish Feminist movement that had existed in 
various forms continuously from the 1880s to the 1930s. On April 18, 1935, the 
Turkish Women’s Union hosted the 12th Annual Congress of the International Alliance 
of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship held in Istanbul. The event was a 
success that proved to be an essential publicity opportunity for modern Turkey. 
Following the congress the Women’s Union which already had lost its radical 
reformist edge, was closed by the government on the grounds that it had “completed 
its task”.573 At the time of its closure, the Union was organised in four large cities and 
had 1,000 registered members. 
The case of the Turkish Women’s Union constitutes a rarity in the early 
Republican history. For the previously mentioned reforms, the contribution of the 
ordinary people to the decision-making process and the implementation of the reforms 
was minimal. The motor of the change was the Republican elite which tried to drag 
the rest of the society along, to make them internalize the reforms such as the abolition 
of the caliphate, the Sufi religious orders or the change of alphabets. There was no 
significant public demand for these reforms. On the contrary, with the reforms on 
women’s rights, it was the Republican elite that was one step behind the public 
demands. The organic feminist movement of Turkey which had already existed for 
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decades had to wait for eleven years to gain the right of political representation in 
Turkey. Furthermore, similarly to the other voluntary organizations of the era, they 
were forced to close down because “they achieved everything that they wished for” 
which contradicts the ideological inclinations of a proudly modernist Republic. The 
motive that I have proposed in the previous chapter to explain this rather unusual 
behaviour was the intolerance of the Republican regime towards every single form of  
collective display of loyalty to religion, ethnicity, gender, ideology or class. The 
Republican political religion discouraged voluntary social organizations, restricted 
religious beliefs, political opinions, different forms of belongingness to ethnic and 
linguistic backgrounds, gender or social class and restrained the formation of 
collective identities to a domain limited within the state, and did not give them any 
room to thrive. Therefore feminism, a form of supranational identity, must have been 
frowned upon by the ruling elite. Zafer Toprak reminds us that the Turkish Women’s 
Union was abolished right after the 12th Congress of the International Alliance of 
Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship held in Istanbul in 1935 and suggests that 
the reason of the demise of the organization may have been the anti-militaristic, anti-
war discourse of the International Alliance of Women (IAW).574 Considering that 
1935 was an especially turbulent year in the world in which Italy was on the verge of 
attacking Abyssinia, Spain was in turmoil which would end in civil war, and Germany 
violated several provisions of the Treaty of Versailles by introducing military 
conscription and rebuilding the armed forces, showing solidarity with an international 
organization such as IAW which persistently addressed issues such as peace and the 
proliferation of arms in Europe could have been perceived as problematic by the 
Republican elite. It is plausible to state that with the closure of the Turkish Women’s 
Union the regime tried to distance itself from the IAW but the more plausible 
explanation is that the Republican regime wanted to dictate an identity to the women 
of Turkey which refused to let them become a part of the global womankind, and to 
show solidarity with the pleas of their fellow feminists. The Turkish feminist women 
should limit their identities within the boundaries of Turkishness, because claiming an 
additional identity whether local or ethnic, gender-based or internationalist, was 
forbidden in Republican Turkey. 
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Modernization, Dersim and Nationalist Historiographies 
As stated above, in Republican modernization, the reforms were implemented as state 
projects while the contribution of the masses were kept to a minimum. The 
modernization project of the Republic showed similarities with the reform projects of 
the previous leaderships while simultaneously differentiating from them due to the 
hostile attitude towards the cultural, political, and social reflections of the Islamic past 
in Turkey. The Republican reforms continued the tradition of the Tanzimat, Hamidian 
and Second Constitutional eras, but a special emphasis was placed on secularisation 
and total disengagement from the traditions, organizations, and institutions which the 
Republican ruling elite associated with the Islamicate and Eastern cultures. The 
Republican ideology was centred around the concept of modernization as well as on 
the intolerance shown towards other identities except the national, modern, secular 
Turkish identity which had been carefully structured by the Republican elite starting 
with the establishment of the single-party rule in 1925. This identity was represented 
by the Turkish nation-state which was revered by the Republicans almost to the point 
of adoration. It was seen as the pinnacle of modernity, and a strong, centralized state 
with working apparatuses that efficiently penetrated every sphere of life was seen as 
the perfect tool to spread modernization. This tendency was best defined by the 
parliament member and Republican ideologue Sadri Maksudi Arsal who described the 
state as the “most effective and most important institution for the development of 
civilization”.575 For citizens, identification with this state was a necessity. Every sense 
of belongingness felt to sources other than the nation state, such as Sufi religious 
orders, different ideologies, Masonic lodges, ethnic groups, labour organizations and 
internationalist movements, were all deemed harmful stumbling blocks preventing 
modernization. To build a monolithic nation-state was not just an aim of the 
Republican elite but a tool needed for the realization of the modernization project. 
In hindsight this project proved to be open to abuse like every other endeavour 
attempted by the unchecked, leviathan power of the state where the contribution and 
active participation of the masses were discouraged and political discussions were 
restricted. The unaccountability of the ruling elite produced arbitrariness which can 
always lead to disastrous consequences. In Republican Turkey, the disaster struck 
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Dersim, a region in Eastern Anatolia where more than thirteen thousand civilians were 
killed by the state forces during a two-year campaign (1937-1938) which, according 
to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, was waged to “open up the region to civilization”.576  
These events were at first presented by the regime as a rightful exercise of power to 
deal with a harmful revolt staged by the reactionary forces against the modernization 
attempts of the government, then for the following decades the graveness of the 
situation was downplayed by successive governments of Turkey. Recently, the issue 
began to be debated openly but the theories about the motives of both parties involved 
in the incidents are misleading, fed with nationalist propaganda and therefore 
insufficient to inform us about the nature of Turkish authoritarianism. The following 
part of the chapter will first briefly introduce the characteristics of the Dersim region 
while discussing the most prevalent interpretations of the events of 1937-1938. This 
section will be followed by a narrative of the events based on the documents from the 
Prime Ministerial Archives and show the connections between Republican 
modernization and the Dersim massacres. 
Dersim is located in eastern Turkey neighbouring the towns of Elazığ, 
Erzincan and Bingöl. Dersim is mountainous; the average altitude is around 2,000 
metres, and the area is rich with various fresh water sources and forests which led to 
its description as an oasis placed in the heart of the Eastern Anatolia, a region that 
mostly associated with its harsh climate and desolateness. In particular, the Munzur 
Valley, which is located in the Munzur Mountain Range and hosts the largest national 
park of Turkey, accommodates very rich fauna and flora which are distinct from the 
rest of the region. The Munzur Mountain range, forming an arc, covers the entire 
north-western, northern and north-eastern flanks of Dersim and cuts off the city from 
the rest of the North-eastern Anatolia. Together with the Euphrates which determines 
the southern border of the city, natural features encircle Dersim and make it possible 
for an entirely distinct culture to flourish here which is almost impossible to simplify 
solely on ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines. The physical separation from the rest of 
the region resulted in the establishment of a tribal society, a different language, a 
distinct culture and an extremely eclectic belief system. The people of Dersim were 
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and still are a minority, in fact they can even be described as a minority within a 
minority, in the ethnic, denominational, and linguistic spheres.  
The majority of the social scientists who deal with the Dersim Massacres 
consider the incidents of 1937-1938 as a part of the on-going “Kurdish Question” in 
Turkey, and the Middle Eastern region. They base this assumption on the ethnic 
identity of the Dersimis although it is questionable if the primary identification of the 
Dersimis is an ethnic one. The people of Dersim are known as ethnic Zazas. For most, 
the Zazas constitute a branch of Kurdish people, therefore for these observers, the 
events in Dersim are perceived as a segment in the “chain of Kurdish revolts” that 
regularly broke out in the region first against the Ottoman Empire and later against the 
Republican regime.577 The most important and widespread of these revolts was the 
Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925. The significant amount of effort, time and funds spent on 
crushing the revolt troubled the leading figures of the republic. This revolt can also be 
read as a watershed moment in Turkish history because the following Law on the 
Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) eliminated the nascent political 
opposition against the Republican People’s Party and paved the way for the 
establishment of the single-party regime in Turkey. Yet, the classification of the 
Sheikh Said rebellion as a Kurdish nationalist uprising is debatable because it can also 
be decoded as a reactionary revolt against the modernization attempts of the 
government, especially as a backlash against the abolition of the Caliphate and the 
Sufi religious orders. The leader of the rebellion, Sheikh Said, himself was a leading 
member of the Nakshbandiyya Sufi order. According to Ali Fethi Okyar, the Prime 
Minister of the era, the documents found in the possession of the rebels showed that 
the only objective of the rebellion was “reinstating Sharia law”.578 Yet, even he who 
had inside information on the events did not rule out the probability of the utilization 
of a form of Kurdish nationalist discourse by the rebels to widen their base of support. 
Furthermore, since religious creeds can also contribute immensely to the creation of 
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national identities, it is almost impossible to isolate the real motive of the rebellion.579 
Nevertheless, even if we accept that a Kurdish nationalism existed in the region in 
1920s and 1930s, the connection of this movement with the incidents in Dersim is 
rather feeble. To demonstrate this claim, we have to briefly discuss the story of 
Kurdish nationalism during the early Republican era. 
According to Oran, Kurdish nationalism is a form of negative nationalism 
because it started to develop as a reaction against the increasingly ethnic tendencies of 
Turkish nationalism, especially during the era dominated by the Committee of Union 
and Progress, the group that organized the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 which 
ushered in the Second Constitutional Era and later became the ruling party of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1913. Oran states that the first Kurdish nationalist ideologues only 
noticed and then embraced their Kurdishness after encountering the nationalist 
discourses of the eminent Turkish nationalists of the Second Constitutional Era, such 
as Ziya Gökalp and Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver. Later, this nationalist nucleus 
expanded during the single-party rule of CUP, but this expansion came to a halt with 
the establishment of the national struggle in Anatolia at the end of the First World 
War. According to Oran, during the Turkish War of Independence the majority of 
Kurds supported the joint cause of Anatolian Muslims against the Allied invasion.580 
Similarly Kirişçi and Winrow state that this coalition between the Kurds and the 
Republican elite remained strong during the early years of the Republic and the 
majority of the Kurds favoured a peaceful co-existence with the Turks. For example, 
when the Sheikh Said Revolt broke out in 1925, many Kurdish tribes offered the 
government their help to crush the revolt. Therefore, according to Kirişçi and Winrow 
the nationalist conscience among the Kurds was established only after the 
intensification of the Turkish ethnic nationalism of the Republican ruling elite during 
the 1930s.581 Another factor which contributed to the national awakening of the Kurds 
is attributed to the disproportionate amount of force used by the Republican 
government when dealing with insurgencies in the areas predominantly populated by 
Kurds. According to Yıldız, “these vulgar displays of power” resulted in the deepening 
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of the gap between the state and the Kurds.582 In summary, a combination of these 
factors made Kurdish nationalism a reality in the region and contributed to the 
escalation of tensions between the government and the Kurds who defined themselves 
with their nationalist identities. Eventually, after the 1980s, Kurdish nationalist 
identity and ideology transformed into being massively popular among the Kurds of 
Turkey. 
Several social scientists suggested that the Kurdish ethnicity of the people of 
the region played a crucial role in the Dersim massacres. For the supporters of this 
view, this was an attempted genocide or ethnocide to wipe out all of the Kurdish 
population of the region. The impetus for the massacres was the ultra-nationalist 
ideology of the Republic which sought to create an ethnically homogenous Turkey. 
For instance İsmail Beşikçi considers the massacres in Dersim as a “genocide directed 
towards Kurdishness”.583 Martin van Bruinessen’s conclusion is slightly different, as 
he claims that the regime did not aim to exterminate the entire Kurdish population of 
Turkey but targeted the destruction of Kurdish ethnic identity, and therefore he 
suggests that the term “ethnocide” would better fit to this case.584 Whether calling it a 
genocide or ethnocide, claiming that the Dersim campaigns were organized to target 
the perceived Kurdishness of Dersim is widespread among the modern Kurdish 
nationalists as well. Ironically, Turkish nationalists also contribute to this perception 
by claiming that the events in Dersim were part of the several “Kurdish nationalist 
revolts”. Examples of this trend in Turkish nationalist discourse can be found in the 
works of diplomat and author Bilâl N. Şimşir who stated that the violence in the region 
started as a Kurdish Rebellion similar to the Sheikh Said Revolt and nationalist 
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journalist Uğur Mumcu who defined the events as the “eighteenth Kurdish 
uprising”. 585  
Regardless of the ethnicity of its supporters, these theories have several 
problems. First of all, these “researches” rarely use primary sources. Apart from 
Beşikçi’s short study of the massacres which consists mostly of texts of laws regarding 
Dersim, most books on the subject are derivative. For instance, Bruinessen’s article 
uses a few reports about the events penned by the British diplomats in Turkey, but 
most of his narrative of the massacres was taken from secondary sources, specifically 
from Kurdish nationalist Nuri Dersimi’s memoirs. Similarly, in Plaggenborg’s book 
on the Republican history, Bruinessen’s narrative is repeated. Although these authors 
manage to remain critical of their sources, this trend of repeating the same secondary 
sources, especially written by Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, leads to the 
regurgitation of the same material, without questioning the real nature of the event.  
Secondly, the Kurdishness of the region is a problematic assumption on its own. The 
debate on the Kurdishness of Zazas is too large of a subject to be discussed here in 
detail but one can spot that, as in the contemporary setting, on one side there is the 
larger Kurdish nationalist movement which consider the Zaza people as a sub-branch 
of the Kurds despite the definite linguistic and, in some cases, religious differences 
between these identities,586 and on the other side there is the newly emerging Zaza 
consciousness, promoted especially by the members of  the Zaza diaspora living in 
Europe who consider Zaza identity as distinct. In fact, an even smaller sub-branch of 
the latter group defines the Dersimi culture as a micro-culture of its own, separate from 
both Kurdish and Zaza identities. A fourth alternative voiced by some Turkish 
commentators in 1980s, holding that Zazas are an essentially Turkic nation that was 
“Persianized” in religion, language and culture due to the Zaza populated regions’ 
close proximity to Iran, has already been relegated to obscurity.587 For the supporters 
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of the first theory, the identity of the Dersimis is imagined on ethno-political lines. 
Some of these proponents also criticize the supporters of separate Zaza or Dersimi 
identities and claim that the division between these are manufactured by Turkish 
nationalism to prevent the emergence of a monolithic Kurdish nationalist awareness. 
For instance for author Munzur Cem, the idea of Zazas being a different ethnicity from  
Kurds was endorsed after 1980s by the Turkish state to divide the larger Kurdish 
nationalist movement. 588 Similarly, Mehmed S. Kaya defined the Zaza people as 
“Zaza Kurds” and claimed that during his fieldwork in the Eastern Anatolian town of 
Solhan, the Zazas living there stated that they had never even considered themselves 
anything other than Kurds and that they regard the Zaza/Kurdish division as a Turkish 
ploy.589 It is plausible to think that these claims that equate favouring a distinct Zaza 
identity with being pawns of the Turkish nationalist plots aiming to divide the Kurdish 
consciousness could have contributed to the ostracization of the supporters of these 
theories from the larger Kurdish community. Therefore it is fair to say that both 
Kurdish and Turkish nationalism actively sought to reshape the Zaza identity 
according to their ideologies. 
Dersimi identity is much more elaborate than being definable solely with Zaza 
ethnicity. Even if we agree with the widely accepted thesis and consider Zazas as 
Kurds, there is no proof on how Dersimis were related to the newly emerging modern 
Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism of 1930s. As mentioned above, Dersimis 
were a minority in every possible sense of the word and their language and belief 
system also greatly differed from the rest of the region which made their belongingness 
to the Kurdish nationalist consciousness of the era rather implausible. Dersimi people 
speak Dimili590, a language from the North-Western group of the Iranian branch of the 
Indo-European language family. It is distinct enough from Kurdish to be called an 
entirely different language, while some linguists and Kurdish nationalists continue to 
classify it as a sub-dialect of Kurdish. This division is highly political and ignites 
debates within Dersim and the larger Kurdish community. Dimili and Kurmanji 
Kurdish, which are spoken by the majority of the Kurds of Turkey, are not mutually 
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intelligible. According to Ludwig Paul, Dimili is genealogically not a very close 
relative of Kurdish, and both historical morphology and phonology detached Kurdish 
from Dimili.591 These findings support the thesis that these two are entirely different 
languages which belong to the same language family. According to Daimi Cengiz, 
“world-famous linguists such as David Neil MacKenzie, Karl Hadank, Oskar Mann, 
and Jost Gippert argue that Dimili is a language of its own” while social scientists such 
as Beşikçi and Cem still consider it as a subdivision within Kurdish.592 Similarly to 
the revisionist claims on the Turkishness of Zazas, in the 1980s propaganda booklets 
were published which claimed that Dimili is a Turkic language but this theory was not 
able to leave any mark on the field.593  
Most importantly, in addition to the linguistic differences, the belief system of 
Dersim is quite distinct from the rest of the region. The Kurds of Turkey 
predominantly adhere to the Shafi`i School of jurisprudence of the Sunni branch of 
Islam. By contrast, the Dersimi people are Alevis. Since the difference between these 
two beliefs are so drastic, and the stigma that associated with Alevism is so strong,594 
these factors led to the self-identification of the Dersimi people with their religious 
affiliation, Alevism (Alevilik) rather than their linguistic and ethnic identities. 595 
Alevis are known as the followers of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and the son-in-law 
of the prophet Mohammed although this definition is overly simplistic to describe the 
syncretic nature of their belief. As their name clearly suggests, the veneration of Ali 
and other family members of the prophet’s household, Ahl al-Bayt, is important for 
their belief system but Alevism cannot be reduced to merely holding Ali and his 
descendants in high regard. Furthermore, the importance of Ali and the acceptance of 
                                                          
591 Ludwig Paul, "Zaza." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Eds.) P.J. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, 
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592 Daimi Cengiz, “Ismail Beşikçi ve Dersim Paneli.” Bianet, August 8, 2013. 
593 For the essential work of this approach, see Tuncer Gülensoy, Kürmanci ve Zaza Türkçeleri Uzerine 
Bir Araştırma: Inceleme ve Sözlük (Ankara: Türk Kültürü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1983). 
594 As an example for this stigma, for a typical Kurdish or Turkish Sunni who follow the Islamic 
traditions, eating food prepared by Alevis, or marrying someone from an Alevi family are strictly 
forbidden, since they are perceived as non-Muslims. 
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used by Alevis to define themselves, without any negative connotations. For more information on 
Alevism, see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Türk Sufîliğine Bakışlar (Istanbul: İletişim, 1996), Ali Yaman & 
Aykan Erdemir, Alevism-Bektashism: A Brief Introduction (London: England Alevi Cultural Centre & 
Cem Evi, 2006), and Irene Melikoff, Uyur İdik Uyardılar (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1993). 
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his descendants as rightful imams do not equate Alevism with Shia Islam. Alevism 
differs from both Sunni and Shia Islam, and not just in appearance but in essence, as 
well. The creed, the rituals, and core beliefs of Alevism all differ from the mainstream 
Sunni and Shia versions of Islam. In Alevism, the compulsory practices of both Sunni 
and Shia Islam, such as daily prayers (Salat), pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj) or the fasting 
during the month of Ramadan, are not observed. Unique religious ceremonies, such as 
Cem, are performed in local vernacular – mostly in Turkish – and open to both men 
and women. Music and dance are incorporated into religious rituals. Poets such as Pir 
Sultan Abdal, Fuzuli and Shah Ismail are recognized as saints and their poetry is 
venerated as sacred texts. The place of worship is not the mosque but rather the Cemevi 
(Cem house) where the Cem rite is conducted. 
Alevism is not unique to Dersimis, but is the largest religious minority in 
Sunni-dominated Turkey. Alevis in Turkey are from the Arab, Zaza and Turkish 
ethnicities. Today their numbers are estimated around 12 million. The majority of 
them are from Turkish decent, including a very small group of Azeri speakers in north-
eastern Turkey. Arabic speaking Alevis live along the Mersin-Adana-Antakya line in 
southern Turkey, close to the Syrian border. The religious rituals of the Arabic 
speaking Alevis are very similar to their Nusayri (or Alawite)596 counterparts who live 
across the border. Their number today is estimated around 200,000. The population of 
the Zaza Alevis (including Dersimis) is estimated to be around 3 million.597 
Among many assumptions on the origins of Alevism, the most common one 
claims that it is a branch of Twelver Shia Islam due to the leitmotif of reverence shown 
to Ali and his descendants. Since the similarities between Twelver Shia and Alevism 
end there, the dissimilarities are explained by the modification of the Shia beliefs due 
to the effects of the pre-Islamic traditions of the Anatolian people (Shamanism), 
Sufism and the influences of the other religions of the area, such as Christianity, and 
Khurramiyah which led to the emergence of a highly eclectic and esoteric religious 
belief, that radically departs from Orthodox Shia Islam. Although this definition of 
Alevism is widely accepted, the nature of Alevism and its position within the Islamic 
community is widely questioned in Turkey. Apart from the aforementioned view of 
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Alevism as a synthesis of Islam, Shamanism, and other beliefs of the region, it is 
suggested that Alevism is interpreted in three other major ways.  A second school 
considers Alevism as the “true form” of Islam, unspoiled and unblemished unlike other 
Islamic sects and asserts that Alevi religious officials, which are called ‘Dede’, are 
descendants of the Prophet Mohammed’s bloodline. The third school of thought 
regards Alevism not as an organized religion but more as a philosophy and 
Weltanschauung specific to Anatolia. According to Oran, a fourth school of thought 
considers Alevism not as an offshoot of Shia Islam, but as a denomination of its own, 
separate from Sunni, Shia, or Khariji Islam.598 
Dersimi Alevi beliefs are even more eclectic due the inclusion of several 
animistic elements such as attribution of sacredness to geomorphological units, bodies 
of water and plants.599 It is theorized by some social scientists that the Dersimi Alevi 
belief system is derived from pre-Islamic ‘Kurdish religions’, such as Yazidi religion, 
and not from Turkic, Anatolian shamanism. For instance Beşikçi suggests that after 
observing the rituals and dances of Dersimi Alevis, he could not see any connections 
between Alevism and Central Asian dance routines, but he immediately recognized 
that Dersimis use similar patterns of movement to Yazidi rituals. Beşikçi also states 
that Alevism should not even be considered as a part of Islam.600 Haşim Kutlu agrees 
with Beşikçi and states that the Ali figure was inserted very late in the Alevi belief 
system in the 15th century.601 These explanations sound similar to Mehrdad Izady’s 
much discussed theory of native ‘Kurdish religions’.602 Izady claims that although the 
majority of the followers of Alevism are Turks, the religion originated among the pre-
Islamic Kurds by considering the similarities between Alevism, and the other 
Mesopotamian religions adhered to mostly by Kurds. These are the Yazidi religion 
and the Ahl-e Haqq (People of the Truth), a religion practised by the Goran Kurds in 
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Western Iran. Similarly, Martin van Bruinessen pointed out the similarities between 
Ahl-e Haqq and Alevism.603  
On the other hand Oran states that for many observers Alevism heavily 
resembles Central Asian Turkic religious beliefs and in time the figures that belonged 
to Central Asia were replaced by their counterparts in the Middle East and Anatolia. 
According to Oran, for these observers the shaman was replaced with the Dede, the 
central cult of Sun was replaced with the Cult of Ali, and the shamanistic rituals were 
turned into non-Islamic Alevi rituals of Cem, Nefes, and Semah.604 Oran further states 
that the reason for the overlap between the Alevi beliefs and Shia Islam are limited to 
the concepts of Ali, Hasan, Husein and Kerbela,605 is that these were perceived as 
symbols of liberation against oppression and resembled the symbols of the Alevis.606 
Different from these interpretations calling Dersimi Alevism as the “Dersimi Belief 
System” and situating it as a unique micro-religion different from mainstream 
Alevism, Islam and Izady’s Kurdish native religions theory is also steadily gaining 
ground in Dersim and the Dersimi diaspora.607 Regardless of the sources of Alevism, 
it is evident that the Dersimi religion is the central concept of the Dersimi identity 
which has differentiated them from their Turkish and Kurdish (or Zaza) neighbours 
who adhered to Sunni Islam.  To define such an elaborate, isolated and unique identity 
such as the Dersimi belief system simply with national or ethnic forms or 
belongingness would be misleading. 
                                                          
603 Martin Van Bruinessen, "When Haji Bektash Still Bore the Name of Sultan Sahak: Notes on the 
Ahl-i Haqq of the Guran District." Alexandre Popoviç & Gilles Veinstein (Eds.) Bektachiyya: études 
sur l'ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach (Istanbul: ISIS, 1995). 
604 Cem is the central rite of Alevis. It is a gathering of the believers representing the miraj, the ascension 
of Prophet Mohammed to heaven and his meeting with other Islamic prophets. Cem usually takes place 
in a Cemevi (Cem house), is participated both by men and women and conducted by a Dede. In Cem, 
prayers are recited and Nefes, religious hymns accompanied by music provided by saz players are 
performed. A special form of dance which is called Semah and choreographed in imitation of the flight 
of cranes, a sacred bird for Alevis, is performed jointly by men and women. Cem rite also acts as a 
social gathering aiming to get Alevis together and resolve any conflicts between the members of the 
congregation. For more information on Cem, see Mehmet Yaman, Alevilikte Cem (Istanbul: Can 
Yayinlari, 2003).  
605 To remember and mourn the death of Prophet Mohammed’s grandson Hussein at Kerbela, Alevis 
fast for a period of twelve days in the month of Moharram. To experience and simulate the deprivation 
of water of Hussein and his followers suffered in Kerbela, and to condemn the violence led to their 
death, Alevis do not drink water, or consume meat during this period.  
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Furthermore from the available archival documents it is impossible to deduce 
that the Dersim ‘rebellion’ had a Kurdish nationalist agenda. In fact it is impossible 
even to verify the existence of a large scale rebellion against the government because 
the campaign against Dersim was not a reaction against an uprising but it was planned 
by the government years before the first skirmishes between the Dersimi militia and 
the state forces and proved to be a rather one-sided affair. During the campaigns of 
1937 and 1938, the Republic lost only 152 security personnel, which is immensely 
disproportional in comparison to the 13,422 Dersimi casualties.608 The numbers alone 
suggest a massacre instead of a large scale Kurdish uprising. The Kurdish and Turkish 
nationalist theses also do not provide an answer to the question of why the ‘Kurds’ of 
this particular region were killed en masse while towns and cities with greater Kurdish 
populations remained unharmed. If ethnic cleansing of all Kurds was the official 
Republican policy, why did the Kurds of South-eastern Anatolia not suffer from 
massacres on this scale?  
The answer to these questions is apparent upon examining the Republican 
ideology. First, as mentioned in the previous chapters, in the 1930s the Republican 
policy concerning minorities was not geared toward their extermination. The official 
policy of this era concerning the minorities was called Turkification (‘Türkleştirme’) 
which was a process of forced assimilation in which citizens of Turkey from all 
ethnicities were forced to accept the new, modern, national Turkish identity. Aktar 
defines Turkification as: 
The uncompromising exertion of the Turkish ethnic identity’s 
authority over every aspect of social life including the language used 
in the streets, history taught in schools, education policies, economic 
life, trade, personnel recruitment regime, private law and settlement 
policies includes relocation of minorities to some regions.609 
 
Turkification was an elaborate process executed by every institution of the 
state, from cultural institutions such as the education system to the military and 
administrative units. The regime presented opportunities for each minority to renounce 
their own identities and accept the identity developed by the regime in this process. 
According to Ahmet Yıldız, this new Republican identity can be summarized as 
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follows: A Turkish citizen must speak Turkish, must be a member of the westernized 
Turkish culture, and must wholeheartedly accept the principles of the Republic.610 If 
any citizen failed to observe one of these features, he or she had to find a way to be 
promoted to full-citizenship. Measures which could be used for this promotion were 
various. For Kurds, the path to Turkishness was only possible by embracing the 
Turkish language and culture. 
Furthermore, the regime supported the Turkification process with its 
ideological tools in the social sciences the “Twin Theses” of history and linguistics. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, every ethnicity and every linguistic group in 
Anatolia were deemed to be Turkish in essence by the government after 1935. The 
Turkish Historical Society decided in 1935, during the Second History Congress of 
the Turkish Historical Society that Anatolia had been populated by Turks for millennia 
and that from the Hittites to the Armenians all of the inhabitants of Anatolia were 
Turkish. According to this theory, citizens whose native languages were non-Turkish 
were the descendants of the aboriginal Turks who lived in Anatolia several millennia 
ago and therefore they were “ethnically” Turks who in time had “lost and forgot” their 
own Turkishness. The repercussions of Republican ideology regarding the situation of 
the minorities and the cultural tools possessed by the regime are visible also in the 
Dersim case. Government and military reports from this era continuously called the 
Dersimi people as “original” Turks611 who originated from the Khorasan region in 
North-Eastern Iran and Central Asia – the ancestral homeland of Turkish people 
according to Republican nationalism – and were linguistically and religiously 
Persianized due to close relations and proximity with Iran. For instance, parliament 
member Hasan Reşit Tankut wrote in his report to Ankara that he was sure that 
Dersimis were “one hundred per cent Turkish”, who forgot their Turkishness due to 
their contacts with “Persian” culture.612 For Republican nationalism, Kurds and Zazas 
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were not unwanted ethnicities. In fact they were promising candidates for the 
Turkification process. After all, as Tankut stated in his report, all they had to do was 
“to be reminded of their own Turkishness”. 
Secondly, the modern Kurdish and Turkish nationalists make the mistake of 
looking at the history of Dersim only through the lenses of their own respective 
ideologies. For Kurdish nationalists, the Dersim massacres were a part of the larger 
framework of the subjugation of the Kurds by the Arab, Iranian and Turkish polities 
after the emergence of nation states in the Near and Middle East following the end of 
the First World War. According to this approach, the Dersim campaign targeted the 
‘Kurds’ of Dersim due to their ethnic identity. Although it is apparent from the 
government records that the Dersimi people only staged a defensive resistance, in most 
Kurdish nationalist sources, the Dersim incidents are depicted as a heroic uprising or 
revolt for the nationalist cause. For instance, in an article written by Kurdish 
nationalists in Syria during the first phase of the military campaign, Sayyid Rıza, the 
most respected chieftain of Dersim was declared as the “Governor-General of 
Kurdistan” who had an army of 100,000 “Kurds, regardless of their religious 
affiliation.”613 Besikçi used this nationalist discourse as well, and described Rıza as 
“the leader of the Kurdish nationalist resistance” in his works.614 According to these 
sources Rıza had the political consciousness of a secular, modern Kurdish 
revolutionary and announced that they had built an autonomous government in 
Dersim. Furthermore, Rıza was described as a leader of both Alevi and Sunni Kurds, 
an idea which is inconceivable considering the historical animosity between these 
groups.  Furthermore, at that time Rıza was not even the leader of all Dersim; personal 
feuds and feuds between tribes prevented this from happening. In 1937, the number of 
arms appropriated from Dersim was 4,263 and the arms of the pro-government tribes 
which were voluntary handed over to the government is included to this amount. 
According to the government reports, during the duration of the 1937 campaign which 
ended with Rıza’s arrest and following execution, the entire Dersimi resistance forces 
that clashed with the Turkish army and captured dead or wounded were only 298 
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people.615 These numbers alone show how inflated and out of touch with reality are 
the numbers uttered by the Kurdish nationalists. 
Similarly, in an article published at La Bourse Egpytienne, a Francophone 
newspaper published in Alexandria, Kurdish nationalists wrote that “this revolt is the 
last one in a chain of continuous Kurdish nationalist revolts against the Turks”. 
Although there is not a single piece of evidence to prove this, according to this piece, 
Sayyid Rıza was a national hero who was trying to gain independence for all Kurds 
and avenge the death of Sheikh Said, the Nakshbandi cleric who campaigned for the 
reinstatement of the Sharia law in 1925 while in reality the revolt he led had not 
attracted any Alevis or Dersimis, including Sayyid Rıza.616 From the available sources 
it becomes rather apparent that these letters were propaganda pieces, which were most 
probably produced by Nuri Dersimi (1890-1973), who managed to be remembered as 
a key figure in Dersimi history and Kurdish nationalism, mostly by self-advertisement 
and a very liberal interpretation of the events that occurred in Dersim. 
Nuri Dersimi, as his name suggests, was a Dersimi intellectual who was an 
ideologue and ardent follower of Kurdish nationalism. A veterinarian by profession, 
Nuri Dersimi became a member of the nascent Kurdish nationalist organizations in 
1910s and later claimed that he was instrumental in inciting a Kurdish revolt in the 
eastern Anatolian town of Sivas in 1920. Nuri Dersimi returned to Dersim in 1921 and 
worked as a public servant. Later Dersimi left Dersim to live in the neighbouring town 
of Elazığ, and before the start of the military campaign of 1937, he moved to live in 
Syria. From here he began to act as a speaker for the people of Dersim. Although he 
had at best limited connection with the region after 1937, his personal narrative of the 
events became gospel for both Kurdish and Turkish nationalism due to the lack of 
sources on the Dersim massacres. Dersimi’s two books, Dersim in Kurdish History 
(‘Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim’, 1952) and My Memoirs (‘Hatıratım’, 1986) are still 
the most referenced works on Dersim despite the fact that they were written by the 
author while he was in Syria, far-removed from the epicentre of the massacres. Nuri 
Dersimi’s books lack a referencing system and they contain various disputable stories 
that serve only the self-aggrandisement of the author.  Furthermore, they are filled 
with factual errors which are unfortunately still referenced by contemporary social 
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scientists.617 Dersimi’s works are written through the lens of his Kurdish nationalist 
ideology and misrepresent the events and the important actors of Dersim history for 
the benefit of his ideology. In Dersimi’s writings, Sayyid Rıza, a tribal chief who did 
not show any previous inclinations towards Kurdish nationalism, and never 
participated in previous ‘Kurdish uprisings’, is a model, modern Kurdish 
nationalist.618 Dersimi even did not shy away from fabricating nationalist propaganda 
on Sayyid Rıza’s behalf. An illustrative example of these fabrications is related to the 
execution of Sayyid Rıza and his last words. The only first-hand account of this 
execution was written by İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, a young civil servant who was 
presiding over the execution process. Çağlayangil, who later served as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs during the multi-party period in Turkey, depicted the last moments of 
Sayyid Rıza in his memoir. According to Çağlayangil, the last words of Rıza were; 
“We are the children of Karbala. We are innocent. This is a disgrace. This is cruelty. 
This is murder.”619 On the other hand, Nuri Dersimi who did not witness the event, 
instead fabricated an agitative speech as Sayyid Rıza’s last words. According to 
Dersimi, who did not even know the exact date of the execution and was not even in 
Turkey during the event, Rıza shouted these words at the gallows: “I am 75. Soon I 
will be a martyr. Soon I will join to the ranks of other martyrs of Kurdistan. Dersim is 
losing the war, but Kurdishness and Kurdistan will remain alive forever! The Kurdish 
youth will take their revenge! Damn the oppressors, damn the turncoats and the 
liars!” 620 
It is apparent from this example that Nuri Dersimi manipulated the truth to 
impose Kurdish identity and nationalism in the struggle between the Dersimis and the 
state forces. Another interesting point is how he erased Sayyid Rıza’s remarks on 
“Children of Karbala”. Nuri Dersimi blatantly removed the Alevi identity from Rıza’s 
last words and changed it with a pan-Kurdist discourse. Therefore, Dersimi’s books 
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are only valuable as documents regarding the nature of Kurdish nationalism but as 
neutral historical narratives, they are not reliable. Martin Van Bruinessen arrives to a 
similar conclusion on Dersimi and criticizes him for being too eager to call the Dersim 
incidents a nationalist rebellion, since the events show “more the signs of a traditional 
tribal resistance to the government interference than anything so modern as the wish 
for a separate state.”621 As stated by Van Bruinessen, in Dersim the focal point of 
politics, and social life has never been ordered by the ideology of the Kurdish struggle 
for independence. In fact, the issue of Kurdish nationalism was a foreign concept for 
the residents of Dersim. Sayyid Rıza, who was called as the “Governor-General of 
Kurdistan” by Nuri Dersimi, was a modest tribal leader. He did not rule over other 
tribes, he only had a higher level influence due to his personality and his religious-
cultural position as a Sayyid.  
The assessment that the tribes of Dersim had a national consciousness is quite 
easy to refute. Dersimi politics were politics of tribal conflicts in which the alliances 
between the tribes changed constantly according to the material needs of the tribes or 
personal feuds between the tribal chiefs. The political sphere was quite dynamic. An 
example from the archival documents sheds further light on this issue.  Prior to the 
massacres of 1938, the most dramatic event of recent Dersim history had been the 
murder of Sayyid Rıza’s son Baba in 1933. According to the reports by the governor 
of the neighbouring town of Elazığ, the perpetrators of the crime were members of 
Kirgan tribe. An enraged Rıza asked the government to locate and arrest the murderers 
or provide him ammunition to help him to hunt them down. Using his prestige and the 
rightfulness of his cause he managed to arm 500 men and threatened the neutral tribes 
with execution in case if they protect the murderers of his son. According to 
government reports, the feud between the two sides developed into a civil war in 
Dersim. The Republican security personnel located in the region did not even try to 
intervene because they were inferior in number in comparison to Sayyid Rıza’s militia 
and they did not want to further inflame an already tense situation. Rıza’s forces 
targeted the villages populated by the members of his rival tribe. The villagers who 
managed to escape from him found refuge in the military outposts of the Turkish 
Army. Initially, Sayyid Rıza seized the district of Sin from the Kirgan tribe as blood 
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money to compensate for the death of his son.622 A month later Rıza came into contact 
with the government through the governor’s office in Elazığ and stated that he and his 
tribe had been victims of Kirgan aggression for a long time and added that the feud 
started back in the late Ottoman era. According to Rıza, when the Kirgan tribe seized 
and plundered government property, his tribe fought with the government forces 
against Kirgan and in these skirmishes the chief of the Kirgan tribe was killed which 
started a long blood feud that ended with the murder of his son.623 Rıza further blamed 
the district governor (kaymakam) for being in league with Kirgan for personal gain 
and asked the government’s help to stop their aggression.624 Later in July 1936, Rıza 
met with government officials and promised them not to seek any further revenge as 
long as the property he confiscated from the Kirgan tribe as blood money would 
remain in his possession.625 These events show the relations between the tribes and 
the relations between the tribes and the government shifted constantly without being 
obstructed by ideological or ethnic concerns. Secondly, these documents show that the 
tribes did not have any type of nationalist consciousness. Apart from their tribal 
identity, the overriding source of belongingness was their religious affiliation; Dersimi 
Alevism. Therefore it is very plausible to assume that the alleged modern nationalist 
Kurdish identity of the region is a product of the imaginations and aspirations of Nuri 
Dersimi and other Kurdish nationalists. They were not alone in this endeavour though; 
strangely Turkish nationalism also approached the Dersim incidents through a similar 
lens. 
These dramatizations and falsifications of the events fed the Turkish nationalist 
account of the incidents. Especially after 1980s, these two very contrasting groups, 
Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, started to share the belief that Dersim was heading 
for a full-fledged nationalist revolt for the independence of all of Kurdistan. From 
these falsifications, Kurdish nationalists manufactured a heroic narrative while 
Turkish nationalists found support for their claims that the state was entitled to use 
“necessary force” to suppress separatist revolts, like the Republican regime 
supposedly did in Dersim in 1937-1938. While the first accounts on Dersim written in 
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1930s emphasized the resistance shown against the modernization attempts of the 
government and the “feudal” system of Dersim as the main reasons for the campaign, 
starting from 1980s, the nationalist approach which blamed Dersimis for treason, 
started to become more and more noticeable in Turkish history writing. The main 
reason for this change was the necessity felt by Turkish nationalists to redefine and 
reposition themselves against the rising Kurdish national consciousness after the 
beginning of protracted guerrilla warfare by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistanê – PKK) in early 1984. The rather reductionist assumption of 
perceiving the Dersim incidents as a Kurdish nationalist, separatist uprising was useful 
on many different levels for contemporary Turkish nationalists because it created a 
link between Kurdish identity and the concept of rebellion against authority. 
According to this discourse Kurds participated in a series harmful activities against 
the state right from the beginning of the Republic, in fact even from Ottoman times. 
This claim was exploited by the Turkish nationalists to show that Kurds were 
intrinsically bent on betraying state authority. Additionally, the massacres were used 
to justify the disproportionate force used by the state to supress the activities of the 
PKK which caused several severe human rights violations, and, to legitimize the use 
of similar methods of suppression in the struggle against the PKK in the future. A 
recent use of this discourse was seen in a parliamentary speech of Onur Öymen, a 
parliament member from the Republican People’s Party who asked the government to 
have resort to stricter measures when dealing with the Kurdish nationalist demands by 
giving the example of how Atatürk used force to stop the revolt in Dersim.626  
There are other contributions made by Turkish nationalism to the debate on the 
nature of the Dersim incidents. One of them takes the international constellation of the 
era into account and evaluates the operation in relation to Turkish foreign policy. For 
Republican Turkey, the most crucial foreign policy issue of 1930s was the situation in 
Sanjak. Sanjak was the name of the region located along the southern borders of 
Turkey which included the cities of Alexandretta, Antioch and their surrounding 
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towns. These lands were carved out of Ottoman Empire after the First World War by 
the French, as a part of French sphere of influence which included modern Syria and 
Lebanon, as well. According to the Franco-Turkish Agreement of 1921 which 
concluded the hostilities of the First World War and Turkish War of Independence 
between these two states, France did not return these lands to the Ankara Government 
and kept them in the French mandate while the Turkish Republic was given observer’s 
status. This special status of Sanjak was approved again at the Treaty of Lausanne in 
1923. In the 1930s, Sanjak became the source of a dispute among Turkey, France and 
Syria.627 From the documents in the Prime Ministerial Archives, one can sense that 
during the early days of the preparation process for the military campaign, the 
Republican regime was expecting French or Syrian infiltration to Southern Turkey. In 
addition to the strained relations over the Sanjak issue, the presence of the Kurdish 
nationalists in Syria made the Republican regime suspicious of the activities along the 
Syrian-Turkish border. The Kurdish nationalists in Syria were members of the Xoybun 
organization, which can be described as the first modern, nationalist and influential 
group of mostly educated Kurdish nationalists. The Arab nationalists in Syria as well 
were at odds with the Republicans because they regarded Sanjak as an integral part of 
the Greater Syria they envisaged. In these circumstances, the government was 
suspecting that arms and ammunition could be smuggled into Turkey from these 
sources in Syria. France was also perceived in this era as a country which could incite 
revolts or similar problems in Turkey to keep Sanjak in the French mandate as much 
as possible. These possible connections would later turn into a Turkish nationalist 
discourse on the Dersim “rebellion” being supported by the foreign powers.  
For instance, among contemporary nationalists, Sinan Meydan wrote that the 
“imperialist powers” supported the uprising in Dersim. Meydan bases this 
presumption mainly on the letters which were attributed to Dersimi leader Sayyid 
Rıza.628 Similarly Suat Akgül stated that France and Syria helped the Dersimis weaken 
the Turkish Republic in order to gain control of Sanjak.629 Among the documentation 
available in the Prime Ministerial Archives, there is not a single document supporting 
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these theses. In fact, there are a dozen documents which prove that there are no links 
between the Dersim incidents and the foreign powers or the Kurdish diaspora. 
Government reports clearly show that no weapons have arrived to Dersim from Syrian 
or French sources. Furthermore, Dersim was not even close to the Syrian border, and 
the inaccessibility of the region makes it even harder for infiltration. Numerous 
security intelligences about Kurdish agents from Syria planning meetings with 
Dersimi tribal leaders were later invalidated by other government reports. For 
instance, an intelligence report from Syria stated that a meeting between Kurdish 
leaders in Syria and Dersimi leaders would happen in Diyarbakir. No such meeting 
occurred according to the latter government documents.630 
Meydan’s claims of an international conspiracy which targeted the Turkish 
government by supporting the Dersim rebellion are quite common in Turkish 
nationalist discourse. For instance, investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu wrote that 
Sayyid Rıza appealed to the British government for help with a letter to prove that 
there was a foreign connection behind the “rebellion”.631 This letter which was also 
sent to the French government and a similar, yet longer and more detailed letter that 
was sent to the League of Nations in September 1937, have an interesting story that 
speaks volumes on how Kurdish and Turkish nationalist narratives converge. Written 
from the point of Kurdish nationalism, the letters stated that the Turkish government 
was not qualified to represent the Kurds, and blamed the Turkish army for various 
crimes committed in Dersim, ranging from bombardment of the civilians, including 
children and women, to the execution of Kurdish intellectuals. The letters ended with 
a plea to get help to the Kurdish cause signed by Sayyid Rıza. These documents are 
used by the nationalists on both sides. For Kurdish nationalists, they support their 
imagination of Sayyid Rıza as Kurdish nationalist hero. For Turkish nationalists, they 
prove the anti-Turkish sentiments of the Dersimi rebellion and fortifies their 
perception of the “Kurdish Question” being manufactured and stirred up by the foreign 
powers who wanted to weaken Turkey. It is unfortunate for both parties that these 
letters were not written by Sayyid Rıza. 
In October 1937, the letters sent to the League of Nations were brought to the 
attention of the Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya. The investigation conducted by the 
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ministry clearly ruled out any possibility that the letter was penned by Sayyid Rıza 
himself. According to Minister Kaya, this letter was an obvious fake, which was 
written by Kurdish nationalists living in Syria. The League of Nations also did not 
consider the letter important and did not take any action.632 Years later, it turned out 
that Şükrü Kaya’s presumption regarding the true writer of the letter was correct. Nuri 
Dersimi accepted in 1952 that he wrote the appeal himself while he was in Syria and 
used Sayyid Rıza’s name to give the pleas the mantle of formality and legitimacy and 
sent copies of the letter to foreign countries and international organizations. Dersimi 
also admitted that this was not the first time that he produced letters by using Rıza’s 
name.633 Strangely, the letter is still used by the nationalists of both sides according to 
their ideological concerns.634 
In summary, the Kurdish and Turkish nationalist ideologies ironically 
converge on projecting their own perspective on the events of 1937-38 without 
considering the realities of the region. In the Dersim of the 1930s, primary 
identification of the people was not an ethnic one. The identities of the Dersimis were 
shaped by their tribal, cultural and religious affiliations and local traditions and not by 
nationalist considerations. In addition to the local Alevi religious culture, Dersimis 
once protected and intermarried with the Armenians who found refuge in this 
mountainous region during the Armenian massacres of 1915.635 Therefore although 
the region was isolated, Christian religious rites and Armenian culture also contributed 
to the unique common culture of Dersim which further prevents Dersim from being 
described as a monolithic Kurdish national body. Trying to explain the rather 
complicated events in Dersim in which diverse elements such tribalism, religious 
differences, mutual distrust between the Dersimis and the state forces, and the 
resistance against the modernization attempts of the government played significant 
parts, just with the nationalist absolutes would be inadequate and misleading. There 
was no Kurdish nationalist rebellion in Dersim because Dersim was neither Kurdish 
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in its modern sense nor the site of a mass rebellion against the government. The 
Dersimis felt at unease with the new set of rules that were proposed by the Republic 
which wanted to disarm them and change the ancient internal social order of Dersim. 
Their panic triggered the implementation of a meticulously planned invasion in 1937, 
which led to a wide-scale massacre in 1938.  
My proposal here is that to explain this complex chain of events, we should 
focus on the thought process of the government that was fixated on modernization. 
The most plausible reason for the nearly complete destruction of Dersim was the tribal, 
supposedly non-modern and therefore, non-Turkish life-style of its people. This 
interpretation is clearly verifiable by the government reports and newspaper articles 
published following the events by the regime-friendly Republican media. For the 
Republican regime, the massacres of 1938 were simply a by-product of the Republican 
policies based on modernization and creating an ideal community. It is baffling how 
the modernization project could be so productive and constructive in some fields such 
as the women’s rights and education, yet being so destructive at the same time. The 
rigidity of the modernization process and the ruling elite’s fanatical devotion to it, 
certainly helped whilst fighting against illiteracy, a patriarchal social order where 
women’s visibility in the social sphere was minimal, or industrial backwardness, but 
the illegalization of every source of difference, every other form of thought and 
practice except the modernist, national model provided by the state led the regime to 
take draconian measures.  
The importance of Dersim multiplies when dealing with Turkish 
authoritarianism from this perspective. Contrary to the modern interpretations, Dersim 
massacres were not a quick tempered reaction to a Kurdish rebellion or an act to 
prevent an imminent security question. This was an immaculately planned military 
campaign to completely change the internal social order of Dersim which turned into 
slaughter for an eclectic set of reasons. In the end, the massacres were justified by the 
regime by pointing out that the Dersimi people were savages who lived in caves in 
extreme poverty. From the official perspective of the regime, they were living 
unmodern, non-ideal lives that were not worth living, thus their destruction was a 
necessity to build a foundation for a new, improved, modern Dersimi society fully 
integrated within the modern, ideal, Turkish community. 
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Dersim in the Government Reports 
Most of the government reports prepared on Dersim before the 1937-1938 campaigns 
deal with security concerns and criminal activities perpetrated by the Dersimi tribes. 
The combined effect of the previously mentioned geographical and cultural 
peculiarities of Dersim resulted in a social order in which political power was gathered 
in the hands of the tribal chiefs, while the spiritual and religious authority were sayyids 
and dedes who claimed family trees tracing back to the Ahl al-Bayt. In some cases, 
tribal chieftains also claimed spiritual leadership and assumed the title of Sayyid. 
However, despite their elevated status in the social sphere, the living conditions in 
Dersim were harsh even for the tribal leaders. The mountainous topography of the 
region limited the size of the arable land, therefore the tribe chieftains did not possess 
large lands in comparison to the tribal leaders of the rest of the Eastern and South-
eastern Anatolia. The sharing of the precious land and the pastures for the livestock 
constitute a major problem for the tribes. The fact that they were armed made this 
problem even more serious. Arms were a part of Dersimi culture. According to the 
government reports the weapons were mostly acquired by Dersimis for self-defence. 
The cultural isolation of Dersim from the rest of the region and the constant 
harassment they suffered at the hands of the Sunni Ottoman state and their Sunni 
neighbours, forced the tribal chieftains to organize armed militia groups. Although the 
relatively low number of arms confiscated at the end of the military campaigns (6,117 
in total) show these militia were relatively small in size, the reports prepared before 
the campaigns estimated a rather alarming rate of individual armament in the region. 
Inspector-General İbrahim Talî Öngören reported that in 1929 there were around 
25,000 arms in the region636 while Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya’s report of 1931 
stated that this amount was between 18,000 and 20,000.637 
 As the small-scale civil war fought in 1933-1934 between the forces of Sayyid 
Rıza and the Kirgan tribe showed, these firearms were used in struggles between the 
tribes but this was not the only concern of the government. The armed Dersimi tribes 
also formed a serious security concern for the nearby towns due to their almost 
constant plundering activities. Between 1929 and 1931 alone, 229 cases of pillage and 
robbery were committed by the people of Dersim in neighbouring Erzincan province 
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alone.638 Some government reports state that some tribes were even taxing the nearby 
towns. According to the reports of İbrahim Talî Öngören, the main reason for these 
incidents was the poverty prevalent in Dersimi society. Öngören states that the reason 
for “banditry, robberies and plundering occur in Dersim can be explained by the 
survival instincts of the Dersimis”.639 
This situation which the Republic inherited from the late Ottoman era 
contributed to the association of Dersim with disorder in the eyes of the government. 
In 1931, Şükrü Kaya decided to see the situation himself and visited Dersim. The 
report he prepared reflects the level of discomfort felt by the rest of the region due to 
the unruly Dersimi tribes.640 Kaya stated that Dersimi harassment of the surrounding 
region was a “constant threat” and “the lives and the livelihoods of these people are 
trampled everyday under the feet of Dersimi tribes”. Kaya managed to visit inner 
Dersim and witnessed that the situation in Dersim was no different than the rest of the 
region; it was chaotic due to the ongoing fighting between the tribes. When the Interior 
Minister came together with Sayyid Rıza and other tribal chieftains they admitted the 
crimes and were apologetic and claimed that their dire economic situation, the scarcity 
of arable land and their ignorance had forced them to pillage the nearby towns. 
Furthermore they complained that the tribal system was withering away and due to the 
lack of social order the people, especially the Dersimi youth, were acting rampant. 
Another example given by the Minister of the Interior further illustrates the chaotic 
situation between the tribes. After a general meeting with all the tribal chieftains, Kaya 
also listened to every single tribal chieftain privately. In these private discussions, 
every chief blamed another one for the disorder in Dersim and the surrounding regions 
and they even went further by proposing the elimination of some chiefs to solve the 
problems of Dersim for good. 
 It is noticeable in the reports regarding Dersim that the government sincerely 
tried to understand the problems of the Dersimi people and to offer remedies to solve 
these issues. The language employed by the state officials show that they empathized 
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with the situation of the Dersimis. A clear example of this approach is visible in a 
report prepared by Cemal Bardakçı, the governor of Diyarbakir.641 Bardakçı wrote in 
1925 that the tribal social order in Dersim was somehow justifiable because it was 
established due to the oppression of the Dersimi people which was perpetuated by the 
Sunni Ottoman regime and its inadequate public officers. Bardakçı claimed that due 
to this constant oppression the Dersimi people were forced to closely associate among 
themselves and had created a local social association of their own which should not 
be confused with the “traditional tribal system” which was prevalent in the rest of the 
Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia. The report further stated that the people of Dersim 
lived for generations in a constant state of fear of deportation and death. The people 
were also extremely poor that they were forced into acts of pillage and robbery out of 
their destitution. Similarly, the issue of the high rate of individual armament was born 
out of the necessity to protect their lives and goods since there had never been a firm 
government authority in the region for the previous 400 years. Bardakçı’s report shows 
a great deal of similarity with the report prepared by Inspector-General Öngören.642 In 
this report which was written in 1929, the Inspector-General did not put the blame on 
the Dersimis and instead blamed the previous governments for their indifference to 
the sufferings and needs of the Dersimi people. Öngören stated that Dersim which 
“always acted as a mischievous child” needed the help of the Republican regime. 
Unlike Bardakçı, the Inspector-General was more critical towards the social order of 
Dersim and particularly targeted the tribal leaders and sayyids, who he described as 
“feudal despots”. Öngören further stated that the tribal chieftains and their religious 
counterparts, sayyids were financially exploiting the Dersimi people and remarked that 
their removal from Dersim was a necessity to bring prosperity to the region. In time, 
this analysis will constitute one of the major motives of the military campaigns of 
1937-1938. 
 These reports show that right until 1929, the government representatives did 
not perceive any separatist Kurdish nationalist activity or a threat to national security 
in Dersim. The Dersimi people were perceived not as the source of the problems but 
as the victims of the problems. Even the criminal activities perpetrated by the Dersimi 
people were seen as problems that emanated from the inefficacy and the indifference 
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of the previous governments. The suggested solutions were also similar. Bureaucrats 
emphasized the complete lack of infrastructure in the region and advised the building 
of roads, schools and hospitals in the region and supporting local agriculture to win 
the hearts of the people of Dersim. As a significant difference Öngören suggested a 
more serious change of order by removing the tribal chieftains and the sayyids. This 
issue regarding the situation of the chiefs and religious leaders would become a 
recurring theme in the later reports as well. In 1931, Şükrü Kaya wrote that the most 
crucial problem of Dersim was the exploitation of the masses by the tribal chiefs and 
sayyids, and advised the government that a military operation targeting these elements 
was needed. Kaya’s solution was similar to Öngören’s suggestions to the government. 
He proposed that the chiefs and sayyids should be located far away from Dersim to 
break apart the long-standing traditional social order. 643  Another remedy for the 
troubles of the region was the disarmament of the tribes. Additionally, almost in every 
single report it was advised that the aforementioned solutions should be accompanied 
by a modernization programme which included the construction of roads, schools and 
hospitals in the region. 
 It is interesting to see that among the government reports regarding Dersim 
there are so many comments and criticisms of the tribal order in Dersim. Although, as 
the report of Bardakçı stated, the tribal chieftains were not as wealthy as the tribal 
leaders of the rest of Anatolia due to the scarcity of the arable land, the social system 
of Dersim was still perceived to be backward and exploitative by the Republican 
bureaucrats. The media reaction concerning Dersim followed a similar pattern. During 
the first months of the military campaign Son Posta newspaper described Dersim as 
“the last bastion of feudalism” in Turkey.644 The statements of the bureaucrats and the 
newspaper reports show that the military campaign of 1937 was perceived by many as 
a battle between the modern state and the archaic feudal order. Regardless of the 
validity of the claims that define the social order in Dersim as a form of feudalism, the 
idea of the Republic fighting against “feudal landlords” does not fit with the larger 
framework of early Republican politics because since there was no social class that 
the Republican elite could rely on during the foundation of the Republic, the 
Republican elite supported the local notables and large land-owners.645 A significant 
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number of large land-owners were members of the parliament during the single-party 
era and the government utilized their traditional connections with the peasantry which 
proved to be crucial for the regime, in exchange for representing the interests of the 
land-owners. A telling example of this symbiotic relationship is evident in the 
constitution of 1924 which prohibited the possibility of a land reform. Furthermore, 
as the previous reports show, the regime had not a perfect but a working relationship 
with the Dersimi tribal leaders, as well. Their meetings with Inspector-General 
Öngören and the Minister of the Interior Kaya show that the Republican regime 
perceived them as local notables and representatives of the Dersimi people. 
Additionally, some of the intelligence reports classified some of the tribes and their 
leaders as “state-friendly” which indicates that not all tribe chiefs were deemed 
unfavourable in the eyes of the government. Yet, the way the events unfolded, 
especially in 1938, show that even the bridges built between these tribal leaders and 
the state were burned down and the tribes and chieftains with which the government 
previously worked with were also targeted. This fact further proves the intricate nature 
of these massacres.  
 From the intelligence reports sent from the region to Ankara, it is apparent that 
the issues of disarmament and the relocation of the chiefs and sayyids made the 
Dersimi tribes feel uneasy about the modernization programme. In 1936, the new 
Inspector-General of the region, Tahsin Uzer wrote that the tribal leaders got together 
to discuss the disarmament issue and voiced their concerns. Uzer stated that the tribes 
were afraid of the possibility “of sharing the same fate as the Armenians” after 
voluntarily delivering their weapons to the government, referring to the mass murders 
of the unarmed, civilian, Ottoman Armenians in 1915.646 During the deportation and 
the massacres of the Armenians many of them took refuge in the Dersimi mountains, 
therefore Dersimi residents were well aware of their fate. According to Uzer, among 
the tribal chieftains, the opinion that the disarmament of the region would eventually 
led to their demise was “strong and long-standing as if it is a creed”. Therefore Uzer 
stated that a voluntary demilitarization would be almost impossible and the tribes 
would instinctively protect themselves. Another intelligence report from February 
1936, supports Uzer’s assumptions. According to this report, several Dersim chiefs 
came together to discuss the increasing governmental interference in Dersim and the 
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Republican modernization project. In these meetings the chiefs once again voiced their 
concerns about voluntary disarmament by citing the Armenian example. Similar 
concerns were pronounced about the government’s plans to remove the tribal chiefs 
and sayyids from Dersim. The chiefs participating in the meetings stated that 
relocation of the chiefs could be a trick which would certainly end with their execution. 
Interestingly, some tribal leaders seemed to trust the government and believed that the 
government was planning to compassionately rehabilitate the region. It is noticeable 
that in time the optimism of both sides was replaced with a mutual distrust. Just as the 
tribal leaders suspected the motives of the government, the government also suspected 
a joint action of the Dersimi tribes who were previously at each other’s throats. This 
mutual distrust would later prove to be the first step of the tragedy of Dersim.647  
 The government reports show how the plan for Dersim campaign was shaped 
in time. A mixture of Bardakçı’s humanitarian outlook which suggested although it 
was possible to demilitarise Dersim with force it would be a bloody and painful option 
and the right path to follow for achieving perpetual peaceful social order in the region 
should be built on a strategy based on mutual trust and sympathy, and Öngören’s views 
on the necessity of eradicating the social significance of the tribal chiefs and sayyids 
provided the basis of the social aspect of the Dersim campaigns of 1937-1938. 
Intelligence reports on the possible coalition of the tribes, and the following military 
reports which stated that a perpetual military presence in Dersim was needed for the 
demilitarization of the tribes and the implementation of the social aspects of the 
campaign created the security aspect of the plan. These two facets of the planning 
found their final form in Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s report from 1935. İnönü 
envisaged a three-staged rehabilitation for Dersim. These stages were; planning, 
demilitarization and rebuilding.648 İnönü estimated the first two stages of the plan 
would be completed within three years. The planning stage included the construction 
of the roads and military barracks, and the establishment of a military force stationed 
in the region to perform the forced demilitarization of the tribes which would not 
voluntarily hand over their firearms to the government. İnönü estimated that the 
second stage, the demilitarization of Dersim would start in 1937 and would be 
completed “as quickly as possible”. Following the completion of this process, the 
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rebuilding phase would begin. Considering that the military campaign for 
demilitarization started in 1937, İnönü’s estimations were correct. 
 
The Military Campaign of 1937 and the Massacres of 1938 
The planning of the Dersim campaign was organized immaculately. Military reports 
that include detailed information on the roads, water supplies and the terrain of the 
region were prepared. The region was bound to Ankara with a railroad system. In 1934 
the Settlement Law (‘Iskan Kanunu’) was introduced. For some scholars, this law was 
specifically designed for the Dersim Campaign although this assumption is debatable 
mainly because military activities against Dersim were regularly planned years before 
the Settlement Law, but they were not put in motion for various reasons, the most 
important being the effects of the Great Depression of 1929.649 Nevertheless most of 
the articles can be related to certain aspects of the Dersim campaign. The most 
significant ones correspond to the termination of the tribal social order of Dersim and 
the expulsion of the tribal chiefs and sayyids from the region. Several articles of this 
law aimed for the dismantling the tribal social structure existing in Turkey. For 
instance Article 10a of the law stated that the legal personality of the tribes would not 
be recognized any more by the state and all of the privileges of tribal chieftains, 
sheikhs and sayyids would be revoked. Furthermore, according to Article 10b, the 
lands and real estates previously belonged to the legal personality of the tribes or the 
tribal leaders and sheikhs will be transferred to the state and will be distributed to the 
immigrants, refugees, nomads, relocated persons and landless farmers. This article 
was significantly aimed at changing the tribal social order of the region.650 Similarly, 
Article 10c targeted the authority of the sheiks, aghas and tribal chieftains and 
announced that these leaders will be relocated to other parts of the country with their 
families. This article provided a framework for the expulsion of certain tribal leaders 
from Dersim.  
                                                          
649 For a narrative which claims that the Settlement Law was specifically prepared for the Dersim 
campaign, see İsmail Beşikçi, Tunceli Kanunu ve Dersim Jenosidi (Istanbul: Belge, 1990). For the 
military campaign planned in 1931 but not put in motion due to budget restraints, see BCA: 30...10.0.0/ 
110.741...2. 
650 For the text of the Settlement Law, see Resmi Gazete, No. 2733 (June 21, 1934), Law No. 2510, p. 
113-125.   
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The Settlement Law did not solely target the removal of the tribal leaders from 
Dersim. Article 10ç stated that tribes whose members were “not culturally Turkish” 
such as the Dersimi tribes whose Alevi Dersimi identity, traditions, and language all 
conflicted with the new, modern, national, Turkish identity promoted by the 
Republican regime, would be relocated to regions where assimilation into this new 
identity would be quicker. Furthermore, to prevent the possible emergence of diaspora 
communities of the relocated tribes in their new regions, tribal members would be 
dispersed among their new settlements and were not allowed to re-establish their 
cultural connection with their kin. This article would provide the basis of the removal 
of thousands of Dersimis after 1938 and their forced relocation to the Western regions 
of Turkey. Therefore even if the Settlement Law of 1934 was not specifically designed 
for the Dersim Campaign, these articles contributed to the establishment of a legal 
framework to change the social order of Dersim. 
To control and hasten the project laid out by Prime Minister İnönü, on 
December 25, 1935, the Tunceli Law (‘Tunceli Kanunu’) was issued. With this law 
the name of the region was changed from its original Dersimi name which roughly 
translates as “The Silver Door” to Tunceli, Turkish for “The Bronze Hand” and a 
political system similar to a colonial rule was established in the region mirroring the 
infamous comment of the Chief of General Staff Fevzi Çakmak who stated in 1930 
that it was impossible to gain the “Dersimi people through flattery. They would only 
understand the language of violence. Dersim should be dealt with as a colony.”651 This 
internal colony would be led by a lieutenant-general who was appointed as the 
governor-general of Dersim and its surrounding region of Erzincan, Elazığ and Bingöl 
whose position and powers were similar to the authority that viceroys enjoyed in 
colonial empires. The Tunceli Law was bestowing the governor-general extraordinary 
powers including; the right to force people into exile, to replace public servants with 
acting military personnel, to appoint district governors and mayors, and to carry out 
death sentences without the National Assembly’s approval. This last article of the law 
was so severe and in conflict with basic principles of the rule of law that it even created 
a debate in the Grand Assembly which at that date was nothing more than a rubber 
stamp for governmental decisions. Hüsnü Kitapçı, the deputy of Muğla province 
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252 
 
remarked that bestowing a military general the power of issuing execution warrants 
was in clear contradiction with the Republican constitution and asked for the removal 
of this clause from the legislation but his proposal was not accepted by the majority of 
the parliament members.652 
The Tunceli Law created a separate legal order for the region. An 
Independence Court was established in Elazığ so as to be able to act swiftly when the 
time arrived. According to the new legislation suspects were not allowed to know what 
they were charged with until they were put on trial or to use translators in court.653 In 
Dersim, where the overwhelming majority of the residents were unilinguals who could 
only speak Dimili, this clause made just trials virtually impossible. This extraordinary 
nature of the new quasi-colonial system of the region was called as the “Special 
Reform Programme”654 by the government. Step by step, the Republic prepared for a 
total assault. To support the military campaign, starting from 1936, military barracks, 
outposts, roads and telephone lines were built in the region. Some local elements who 
realized that this time the government was well-prepared to build a lasting authority 
over the region targeted these new constructions starting from March 20, 1937. 
According to Aygün, one of these attacks targeted a bridge in Pah district and one 
soldier lost his life.655 These attacks which were described by Prime Minister İnönü as 
a revolt against the “development and reform programme of the government” 
triggered the last phase of the military plan.656 
In May 4, 1937, a cabinet meeting adopted a strategy which was described as 
a “fierce and penetrating attack” followed by “the disarmament and transfer of the 
insurgents”. The army would raid the villages, disarm the people who tend to 
participate in the anti-government activities and transfer them to the western regions. 
In this early cabinet decision the number of Dersimis who would be expelled was 
                                                          
652 For the parliamentary discussion regarding the Tunceli Law, see T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre V, 
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653 For the full text of the Tunceli Law, see Resmi Gazete, No. 3195 (June 25, 1931), Law No. 2884, 
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limited to 2,000 people. Among the government reports there is not a list of the 
Dersimis who would be deported but from the Republican discourse targeting tribal 
chieftains and sayyids and Prime Minister İnönü’s speeches following the start of the 
campaign, it is apparent that tribal chieftains and sayyids were targeted first by the 
government to be rounded up and deported.  
On June 14, 1937, İnönü explained the situation in Dersim to the Parliament 
and to the public. In his speech, İnönü once again targeted the tribal chieftains and 
blamed them for trying to prevent the modernization programme. He announced that 
the campaign was not just a military operation with limited ambitions but rather a 
reconstruction project that would eradicate the existing social order. İnönü stated that 
the construction of roads, bridges, schools and barracks would continue in the region. 
He also denounced news reports referring to heavy casualties and stated that in the last 
three months, 13 security personnel had been killed.657 İnönü was adamant in his 
speech, he promised to the parliament that the insurgency would not prevent the 
implementation of the reform programme and even if it were to take years, this 
programme would be implemented. After delivering the speech İnönü travelled to the 
region and arrived in Dersim on June 20 to personally inspect the progress of the 
campaign. 
According to local sources such as Nuri Dersimi, the resistance of the Dersimis 
was fierce but the numbers cited in the military documents prove İnönü right and show 
that the losses of the Republic were minimal. In addition to the 13 casualties referred 
to by İnönü, until the end of the year the Republican army lost only 17 security 
personnel. Dersimis on the other hand, lost 262 people while more than 900 Dersimis 
surrendered themselves to the government. As for the demilitarization of Dersim, one 
of the most important objectives of the Republican agenda, the government was quite 
successful. During the first year of the campaign, 4,263 firearms were confiscated in 
Dersim. Additionally, the surrounding region of Dersim, namely the towns of Elazığ, 
Bingöl, Sivas and Malatya were also demilitarized. In these towns, a total of 8,626 
firearms were confiscated. The government reports define these weapons as “arms 
gathered from the towns that are in relation with Dersim” but the nature of these 
relations was not cited in the reports. Regardless, the number of the confiscated arms 




showed a considerable discrepancy between the previous estimates proposed by the 
government and the actual number of arms in the region.658 
For the completion of the second objective, the removal of the tribal chieftains 
and sayyids, the government had to wait longer than they expected. The terrain in 
Dersim provided them opportunities to evade the military searches. Still, the armed 
forces tracked the tribal chieftains village by village to disarm them and expel them 
from Dersim along with their families. The military reports regarding this phase of the 
campaign supports the objectives of the reform programme. A report dating August 
14, 1938 specifically separated the tribal chieftains from the Dersimis who joined the 
resistance “unwillingly, only after being threatened to join the rebellion” by the 
perpetrators. According to the report the armed forces would continue to pursue the 
chiefs while the “poor residents who were forcefully dragged to disobedience against 
the government” would be pardoned when they would voluntarily hand over their arms 
to the government. The number of the participants is given as “around 1,000” while 
the remaining resistance leaders were estimated around 65 men, except ten leaders 
who were captured alive and an unspecified number of men who were captured dead. 
This report also cites the name of the tribes that did not participate in the resistance 
which constitute the majority of the tribes in Dersim, and the names of the wanted 
tribal chieftains, including, perhaps not surprisingly Sayyid Rıza.659 According to the 
report, in addition to the 65 wanted men, around three hundred armed men fled to the 
forests, and to the caves in the mountains, in fear of their lives. The report made clear 
that the punishment of these will not be as severe as their leaders because these “poor 
and ignorant” Dersimis were dragged to this situation by their chiefs. According to the 
report the government asked the cooperation of all Dersimis to capture the wanted 
men. Helping to locate a resistance member would be rewarded while if this help 
would come from a fellow resistance member, his crimes would be pardoned. While 
being generous to the Dersimis who were “forced to join” to the resistance, the state 
forces were relentless against the leaders of the resistance. The villages and houses 
they left behind when they went to hiding were bombed or burned to the ground to 
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prevent them from returning and to intimidate them.660 Eventually, the combination 
of the compassionate and relentless policies seemed to work in the favour of the 
government because the search for the wanted men ended in success. On September 
11, 1937, Sayyid Rıza with his two men surrendered to the state forces in the nearby 
town of Erzincan. With his capture the initial phase of hostilities seemed to come to a 
conclusion.661  
On October 12, 1937, Rıza and other chieftains, 64 defendants in total, were 
put on trial in the neighbouring town of Elazig, under article 149 of the Turkish Penal 
Code which charged them with “inciting and participating in a rebellion”. As the result 
of the extremely swift trials, nine defendants were acquitted of all crimes, thirty-eight 
were sentenced to various amounts of time in prison, and eleven men were sentenced 
to death.662 Later, the death sentences of four men were changed to prison sentences 
because they were over the age-limit. Sayyid Rıza, his son and five other chieftains 
were executed on the night of 14 November, 1937. Two days later President Mustafa 
Kemal visited the region and opened the new infrastructure and constructions. These 
two successive events showed that the Republican regime managed to reach their 
objectives. A large part of Dersim was demilitarized, at least some chieftains were 
eliminated and the modernization project was still in motion which was symbolized 
by the opening of new buildings and construction projects by Atatürk. Yet, it turned 
out that this was not the end of the campaign, but only a temporary break due to the 
harsh winter conditions in Dersim. 
The execution of the chiefs made the resistance linger until 1938. In January 
1938, an attack on a military outpost by the remaining Dersimi militia ended with the 
death of nine soldiers. Furthermore, a decision taken on June 1, 1937 “to prevent future 
incidents of banditry for good” would incite further resistance in the region.663 This 
decision was the establishment of two forbidden zones within Dersim, to control the 
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inaccessible parts of the region which were used by the wanted tribal members to 
escape from the searches of the armed forces. From July 1938 on, these regions would 
be depopulated entirely, regardless of the previous affiliation of the people who took 
refuge or resided in the forbidden zones. Another part of the plan showed that the 
nature of the military campaign of 1938 would be quite different from the campaign 
of the previous years. A further objective added to the “reform programme”; the 
people who would be driven out of the forbidden zone would not be relocated to other 
parts of Dersim, or would not return to the villages they had abandoned. They would 
be transferred to other parts of the country. In a report dated July 28, 1938, it was 
stated that the number of the people who would be sent away from Dersim was 7.000. 
This was a joint decision of the Inspector-General of the region, the Chief of General 
Staff and the new Prime Minister Celal Bayar. In addition to the creation of the 
forbidden zones, and the proposed forced relocation of thousands of Dersimis, the 
search for arms and armed men continued and the field of operations was enlarged to 
encompass all of Dersim.664 It was this phase of the campaign that would turn into 
mass murder. 
It is still debatable what Bayar’s government tried to achieve by changing the 
objectives of the first campaign and targeting the entire region instead of focusing on 
finding the individuals who joined the resistance movement. It is evident from the 
archival documents that in 1938 new tribes joined the resistance such as the tribes of 
Kalan, Haydaran, Demanan, Sam Uşağı and Koç Uşağı which have been neutral or 
government-friendly during the campaign of 1937.665 It is presumed that the mutual 
distrust felt by the both sides led to the acceleration of the clashes. More and more 
tribes felt insecure due to further utilization of planes and bombing of the places 
associated by the government with the resistance, and the enlargement of the area of 
military operation, while the government started to perceive every Dersimi, in fact the 
very concept of Dersim with its traditions, social order, residents and geography, as 
an enemy. The military operation continued until September 1938. The forced 
relocation of the Dersimis, including tribal chieftains, sayyids, their families and 
residents of the areas associated with the resistance, followed the military operations.  
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The military campaign of 1938 had disastrous consequences. Unlike the 1937 
campaign which had solely targeted the tribal leaders and sayyids who were perceived 
as the leaders of the resistance, the campaign of 1938 targeted the entire Dersimi 
population, and even the tribes who previously had made coalitions with the 
government suffered during this phase. Perhaps not surprisingly, mass killings of 
civilians were not reported in the official documents and the murdered Dersimis were 
defined as “bandits and their partners”. Here, the word “partners” can be deciphered 
as civilians who were related to the mentioned “bandits” either through family or tribal 
connections. Considering that the official death toll of 1938 was 13,160 Dersimis in 
comparison to 122 security personnel, while the government could only gather 844 
firearms in that year, it shows that the majority, in fact almost the entirety, of the 
casualties were civilians.666 To better comprehend the scale of the killings, looking at 
the military report of a random day in Dersim is enough. For instance, the report dated 
August 19, 1938 stated that within a day, in the district of Sin alone 290 “bandits and 
their partners”, in Mazgirt 52 bandits “who tried to escape from the convoy of convicts 
after their capture”, in the village on Lolantanir 170 “bandits and their partners” who 
tried to escape from the search party, in 13 villages searched by the 15th  Division of 
the army 152 “bandits and their partners” who resisted to the soldiers, and lastly, in 
three villages searched and burned to the ground by the 14th Division “69 people” were 
killed.667 In total, 733 Dersimis were killed within a day while on the other side, just 
two soldiers were slightly injured. The death tolls, the description of the events, and 
the inadequate number of weapons seized strongly suggest that these events were part 
of wide-scale massacres.   
The methods of the massacres are hard to prove but stories about gathering 
people together and opening fire on them, burning them alive, killing the civilians who 
found refuge in the caves using chemical gas or poisonous carbon dioxide emanating 
from the fires which were lit in front of the caves, are common in the personal 
accounts. The issue of chemical gas is not well documented. Other methods such as 
burning people alive are so extreme that they are quite difficult to believe. Coming 
across countable oral history data is a hard task especially in this case in which eye-
witnesses are very old and - naturally for Dersim - their stories tend to be interwoven 
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with various myths but in the last decade there has been an increase of non-biased oral 
history accounts. Nevertheless, the data gathered from these accounts and from the 
available official documents is insufficient to determine whether the mass killings 
were ordered by the government or the military in a hierarchical fashion or they were 
improvised by the local army forces to hasten the process of expulsion of Dersimis 
from the forbidden zones. 
One recurring theme visible in the personal accounts stands out as a valuable 
information to understand the psychology of the soldiers who participated in the 
massacres. This theme is the deep-seated hatred that the Sunnis felt for the Alevi 
Dersimis. Various eyewitness accounts gathered by Dersimis, such as the “Dersim 
1937-38 Oral History Project”, state that some soldiers were lectured by their officers 
on the religious persuasion of the Dersimis before the campaign. A soldier who 
participated the campaign told to the Project that he saw “Dersimis calling out for Ali 
to help them” which only motivated the soldiers to treat them more viciously while 
verbally abusing them as “dirty Kizilbash”.668 Another eye-witness who managed to 
escape the massacres while heavily injured stated that the soldiers who stabbed him 
over and over chanted “Allah, Allah!” which is traditionally used as battle cry of the 
Turkish Army while fighting against non-Muslims.669 It is reasonable to speculate that 
the officials exploited the anti-Alevism of the military personnel as an instrument to 
achieve the goal of depopulation of Dersim more quickly. The fact that no other anti-
Alevi pogroms or massacres occurred during the early Republican era supports this 
assumption.  
One of the factors that made the Dersim campaign so bloody was the 
“effective” utilization of modern weaponry. Although it was not the first time that 
bomber planes were used by Turkish armed forces, planes were more visible in this 
campaign than ever. The campaign was also used by the government to show the world 
how modernized the Turkish army was and how capable it would be in a future war, 
which was seen as imminent by all at that time. Considering that the period between 
1935 and 1938 was an especially turbulent years in the world in which Italy attacked 
Abyssinia, Spain was in turmoil due to a bloody a civil war, and Germany violated 
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several provisions of the Treaty of Versailles by introducing military conscription, 
rebuilding the armed forces, occupying the Rhineland, and annexing Austria with the 
Anschluss, one can only speculate if the Republican government used this 
“opportunity” to test its army’s capabilities, similarly to the Nazi Germany which 
tested the capability of the Luftwaffe during the Spanish Civil War, by bombing 
civilian targets in Spain, such as Guernica. Additionally, the Republic was pursuing a 
diplomatic war against France and Syria over the Sanjak issue. In 1936, France had 
recognised the independence of Syria including the disputed Sanjak region. Turkey 
intervened and the issue was taken to the League of Nations which bestowed on Sanjak 
the status of a distinct entity from Syria which would be dependent for its foreign 
relations to Syria, and would be independent domestically which created tension 
between Arab and Turkish nationalists in Sanjak, and between Syrian and Turkish 
governments. The summer of 1938, the period of the massacres of Dersim, coincided 
with the most hostile period of the Sanjak issue. On May 28, 1938, Atatürk travelled 
to the general headquarters of the Southern Army to make an appearance and inspected 
the army forces in Mersin and Adana, along the Syrian border. After this appearance 
30,000 soldiers were allocated to the border region. In July 1938, the Turkish 
dominated government of Sanjak declared their independence and adopted a flag 
similar to the Turkish flag and the same laws as the Turkish Republic. The relentless 
approach of the government in Dersim, can also be read as a show of strength, 
determination and capability of the Turkish Army in the height of such an international 
crisis. 
 
The Republican Modernization of Dersim: The Republicans’ Burden 
During the military campaigns of 1937-1938, the Dersimi people were represented by 
the ruling elite and the media as habitual law-breakers. In the inaugural speech of the 
legislative year, Prime Minister Celal Bayar, who was reading Atatürk’s message670 
defined the situation in Dersim not as a military campaign or a revolt but as “an act of 
mass banditry”.671 “Bandit” was the most widely used tag for the Dersimi (“Tunceli 
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bandits are getting exterminated”672) followed by “marauders” (“The marauders are 
accounting before the courts”673) and “plunderers” (“The remnants of the plunderers 
are surrendering” 674 ), while Sayyid Rıza was called as the “Bandit Chief”. 675 
Throughout the campaign party representatives approached this issue as a crusade for 
order and modernisation. Atatürk stated concerning the campaign that “there should 
be no obstacles left between our nation and the high civilization and welfare that it 
truly deserves” and thus implied that Dersim was an obstacle for reaching the ultimate 
goal of civilization.676 Similarly, İnönü described the campaign on Dersim as an action 
“which will make the region civilized.”677 The regime-friendly media followed suit. 
Yunus Nadi, a member of the parliament and the owner of the influential and pro-
government newspaper Cumhuriyet depicted the campaign as “not a military 
campaign but a march of civilization” and defined the people of Dersim as the 
“mountain Bedouins”. 678  Similarly Kurun newspaper described the campaign in 
Dersim a fundamental part of the Turkish revolution and stated that Turkey was 
establishing “culture and civilization” in the region.679 According to Son Posta this 
was a fight between the two spirits at the end of which the spirit of civilization and 
progress will predominate”.680 
These examples show that the Republican modernism acted as if the local 
culture of Dersim was non-existent. For them, Dersim was not just materialistically 
underdeveloped but also deprived of its own culture, history and civilization. Similar 
to the colonialist approach, from the Republican perspective Dersim was seen as a 
place still in its natural form, devoid of any culture and civilization. These features 
could only be inserted to the region externally, by the forces of the Republic. By 
inspecting the official discourse of the government and its organic extension in the 
media, one can observe that an evident auto-orientalism and a crude colonialist 
approach were the main instruments of the regime during the period of military 
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campaigns of 1937-1938. The ruling party and the media both declared that the 
resistance in Dersim which in reality emanated mainly from a strong sense of panic 
due to the government’s agenda of eradicating the ancient social order and cultural 
institutions, was shown to be nothing but a rebellion by the “archaic forces of the past” 
against the “modern forces” represented by the Republic. As the reports from August 
1938 show, the Republican forces claimed that they acted on behalf of the “poor, 
uneducated, ignorant people” of Dersim who were unable to know right from 
wrong.681  
From the official point of view, the single-party insisted that to develop 
modernity from this archaic system, a fresh start was needed and this objective could 
only be achieved through drastic measures. Therefore, most of Dersim was levelled to 
the ground, as an act of “creative destruction” in order to build it again from scratch 
and to bring civilization to the region through pacifying the perceived “barbarians”. 
Numerous examples supporting the legitimacy of this claim are visible both in the 
media and the deeds of the government. The physical appearance, clothing, belief 
system and life-style of the Dersimi people were reviewed daily in newspapers during 
the military campaign, mostly in a condescending tone. Their “savage, primitive living 
conditions in their caves” 682  are a crucial part of the Republican imagination of 
Dersim. According to Tan newspaper, the modern machinery used by the Republican 
Army dumbfounded the residents of Dersim. The newspaper stated there were 
voluminous reports on how “the ignorant and primitive people of Dersim” were 
shouting “the Birds of Kemal (Atatürk) are coming!” and fleeing upon seeing the 
approaching Turkish bombers.683 Following details in the article on how Kamer Agha, 
one of the most respected chieftains of Dersim, had not even seen a motorized vehicle 
in his life before his arrival to Elazığ after his capture further serves the depiction of 
the Dersimi people in miserable condition, in a ridiculous naivety, opposed to the 
technological prowess of the Republic.  
Despite the resistance of the locals, the Republican regime was depicted as 
merciful and forgiving to these people “who were at each other’s throats before” the 
military campaign.684 According to Ulus, the young Republic was trying to “insert all 
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of the elements of a civilized life-style to the region through the instrumentality of 
culture and technique from the start of the year 1936”.685 Another newspaper article 
stated “although this type of under-developed regions exists even in the most 
developed countries, this was unacceptable for the Republic”.686 According to the 
politicians and newspapers, victory was inevitable, the regime would “eradicate all 
historical evil” and “through the military order this region of savages will at the end 
become the Switzerland of Turkey”.687 Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya’s circular dated 
August 26, 1937 similarly stated that the programme of the government was “to make 
Republican laws master of the region through the construction of roads, bridges, 
schools, outposts and barracks, to capture the bandits and to make these poor, ignorant 
and uncouth men benefit from the climate of order, welfare and civilization provided 
by the Republic”.688 
As if to open up a clean slate, a tabula rasa, immediately after the destruction 
a massive rebuilding campaign was started. Both Atatürk and İnönü opened new 
structures such as bridges when they visited the region to further accentuate that this 
campaign was a creative campaign which was aiming to erase the past. Falih Rıfkı 
Atay, wrote in Ülkü that the campaign was aiming “not to confiscate some bandits but 
to remove all of the foundations of banditry through building schools and roads for the 
Dersimi people”. For him this was not a colonializing attempt but on the contrary it 
was a liberating one, “a fight for freedom”.689 Ulus reported that in the summer of 
1937, “new roads, and bridges were built, swamps were drained to reduce the threat 
of diseases”690 in Dersim, as a part of the modernization project which the newspaper 
titled as the “Major Rebuilding Programme”. In these newspaper reports the 
construction of roads and bridges were especially celebrated because they would 
connect a previously unreachable land to modern Turkey thus acting as symbolic 
passages to civilization. Another example of the fascination with the rebuilding project 
is evident in the same Ulus article which claims that for the first the time in the history 
of Dersim, “radio, telephone, saw and hammer noises are heard in the region instead 
of firearm noises”. The article ends with an obvious colonialist comment: “Now, 
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Dersim is ours as much as Ankara”.691 Indeed, we can see examples of perceiving 
Dersim as a new colony, a newly-acquired land that raised a spirit of colonial 
excitement in Turkey. An article which ‘with colonial joy’ announced that the 
“Scientists found precious mines in the region!” neatly represents this mind-set.692 
Interestingly, this colonial attitude is recognised and supported by some sections of 
the international community as well. An article written in a British periodical ‘Truth’ 
which was close to the Conservative Party, warmly saluted the deeds of the Turkish 
regime in Dersim with fraternity and claimed that the “British nation which is very 
experienced when it comes to deal with uncivilized tribes around the world perfectly 
understands the situation of the modern Turkish government”.693  
These examples and many more show that the Republic and the state-
controlled media acted as if the Dersimi identity, with all of its different components; 
the semi-autonomous political existence, Kurdish/Zaza or Dersimi ethnicity, Dimili 
language, Alevi religion, and tribal social order, did not matter or even more 
maliciously did not exist at all. They became objects in the eyes of the Republic which 
could be easily destroyed for their difference and diversity. Another example of the 
objectification of the Dersimis is evident regarding the fate of the expelled. Dersimis 
who were forced to relocate to other regions of Turkey were dehumanized and reduced 
to the situation of being mere commodities. They were dealt as “things” without 
personal integrity. According to a report from July 1938, the number of the Dersimis 
who would be relocated was determined initially as 2,000, and later this number was 
raised to 7,000. As a circular of the Prime Minister Celal Bayar from July 1938 shows 
us, the government planned to relocate 1,500 of these Dersimis specifically to the 
industrialized Western region of Turkey as a remedy to the acute labourer shortage of 
the Western region. Large factories and production facilities, such as the paper factory 
in İzmit, or the Iron-Steel Works of Karabük, and the coal mines of Zonguldak were 
identified as some of the institutions which could benefit from the Dersimi work-
force. 694  Later this plan was sent to the ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, 
Economy, and Health, as well as to the General Staff to hear their opinion on this 
matter. The response of the Ministry of the Interior to this demand is especially 
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striking. The ministry claimed that Dersimi people were not suitable to work 
efficiently in modern conditions and would definitely constitute a source of “constant 
sorrow, expense, and concern”. The report continued that at most, a limited number of 
them should be employed in these environments to “test their talents”. Despite this 
opposition, the government decided to deport 7,000 Dersimis and locate 3,100 of them 
in the industrialized Western regions to solve the labour shortage problem.  
It is quite difficult to determine whether or not this plan, which eerily sounds 
like the practices of the colonial empires, was ever put in motion. It is evident from 
the documents that a large number of Dersimis were deported from the forbidden zone 
but the question of whether they were employed in these industrial enterprises is left 
open to interpretation. On the other hand, giving a healthy estimation of the total 
number of deportees is quite possible due to a presidential decree signed by İsmet 
İnönü on June 3, 1939 which shows that the government underestimated the number 
of the deported Dersimis in 1938. In fact, the number of the deportees was raised to at 
least 14,000 at the time of the mentioned decree.695 The numbers of a recent enquiry 
corresponds with this number. On February 17, 2012, as a sub-division of the Petition 
Committee of the Grand Assembly, a sub-committee named “Relief for the Sufferings 
Caused by the Dersim Incidents of 1937-1938 and its Aftermath” was established. The 
sub-committee asked the Republican Archives of the Prime Ministry to share the 
documents regarding the fate of the Dersimi refugees. These documents were not open 
to investigation before the request of the sub-committee. On April 29, 2012, the sub-
committee announced that in total 14,111 Dersimis were deported from the region to 
32 different cities, which tallies with the numbers given in İnönü’s decree. From the 
western cities mentioned in the plan of employing the Dersimi workers in the industrial 
enterprises, only Isparta and Muğla received a large number of Dersimis.696 
These acts of the government show that by destroying the Dersimi identity in 
a humiliating way and treating Dersim as an internal colony, several aspects of their 
political agenda was fulfilled. This was an attempt to melt another identity, similar to 
the other religious, ethnic, gender-based, or ideological identities, within the modern 
Turkish identity. Furthermore, the regime felt the supremacy derived from “play-
acting” as a colonial power for a while. For once, Turkey could act as a modern power 
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with its own “white man’s burden”. According to Chakrabaty, for the orientalist 
Western observers the Indian history existed only in transition between despotic and 
constitutional, medieval and modern, feudal and capitalist. Within this narrative, the 
Indian was always a figure of lack, inadequate and bound to failure.697 Dersim and 
Dersimis were perceived similarly by the Republicans. Dersim was a colony, a place 
which existed in transition on which the Republic can show off its progress and impose 
its modernity on its residents.  
An effective example supporting the presence of this Republican approach was 
a public exhibition held in the Ankara Police Institute Museum after the arrest of 
Sayyid Rıza who was described by the newspapers as a “trickster” who had deceived 
and exploited the Dersimi people. While Sayyid Rıza was still in Elazığ, waiting for 
the conclusion of his trial, his personal belongings, including some items he used in 
religious, spiritual rituals, including “supposedly holy trinkets, enchantments, 
Christian crosses and blankets with magical powers, a crown with supernatural 
abilities and a cut finger that allegedly belong to Jesus Christ”698 were displayed in 
this exhibition. This display strongly resembles the numerous colonial exhibitions held 
in Western Europe in the last half of the 19th century during the peak of the colonial 
empires. Whether this exhibit was held to ridicule the eclectic belief system of the 
Dersimi tribes or to satisfy the curiosity felt by people of Ankara towards the exotic 
new-found-lands of the east, it perfectly demonstrates the auto-orientalist and 
colonialist attitude of the regime. For the modern Republic, Dersim was dealt with as 
a mysterious place whose non-modernity should be frowned upon.  
Their entire social order and cultural inheritance which managed to survive for 
centuries were first shown as a source of problems, then was ridiculed and eventually 
destroyed by the Republic “for the sake of Dersimis”. A year after the military 
campaign of 1938, the Minister of the Interior Faik Öztrak spoke in the Parliament to 
renew the Tunceli Law until 1942, and proudly presented the facts that supported the 
Republican discourse of modernization. The regime managed to build nine military 
barracks, five government offices, six military outposts, eight schools, and twelve 
bridges, in addition to roads and housing for the public servants and officers stationed 
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in the region.699 While giving this information Öztrak failed to mention the 13,806 
dead Dersimis, and more than 14,000 deported people who were forced to live far 
away from their homeland. Furthermore, Öztrak spoke too soon to proclaim victory 
for the Republic. With the emergence of the Second World War and the economic 
problems ensuing from it, the development of the region stopped. If we observe what 
happened to Dersim after this brief period of modernist passion, we can clearly see 
that the authoritarian government was miles away from accomplishing its ultimate 
goal of creating a modern society in Dersim from scratch. The archival documents 
which follow the events of 1938 show that Dersim was reduced to a public order 
problem. Documents reveal that Dersimi people continued to harass the neighbouring 
villages and steal their livestock. This time local gendarmerie forces dealt with these 
incursions. Dozens of these incidents were reported which proves two certainties. 
First, life always goes on despite all the chaos, and secondly the target which was set 
by the republic on creating a new Dersim did not come true at all. The cold reality 
greatly differed from that colonialist passion aimed at creating a Switzerland out of 
Dersim. 
 
An Assessment of the Turkish Modernization 
This chapter examined the single-party years of the Turkish Republic through the lens 
of modernization. Here I have used the Republican reform project as a heuristic device 
to learn more in-depth about the authoritarian tendencies of the regime. I specifically 
examined how the Republican modernization project aimed at total Westernization 
instead of adopting only Western technology and tried to generate social change in 
Turkey through reducing the importance and visibility of Islam and the traditions, 
institutions, and regulations emanating from the Islamicate culture of Turkey. Among 
the various reforms implemented in the fields of law, culture, education and women’s 
rights, leaving the Islamicate world and joining Western civilization was perceived as 
the main objective. The reform process was not without its successes, the 
secularisation of the legal order, the expansion of the rights of women, the increase in 
the availability of formal education, and the increased rate of literacy could all be 
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regarded as improvements. Yet, its implementation was authoritarian and geared 
toward the uniformization of the multiple identities of post-Ottoman Turkey.   
Republican ideology was centred around the concept of modernization as well 
as on the intolerance shown towards other identities other than the national, modern, 
secular Turkish identity that had been carefully structured by the Republican elite 
starting with the establishment of single-party rule in 1925. The modernization 
programme was one of the key instruments of this process. Following the examples of 
reformist attitude of Tanzimat, Hamidian and Second Constitutional eras, but 
simultaneously drastically differentiating from them by targeting to reduce the 
visibility and significance of religion, religious institutions, and the traditions 
emanating from these, the Republican reform programme aimed to create lasting 
change in the new Turkish society. To achieve this it established an authoritarian, 
semi-fascist single-party rule in the political sphere and in the ideological sphere, the 
regime encircled the society through the instrumentality of a political religion based 
on the personality cults of the party leaders and the sacralisation of the secular entities 
such as the state, nationhood, and the ruling party. Republican modernization 
completed these elements explained in detail in the previous chapters, in the cultural, 
educational and social spheres. 
 As stated above, in Republican modernization, the reforms were implemented 
as state projects while the contribution of the masses were kept to a minimum. Even 
in the women’s rights issue, where an independent, organic feminist movement 
existed, the state proposed and implemented its own programme without allowing this 
movement to continue to exist and thrive. The attitude of the modernization project 
towards cultural, political, and social reflections of the Islamic past of Turkey, and the 
sources of differences in the society was hostile. The project targeted a civilizational 
shift, a transition from the Eastern, Islamicate or Oriental culture, to Western and 
modern civilization. This approach only accepted absolutes, there was no grey zone 
between these two polar opposites. The acceptance of the Western civilization could 
only be achieved with the rejection of the Eastern one. Therefore for the creation of 
the new, national, modern, secular identity dreamed of by the Republican elite, 
traditions such as the Arabo-Persian alphabet, institutions such as Sufi religious 
orders, religious, linguistic, class-based, gender-related and ethnic identities, had to be 
rejected as well. 
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 Dersim was a crystallization of this total rejection, therefore studying it is a 
valuable tool to better comprehend the nature of Turkish authoritarianism. Dersim was 
seen by the Republican elite as a backward entity which was established from various 
backward components such as Dersimi culture, Kurdish (or Zaza or Dersimi) 
ethnicity, Dimili language, and Dersimi Alevi religion. Additionally, the social order 
of Dersim was problematic for the Republican perception of modernity. The residents 
of Dersim felt a connection to their kin, their tribes, their tribal leaders and religious 
figures such as Sayyids. Furthermore, there was poverty in the region which created a 
security problem for its surrounding regions. For the Republican regime, Dersim 
became the embodiment of every social, cultural and political illness that should be 
purged from the country. From that point on, the Republic presented Dersimi people 
only two options. They would either renounce their own identity and embrace the new, 
modern, secular, Turkish identity or be eliminated. According to the official 
documents 13,806 Dersim residents were killed in the operations. In addition, more 
than 14,000 of them were deported from Dersim. Considering the estimated 
population of Dersim was around 65,000 before the campaigns, in 1939 the number 
of Dersimi residents was almost reduced to half. Although it was presented as a bloody 
revolt by the Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, only a small minority within Dersim 
resisted. The majority of the tribes did not participate in the resistance. Yet, almost the 
entire population of Dersim suffered from the military campaigns. This was the most 















There is a monster in the world. A monster 
called the state which is in the process of 
devouring the society. 
- Carlo Roselli, 1934  
 
 
In 1934, upon inspecting the destruction unleashed on the European continent by 
authoritarian regimes, Italian dissident Carlo Roselli noted that, there was monster in 
the world, “a monster called the state, which is in the process of devouring the 
society”. 700  This remark perfectly encapsulates the very soul of the Republican 
policies and ideology which I tried to explain in this study by examining it through 
three different, yet interrelated lenses. The Republican regime’s main ideological trait 
was a strong drive for modernization. Members of the Republican elite, including 
Atatürk himself, came to the conclusion upon inspecting the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire that Turkey should be a modern, nation state which was firmly integrated to 
the Western civilization. To perform this civilization leap, Turkey should severe all of 
its ties with its past, the Islamicate culture which was associated by the regime with 
backwardness. To achieve this feat, the regime promoted the establishment of an ‘ideal 
community’; a monolithic, national bloc of people without any political, social and 
cultural division between them. As depicted in the previous chapters, the Republican 
regime used a combination of assimilationist and exclusionary policies to destroy 
every sense of belonging, every identity either secular such as class-based, gender-
based, linguistic and ethnic, or religious, and melt them into a national singularity. As 
Roselli stated, the Republican regime devoured the post-Ottoman society of Anatolia 
and created a modern, Turkish one out of it. 
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 This study argues that the Republican regime was extremely aggressive and 
uncompromising about the decision of modernizing at all costs; because the members 
of the ruling elite witnessed to scenes of immense suffering during the last days of the 
Ottoman Empire. Some of them lost their homelands, and families in the wars, most 
of them were forced to live their lives away from their birthplaces.701 Additionally, 
they all witnessed to the near destruction of the sovereignty of the Ottoman subjects 
during the First World War, as well. Furthermore, as the parliamentary speech of 
deputy Atalay which mentioned the sufferings of the Muslims of Sudan, Morocco and 
Central Asia suggests, they were also following the colonial subjugation of their 
fellow Muslims. In addition to these elements, the zeitgeist of the inter-war era made 
the adherents of many ideologies to believe that their communities were living through 
a special time period, which would determine the ultimate fate of their people. A 
combination of these traumatic experiences and the belief in the transitionary nature 
of their times, shaped the Republican mind-set. As Mustafa Kemal’s quote on the 
futility of “resistance to the storming impulse of the civilization” clearly depicts, the 
Republican regime perceived the ‘civilizational leap’ from the Ottoman past, to a 
Western future as a matter of life-and-death. This perception further radicalized the 
Republican policies. In accordance to the zeitgeist, they decided to take drastic 
measures to create an easily controllable, ideal, national community, and carry this 
society from its Islamicate past to a Western feature. This study was an evaluation of 
these policies. 
The first chapter of the thesis, summarized both the history and historiography 
of the single-party years and showed that there was no democratic intent in the single-
party rule, and that it was not a transitionary period between a monarchy and multi-
party democracy. All reforms performed by the Republican regime which weakened 
authoritarianism and were presented to the public opinion as genuine attempts to adopt 
democracy came to life after 1945, after the utter defeat of authoritarianism in Europe 
during the Second World War, chiefly to establish friendly relations with the Allied 
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powers. Single-party regime of Turkey was a definite authoritarian regime with an 
extremely limited pluralism and it actions were legitimized by the perceived 
importance of its mission of modernization. Its complete rejection of the Islamicate 
past separated it from the previous Young Turk regimes while reading it as a 
traditional conservative authoritarianism like the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese 
examples or assuming that it had an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial character are 
historically inaccurate. The republican regime aimed to destroy the traditional sources 
of authority such as the sultanate or the Sufi religious orders unlike other 
Mediterranean dictatorships that embraces the royal and religious sources of authority. 
As for its anti-imperialist colouring, that element remained as a part of the regime for 
a short while, starting from mid 1920s the regime joined to the international liberal 
camp and as the colonial nature of the Dersim massacres and the glorification of the 
Western civilization show, it never imagined itself anywhere expect the Western world. 
Therefore the Republican regime was a definite authoritarian regime which shared 
many similarities with the numerous fascist and totalitarian regimes of the inter-war 
era. 
The second chapter focusing on fascism displayed the fascist tendencies of the 
regime. In this study, fascism is defined as an authoritarian, revolutionary, and ultra-
nationalist movement or regime, whose policies are based on the elimination of the 
internal and external enemies of the nation to revive it, and reclaim its past glories. 
This chapter pointed out that the Turkish authoritarianism targeted a total 
transformation of the society to create an ideal national community. It was 
revolutionary, and ultra-nationalist. Although it pursued a peaceful foreign policy and 
did not employ an expansionist, militarist language like major Fascist regimes of 
Europe, the regime still depicted elements of fascism, especially regarding the 
exclusionary policies they implemented on the non-Muslim minorities. Fascist 
tendencies of the regime emerged out of the type of the community they envisaged. 
Their ideal community was a cohesive, monolithic bloc undivided by class-struggle, 
religious and denominational differences, different lifestyle choices, diverse linguistic 
and ethnic identities, and ideological currents. There was not much room for plurality 
of any kind in the society conceived by the Republican elite. Therefore every single 
form of dissidence and plurality had to be purged from the society. As shown in the 
first chapter starting from 1925, the entire political sphere was cleansed from 
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opposition. Similarly with the closure of social organizations such as Turkish Hearths 
and Sufi religious orders, the social sphere was cleansed. With the reforms on 
education, language, and with the policies of assimilation, the cultural sphere was 
purged from plurality and all cultural, ethnic and linguistic identities were tried to be 
melted in a monolithic Turkish identity. Therefore although the regime did not use the 
same aggressive, militant language with some of its European counterparts, and did 
not plan of resurrecting a lost empire through territorial expansion, it still carried 
fascist undertones. 
For the total civilizational transformation planned by the regime, the 
Republican elite needed total control over society. As the third chapter displayed, to 
fill the vacuum emerged in the political, social and even the religious spheres, and to 
maintain complete ideological control over the society, a political religion based on 
the sanctity of the ruling party, its ideology and its leaders was carefully established 
during the single-party era. Republican political religion aimed to replace the place of 
all other secular ideologies in Turkey and it perceived the religion as a formidable 
opponent in the race of controlling the society. Therefore Republican regime was not 
a tolerant civil religion, on the contrary, it was a textbook political religion. In fact, 
since elements of this religion are still visible in the Turkish society, one might argue 
that the Republican political religion was one of the most complete, and successful 
processes of sacralisation of the politics.  
 As the last chapter displayed, the destruction of Dersim was a culmination of 
these radical policies. Instead of leaving it as a mere footnote in the history of the 
single-party era, or categorizing it as “another Kurdish revolt”, this study tried to 
interpret the massacres in Dersim as a central event in the Republican history. Dersim 
is central because it is the crystallization of the Republican total rejection of the social, 
cultural, and political diversity in Turkey. The massacres in Dersim depicted the most 
extreme, most brutal face of the Turkish authoritarianism. Due to their tribal 
connections, perceived backwardness, the language they used, their ethnic background, 
religious affiliation and diverse culture, the people of Dersim represented the 
embodiment of every type of social ill that the regime fought against. Therefore the 
regime decided to eliminate them as they eliminated the political opposition, social 
organizations, and cultural diversity in the country. According to the official numbers, 
almost half of the population of the region was either killed or relocated in other parts 
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of the country. This almost annihilation of the Dersimi identity in 1938 showed how 
determinate and unyielding the Republican government was in their project of 
transformation of the society according to their ideology. Although the Republican 
regime had many impressive achievements, such as the peaceful foreign policy, 
industrialization, secularization, developments regarding the women’ rights, increase 
in the availability of education, and many more, this destructive side should not be 
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